Professor of Social and Political Theory, European University Institute. ABSTRACT Liberal democratic citizenship has been shaped by the legacies of Athens (democracy) and Rome (legal rights) but operate between individuals and states. In a Westphalian world, citizenship has both instrumental and identity value. Enhanced opportunities and interests in mobility rights strengthen instrumental interests in multiple citizenship among immigrants, among populations in less developed countries, and among wealthy elites. The latter two trends potentially undermine a genuine link norm and, if they prevail, might replace the Westphalian allocation of citizenship with a global market. New digital technologies create a second challenge to Westphalian citizenship. As has argued, digital identities could provide a global legal persona for all human beings independently of their nationality, and blockchain technologies could enable the formation of non-territorial political communities providing governance services to their members independently of states. Both the instrumental uses of citizenship for geographic mobility and technologies that create substitutes for territorial citizenship are not merely relevant as current trends. They are also advocated and defended normatively as responses to the global injustice of the birthright lottery. I will challenge this idea and argue that liberal democracies should not be conceived as voluntary associations whose membership is freely chosen, but as communities of destiny among people who have been thrown together by history and their circumstances of life. How these foundations of democratic community can be maintained in the context of rising mobility and the digital revolution remains an open question.

Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Volume 51, 2017 Abstract The popularity of research into categories has grown in recent decades and shows no sign of abating. This introductory article takes

In: Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal, Maria Wallenberg-Bondesson (eds.). Methods in world history. A critical approach. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. Methods in World Historyis the first international volume

Three lectures with Charles F. Manski. Public policy advocates routinely assert that “research has shown” a particular policy to be desirable. But how reliable is the analysis in the research they invo

in: The Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 28:3, s. 273-295 (2020) In October 2017, following the Harvey Weinstein scandal, US actress Alyssa Milano called upon victims of sexual harassment to uni

Synthese, vol. 204, 86 Abstract How is someone who seeks a reflective equilibrium to respond upon learning that others disagree with her? Regrettably, not much attention has been devoted to that questio

Basic Income Studies, 11 (1), 61–74. https://doi.org/10.1515/bis-2016-0013 Abstract A widespread argument in the basic income debate is that the unconditional entitlement to a secure income floor improve

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

Should Extinction Be Forever?, Philosophy and Technology, First online: 17 october 2015 This article will explore a problem which is related to our moral obligations towards species. Although the re-cr, (6128), 32–33, ). This article will provide an argument in favour of re-creation based on normative considerations. The environmentalist community generally accepts that it is wrong to exterminate species, for reasons beyond any instrumental value these species may have. It is often also claimed that humanity has a collective responsibility to either preserve or at least to not exterminate species. These two beliefs are here assumed to be correct. The argument presented here departs from and places these two ideas in a deontological framework, from which it is argued that when humanity causes the extinction of a species, this is a moral transgression, entailing a residual obligation. Such an obligation implies a positive duty to mitigate any harm caused by our moral failure. In light of recent scientific progress in the field of genetic engineering, it will be argued that humanity has a prima facie obligation to re-create species whose extinction mankind may have caused, also known as de-extinction.

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.