deontological
Workshop on deontological approaches to population ethics
This workshop is a part of the project Valuing future lives funded by the Swedish Research Council. It will take place at the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm. If you are int or .
A patch to the possibility part of Gödel’s Ontological Proof
in Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 2 AbstractKurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possib
Elizabeth Finneron-Burns
I am a post doc working with Krister Bykvist and Gustaf Arrhenius on the Valuing Future Lives project. I submitted my DPhil thesis at Oxford University in September 2015. Before studying at Oxford I wo
Should Extinction Be Forever?
Should Extinction Be Forever?, Philosophy and Technology, First online: 17 october 2015 This article will explore a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species. Although the re-cr, (6128), 32–33, ). This article will provide an argument in favour of re-creation based on normative considerations. The environmentalist community generally accepts that it is wrong to exterminate species, for reasons beyond any instrumental value these species may have. It is often also claimed that humanity has a collective responsibility to either preserve or at least to not exterminate species. These two beliefs are here assumed to be correct. The argument presented here departs from and places these two ideas in a deontological framework, from which it is argued that when humanity causes the extinction of a species, this is a moral transgression, entailing a residual obligation. Such an obligation implies a positive duty to mitigate any harm caused by our moral failure. In light of recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, it will be argued that humanity has a prima facie obligation to re-create species whose extinction mankind may have caused, also known as de-extinction.
Laura Valentini: There Are No Natural Rights: Rights, Duties and Positive Norms
Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.
Collective responsibility. Perspectives on political philosophy from social ontology
Editor with Bill Wringe. Published by Springer Nature. This book provides a comprehensive overview of the ways in which the concept of collective responsibility is relevant to ongoing normative debates
