goldman
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
Tom Mueller
I am a free-lance writer of non-fiction and fiction. I studied at Oxford (DPhil, Rhodes Scholar), Harvard (BA, summa cum laude), and Alief Hastings High School in rural east Texas. After that, I worke
The Problems of Philosophy in Virtual Reality
Venue:The Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, and online This event is open to the public.Conference poster. This conference will depart from and engage with the recent and critby Professor David Chalmers.
Gustaf Arrhenius more information
Current and Recent Projects The Mimir Institute for Long Term Futures Studies Climate Ethics and Future Generations Sustainable Population in the Time of Climate Change Anxieties of Democracy The Boundary
