inferring
Investigating sequences in ordinal data: A new approach with adapted evolutionary models.
Political Science Research and Methods, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp. 449-466. doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2018.9 Abstract This paper presents a new approach for studying temporal sequences across ordinal variables. I
What's (not) underpinning ambivalent sexism?: Revisiting the roles of ideology, religiosity, personality, demographics, and men's facial hair in explaining hostile and benevolent sexism
Personality and Individual Differences, Volume: 122, pp. 29-37. doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.001 Abstract Ambivalent sexism is a two-dimensional framework that assesses sexist and misogynous attitudes
Debating demography
This week the newspaper Upsala Nya Tidning published an article by Joakim Palme, former CEO at the Institute, on how we can meet the challenge of an ageing population. Educating young people is necess
Arne Jarrick & Maria Wallenberg Bondesson: The cultural dynamics of law-making – A world history
Prof. Arne Jarrick and PhD. Maria Wallenberg Bondesson, Centre for the study of Cultural Evolution at Stockholm University and Institute for Futures Studies.ABSTRACTOur presentation gives significant hig

Finding popular solutions to climate change
A global investigation of public opinions about climate policies and their determinants.
Chris Armstrong: Decarbonisation and World Poverty
Professor of Political Theory at the University of Southampton. ABSTRACT If dangerous climate change is to be avoided, it is clear that the majority of the world’s fossil fuel supplies cannot be burned.
Non Ideal Social Ontology III
By 'non-ideal social ontology', we have in mind social ontology that starts with difficult, complicated cases of immediate importance to social theory, rather than starting from simplified or abstractOur thinking is that just as critical philosophers of race such as Charles Mills have made a case for the importance of non-ideal political philosophy, non-ideal social ontology could play an important role in advancing emancipatory social theory. 09.00 Welcome 09.15–10.30 Robin Zheng (Yale-NUS College) “Responding to Bias: Oughts, Ideals, and Appraisals” 11.00–12.15 Åsa Burman (Stockholm University & Institute for Futures Studies) ”Collective responsibility for implicit bias” 12.15–13.30 Lunch 13.30–14.45 Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (Institute for Futures Studies) ”Implicit bias and discrimination” 15.15–16.30 Alex Madva (California State Polytechnic University), ”Responsibility for Interpreting Implicit Bias” 19.00 Workshop dinner 09.00–10.15 Rebecca Mason (University of San Francisco) ”Oppression and Incredulity” 10.30–11.45 Johan Brännmark (Malmö University) ”Institutions, Ideology, and Non-Ideal Social Ontology” 11.45–13.15 Lunch 13.15–14.30 Staffan Carlshamre (Stockholm University) ”Natural kinds, social kinds, mixed kinds” 14.45–16.00 Katharine Jenkins (University of Nottingham) ”Sex and gender, grounding and anchoring” Organized by Åsa Burman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen. Sponsored by Jane and Dan Olsson Foundation, Institute for Futures Studies, and the Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University Questions? Please contact:
Against lifetime QALY prioritarianism
Journal of Medical Ethics 44: 109-113. doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104250 Abstract Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification o
Comparativism and the Grounds for Person-Centered Care and Shared Decision Making
Journal of clinical ethics 28(4): 269-278. Abstract This article provides a new argument and a new value-theoretical ground for person-centered care and shared decision making that ascribes to it the rol
Different Populations Agree on Which Moral Arguments Underlie Which Opinions
Frontiers in Psychology AbstractPeople often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It isunfairif homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals matraditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.