intuitively
Transformative Experience and the Shark Problem
Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.
Asymmetry and Non-Identity
Utilitas, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp.213-230. doi.org/10.1017/S0953820818000341 Abstract In this article we distinguish two versions of the non-identity problem: one involving positive well-being and one inv
Allocating adaptation finance: examining three ethical arguments for recipient control
International Environmental Agreements , 16(5), p.655–670. doi:10.1007/s10784-015-9288-3 Abstract Most agree that large sums of money should be transferred to the most vulnerable countries in order to he
Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle
Philosophical Studies Abstract Parfit (Theoria 82:110–127, 2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing imprecise equality. However, Parfit’s notion of imprecise degrees of incommensurabilityeveryone
Degrees of Incommensurability and the Sequence Argument
In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract Parfit (2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnan
Jeff McMahan: Creating Happy Animals in Order to Eat Them
Jeff McMahan is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, a distinguished research fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Abst
Someone to sit next to in the segregated class room
“Who in your class would you not like to sit next to?” This question was posed to almost 5000 pupils (age 14–15) at Swedish high schools 2010/2011. Many adolescents experience systematic rejection duri
Stephen M. Gardiner: Contractualism and Tyranny Over Possible People
Research seminar with Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment/Director, Program on Ethics at the University of Washingt
A more plausible collapsing principle
Theoria, Volume 84, Issue 4. doi.org/10.1111/theo.12166 Abstract In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “par
Learning by Imitation in Games: Theory, Field and Lab
Erik Mohlin, Oxford University We exploit a unique opportunity to study how a large population of players in the field learn to play a novel game which has a complicated and non-intuitive mixed strateg