Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (Forthcoming, Publication in August 2017). This groundbreaking book brings together perspectives from political philosophy and comparative social policy to discuss generational

Larry S. Temkin is Distinguished Professor at Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University.ABSTRACTThis talk explores and challenges several common assumptions regarding the assessment of outcome good

Child Development Abstract Research shows that peer relationships are associated with students' school adjustment. However, the importance of advantageous and disadvantageous factors for students' educa

Digital development and educational outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A recipe for inclusive development or deepening divides?

A project on how the spread of digital information and communication technology in Sub-Saharan Africa has affected educational outcomes and inequalities.

PLOS Computational Biology Abstract Social learning is common in nature, yet cumulative culture (where knowledge and technology increase in complexity and diversity over time) appears restricted to huma

Oskar Nordström Skans och Lena Hensvik, Institutet för arbetsmarknads- och utbildningspolitisk utvärdering The Montgomery (1991) model of employee referrals suggests that it is optimal for firms to sel

Few women reach top positions in the corporate world, despite increased gender equality. This project examines gender differences in social networks at the Stockholm School of Economics.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2021), 51: 4, 256–269 Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the stan

Australasian Journal of Philosophy ABSTRACT This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prud

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.