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Social Values and Attitudes in the Mena Region - evidence from World Values Survey

A report from World Values Survey Association in cooperation with ERF and Silatech

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Young People...Enterprise...Employment...

The MENA Report on Values and Social Norms - evidence from World Values Survey

Edited by Bi Puranen & Fares Braizat.
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Preface

This Report on the Middle East and North Africa is the result of the close work and collaboration between Silatech, a Qatar-based philanthropic organisation and the World Values Survey. Silatech supported the World Values Survey's fieldwork in four countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, and Iraq. The Economic Research Forum (ERF) has funded Tunisia and Yemen and both organizations have generously facilitated meetings and workshops connecting researchers in the region with scholars from around the world. Silatech supplied the financing for this Report, which provides a comprehensive assessment of the findings of the World Values Survey, Wave 6 in the 12 MENA countries where interviews were conducted.

The Report was produced in collaboration with young scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and North America, with the academic support of NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions in Amman, Jordan.

The production of this Report has been supervised by Associate Professor Bi Puranen, Secretary-General of the World Values Survey and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Future Studies in Stockholm, Sweden, and Dr. Fares Braizat, Amman, Jordan, Chairman of NAMA Strategic Intelligence Solutions and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the World Values Survey.

With generous assistance from Silatech and ERF (Economic Research Forum), Wave 6 of the World Values Survey is one of the most exhaustive surveys ever conducted in the MENA region. It is our hope that the diverse social, political, cultural, economic, and ethical insights gathered by the World Values Survey and presented in this Report will be of indispensable value to academics, journalists, business leaders, policy and decision makers, and anyone else with an interest in this critical part of the world.

Stockholm & Amman, July 2017

Bi Puranen
Secretary-General

Social Values and Attitude in the MENA Region: Evidence from World Values Survey, Wave 6

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1. Introduction

The least peaceful region in the world

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is in turbulence, confusion and disorder. Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen are in civil war, causing immeasurable damage not only to human lives but also to physical buildings, schools, hospitals, historical monuments and infrastructure. Several other countries in the region are in despair and turmoil politically, socially and economically. The MENA-region is by far the least peaceful region in the world.[1] The current concentration of violence and conflict in MENA is so intense that, when considered separately, the rest of the world's average peace levels the last years have improved. Fifteen million people have fled their homes, many to fragile or economically weak neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Tunisia, giving rise to the biggest refugee crisis since World War II.[2] The occurrence of IS and the civil wars in Yemen, Libya and Syria have set those countries' development back decades. Blockades, unrest and violence have made Gaza's unemployment rate the highest in the world and oil exporting countries like Algeria, Iran and the GCC, are grappling with low oil prices along with chronic youth unemployment. In its early stages, the Arab Spring popular movement appeared powerful enough to transform the region dramatically towards rapid democratisation, resembling to the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, but such hopes proved premature.

The aftermath of the Arab Spring – some have even begun to call it the Arab Winter – has shown a wave of reaction and a descent into violent chaos; the ascendancy of the extreme jihadist Islamic State (IS) and other radical Islamist groups in MENA has been permitted by the political vacuum left behind by the demise of Arab nationalism, the failure of other political forces like the Muslim Brotherhood and the collapse of nation states over the past two decades.

[1] Global Peace Index, 2015: http://visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index/2015
[2] Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase. One in every 122 humans is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum, UNHCR, June 18 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/6/558193896/worldwide-displacement-hits-all-time-high-war-persecution-increase.html

Most people favour democracy

Despite setbacks and overall stagnation in the region after the Arab uprisings, this and other surveys show that most people in most places still favour democracy. The Arab barometer shows that between 70 and 80 % of the people in the MENA region have maintained their faith in democracy.[3] The World Values Survey show similar support for the idea of democracy and democratic values. Trends such as globalisation, increasing education and expanding middle classes, tend to favour the organic evolution of democracy. However, after a unsuccessful attempt by the US and Britain to implement democracy to the Middle East in 2003 and onwards, democracy's proponents have become increasingly wary and cautious about the prospects of a further wave of democratisation. [4]The general idea when nations are financing, supporting and in other ways try to implement democracy or advancing a specific ideology or religious belief, they do it with the intention to see an end to a conflict. Research suggests that the opposite effect is what is achieved. Proxy wars tend to cement civil wars and make them last longer. [5]History has taught us that civil wars seldom find its peaceful solution by the use of weapons, terror and suicide bombs, they are won through negotiations and compromises.

Even so, there are many reasons to expect that political upheavals will present further challenges to authoritarian regimes also in future. These protests may not all be successful and not all will take the form of mass popular uprisings, but the outlook for democratic transition is, however, uncertain. The developments following the Arab uprising have been a dark reminder that the forces of reaction can win even after a mass popular struggle for democratic change. The ingredients that initiated the protests are as present and explosive as ever: Politically, the repressive and military backed systems of governance that have dominated the region for decades, will appear ever more odd and alien to the region's young and all the more interconnected and globally aware populations. Economically, governments will struggle to provide sufficient job opportunities for their more educated workforces.

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[3] Robbins, M., 2015, After the Arab Spring, people still want democracy, Journal of Democracy, October 2015, https://www.arabbarometer.org/.../10_26.4_Robbins%20pp.%2

[4] Economist, The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2015, Democracy in an age of anxiety: https://www.yabiladi.com/img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf

[5] Laia Balcells &Stathis N. Kalyvas, Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars Journal of Conflict Resolution December 2014 58: 1390-1418, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002714547903

Education and employment

In Egypt you are more likely to be jobless if you have studied at a university than if you are an unskilled worker. The fact is that the youth unemployment rate increases with each additional level of educational attainment; tertiary-level graduates have the highest rate at 34.0 %, compared to only 2.4 % among youth with less than primary-level education. For young women, the highest unemployment rate is among those with general secondary-level education with a rate of inconceivable 76.0 %.[6] A whole generation of young men and women is facing the risk of social and economic exclusion, states an OECD report about the future for young people in the MENA-region.[7] And this situation will not be eased by the up-keeping of the often corrupt and nepotistic practices upon which many of the Middle East's authoritarian regimes are founded.

