cognitivism
Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 95, Issue 4, pp. 1-6. doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1269352 Abstract Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about eth
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
in: Synthese 2020 Abstract Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, su
CANCELLED! All things considered? A cognitively plausible model of neighborhood choice
THIS SEMINAR IS UNFORTUNATELY CANCELLED. Elizabeth Bruch, University of Michigan (Attention: this seminar is held on a Monday) Although there have been efforts in recent years to study the linkages bet
Moral Disagreement
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition) ABSTRACT Appeals to moral disagreement have figured in philosophical discussions since antiquity, especially regarding questions about the nat, 14). It is often dubious to characterize the thoughts of ancient philosophers by using distinctions and terminologies that have emerged much later. Still, it is tempting to take Sextus to offer an argument against the metaethical position known as “moral realism” and its central thesis that there are moral truths which are objective in the sense that they are independent of human practices and thinking.
How software developers can fix part of GDPR’s problem of click-through consents
AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00970-8 Abstract When General Data Protection Regulation of the European Union (GDPR) arrived, most people probably noticed a practical flaw in the pr, p. 858)—revealing a practical flaw in the GDRP regulation, in which individuals’ privacy fail to be properly protected.
The Origin of Status Inequality: A Simulation-Based Study
Gianluca Manzo, Sociology Sorbonne Status hierarchies have the characteristic of being increasingly asymmetric distributions that, however, never turn into winner-take-all structures. In this paper we