By analysing pension reforms in three Nordic countries – Denmark, Finland and Sweden that apply different institutional solutions in their old-age security programmes – the paper argues that the polit

Bo Rothstein: Why No Economic Democracy in Sweden: A Counterfactual Approach

Companies, that are owned and/or governed by their employees are on average performing better and have higher productivity than firms that are governed by outside capitalists/owners/investors and they

Felicia Fahlin

I work as a research assistant in the collaborative, art-based projectGhost Platform: Generating the "Complex Image" of Data, Labour, and Logistics,a projectwhich aims to illuminate the hidden human r

Point of you

Developing a new format for research communication, where performative elements and the participants' own experiences serve as the starting point for discussion.

Bo Rothsteinhold the August Röhss Chair in Political Science at University of Gothenburg, a position established by a donation to the university in 1901. He has also held positions at Oxford Universit

Mark Jaccard, Professor in the School of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University, VancouverAbstractThere are obvious reasons why for three decades most jurisdictions have failPublic surveys and observation of real-world GHG reduction successes suggest that explicit carbon pricing (carbon tax and perhaps cap-and-trade) can be substantially more politically difficult than certain regulatory policies for shifting the energy system on to a deep decarbonization trajectory. Nonetheless, some people have argued that carbon pricing is an essential GHG reduction policy, suggesting that sincere politicians must do carbon pricing no matter how politically difficult. But the claim that carbon pricing is essential is factually incorrect. Deep decarbonization can be achieved entirely with regulations. Regulatory policies are unlikely to be as economically efficient as carbon pricing. But not all regulations perform identically when it comes to the economic-efficiency criterion. Flexible regulations have some attributes that make them low cost relative to regulations that require adoption of specific technologies.This talk provides evidence that assesses both the relative economic efficiency of policies and their relative political acceptability. The findings reported here suggest that some kinds of flexible regulations can perform significantly better than explicit carbon pricing in terms of relative political cost per tonne reduced while performing only marginally worse in terms of economic cost per tonne reduced. Presumably, this type of trade-off information could be of value to politicians who sincerely want deep decarbonization but would also like to be rewarded with re-election so that they and competing politicians see the value in ambitious and sustained GHG reduction efforts.

In the wake of the election one can start to wonder what politics should really be about. What are the greatest challenges to our modern society and what can be done to overcome these, with a brighter