With high levels of youth unemployment and overall low employment levels, political tensions and social instability are expected to increase across the MENA region well into the 2020s At the same time The MENA report, suggest that people are tired of conflict and civil war, and are swaying in their support for the nation where they live. When asked of their willingness to fight for their country, there are more people in Europe and the US who are prepared to do so than in all countries in the MENA report. The MENA average is 72 % – in US and Sweden there are more than 85 % who say they are prepared to fight in name of their nation.

Ethnic diversity and demographic change

The MENA-region is encompassing approximately 20 to 25 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA demonstrates a kaleidoscope of ethnic and religious groups. Most states in the region have at least one major, one or two minor and a number of small minority groups. Some are just within a state, while others are scattered across several countries. Minorities and their position in society is an important direct or indirect cause of many of the conflicts in the region. In 2012, investigators from the Human Rights Council interviewed more than 1,200 victims, refugees and militia in Syria. Many of the rebel fighters interviewed by the panel described themselves as loyal to Islamist militias or ethnic-based movements. Civilians, likewise, are increasingly being drawn into the

[6] Barsoum, G., Ramadan,M., Mostafa M. 2014, Labour market transitions of young women and men in Egypt, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_247596.pdf

[7] Youth in the MENA Region, How to bring them in, April 2016, http://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/youth-in-the-mena-region.pdf

opposing camps, the authors said. They described a sectarian conflict that "alongside the fight against the government," would have far-reaching consequences for Syria's future.[8] The past fifty years have seen a near quadrupling of the population in the region, increased living standards, high urbanization, industrialization and consumption. The result is that water shortages are evident today in all but five countries. In other places electricity and public transport is unreliable, scarce or non-existent. This reduces and limits investment opportunities and growth. As a result, the demographic change characterized by the growing young population is considered to be a burden on the economy rather than an asset. This situation alone is likely to fuel social unrest and further instability as a youthful population grows.

Oil dependency and jobs creation

Over the past decade, the countries in the MENA region has had an economic growth of less than 2 % per year. This growth rate has proven too low to generate sufficient employment opportunities for the fast-growing population and many workers only find jobs in the informal economy. Indeed, unemployment in the region remains the highest in the world. The International Labour Office, ILO claims that many jobs could be created in the MENA region if the foreign investment could be steered away from sectors like construction, telecommunications and mining. ILO thinks more jobs would be created in sectors like manufacturing, high-technology services and agriculture. Such jobs will also have positive spill-overs onto other sectors ending in a surplus productivity growth in the region.

The MENA region accounts for 5 to 6 % of the world's population, 60 % of the world's known oil reserves and 45 % of the world's known natural gas reserves. These resources has for decades been an important source of global economic stability and also given wealth to some countries in the region. Today few believe that petroleum anytime soon will regain its role as an instrument to preserve economic stability in the MENA region. Aside from the general slowdown in the world economy, where China has entered a period where real estate developers have slowed down investment in new projects. The reasons for the slowdown are plentiful: worldwide climate protection policies, technological advances in the energy sector, increasing use of solar panels and windmills and the rising popularity of electric and hybrid vehicles. Still the transport sector depends on oil and gasoline for 90 % of its fuel, but the transition from fossil fuels to a low-carbon economy could come much sooner than the oil and gas industry expects. The

[8] Warwick, J., Syrian conflict's sectarian, ethnic dimensions growing, U.N. warns, Washington Post, December 20, 2012, http://www2.ohchr.org:80/english/bodies/hrcouncil/

consequences can be tough for the whole MENA-region; volatile economies add pressure to the social and political burdens already affecting the region.

Saudi Arabia and Gulf states has the means to transform

Some of the countries in the MENA-region are making some preparations in the event that oil no longer will run their economies. In Saudi Arabia, the Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already initiated his "Vision 2030" plan, that aims to boost the country's non-oil revenues from today's humble 10 % of the total. The plans include the transformation of the national oil producing company Aramco into a global industrial conglomerate, the formation of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund that will "expand across borders". If this means the MENA-region or the New York Stock Exchange is unclear, but the vision includes setting up new factories for military materiel and digital equipment. The vision foresees job opportunities for millions, introduction of reforms for transparency and accountability.[9]

Also the UAE have presented a post oil-vision for the emirates in the gulf. In January 2016, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, declared: "Shifting towards the post-oil era is a major transformation in our history as Emiratis: success is the only option," he said. "We want the UAE to be a success story in shifting our economy from relying on natural resources to relying on Emiratis' skills and knowledge." Many analysts say that the only way to achieve this, is to open up ownership to foreign investors and encourage greater transparency and streamline taxation and regulation.[10]

The Human Freedom Index

Every other year since 2008 the Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom present the Human Freedom Index (HFI).[11] It is the most comprehensive freedom index created for a globally set of countries. The HFI covers 159 countries and captures the degree to which people are free to enjoy the major freedoms often referred to as civil liberties—freedom of speech, religion, and association and assembly. In addition, it includes indicators on rule of law, crime and violence, freedom of movement, and legal discrimination against same-sex relationships. The index

[9] Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-SaudSaudi, April 24 2016, Vision 2030, http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/reports
[10] Razan Nasser, senior economist at HSBC, interviewed in The Nation, January 31, 2016, http://www.thenational.ae/uae/leaders-chart-new-strategic-roadmap-for-the-uae-after-oil
[11] Vásquez I. and Porčnik T., The Human Freedom Index 2016 https://object.cato.org/iles/human-freedom-index-files/human-freedom-index-2016-update-3.pdf

also include nine variables pertaining to women's freedom that are found in various categories of the data set.

On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 represents more freedom, the non-weighted average rating for 159 countries in 2014 – the most recent year for which data are available – was 6.93. The level of global freedom stayed about the same compared to 2008, but almost all countries experienced changes in their ratings, with about half of those increasing their ratings and half decreasing. The top freest jurisdictions were Hong Kong, Switzerland, New Zealand, Ireland, Denmark, Australia , Canada, the United Kingdom, Finland and the Netherlands. The least free countries are Guinea, Angola, Myanmar, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Syria, Iran, Yemen and Libya. Out of 17 regions, the highest levels of freedom are in Western Europe, Northern Europe, and North America (Canada and the United States). The lowest levels are in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and sub- Saharan Africa.

