The purpose of this paper is to perform a diachronical cross-national analysis of health care services and raise questions of decline and convergence of European health care systems. Contrary to previ

Institute for Futures Studies Working Paper Series 2020:12 Abstract The response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the public discourse about the pandemic, can be used to illustrate three common mistakes in

Orri Stefánsson, philosopher at the Institute for Futures Studies and decision theorist, dissects the moral reasoning about the Covid-19 pandemic. (This text is part of the Institute for Futures Studie)

Social Psychology Quarterly Abstract Existing research and popular culture suggest that women are more approving of gossip. But are they? This research note uses two studies to ask whether gender stereo

Jan O. Jonsson

Professor of Sociology at the Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI), Stockholm University; Official Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford University; member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Science

Physica Scripta 89 128005 (7pp) Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Abstract  Global catastrophic risk is a term that refers to the risk of the occurrence of an event that kills at least millions of people

Journal of personality and social psychology. Abstract Does selfishness pay in the long term? Previous research has indicated that being prosocial (or otherish) rather than selfish has positive conseque

Business and Politics Abstract What determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected throug

Environmental Research Communications Abstract While previous studies on the relationship between political trust and support for climate policy have focused on the evaluative component of trust, namely

Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have  (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.