compelling
Janine Wedel: Russia, Ukraine, and our world of competing visions. Can civil society counter oligarchic capitalism?
Plats: Institutet för framtidsstudier, Holländargatan 13, 4 trappor i Stockholm Register here Research seminar with Janine R. Wedel, University Professor, Schar School of Policy and Government,George Mas
Non-transitive better than relations and rational choice
in: Philosophia 48 (2020) AbstractThis paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reason

Hidden convergence in ethics
Ethics has for a long time been dominated by several competing traditions. But is it entirely true that these traditions have not moved closer with time. That is what this project aims to investigate.
Recent Work on Reflective Equilibrium and Method in Ethics
Philosophy Compass 13 (6), 2018. DOI:10.1111/phc3.12493. Abstract The idea of reflective equilibrium (IRE) remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of cr
Modeling the Evolution of Creoles
Language Dynamics and Change, 5(1), 1-51. DOI: 10.1163/22105832-00501005 Abstract Various theories have been proposed regarding the origin of creole languages. Describing a process where only the end res
Of Malthus and Methuselah: does longevity treatment aggravate global catastrophic risks?
Physica Scripta 89 128005 (7pp) Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Abstract Global catastrophic risk is a term that refers to the risk of the occurrence of an event that kills at least millions of people
Belief Revision for Growing Awareness
Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.
Distributive justice, social cooperation, and the basis of equality
Theoria Abstract This paper considers the view that the basis of equality isthe range property of being a moral person. This view,suggested by John Rawls in hisA Theory of Justice(1971),is commonly dism
Air: Pollution, Climate Change and India's Choice Between Policy and Pretence
Harper Collins India’s air pollution is a deadly threat. Will its politics meet the challenge? Exposure to the world’s worst air pollution kills over a million Indians each year. It also affects childr
Incommensurability, the sequence argument, and the Pareto principle
Philosophical Studies Abstract Parfit (Theoria 82:110–127, 2016) responded to the Sequence Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion by introducing imprecise equality. However, Parfit’s notion of imprecise degrees of incommensurabilityeveryone