Figure 1. Average Freedom Index Ranking by Region, 2014



Women's freedoms, as measured by seven relevant indicators in the index, are strongest or least repressed in Europe and North America and least protected in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Countries in the top quartile of freedom enjoy a significantly higher per capita income ($37,147) than those in other quartiles; the per capita income in the least-free quartile is $8,700. The HFI shows a strong correlation between human freedom and democracy.

Figure 2. Average Women's Personal Freedom Index Score by Region, 2014



The World Values Survey's general findings

In this report, results from face-to-face interviews carried out between 2012 and 2015 with people from 13 of the countries in the MENA-region are presented. The results are analysed within the framework for an on going global survey on peoples' values that was initiated by a network of scholars in 1981, called the World Values Survey.

The WVS network every five years conduct a new wave of interviews. The survey is carried out by professional organizations in almost 100 countries covering the ideas, thoughts, beleifs and values of more than 90 % of the worlds population. Each country has a Principal Investigator (social scientists working in academic institutions) who is responsible for conducting the survey in accordance with the fixed rules and procedures. The WVS measures, monitors and analyzes: support for democracy, tolerance of foreigners and ethnic minorities, support for gender equality, the role of religion and changing levels of religiosity, the impact of globalization, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national identity, culture, diversity, insecurity, and subjective well-being.

The findings provide information for policy makers seeking to build civil society and democratic institutions in developing countries. The work is also frequently used by governments around the world, scholars, students, journalists and international

organizations and institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations. Some of the survey's basic findings on a global level are:

- Much of the variation in human values between societies boils down to two broad dimensions: a first dimension of "traditional vs. secular-rational values" and a second dimension of "survival vs. self-expression values."
- On the first dimension, traditional values emphasize religiosity, national pride, respect for authority, obedience and marriage. Secular-rational values emphasize the opposite on each of these accounts.
- On the second dimension, survival values involve a priority of security over liberty, non-acceptance of homosexuality, abstinence from political action, distrust in outsiders and a weak sense of happiness. Self-expression values imply the opposite on all these accounts.
- The largest increase in existential security occurs with the transition from agrarian to industrial societies. Consequently, the largest shift from traditional towards secular-rational values happens in this phase.
- People's priorities shift from survival to self-expression values as their sense of individual agency increases (or backwards from self-expression values to survival as the sense of individual agency decreases).
- The largest increase in individual agency occurs with the transition from industrial to knowledge societies. Consequently, the largest shift from survival to self-expression values happens in this phase.
- The value differences between societies around the world show a pronounced culture zone pattern. The strongest emphasis on traditional values and survival values is found in the Islamic societies of the Middle East. By contrast, the strongest emphasis on secular-rational values and self-expression values is found in the Protestant societies of Northern Europe.

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2. Country Descriptions

2.1. Introduction

There are numerous paradoxes related to the 'Middle East' – one of them being the origin of the region's very name. The term 'Middle East' by which the region is referred to today, was for a long time regarded as an invention of the early 1900s, answering a Eurocentric need to find a more precise description of the area between the 'Near East' (based on Turkey) and 'Far East' (based on China). An American naval officer, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, used the term Middle East in an article in the September 1902 issue of National Review.[12] Mahan never exactly defined which countries comprise the region – he merely implied that the term encompassed the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

More recent research claims the term 'Middle East' was coined two years earlier in 1900 by a British officer, General Sir Thomas Edward Gordon; while others suggest that the term was in use well before and may have originated in the 1850s via the British India Office.[13] The Arabic equivalent to 'the Middle East' has become standard usage in the mainstream Arabic press, in spite of the term's Western origins.[14]

The acronym 'MENA' was first used in the 1980s by Western politicians, businessmen and economists as shorthand for the Middle East and North Africa. The term broadly refers to the region spanning from Morocco in the west to Iran in the east, including around 20 countries. A fixed definition of the MENA region does not exist – sometimes countries like Cyprus, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Sudan, West Sahara, Mali, Eritrea and also Somalia are included – but most often not. The acronym is more geographically defined, rather than religiously or socially. The following is a list of the countries and territories in MENA-region as defined by the UN and World Bank: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates The MENA region has – depending on which countries are included – between 300 and 400 million inhabitants, accounting for about 5-6% of the world's population.

[12] Koppes, C.R., 1976, Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term 'Middle East', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), pp. 95-98
[13] Ephraim, K. and Muhammad S.. 2009, Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence, Scarecrow Press
[14] Anderson, E.W., Fisher, W.B. 2000), The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics. Routledge. pp. 12–13

This report is based on 16,422 interviews conducted in 13 countries in the MENA region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen. For several reasons explained in detail in Chapter 3, Bahrain is excluded from this report; survey data collected for Bahrain failed to exhibit the same high quality as the data for the other 12 MENA countries.

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2.2. Country descriptions

2.2.1. Algeria

- Official title: People's Democratic Republic of Algeria[15]
- Capital: Algiers
- Territorial area: 2,381,741 sq km
- Population: 40,263,711 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 76.8 years
- Median age: 27.8 years
- Government
  - Type: Presidential republic
  - Chief of State: President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (since April 1999)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal (since April 2014)
- Currency: Algerian Dinar (DZD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $609.4 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $15,000 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 3.6% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -14.1% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 6.0% of GDP (2016)

The global fall in the oil prices in recent years has squeezed Algerian finances. Revenues from oil and gas make up over 95% of the country's exports and more than half the budget. Not unlike other MENA countries unemployment is very high – especially among youth. Corruption and poor public services are a leading contributing factor for increased discontent among the population. Without economic and political reforms, Algeria is at risk of slumping deeper into crisis. Still, Algeria has assets that could enable it to become a significant regional power. The country is also a major player in the fight against terrorism.

[15] All bulleted figures here are from: "Algeria." World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 8 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html

Map of Algeria[16]

Algeria is Africa's largest country – almost one-fourth the size of Europe – extending from the Mediterranean deep into the Sahara. The vast majority of Algeria's population of 40 million live along the coast, where the capital, Algiers, is located. Ninety-nine percent of Algerians are Muslim – predominately Sunni. Large deposits of oil and natural gas provide the economic backbone of the country, supplemented by other natural resources like iron ore, phosphates and uranium.[17] Settlements in the northern coastal portion of the country bear the influence of more than one hundred years of French colonial rule, which ended with a bitter war lasting from 1954 to 1962. An attempt in 1991 to introduce democracy also turned into a violent conflict, provoked by the Algerian military's move to thwart the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist political party. More than 100,000 people are estimated to been killed in the 1991-2002 civil war.

Up until the 1970s Algeria had a very high fertility rate, but due to increases in women's education and participation in the labour market, the rising age of first marriage (from around 19-years-old in the 1950s to just over 30-years-old in 2000), and wider use of contraceptives, the fertility rate has fallen from seven children per woman in 1970 to 2.3 in 2016.

[16] Map of Algeria (Physiography) 2001. Perry-Castañeda Library, University of Texas-Austin. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/algeria_physio-2001.jpg

[17] Algeria sees $51 billion budget deficit on weaker oil." Al-Arabiya. 30 December 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2014/12/30/Algeria-sees-51-billion-budget-deficit-on-weaker-oil.html

A former army officer and foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika won his first presidential term in 1999 and continues to rule Algeria in his fourth term as president, with the backing of an opaque group of military officers and civilian movers and shakers referred to as "le pouvoir" or "the power". After an amendment to the constitution that allowed him to serve as president more than two terms, Bouteflika won his subsequent third and fourth terms in 2009 and 2014. In response to the Arab Spring, the government in 2011 introduced some modest reforms, which included lifting state of emergency restrictions, increasing quotas for female representatives in elected assemblies, pay rises for state employees, and decreased prices for essential foods and social housing. But collapsing oil revenues, providing the bulk of government finances, mean that these new hand-outs – in addition to existing large public spending – are not sustainable in the long-run. Protests over rising prices and stagnant incomes are common.[18] Twenty-three percent of Algerians live below the poverty line. In a situation that is not unique to the North African country, Algerian society is going through a growing social crisis relating to dissatisfaction with income inequality, a housing crisis, and poor public services. The public sector constitutes 60% of the job market. Algerian youth (15 to 29-years-old), who account for almost one-third of the population, experience high levels of employment, at 25%.

On-going unrest in neighbouring Tunisia and especially Libya has compounded Algerian anxieties, as have rumours concerning the health of 80-year-old President Bouteflika. Bouteflika has had two strokes, and since 2013 has reportedly undergone cancer treatment in France for extended periods.[19] In September 2016, the then 79-year-old president made a rare appearance to inaugurate a conference centre in Algiers – his first public appearance since 2014. Many believe that "le pouvoir" have seized power amidst the president's declining health, and that this clique of unelected oligarchs, generals, and ministers now call all the shots in government.[20]

[18] "Algeria's Bouteflika Makes Rare Appearance After Opponents Call for Early Polls." Voice of America (VOA). 8 September 2016. http://www.voanews.com/a/algerias-bouteflika-makes-rare-appearance-opponents-call-early-polls/3499223.html

[19] "Algeria: Who is in charge?" The Economist. 4 February 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21690070-rumours-swirl-around-ailing-president-who-charge

[20] Gall, C., "Who Runs Algeria? Many Doubt It's Ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika." New York Times. 23 December 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/world/africa/suspicions-mount-that-ailing-president-abdelaziz-bouteflika-is-no-longer-running-algeria.html?_r=0

2.2.2. Egypt

- Official title: Arab Republic of Egypt[21]
- Capital: Cairo
- Territorial area: 1,001,450 sq km
- Population: 94,666,993 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 72.7 years
- Median age: 23.8 years
- Government
  - Type: Presidential republic
  - Chief of State: President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (since June 2014)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Sherif Ismail (since September 2015)
- Currency: Egyptian Pound (EGP)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $1.105 trillion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $12,100 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 3.8% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -9.4% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 1.7% of GDP (2015)

In the fertile lands along the Nile River, one of the world's earliest civilisations developed around 5,000 years ago. Much of Egypt's ancient history remained a mystery until the 1799 discovery of the Rosetta Stone and the subsequent translation of Egyptian hieroglyphs. The Great Pyramid of Giza is the only one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World still intact today. The modern Egyptian republic was founded as a result of the Revolution of 1952 led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser of the Free Officers Movement, which precipitated the complete withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal. The 1952 revolution and founding of the republic represented the first time in 2,300 years that Egypt was fully independent and ruled by native Egyptians. While Egypt is, by virtue of its size and history, one of Africa's most important political actors, the country is currently marked by political unrest and repression, demographic stress, profound class divisions, and widespread poverty[22]

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[21] All bulleted figures here are from: "Egypt." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 11 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html

[22] After the Arab Spring: The ruining of Egypt." Economist. 6 Aug 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21703374-repression-and-incompetence-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-are-stoking-next-uprising

Map of Egypt[23]

Egypt, with approximately 90.2 million people, is the most populous country in the Middle East and the third most populous country in Africa, after Nigeria and Ethiopia.[24] Most of the population is heavily concentrated in the Nile Valley and Delta, which are among the most densely populated areas in the world. The area around the Suez Canal is also fairly densely populated. Egypt's inhabited and cultivated lands altogether make up less than 5% of the land surface. Cairo city proper and its suburbs form a megalopolis of nearly 20 million inhabitants. Egypt's rapid population growth – 46% between 1994 and 2014 – places enormous stress on the country's limited natural resources, as well as jobs, housing, sanitation, education, and health care services. The main sources of foreign currency are remittances from workers abroad, Suez Canal transit fees, tourism, and oil.

