in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it

Bykvist, K., & Campbell, T. (2020). Persson's Merely Possible Persons. Utilitas,32(4), 479-487. doi:10.1017/S0953820820000199 AbstractAll else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the worl

Venue: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm, and online Note that the speaker will join us online. Research seminar with Mike Otsuka, Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers Universit

Research seminar with Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment/Director, Program on Ethics at the University of Washingt

Oxford University Press Very often we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don't know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the live

Beyond reductionism: Contingent grounding and the Mind-Body Problem

I det här projektet undergrävs de två traditionella sätt på vilka man har betraktat kropp-medvetandeproblemet och föreslår en ny teori.

Claim-based distributive theories

The overarching purpose of this project is to present a framework for claim-based distributive theories. Since scarcity is a ubiquitous societal problem, the project has wide-reaching relevance for society.

Matthew Adler, Richard A. Horvitz Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, Philosophy and Public Policy ABSTRACTPrioritarianism is the equitable counterpart to utilitarianism. Rather than merely ad

Katie Steele, Associate Professor, Australian National University. Abstract It is a feature of our ordinary moral talk that some acts are supererogatory, or beyond what is required. But ‘beyond’ in what

Anandi Hattiangadi: A Skeptic's Guide to Virtual Worlds - A response to David Chalmers

Are virtual worlds "real"? Or are they merely "virtual"? In a recent book by David Chalmers, "Reality + - Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy", he argues that if we in fact were already livi