Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Katie Steele, Associate Professor, Australian National University. Abstract It is a feature of our ordinary moral talk that some acts are supererogatory, or beyond what is required. But ‘beyond’ in what

in Noûs, Volume 34:4 AbstractA standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that eac

PLOS Computational Biology Abstract Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to huma

How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).

Sociological Science 3:39-60. 10.15195/v3.a3. Abstract It is often pointed out that conclusions about intergenerational (parent–child) mobility can differ depending on whether we base them on studies of c

in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it

Theoria, Volume 82, Issue 2,p. 166–181,May 2016. DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094 Abstract Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion

Bykvist, K., & Campbell, T. (2020). Persson's Merely Possible Persons. Utilitas,32(4), 479-487. doi:10.1017/S0953820820000199 AbstractAll else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the worl

Completed: Climate ethics and future generations

What should the current generation do about climate change when our decisions do not only affect how future generations will live, but also who and how many people will exist?