Egypt's population growth has only recently begun to tapper off; however, the population is still quite young. One in three residents are under 15-years-old, and the absolute number of young Egyptians is expected to continue to grow, from 46 million in 2010 to 58 million in 2025. By 2050, the United Nations projects Egypt could be home to up to 150 million people.[25]

Around 90% of Egyptians are Muslim, predominantly Sunni. The majority of Egypt's Christians (roughly 10% of the total population) belong to the Coptic Orthodox church. The Copts view themselves as successors to the ancient Egyptians, and their language is a direct descendant of the Demotic Egyptian spoken during Roman times. The remainder

[23] Map from Nations Online Project: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/egypt_map.htm
[24] "About Egypt." UN Development Programme. http://www.eg.undp.org/content/egypt/en/home/countryinfo.html
[25] World Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision: Key Findings and Advanced Tables. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. New York, 2015. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf

of Egypt's sectarian composition contains minorities such as Nubians, Armenians, Greeks, and Berbers. A number of scattered minorities few % of the population belong to minorities like Nubians, Armenians, Greeks and Berbers.[26]

After achieving full independence from the British in 1952, Egypt soon became a military dictatorship promoting a vision of Arab nationalism intertwined with socialist economic planning: a political philosophy dubbed "Nasserism" and a primary example of pan-Arabist thinking. Anwar al-Sadat, who became president in 1970 abolished the one-party state, but maintained authoritarian rule over Egypt. Following a string of deeply embarrassing military defeats to Israel, Egypt under Sadat became the first Arab country to recognise Israel with the 1978 Camp David Peace Accords. Chastised by this move, Egyptian Islamists dismissed the peace deal and assassinated Sadat in 1981. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, continued a low-intensity conflict with the Islamists, while the economy was liberalised. Mubarak was driven from power during the Arab Spring in 2011, and in 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood won the first free elections in Egypt, delivering Mohamed Morsi to the presidency. Morsi immediately dissolved parliament, and attempted to curtail the power of Egypt's military establishment by firing the supreme commander and other high-ranking officers. Morsi furthermore arguably demonstrated his authoritarian tendencies by suspended the judiciary. Millions of Egyptians took to the streets again. Many accused the Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of hijacking the revolution and using their electoral victory to pave the way for the Islamisation of Egypt.

After several sustained days of public demonstrations and violence for and against the government, President Morsi was deposed in a military coup on 3 July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood has since been branded as a terrorist organisation, and thousands of its supporters have been jailed. The current military regime has also silenced much of Egypt's secular and liberal opposition. The former army chief and coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won the Egyptian presidency in 2014 with almost 97% of the vote, in an election that was boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood and most political parties. President Sisi has since struggled to come to grips with a languished economy buffeted by terrorism and political upheaval. In January 2016, al-Sisi reinstated the Egyptian Parliament. After the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stipulated tough conditions for the extension of new loans to Egypt, the government in autumn 2016 started to implement a series of reforms, including a value-added tax (VAT), and passed reforms to the civil service. In November 2016, the central bank floated the Egyptian pound, which had been overvalued for years, and allowed the price of subsidised fuel to rise; in the

[26] "Egypt's demography: The too fertile crescent." Economist. 4 June 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21653623-challenge-egypts-rising-fecundity-too-fertile-crescent

political sphere, an Egyptian court began demonstrating a greater degree of leniency to the Muslim Brotherhood.[27]

As earlier mentioned, Egypt's rapid population growth and youth bulge comprise one of the country's many major challenges. While the total fertility rate fell from roughly 5.5 children per woman in 1980 to just over three in the late 1990s as a result of state-sponsored family planning programmes, Egypt's population growth rate decreased more modestly because of reduced mortality rates and longer life expectancies. At present, literacy, educational attainment, and labour force participation rates are much lower for women than for men. Population pressure, poverty, high unemployment, and the fragmentation of inherited land holdings have historically motivated Egyptians, primarily young men, to internally migrate from rural and smaller urban areas in the Nile Delta region and the poorer rural south to Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban centres in the north.

Egypt ranks 131st out of 155 countries on the Gender Inequality Index, published by the UN Development Programme. Forty-four percent of Egyptian women have reached at least secondary education compared to 60% of their male counterparts, and 23% participate in the labour market compared to 74% of men.[28] In a comparative study published in 2013 on respect for women's rights in 22 Arab countries, Egypt ranked last. Domestic violence is common and not prohibited by law. The same applies to marital rape.[29] On press freedom, Egypt placed 159th out of 180 according to a Reporters Without Borders ranking of press freedom around the world.[30]

[27] Egyptian politics: Sense and sensitivity. Economist. 10 Nov 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709971-abdel-fattah-al-sisis-reforms-will-make-him-unpopular-can-he-stand-it-sense-and
[28] Human Development Report, 2015. UN Development Programme http://report.hdr.undp.org
[29] "Poll: Women's rights in the Arab world." Thomson Reuters Foundation. 12 November 2013. http://news.trust.org//spotlight/poll-womens-rights-in-the-arab-world/
[30] 2016 World Press Freedom Index. Reporters Without Borders. https://rsf.org/en/ranking#

2.2.3. Iraq

- Official title: Republic of Iraq[31]
- Capital: Baghdad
- Territorial area: 438,317 sq km
- Population: 38,146,025 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 74.9 years
- Median age: 19.9 years
- Government
    - Type: Federal parliamentary republic
    - Chief of State: President Fuad Masum (since July 2014)
    - Head of Government: Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (since September 2014)
- Currency: Iraqi Dinar (IQD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
    - Total: $596.7 billion (2016 est.)
    - Per capita: $16,500 (2016 est.)
    - Real growth rate: 10.3% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -16.3% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 7.3% of GDP (2015)

In Mesopotamia human civilisation developed 5,000 years ago. In more recent, contemporary times, this region, now known as "Iraq," has been the site of terrible violence and devastation – under the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein and his war with neighbouring Iran, then with the 2003 U.S. invasion and ensuing sectarian civil war, and now the Islamic State, or ISIS. Haider al-Abadi took the reigns of leadership from Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq's prime minister in 2014 amidst ISIS' lightning advance across most of the western portion of the country that summer. As of early 2017, significant advances have been made against the terrorist caliphate, with an on-going coalition-backed Iraqi offensive having made progress in recapturing the city of Mosul – the largest city population centre under ISIS occupation.

