White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Corpus Christi College at the University of Oxford ABSTRACTMany people believe that collectives of certain kinds, such as corporations and states, are entities ca

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm or online on Zoom Welcome to a seminar where philosopher Säde Hormio presents her new book Taking Responsibility for Climate Change!  REG

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, level 4, Stockholm Welcome to a seminar where philosopher Säde Hormio presents her new book Taking Responsibility for Climate Change!  REGISTER >

in: The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 28:3, s. 273-295 (2020) In October 2017, following the Harvey Weinstein scandal, US actress Alyssa Milano called upon victims of sexual harassment to uni

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30(1), 5–22. Abstract It is widely believed that voting rights confer power to individual voters as well as to the collective body of the electorate. This pa

Routledge, 156 p. InClimate Obstruction: How Denial, Delay and Inaction are Heating the Planet, Kristoffer Ekberg, Bernhard Forchtner, Martin Hultman and Kirsti Jylhä bring together crucial insights fr

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimina­tion (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discri­mination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future genera­tions is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.

Åsa Burman, Director of Studies in practical philosophy at Stockholm University and affilited researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen, Researcher at the Institu