I’m a research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research in Oxford, where most of my research concerns ethical questions about the long-term future. In addition to ethics, I’m also interested in formal epistemology and decision theory. I defended my PhD thesis in philosophy at the London School of Economics in November 2018.
Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69(4):1205-1230. 2018.
Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication Synthese 191 (9): 1991-2007. 2014. (with Erik J. Olsson)
Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement? Synthese 190(8): 1437-1454. 2013. (with Erik J. Olsson)
Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement? Synthese 190(8): 1437-1454. 2013. (with Erik J. Olsson)
Norms of assertion and communication in social networks. Synthese 190 (13): 2557-2571. 2013. (with Erik J. Olsson)