[31] All bulleted figures here are from: "Iraq." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 11 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

Map of Iraq[32]

"Mesopotamia" roughly translates to "the land between the rivers" – those being the Tigris and Euphrates. The region is often referred to as the cradle of civilisation, and it was one of the earliest known areas where mankind began to read, write, create laws, and live in cities under an organised government – notably Uruk, from which "Iraq" is derived. Formerly a region in the Ottoman Empire, subdividing into a handful of smaller provinces, Iraq was occupied by the United Kingdom during the course of World War I. In 1920 it was declared a League of Nations mandate under British administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq eventually attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A "republic" was proclaimed in 1958 after a military coup, designating the beginning of a procession of secular autocrats that would rule Iraq until 2003 – the last of whom was Saddam Hussein.

With the help of increasing oil revenues, Iraq under Saddam diversified its largely oil-based economy. Saddam implemented a national infrastructure campaign that made great progress in building roads, promoting mining, and developing other industries. Prior to the 1970s, most Iraqis lived in the countryside and roughly two-thirds were peasants. The portion of Iraqis living as peasants decreased from the 1970s onwards as tens of billions of dollars from rising global oil prices was invested into industrial expansion. Electricity was brought to nearly every city in Iraq and many outlying areas. These developments benefitted Saddam's political position.

[32] Map from United Nations: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/46/Un-iraq.png

Territorial disputes with Iran – as well as fear of the ayatollahs' revolutionary pan-Islamist ideology spreading to Iraq and undermining its own secular nationalist regime – led to a costly and ultimately inconclusive war lasting between 1980 and 1988. Two years later, in August 1990, Iraq would again involve itself in an ill-fated military adventure, invading and occupying Kuwait until being expelled by a US-led UN coalition during the Gulf War. After the Gulf War, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions on Iraq tied to the removal of its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The sanctions regime was a near-total financial and trade embargo (with exceptions for medicines and foodstuffs), and it had a deep humanitarian impact and remains an issue of controversy; childhood mortality more than double over the course of the 1990s.[33] Sanctions on Iraq were eventually lifted with the U.S. invasion in 2003.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the U.S. urged the United Nations to take bolder military action against Iraq, but after having made weapon inspections in the country, the UN Security Council did not find sufficient evidence of a continued WMD programme to authorise such action. In March 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom unilaterally invaded Iraq. Saddam Hussein, who fled from his palace in Bagdad in April, was captured on 13 December 2003.

Iraq's first post-invasion parliamentary election was held in January 2005. This aspirational moment was followed in the subsequent years by Iraq's descent into a vicious sectarian civil war broadly pitting the country's Sunnis and Shias against one another; this violence was finally brought back down to tolerable levels by the 2007 U.S. troop surge. In December 2011, the U.S. completed a total withdraw of its military forces from Iraq, resulting in renewed sectarian escalation as the central government in Baghdad under al-Maliki adopted a more exclusionary posture in relation to Iraq's minority Sunni population. The Islamic State (ISIS), which can trace its origins to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), returned to Iraq from Syria in 2013–14, seizing the majority of Anbar province and many other settlements in northern Iraq, among them the city of Mosul, home to around 2 million people. During this time, the Iraqi military, which the United States had invested billions of dollars and thousands of lives to train and equip, essentially dissolved when confronted with the enemy.

From this low point in 2014, ISIS has been put on the defensive, with cities in Anbar province like Ramadi and Fallujah recaptured by a retrained Iraqi military. On 3 November 2016, Iraqi forces accompanied by Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni tribal fighters

[33] "Child death rate doubles in Iraq." BBC News. 25 May 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/763824.stm

and Iranian-backed Shia militias entered Mosul after more than two weeks of fighting their way across the plains to the east of the city, through nearby towns and suburbs.[34] Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said on 29 November 2016 that Mosul would be "liberated" by the end of that year.[35] However, as of April 2017, ISIS fighters are still active in western Mosul, and most of the city remains without water, food and electricity. The United Nations estimated on 17 April that as many as 500,000 people remain in ISIS-controlled districts in western Mosul, including 400,000 in the densely populated old city: "The sheer volume of civilians still fleeing Mosul city is staggering," said Lise Grande, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq in a report.[36]

The military defeat of ISIS in Iraq and the ultimate destruction of its caliphate extending into Syria is understood to be a precondition for peace in a part of the world that has not experience real peace for some time now.

2.2.4. Jordan

- Official title: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan[37]
- Capital: Amman
- Territorial area: 89,342 sq km
- Population: 8,185,384 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 74.6 years
- Median age: 22.3 years
- Government
  - Type: Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
  - Chief of State: King Abdullah II (since February 1999)
  - Head of Government: Hani Al-Mulki (since June 2016)
- Currency: Jordanian Dinar (JOD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $86.19 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $11,100 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 2.8% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -6.5% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 4.3% of GDP (2015)

[34] Mosul will be liberated, but Iraq's future hangs in the balance, David Gardner, Financial Times, October 18, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/92dec32a-9528-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b

[35] Iraq sees near end to Mosul battles, Mohamed Mostafa, Nov 29, 2016, Iraqinews, http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/iraq-sees-near-end-mosul-battles-us-projects-longer-term/
Abadi: Battle to liberate Mosul continues, Staff writer, Al Arabiya, 29 October 2016, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/10/29/US-Coalition-Mosul-battle-to-halt-for-two-days.html

[36] UN Releifweb: "Nearly half a million civilians have fled Mosul since fighting began six months ago". http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/nearly-half-million-civilians-have-fled-mosul-fighting-began-six-months-ago-hundreds

[37] All bulleted figures here are from: "Jordan." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html

Ever since its invention by the British after the First World War, Jordan has served as an essential pro-Western intermediary to the Middle. Jordan is one of the more politically stable Arab countries, if resource-poor, with a well-educated population and a comparatively good health system. The Hashemite royal family (considered to be directly descended from the Prophet Muhammad) has long enjoyed wide respect among its subjects, but in recent years has begun to face simmering dissatisfaction tied to deep class divisions and a lack of political freedom. More than half the country's population of almost 10 million are Palestinian, most of whom are either refugees or their descendants, Jordan's geography presents unique challenges, with Israel to the west, Syria to the north, Iraq to the east, and Saudi Arabia to the southeast. The country is moreover almost entirely landlocked with a mere 26 kilometres coastline giving it access to the Red Sea. The well-equipped armed forces devour more than a quarter of the state budget.

