counterintuitive
Population Ethics and Different-Number-Based Imprecision
Theoria, Volume 82, Issue 2,p. 166–181,May 2016. DOI: 10.1111/theo.12094 Abstract Recently, in his Rolf Schock Prize Lecture, Derek Parfit has suggested a novel way of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion
The bias of adapted patients in practice
Journal of Law and the Biosciences, vol. 8 issue 2 Abstract Current patients seem to be subject to certain biases when it comes to the report of their utility. Eyal’s proposal is to calibrate current pa
The Value of Existence
in: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory Eds.Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, Oxford University Press. Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging exis
Katie Steele: Neutrality about creating good lives - No panacea for longtermism
Place: At the Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, Stockholm, or online.REGISTERAbstractThe principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalistapproach to evaluating popu

Katie Steele: Neutrality About Creating Good Lives - No Panacea For Longtermism
The principle of neutrality can be seen as a direct response to the totalist approach to evaluating populations of varying constitution and size: while the latter holds that the addition of a good lif
The Repugnant Conclusion: An Overview
In Stephen M. Gardiner (red), The Oxford Handbook of Intergenerational Justice, Oxford Academic. Abstract The repugnant conclusion can be formulated as follows: For any population consisting of people wi

Completed: Climate ethics and future generations
What should the current generation do about climate change when our decisions do not only affect how future generations will live, but also who and how many people will exist?

Who cares (about)? How welfare capitalists, churches and migrants change the care of children and elders in Sweden, Germany and Italy
In Sweden, Germany and Italy welfarecapitalists, churches and migrants have been given the responsibility for health and social care. How did this happen and why?
Gustaf Arrhenius: Imprecision in Population Ethics
The fourth meeting of the Oxford Moral Philosophy Seminar in Trinity Term will be on Monday, 16 May, in the Lecture Room on the second floor of the Radcliffe Humanities Building, Woodstock Road, Oxfor
Completed: Valuing future lives
How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).