Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Volume 20, Issue 5,  pp 957–968, doi.org/10.1007/s10677-017-9842-x. Abstract Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one

How to be an anti-capitalist for the 21st century

The American sociologist Erik Olin Wright was invited  to Stockholm for a talk in 2017 by the Institute for Futures Studies and Katalys. Moderator is Stefan Svallfors, and discussants are: Marika Lindg

There is no denying that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will change the world of work. In the report "The Future of Work: Augmentation or Stunting?" philosopher Karim Jebari and Markus Furendal, a polit

Housing, Theory and Society 36(2): 149–166. doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2018.1459826. Abstract The term social housing has been characterized as a “floating signifier”, i.e. a term with no agreed-upon meanin

Workshop talk: The Duty to Compensate for Injustice as Applied to Reconstruction by Derek Matravers

Philosopher Derek Matravers from the Open University reads a paper he has written on the question of whether one should restore or simply leave damaged cultural heritage after a conflict has ended. Fr

Causes and consequences of environmental protests. The global environmental contestation and civic mobilization observatory

Environmental protest events are increasing. Does it have any consequences for policy? With global data-sets, this project will try to answer that question.

Deviant Behavior Volume 36, Issue 7, pages 565-580. DOI:10.1080/01639625.2014.951569 Abstract This study examines if graffiti initiation leads to greater deviant behavior. Swedish students (N = 1,010) co

Journal of the American Philosophical Association Abstract Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts

Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes  evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.

in International Journal for the Study of Skepticism10 (ISSN: 2210-5697). Abstract:A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlyi