European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 14, Issue 3, pp. 567-583, doi.org/10.1017/S1574019618000287 Abstract Constitutional referendum – Popular sovereignty – Constituent power – Democratic legitimac

Cécile Laborde, Professor of Political Theory FBA, Nuffield Chair of Political Theory.ABSTRACTIn this talk, I ask whether liberal legitimacy requires secularism – or separation between state and relig

Politics & Policy Abstract This article analyzes the emergence of the Swedish “national system for knowledge-driven management.” We argue that the system is best understood as a meta-instrument that

Citizenship Studies ABSTRACT The doctrine of popular sovereignty holds that the ‘supreme authority of the state’ belongs to the people, not to the political institutions exercising public power. What ar

Chapter in Hélène Ruiz Valérie Rosoux Alessandra Donati (red.), Representing the Absent, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag. Find the full book here > Abstract Recognising widely held concerns regarding ‘presentchapter challenges the contention that democratic legitimacy inexorably requires the inclusion of futuregenerations in democratic decisions. According to two requirements of democratic legitimacy – inclusionand constitutional empowerment – people should be empowered to participate in decisions about policyand law, and to determine the rules structuring the political framework. Drawing a distinction betweenthese requirements, this chapter contends that though it may be feasible to ‘include’ future generations forproxy representation, future generations cannot enjoy ‘constitutional power’.

Completed: Sustainable population in the time of climate change

What level of population is sustainable, given the available resources and a certain level of well-being? How can we achieve a stable or declining population?

Daniel Hausman: What is a Fair Allocation of Healthcare?

Research seminar with Daniel M. Hausman, Research Professor at Center for Population-Level Bioethics at Rutgers University. This seminar is arranged by the Institute for Futures Studies and Center for

Criminal Law and Philosophy, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 125-142. Abstract Retributivism may seem wholly uninterested in the fit between penal policy and public opinion, but on one rendition of the theory, h

Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have  (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.

David Miller, Professor of Political Theory, FBA, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College Abstract States often justify their restrictive immigration policies by appealing to their right of self-determ