antalogi
Julia Nefsky: Expected Utility, the Pond Analogy and Imperfect Duties
Plats: Institute for Futures Studies, Holländargatan 13, StockholmResearch seminar with Julia Nefsky, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Toronto. Register hereAbstractThis talk brings to
New anthology on the possibilities and challenges of digitalisation
The Digitalisation Commission, established by the Swedish government in 2012, has published an anthology where scholars and experts writes on how it is that Sweden has been so successful in digitizati
Publications
These are publications resulting from the project. For a full list, get in touch with the project members. Askanius, T.(2021) "On Frogs, Monkeys, and Execution Memes: Exporing the Humor-Hate Nexus at t 22(2): 147–165.

AI och makten över besluten
Allt fler offentliga beslut fattas av algoritmer. Automatiserade processer kan numera till exempel avgöra vilken skola dina barnhamnar i, vad du ska få för vård och om du har rätt till bidrag eller in
Gustaf Arrhenius more information
Current and Recent Projects The Mimir Institute for Long Term Futures Studies Climate Ethics and Future Generations Sustainable Population in the Time of Climate Change Anxieties of Democracy The Boundary
Erik Angner: Nudging as Design
Erik Angner, Professor of Practical Philosophy Abstract The nudge agenda due to Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein has proven polarizing. To advocates, nudging allows us to improve people’s choices and th
Ethics of Coordination
This is a hybrid workshop. If you wish to join, get in touch with Olle Torpman, [email protected] more information about the workshop, including abstracts, visitthe project website Agenda Wednesd10.00–11:45 Julia Nefsky: Expexted Utility, the Pond Analogy and Imperfect Duties13.30–14.30 Anne Schwenkenbecher: We-mode reasoning about our environmental obligations14.45–15.45 Vuko Andric:
Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction: A Reply to Goodman.
Philosophia 45(3): 1275–1282. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9812-5. Abstract In this reply I defend Kripke’s creationist thesis for mythical objects (Reference and Existence, 2013) against Jeffrey Go). I argue that Goodman has mistaken the basis for when mythical abstracta are created. Contrary to Goodman I show that, as well as how, Kripke’s theory consistently retains the analogy between creation of mythical objects and creation of fictional objects, while also explaining in what way they differ.
Moral Uncertainty
Oxford University Press Very often we're uncertain about what we ought, morally, to do. We don't know how to weigh the interests of animals against humans, how strong our duties are to improve the live
Statistical Mechanics of Money, Income, Debt, and Energy Consumption
Victor Yakovenko, University of Maryland By analogy with the probability distribution of energy in statistical physics, I argue that the probability distribution of money in a closed economic system sh, Reviews of Modern Physics 81, 1703 (2009), New Journal of Physics 12, 075032 (2010). This work is currently supported by the Institute for New Economic Thinking,