Map of Jordan[38]

Jordan is home to some of mankind's earliest settlements, and relics from many of the world's great civilisations bear witness to this fact even today.[39] Located at the crossroads

[38] Map from Library of Congress: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/jordan_physio-2004.jpg
[39] Keys to the Kingdom, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/history.html

of the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean, the lands that comprise present day Jordan have served as a strategic node connecting Asia, Africa, and Europe. In this way, Jordan's geography has given it an important role to play as a conduit for trade and communications, connecting east and west, north and south.[40] Many different peoples have fought over these lands through the course of history: in the 600s, it was the Arab-Islamic Umayyads, followed by the Abbasids – whose decline was followed by a succession of Mongols, Crusaders, Ayyubids, and Mamlukes. Finally, in the early 1500s, the area today known as Jordan was conquered by the Ottoman Turks, who would continue to rule there for the next 400 years. The Ottomans were driven out and back to Turkey at the end of the First World War by the British. The newly-formed League of Nations awarded Britain the mandate to govern much of the Middle East, including Palestine. Jordan was drawn up and recognised in 1923 as "Transjordan," led by Emir Abdullah I. Jordan got full independence in 1946 and was rebranded as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, with with Abdullah I preserving his role as king.[41]

In 1948, Jordan led an alliance of Arab armies to invade the newly created Jewish state of Israel, formed from lands principally populated by Palestinian Arabs living under a British mandate. Israel's creation, under a UN partition plan, effectively gave the new state control of the West Bank and annexed non-Jewish Palestinians under a decisively Jewish religious state. In 1952, Hussein bin Talal became the King of Jordan on his eighteenth birthday. King Hussein ruled Jordan for almost half a century, from 1952 to his death in 1999, and successfully navigated competing pressures from major powers like the U.S., USSR, and United Kingdom, as well as various Arab states, Israel, and a large internal Palestinian population.[42]

During the Six-Day War against Israel in 1967, Jordan lost the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and thereafter became the central base of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in its struggle against Israel. The alliance between the PLO and the Jordanians, active during the "War of Attrition" (a protracted conflict following the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO), came to a bloody end in the Black September conflict of 1970, when a civil war was fought between Jordanians and the country's displaced Palestinian population (with Syrian Ba'athist support). The conflict was about whether the Hashemite monarchy or the PLO would rule Jordan, and it took thousands of lives.[43] In the aftermath of King Hussein's victory, the defeated PLO

[40] A brief history of Jordan, Tim Lambert, New York Times, http://www.localhistories.org/jordan.html
[41] Landguiden– Jordanien, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 2016, http://www.landguiden.se/lander/asien/jordanien
[42] Myriam Ababsa (2013). The Hashemites and the Creation of Transjordan. Atlas of Jordan: History, Territories and Society. Beirut: Presses de l'Ifpo, Institut français du Proche-Orient. pp. 212–221.
[43] "Guerrillas Back At Jordan Camp – Attack by Israelis Failed to Destroy Base at Karameh or Wipe Out Commandos". *The New York Times*. September 28, 1968

was forced out of Jordan along with tens of thousands of its supporters and their Palestinian families, who largely relocated to southern Lebanon.

During the 1980s, Jordan witnessed some of the most severe protests and social upheaval in its history. Universities and urban areas were the site of protests against high inflation and the country's lack of political freedom. Massive upheaval occurred in the southern city of Ma'an, and there was rioting in several other cities over price increases. By the end of the decade, the people of Jordan were able to vote in their first general election since 1967. In 1988, King Hussein permanently relinquished Jordan's claims to the West Bank, and in 1994 he signed a peace treaty with Israel.

King Abdullah II, King Hussein's eldest son, assumed the throne following his father's death in 1999. During the first ten years of his tenure, Abdullah II implemented modest political and economic reforms. However, amidst the 2011 Arab Spring revolts across the Middle East, Jordanians pressed for even greater political liberalisation, government reforms, and economic improvements. Four years after the Arab Spring Jordan is still considered a safe haven in an increasingly chaotic Middle East. Millions of Syrian refugees presently live in gigantic camps in the north of Jordan. Still, economic growth has fallen to less than 2%, and public debt has leapt to 93% of GDP as foreign aid, tourism, investment and remittances have all sharply fallen since 2011.[44]

In September 2016, parliamentary elections under a new proportional representation system were held. It was the first such instance since 1989, when the single non-transferable vote system was introduced to weaken Islamist parties. The Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic Action Front ended its boycott of elections and made some gains, as did female candidates.[45]

Unrest due to economic hardship has accompanied political events during late 2016. A fresh bout of tax and price increases on essentials like water and bread is underway as part of a loan deal with the IMF. Years of price hikes and cuts to subsidies have eroded the position of the kingdom's once-comfortable middle class. Amman is the Arab world's most expensive capital city, but salaries are among the lowest.[46] Cuts to education and health services feed discontent, and the influx of refugees from Syria has increased the competition for jobs and resources. In February 2016, King Abdullah II

[44] Le tourisme Jordanien, victime collatérale du terrorisme, La Tribune, Tiphaine Honoré, Decembre 29, 2015, http://www.latribune.fr/economie/international/le-tourisme-jordanien-victime-collaterale-du-terrorisme-538614.html
[45] Jordan profile - A chronology of key events," BBC, 6 October 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14636713
[46] "Jordan – the uneasy crown," Economist, October 20, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709014-discontent-growing-king-abdullahs-increasingly-autocratic-rule-uneasy

said Jordan had reached saturation point in its ability to take in more Syrian refugees and on 21 June, when a terrorist attack on the last open entry point from Syria into Jordan killed seven Jordanian soldiers, authorities closed the border.[47] The decision reminded foreign governments and agencies that Jordan had already taken in 660,000 registered refugees, putting huge pressure on its economy, infrastructure, and services. During the autumn of 2016, the Jordan-Syria border was reopened to allow just a few dozen refugees across every day. In the beginning of December 2016, UNHCR urged Jordan to let pregnant women, seniors, and toddlers pass the border immediately.[48] According to the UNHCR, around 12,000 Syrian civil war refugees were trapped in the desert at the Jordanian border in the beginning of December 2016.

