Andrea S. Asker

I am a PhD candidate at Stockholm University and a research assistant at the Institute for Futures Studies. I am also affiliated with the Mimir Center for Long Term Futures at the institute. I have an in

Location: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13 in Stockholm If you plan to attend all or parts of the conference, please register by sending an e-mail to [email protected] Thursday Decem

In: Acker S., Ylijoki O-H., and McGinn M. The Social Production of Research: Perspectives on funding and gender. Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE)/Routledge. Abstract Status as been descri

Klimatförändringarna efter Paris – vad gör vi nu?

Förra årets klimatmöte i Paris har beskrivits som ett genombrott för den internationella klimatpolitiken, men kan vi förvänta oss att de nödvändiga förändringarna sker när världens länder förväntas hö

The main purpose of this work is to assist the secretariat in administrative matters including maintaining the web site, the Facebook and the Twitter accounts, organising events, editing the Newslette Fund-raising is a substantial part of our work and the person we’re seeking will also be asked to assist in this work (complete the forms, submit the paperwork and follow up on behalf of the association). All communication will be in English. The person we are looking for will be placed at the Institute for Future studies in the very centre of Stockholm.

Journal of Marriage and Family, Volume 79, Issue 2, pp. 419-436. Abstract Children of immigrant background, despite problems with acculturation, poverty, and discrimination, have better mental health th

If a social scientific observer of the mid-1980s had been presented with a line-up of rich Western countries – say Germany, Sweden, the UK, France, the US – and asked to guess which  of these countrie

Campbell, T. Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox. Philosophies 2022, 7, 80. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040080 Abstract: According to axiological retributivism, people canan outcome in which someone gets what she deserves, even if it is bad for her, can thereby haveintrinsic positive value. A question seldom asked is how axiological retributivism should deal withcomparisons of outcomes that differ with respect to the number and identities of deserving agents.Attempting to answer this question exposes a problem for axiological retributivism that parallels awell-known problem in population axiology introduced by John Broome. The problem for axiologicalretributivism is that it supports the existence of a range of negative wellbeing levels such that if adeserving person comes into existence at any of these levels, the resulting outcome is neither betternor worse with respect to desert. However, the existence of such a range is inconsistent with a setof very plausible axiological claims. I call this the desert neutrality paradox. After introducing theparadox, I consider several possible responses to it. I suggest that one reasonable response, thoughperhaps not the only one, is to reject axiological retributivism.

AbstractIs Deliberation an Antidote to Extreme Partisan Polarization? Reflections on “America in One Room” Register here to join the seminar This talk is positioned at the intersectionof two literatures

What does happiness data mean? Daniel J. Benjamin and Ori Heffetz

In this episode we talk about happiness. Imagine you get a survey in the mail, and in one question you are asked to rate your level of happiness on a scale from 0 to 10. Let’s say you answer a seven.