implausible
A more plausible collapsing principle
Theoria, Volume 84, Issue 4. doi.org/10.1111/theo.12166 Abstract In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “par
CANCELLED! All things considered? A cognitively plausible model of neighborhood choice
THIS SEMINAR IS UNFORTUNATELY CANCELLED. Elizabeth Bruch, University of Michigan (Attention: this seminar is held on a Monday) Although there have been efforts in recent years to study the linkages bet
Why Wear Blinders? Boonin and the Narrow Approach to the Non-identity Problem
Law, Ethics and Philosophy vol. 7, 102-126 Abstract Boonin endorses reasoning that leads to what he calls the Implausible Conclusion regarding when future-directed choices that at first glance seem to i
A patch to the possibility part of Gödel’s Ontological Proof
in Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 2 AbstractKurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possib
Against lifetime QALY prioritarianism
Journal of Medical Ethics 44: 109-113. doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2017-104250 Abstract Lifetime quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) prioritarianism has recently been defended as a reasonable specification o
Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle
Philosophical Studies Abstract Parfit (Theoria 82:110–127, 2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing imprecise equality. However, Parfit’s notion of imprecise degrees of incommensurabilityeveryone
Degrees of Incommensurability and the Sequence Argument
In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract Parfit (2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnan
A Dilemma for Privacy as Control
The Journal of Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-019-09316-z Abstract Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such
Prioritarianism, timeslices, and prudential value
Australasian Journal of Philosophy ABSTRACT This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prud
Counterfactual Desirability
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68(2), 2017: 485-533. Abstract The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value de
