In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generationsvol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract A common objection to sufficientarianism is that it allows large

European Sociological ReviewFull text Abstract Scholars have documented ethnic and gender discrimination across labour markets since the 1970s by using field experiments (correspondence tests) in which

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract Justice in production is concerned with ensuring the benefits and

Olle Torpman

I defended my dissertation on the implications of libertarianism on different climate issues at Stockholm university, and since then I have researched, among other subjects, principles of just allocat

Law, Ethics and Philosophy vol. 7, 102-126 Abstract Boonin endorses reasoning that leads to what he calls the Implausible Conclusion regarding when future-directed choices that at first glance seem to i

In The Oxford Handbook of Intergenerational Ethics, Stephen M. Gardiner (ed.), s. C36.S1 - C36.N20. Abstract In constructivist contractualist theories, such as Rawls’, principles of justice should mirror

Julia Mosquera & Olle Torpman (eds) Working paper series 2024:10–17 10: Productive Justice in the 'Post-Work Future' Caleb Althorpe & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns  11: Degrees of Incommensurability and  

Journal of Applied Philosophy, published online first, doi.org/10.1111/japp.12357 Abstract A challenge for the theorising of climate justice is that even when the agents whose actions are supposed to be r

Oxford University Press, 648 p.  The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethicspresents up-to-date theoretical analyses of various problems associated with the moral standing of future people and animals in c

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.),Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract In this paper, I analyse whether the present generation’s choices. This has been tentatively suggested in both legal theory and philosophy; I review such suggestions briefly in section 1. However, a more rigorous analysis – outlining the concept, relevant grounds, and wrong-making features of discrimination, and applying these to future generations – is still lacking. To address this lacuna, I propose a theory of discrimination and analyse why it might seem to apply – yet ultimately fails to apply – to the differential treatment of future generations. More specifically, I propose a definition of discrimina­tion (section 2.1) and an account of the moral wrongness of discrimination (section 2.2). I moreover explore the connection between discrimination and theories of social (in)justice (section 2.3). I then apply this theory to the problem of differential treatment of future generations. While discri­mination may occur between collectives, such as generations (section 3.1), my analysis shows that the specific temporal status of future genera­tions is not comparable to other grounds of discrimination, such as gender or race (section 3.2). Moreover, due the non-identity problem and the problem of lack of a “community of social meaning” between generations, future generations cannot be claimed to be subjected to worse treatment by the present generation (section 3.3). Hence, their differential treatment due to the present generation’s choices does not amount to discrimination. Section 4 concludes and outlines some upshots of my analysis.