Institutes, companies and organizations connected to futures studies or future aligned consultancy. The Institute for Futures Studies is not responsible for the content of these web sites and many of t

Foresight, doi.org/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0042  Abstract PurposeThe claim that super intelligent machines constitute a major existential risk was recently defended in Nick Bostrom’s book Superintelligence and

Mind 130(520), 2021 Abstract The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described asconservative changefrom one probabilistic belief orcredencefunction to another in response to new information. ). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or concepts of which one was previously unaware? The economists,) make a proposal in this spirit. Philosophers have adopted effectively the same rule: revision in response to growing awareness should not affect the relative probabilities of propositions in one’s ‘old’ epistemic state. The rule is compelling, but only under the assumptions that its advocates introduce. It is not a general requirement of rationality, or so we argue. We provide informal counterexamples. And we show that, when awareness grows, the boundary between one’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ epistemic commitments is blurred. Accordingly, there is no general notion of conservative change in this setting.

The Institute for Futures Studies is looking for a postdoc to be part of a research project on valuing future lives. The applicant needs to hold a PhD degree on a relevant philosophical topic when the (Philosophy).

How should we value future lives when making decisions? This question is directly relevant to for example prioritisation in health care, population control, climate change, and existential risk (the survival of animal species and humanity).

Roger Crisp, Professor of Moral Philosophy, Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St Anne's College, University of Oxford Abstract It is widely believed that one of the main reasons we should seek to d

Hernan Mondani

I work at the Department of sociology, Stockholm University and at the Institute for Futures Studies. My previous appointments are: Research assistant and doctoral student at Department of sociology,

In: Mosquera, J. & O. Torpman (ed.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations vol. 6. Working Paper Series 2024:10–17 Abstract ‘For this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer thro

Annual Review of Environment and Resources, vol. 49 Abstract This review examines the promises and pitfalls of multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) for sustainable development. We take stock of the lite

Edward Page, Associate Professor of Political Theory, University of Warwick ABSTRACTClimate change, by damaging the quality of life of populations already suffering from acute vulnerability and hardshi the adoption of measures of mitigation and adaptation and a ‘second-order injustice’ if the associated losses and damages arise as of these measures. Both forms of injustice involve ‘losses and damages’ arising that would not have occurred but for climate change but raise distinct normative problems given their diverging origins. This research seminar explores some key normative puzzles raised by the new ethics and politics of ‘loss and damage’ as it relates to both first-order and second-order climate change injustice. In particular, the lecture focuses on which normative principles should guide measures seeking to address first-order and second-order climate change injustices experienced by states and how (if at all) new forms of policy can be designed that respect these principles.