Gustaf Arrhenius will speak at a workshop on population ethics at Ritsumeikan University. Host is the Research Center for Ars Vivendi. We invite Prof. Gustaf Arrhenius of Stockholm University, who is a

Pp. 261-284, Chapter 10 in Morel, Nathalie, Palier, Bruno & Joakim Palme (eds), Towards a social investment welfare state?. Policy Press, Bristol.

in Ole Frithjof Norheim (ed.) Measurement and Ethical Evaluation of Health Inequalities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199931392.003.0007 We usually examine our considered

Oxford University Press, 648 p.  The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethicspresents up-to-date theoretical analyses of various problems associated with the moral standing of future people and animals in c

The Monist, Volume 102, Issue 1, pages: 42-65. doi.org/10.1093/monist/ony021 Abstract It is often claimed that reducing population size would be advantageous for climate change mitigation, on the ground

Chapter 23 Intergenerational redistribution in Sweden’s public and privat sectors By the book here: http://www.e-elgar.com/Print_product_detail.lasso?id=13816 Population Aging and the Generational Econom

Ars Vivendi Journal, Special Issue: On Population Ethics, No.8/9, pp.3-6. One of the most important insights to emerge over the past hundred years is that the actions of the current generation could ha

Workshop on well-being and population ethics. Part of the project ‘Valuing future lives’ (‘Att värdera framtida liv’), funded by the Swedish Research Council (‘Vetenskapsrådet’). Venue: The Institute f

Burke, R., Cooper, C. & Field, J. (eds.) SAGE Handbook of Aging, Work and Society, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.  (2013) doi: 10.4135/9781446269916

Frontiers in Psychology AbstractPeople often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It isunfairif homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals matraditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.