goodman
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
Tom Mueller
I am a free-lance writer of non-fiction and fiction. I studied at Oxford (DPhil, Rhodes Scholar), Harvard (BA, summa cum laude), and Alief Hastings High School in rural east Texas. After that, I worke
The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology
2009. Oxford University Press. Table of Contents Foundations1: Peter Hedström and Peter Bearman: What is analytical sociology all about? An introductory essay by Peter Hedström2: Peter Hedström and Lars Udéhn:
