duties
Individual and Collective Duties to Rescue
The ongoing refugee crisis in Europe, along with calls for intervention in conflicts in Syria and elsewhere, has pushed discussion of duties to rescue into the political spotlight. At the same time, t
Recent Debates on Victims' Duties to Resist Their Oppression
Philosophy Compass Abstract This article reviews recent arguments in contemporary political philosophy on victims' duties to resist their oppression. It begins by presenting two approaches to these duti
Epistemic Privilege and Victims’ Duties to Resist their Oppression
Journal of Applied Philsophy, DOI: 10.1111/japp.12255. Abstract Victims of injustice are prominent protagonists in efforts to resist injustice. I argue that they have a duty to do so. Extant accounts of
Serena Olsaretti: Intergenerational justice and the rights and duties of procreators
Serena Olsaretti, ICREA Research Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. ABSTRACT Questions about the rights and duties of procreators on the one hand, and about justice between (overlapping and
Democratic duties. Why we should vote to rectify political injustice
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Abstract This paper argues that voters have duties of political justice to rectify imperfections in the democratic process, specifically
Julia Nefsky: Expected Utility, the Pond Analogy and Imperfect Duties
Plats: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, StockholmResearch seminar with Julia Nefsky, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto. Register hereAbstractThis talk brings to
Laura Valentini: There Are No Natural Rights: Rights, Duties and Positive Norms
Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.
Climate Change, Historical Emissions, and Unjust Benefits: A Comment on Axel Gosseries’ Account of Climate Justice
Journal of Practical Ethics Abstract One of the claims Axel Gosseries makes in What is Intergenerational Justice? is that greenhouse gas emissions produced before 1990 are morally unimportant for presen
Ethics of coordination
We need new ethics to understand our duties towards others in matters such as climate change.
Moral uncertainty
Participants: Krister Bykvist, Toby Ord and William MacAskill. Very often we are uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We do not know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how