etiology
Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value
i: Economics and Philosophy Vol. 36:1 AbstractCritical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population
Values and Vampires: Why Moral Axiology Withstands the Argument From Queerness
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Abstract The argument from queerness is one of the most important arguments for moral error theory. Moral error theory holds that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed o
Lorne L. Dawson: Reconceptualizing Lone-Actor Terrorists as Solo Public Mass Murders
Lorne L. Dawson, Professor Emeritus, University of Waterloo, Canada. In public and expert judgements of whether an incident of mass violence by a lone actor is an instance of terrorism or simply mass m
Lorne L. Dawson: Reconceptualizing Lone-Actor Terrorists as Solo Public Mass Murders. An Overview and Analysis of the Research
Seminar with Lorne L. Dawson, Professor Emeritus, University of Waterloo, Canada. Register here > Abstract In public and expert judgements of whether an incident of mass violence by a lone actor is an
Annie Woube
I am an Associate Professor of Ethnology and conduct research on leisure and various forms of self-realization, with a focus on gender constructions, gender equality, and social equality. In my curren
Chapter 26: The evolution of legal positivism: Reflections on continuity and discontinuity in the positivist tradition
In Zaluski, W., Bourgeois-Gironde, S. & A. Dyrda (eds.) Research Handbook on Legal Evolution. Elgar Abstract This chapter maps the evolution of legal positivism (LP) with an eye to both continuous and
Vuko Andric
I am a researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies and associate professor at Linköping University. My main research interests lie in ethics and political philosophy. In ethics I am particularly i
Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox
Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.
Wlodek Rabinowicz
I am senior professor of practical philosophy at Lund University. After defending my doctoral dissertation in Uppsala in 1979, I remained there as associate professor in practical philosophy. 1994-95 and a former editor of and .
Nondeterminacy, cycles and rational choice
in: Analysis (2020) Volume 80:3. AbstractA notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be g. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, that is, impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria.