Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (Forthcoming, Publication in August 2017). This groundbreaking book brings together perspectives from political philosophy and comparative social policy to discuss generational

Larry S. Temkin is Distinguished Professor at Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University.ABSTRACTThis talk explores and challenges several common assumptions regarding the assessment of outcome good

Child Development Abstract Research shows that peer relationships are associated with students' school adjustment. However, the importance of advantageous and disadvantageous factors for students' educa

Digital development and educational outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A recipe for inclusive development or deepening divides?

A project on how the spread of digital information and communication technology in Sub-Saharan Africa has affected educational outcomes and inequalities.

PLOS Computational Biology Abstract Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to huma

Oskar Nordström Skans och Lena Hensvik, Institutet för arbetsmarknads- och utbildningspolitisk utvärdering The Montgomery (1991) model of employee referrals suggests that it is optimal for firms to sel

Venue: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm Research seminar with Ann-Sofie Isaksson, researcher in development economics, based at the Institute for Futures Studies (IFFS) and

Few women reach top positions in the corporate world, despite increased gender equality. This project examines gender differences in social networks at the Stockholm School of Economics.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2021), 51: 4, 256–269 Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the stan

Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes  evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.