Criminal Law & Philosophy Abstract The aim of the paper is to investigate how retributivists should respond to the apparent tension between moral desert and proportionality in punishment. I argue th

The #MeToo movement has recently been praised by the United Nations experts in women’s human rights. Yet if sexist violence against women has been under the spotlight and denounced in every context ov

This paper uses demographic projections of age structure and correlations with GDP and GDP growth to study the forecasting properties of demographically based models. Extending the forecasts to 2050 s

This paper attempts to explain temporal and spatial variation of poverty rates in terms of unemployment insurance and socio-demographic factors, and test the ‘convergence hypothesis’ of the poverty ra

Martin Kolk: Low-fertility countries are responsible for almost all of the CO2 emissions

Do we need to reduce population growth to address the climate challenge? From the perspective that each person contributes to green house gas emissions and resource consumption, it is a logical though

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx035 Abstract According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of th

Mind, Volume 125, Issue 499, Pp. 691-725. Abstract The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes or expects the proposit

Thomas Christiano, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona ABSTRACTI argue we can make a great deal of progress in understanding the promise and the perils of voluntary exchange by elabora

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Synthese, Volume 193, Issue 6,  pp. 1967–1981DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0823-0 Abstract This paper explores the different ways in which conditionals can be carriers of good and bad news. I suggest a general