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Three Mistakes in the Moral Reasoning About the Covid-19 Pandemic
Institute for Futures Studies Working Paper Series 2020:12 Abstract The response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the public discourse about the pandemic, can be used to illustrate three common mistakes in
Three Mistakes in the Moral Reasoning About the Covid-19 Pandemic
Orri Stefánsson, philosopher at the Institute for Futures Studies and decision theorist, dissects the moral reasoning about the Covid-19 pandemic. (This text is part of the Institute for Futures Studie)
Being and Well-Being
in: Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Eds.Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, Oxford University Press. This chapter discusses the question of whether we can make it better
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
Chandra Kumar: Racist Explanations
Chandra Kumar, with a PhD in Philosophy, teaches philosophy at the Department of Philosophy at York University in Canada. AbstractWhile crudely and explicitly racist explanations persist in our social
Hilary Greaves: The collectivist critique of effective altruism
Hilary Greaves: Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, and a Tutorial Fellow at Somerville College, Oxford. The previous topic "Reductionism about personal identity, prudential value and
