Philosophical Studies Abstract In her ground-breaking and highly influential book Transformative Experience, L.A. Paul makes two claims: (1) one cannot evaluate and compare certain experiential outcomes  evaluate and compare certain intuitively horrible outcomes (e.g. being eaten alive by sharks) as bad and worse than certain other outcomes even if one cannot grasp what these intuitively horrible outcomes are like. We argue that the conjunction of these two claims leads to an implausible discontinuity in the evaluability of outcomes. One implication of positing such a discontinuity is that evaluative comparisons of outcomes will not be proportionally sensitive to variation in the underlying features of these outcomes. This puts pressure on Paul to abandon either (1) or (2). But (1) is central to her view and (2) is very hard to deny. We call this the Shark Problem.

Kurs om att tolka forskningsresultat med professor Charles F. Manski. Den 21–22 januari kommer Charles F. Manski att ge en kurs som omfattar tre föreläsningar. Under kursen kommer Manski att visa varfö

Three lectures with Charles F. Manski. Public policy advocates routinely assert that “research has shown” a particular policy to be desirable. But how reliable is the analysis in the research they invo

Robert Goodin, Research Professor of Philosophy at Australian National University. Robert Goodin's research focuses on political theory and public policy. Read more about Robert Goodin ABSTRACT According

IFFS Policy Paper: 2022:1 With the rapid rise of the global human population, long term consequences materialize. These concern the welfare of future generations and the safety of eco-systems on the pl

Irina Vartanova

In my research, I use survey data, such as World Values Survey, to study social norms and their change in different cultures. At the Institute, I work with Pontus Strimling and Kimmo Eriksson on a project

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Pages 1-15, Received 11 Dec 2015, Published online: 04 Sep 2016 Abstract This paper defends two related claims about belief: first, the claim that, unlike numerical d

Economics and Philosophy, DOI:10.1017/S0266267119000026 Abstract This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes en

Philosophy Compass, 12:3 2017. DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12408 Abstract What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making und

Australasian Journal of Philosophy ABSTRACT This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prud