cognitivists
Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 95, Issue 4, pp. 1-6. doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1269352 Abstract Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about eth
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
in: Synthese 2020 Abstract Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, su
Moral Disagreement
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) ABSTRACT Appeals to moral disagreement have figured in philosophical discussions since antiquity, especially regarding questions about the nat, 14). It is often dubious to characterize the thoughts of ancient philosophers by using distinctions and terminologies that have emerged much later. Still, it is tempting to take Sextus to offer an argument against the metaethical position known as “moral realism” and its central thesis that there are moral truths which are objective in the sense that they are independent of human practices and thinking.
