in Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 2 AbstractKurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possib

This workshop is a part of the project Valuing future lives funded by the Swedish Research Council. It will take place at the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm. If you are int or .

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

Professor Stefan Svallfors was elected President of the Swedish Sociological Association for the years 2014-2016. Read more about Stefan Svallfors.

2011. Praeger.

Editor with Bill Wringe. Published by Springer Nature. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the ways in which the concept of collective responsibility is relevant to ongoing normative debates

Joakim Kulin, Researcher at Department of Sociology, Umeå University.ABSTRACT It is increasingly evident that greenhouse gas emissions and global warming pose serious existential risks to human societi

Elizabeth Finneron-Burns

I am a post doc working with Krister Bykvist and Gustaf Arrhenius on the Valuing Future Lives project. I submitted my DPhil thesis at Oxford University in September 2015. Before studying at Oxford I wo

Should Extinction Be Forever?, Philosophy and Technology, First online: 17 october 2015 This article will explore a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species. Although the re-cr, (6128), 32–33, ). This article will provide an argument in favour of re-creation based on normative considerations. The environmentalist community generally accepts that it is wrong to exterminate species, for reasons beyond any instrumental value these species may have. It is often also claimed that humanity has a collective responsibility to either preserve or at least to not exterminate species. These two beliefs are here assumed to be correct. The argument presented here departs from and places these two ideas in a deontological framework, from which it is argued that when humanity causes the extinction of a species, this is a moral transgression, entailing a residual obligation. Such an obligation implies a positive duty to mitigate any harm caused by our moral failure. In light of recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, it will be argued that humanity has a prima facie obligation to re-create species whose extinction mankind may have caused, also known as de-extinction.

Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have  (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.