Daniel Naurin, Department of Political Science, Göteborg University Judicial independence is a challenge for courts whose decisions have politically salient consequences. Several tools are available fo

Res Philosophica 98 ABSTRACT This article presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g., prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what t

The Institute for Futures Studies - What we do

The Institute for Futures Studies is an independent foundation that conducts research on important questions that shape our future society. Based on four themes, we investigate critical issues for the

Frontiers in Psychology AbstractPeople often justify their moral opinions by referring to larger moral concerns (e. g., “It isunfairif homosexuals are not allowed to marry!” vs. “Letting homosexuals matraditions!”). Is there a general agreement about what concerns apply to different moral opinions? We used surveys in the United States and the United Kingdom to measure the perceived applicability of eight concerns (harm, violence, fairness, liberty, authority, ingroup, purity, and governmental overreach) to a wide range of moral opinions. Within countries, argument applicability scores were largely similar whether they were calculated among women or men, among young or old, among liberals or conservatives, or among people with or without higher education. Thus, the applicability of a given moral concern to a specific opinion can be viewed as an objective quality of the opinion, largely independent of the population in which it is measured. Finally, we used similar surveys in Israel and Brazil to establish that this independence of populations also extended to populations in different countries. However, the extent to which this holds across cultures beyond those included in the current study is still an open question.

Journal of Applied Philosophy, published online first, doi.org/10.1111/japp.12357 Abstract A challenge for the theorising of climate justice is that even when the agents whose actions are supposed to be r

This preliminary study of central actors in the future landscape argues that there is a spectrum from institutions claiming independent expertise and scientific certainty about the future, to those fo

Noûs, (Early View), DOI: 10.1111/nous.12135. Introduction A familiar way of supporting skeptical doubts about the beliefs in some area, such as ethics orreligion, is to provide a “debunking argument” agaiway is to appeal to the disagreement that occurs in the area.2 These types of challenge areoften treated separately and there is not much overlap in the literature they have given rise to.Yet, as they pursue the same conclusion—that the target beliefs are not (fully) justified andthat we should reduce our confidence in them—one might well wonder how they are related.Are they entirely independent or do they interact in non-trivial and interesting ways? That isthe question I shall explore.

Topoi, doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9519-z Abstract Orthodox expected utility theory imposes too stringent restrictions on what attitudes to risk one can rationally hold. Focusing on a life-and-death gambl

Venue: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4th floor, Stockholm, and online Research seminar with Eri Bertsou, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of St. Gallen (HSG).REG

Eri Bertsou: What do citizens consider to be politically legitimate uses of expertise?

Can democratic politics incorporate citizen demands for independent expertise in ways that boost legitimacy and trust in politics? Democratic governments worldwide face the dilemma of how to deal with