Liberal nationalism

David Miller, Gina Gustavsson and Yael Tamir, discusses with Philippe van Parijs and moderator Lars Anell. Gustaf Arrhenius and Bengt Westerberg introduce the subject.

Kay Axhausen, ETH Zürich Transport planning has studied social networks as central element behind the location choice for residential locations and for leisure activities. The talk will introduce the o

in: Poetics AbstractPsychological dual-process theory has become increasingly popular among sociologists. The dual-process framework accounts for two types of thinking; a fast, associative, automatic o

Cambridge University Press The main aim of this Element is to introduce the topic of limited awareness, and changes in awareness, to those interested in the philosophy of decision-making and uncertain

Economic Letters, vol. 203 Abstract Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size populations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CL

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4th floor, Stockholm, or online.Research seminar with Olle Hammar, Ph.D. in Economics and researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies. RegistIn this paper, we introduce novel estimates of wealth inequality, integrating the standard household wealth concept with newly assessed individual human capital. Using microdata and national accounts from numerous countries since 2000, we explore the distribution across age, gender, education, and occupation. Our analysis reveals two key findings: 1) human capital is more evenly distributed than financial capital, and 2) total wealth, the sum of human and financial capital, is significantly more equal than financial wealth alone. This study offers a groundbreaking perspective on global wealth dynamics, emphasizing the critical, yet often overlooked, role of human capital in wealth distribution.

Economics and Philosophy, DOI:10.1017/S0266267119000026 Abstract This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes en

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

Frontiers in Climate 4 Abstract Since introducing a path-breaking carbon tax in 2008, the western Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) has attracted significant attention from climate policy schola

I4R Discussion Paper 107 Abstract This study pushes our understanding of research reliability by reproducing and replicating claims from 110 papers in leading economic and political science journals. Th