Jeff McMahan is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, a distinguished research fellow at the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics and a fellow of Corpus Christi College. Abst

Place: At the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, or online.REGISTERAbstractThe principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalistapproach to evaluating popu

Creating happy animals in order to eat them: Jeff McMahan and Tim Campbell

In recent debates about the ethics of eating animals, some have advanced the claim that if people cause animals to exist and give them good lives in order to be able to eat them, then even if the anim

Katie Steele: Neutrality About Creating Good Lives - No Panacea For Longtermism

The principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalist approach to evaluating populations of varying constitution and size: while the latter holds that the addition of a good lif

- Neoliberalism and a System of violence after the US invasion, 2003-2011 Dr Thomas Sommer-Houdeville, Stockholm University, Department of Sociology. ABSTRACT After the invasion of Iraq and the destructi

It may sound crazy to pay people an income whether or not they are working or looking for work. But today, with the traditional welfare state creaking under pressure, the idea of a basic income has be

New Methods for Sharing Research Findings with Society

Finding new formats for presenting policy-relevant research results.

Peter Hedström at the Institute for Futures Studies has been granted funding for a project called "Analytical sociology: Theoretical developments and empirical research”. 302 researchers in total were

in: Utilitas 32 (4): 1-9 (2020) Abstract:All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it

Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes  evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.