in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory Eds.Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging exis

In six months libraries and schools will once again be transformed into voting stations and the Swedish people will vote for the Sweden they want for the next four years. A question that has been on p

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 edition), Zalta, E. (red.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/nonidentity-problem The nonidentity problem raises questions regardin

Christian Munthe, Professor of Practical Philosophy, University of Gothenburg and comments by Olle Häggström, Professor of Mathematical Statistics at Chalmers. "The Price of Precaution: Evaluating Acti

What significance does your name have for your chances of getting a job? We ask Moa Bursell, a sociologist and research leader at the Institute for Futures Studies, who has researched discrimination i

in: Weighing and Reasoning. Themes from the Philosophy of John Broome, Eds.Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner, Oxford University Press. The person affecting restriction states that one outcome can only be

Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it

How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).