Dr Malcolm Fairbrother, University of Bristol ABSTRACTMost people say they are concerned about the serious environmental problems confronting the world today and threatening the well-being of future ge

Jo (Jonathan) Wolff, Professor of Philosophy at University College London ABSTRACTMoral and political philosophers typically hope that their theories and arguments will have a positive influence on rea

in Klenk, M. (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, London: Routledge, 2020. (ISBN: 0367343207) AbstractSome philosophers question whether higher-order evidence can support the radical sk

in Analysis, Volume 80, Issue 2 AbstractKurt Gödel’s version of the Ontological Proof derives rather than assumes the crucial (yet controversial) Possibility Claim, that is, the claim that it is possib

in: Nature Communications 12, 1481. AbstractNorm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violation

Rae Langton, Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge University ABSTRACTWhat we do with words can help or hinder justice in ways that exploit rules of accommodation: a process of adjustment that tends to

in: Frontiers in Psychology AbstractCross-cultural comparisons often investigate values that are assumed to have long-lasting influence on human conduct and thought. To capture and compare cultural val

Åsa Knaggård, Phd in political science at Lund University. ABSTRACTThat scientific knowledge should be useful and that policies should be based on knowledge, are believes that today are increasingly en

Laura Valentini, Associate Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics ABSTRACTMany contemporary philosophers—of a broadly deontological disposition—believe that there exist some pre-i. In this paper, I defend this unpopular view. I argue that all rights are grounded in —namely, norms constituted by the collective acceptance of gives “oughts”—, provided the norms’ content meets some independent standards of moral acceptability. This view, I suggest, does justice to the relational nature of rights, by explaining how it is that right-holders acquire the authority to demand certain actions (or omissions) from duty-bearers. Furthermore, the view does not divest human beings of fundamental moral protections. Even if, absent some rights-grounding positive norms, obligations cannot be to others, we still have  (non-directed) placing constraints on how we may permissibly treat one Another.

White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy, Corpus Christi College at the University of Oxford ABSTRACTMany people believe that collectives of certain kinds, such as corporations and states, are entities ca