2.2.5. Kuwait

- Official title: State of Kuwait[49]
- Capital: Kuwait City
- Territorial area: 17,818 sq km
- Population: 2,832,776 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 78 years
- Median age: 29.2 years
- Government
  - Type: Constitutional monarchy
  - Chief of State: Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah (since January 2006)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Jaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah (since November 2011)
- Currency: Kuwaiti Dinar (KWD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $301.1 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $71,300 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 2.5% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -16.5% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 3.7% of GDP (2014)

Kuwait was established in the mid-1700s by Bedouins in search of water. They settled in the area, engaging in trade, fishing, and pearl hunting. Like the other Arab emirates

[47] 12.000 syrische Flüchtlinge sitzen in der Wüste fest, Der Spiegel, December 8, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/jordanien-12-000-syrische-fluechtlinge-warten-an-grenze-a-1066774.html
[48] "Syrian refuges in Jordan: From haven to hell." Economist. July 23, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21702471-thousands-syrians-are-trapped-border-jordan-haven-hell
[49] All bulleted figures here are from: "Kuwait." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ku.html

(broadly equivalent to Western "principalities") on the Persian Gulf, Kuwait since World War II has undergone a dramatic transformation from a poor fishing outpost to a very rich oil producer and exporter. Today it has the second highest GDP per person in the region (and the fourth-highest in the world), thanks to its large oil reserves and small population of 4.2 million people – of which 1.3 million are Kuwaiti nationals and 2.9 million are expatriates. Kuwait is widely considered among the most democratic countries in the region.

Map of Kuwait[50]

Kuwait became an independent state in 1961 after more than 60 years as a British protectorate. From early on Kuwait has had to contend with the geopolitical demands of being a small state surrounded by large powers; in particular, Saddam's Iraq, which claimed historical rights to the area as Kuwait, up until World War I, was Iraqi territory. This grievance – in addition to economic competition between the two countries; Kuwait's refusal to forgive loans made to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; and accusations that Kuwait was stealing Iraqi oil via slant drilling – ultimately came to a head when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait in 1990. Iraq was driven out of Kuwait by a US-led military coalition in early 1991. Since then, Kuwait has deepened its ties to the West and conducted several democratic reforms, including the 1992 reintroduction of an elected parliament after having been disbanded in 1986.

[50] http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kuwait_trans-2006.jpg

After the First Gulf War, the House of Sabah returned to power and established one of the most independent legislatures in the Arab world – restoration of the parliament was a key condition of U.S. support for the ruling family. In 2009, the country witnessed the historic election of four women to the National Assembly. During the Arab Spring uprisings, stateless Arabs known as "Bedoons" (children born to Kuwaiti mothers and stateless fathers) and immigrants, including Palestinians, Jordanians, Iraqis, Yemenis, and Sudanese, protested in the streets of Kuwait City demanding citizenship, jobs, and other benefits available to Kuwaiti nationals. Youth activist groups – supported by opposition legislators – rallied throughout 2011 for the prime minister's dismissal, amid allegations of widespread government corruption. The protests ultimately prompted the prime minister to resign in late 2011.

Despite some constitutional constraints, the al-Sabah family is firmly in charge of Kuwait The palace limits speech and appoints the most important figures in government, including the prime minister – who then selects the rest of the cabinet. The system has been described by scholars as "semi-democratic."[51] The 50-member National Assembly serves as Kuwait's parliament and is elected by the citizens and is often outspoken and challenging.[52] Indeed, in a general election held on 26 November 2016, voters ousted over half of incumbents in favour of candidates who promised to question and challenge the government over recent austerity measures. Earlier in 2016, the National Assembly decided to raise prices on petroleum by 83%, as well as on other subsidised commodities like food. In April 2016, parliament approved a government initiative to raise electricity and water prices paid by foreign residents and businesses, exempting citizens. The emirate is home to 1.3 million native citizens and around three million foreigners.

A friendly rivalry (it might be said, envy) exists between Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in large part because the Emirates occupies the same position Kuwait once held, as the Gulf's shining star. Kuwait created the world's first sovereign wealth fund in the 1950s and was an early regional leader in healthcare. Kuwait also started one of the first airlines in the region, Kuwait Airways: the decline of which is instructive. As its fleet aged and losses piled up, carriers from Qatar and the UAE began offering better service and more routes. Politicians have talked of privatisation, but parliament has thus far blocked these efforts, reluctant to interfere with one of the country's largest employers.

[51] The Economist, Dec 30 2016, "Kuwait is the closest thing to a democracy in the Gulf": http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21711044-elections-allow-citizens-complain-about-welfare-cuts-little-else-kuwait

[52] Landguiden 2017: https://www.ui.se/landguiden/lander-och-omraden/asien/kuwait/modern-historia/

Demonstrations took place in late 2012 in response to an Amiri decree (a decree of the emir) amending the electoral law to reduce the number of votes per person from four to one. The opposition, plus a number of different youth groups, boycotted legislative elections in 2012 and 2013, which ushered in a legislature more amenable to the government's agenda. Since coming to power in 2006, Emir Sabah al-Sabah has dissolved the National Assembly on five occasions (the Constitutional Court annulled the Assembly in June 2012 and again in June 2013) and has shuffled the cabinet over a dozen times, usually citing political stagnation and gridlock between the legislature and the government.

2.2.6. Lebanon

- Official title: Lebanese Republic[53]
- Capital: Beirut
- Territorial area: 10,400 sq km
- Population: 6,237,738 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 77.6 years
- Median age: 29.9 years
- Government
  - Type: Parliamentary republic
  - Chief of State: President Michel Aoun (since October 2016)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Saad Hariri (since December 2016)
- Currency: Lebanese Pound (LBP)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $85.16 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $18,500 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 1.0% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -8.7% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 4.8% of GDP (2015)

A rigid political system originally drawn up in the 1920s under French administration has remained Lebanon's scourge long after the tiny country got its independence in 1943. The system gave disproportionate power to Lebanon's Maronite Christians, which followed a pro-Western policy, annoying the country's Muslims who turned towards the rest of the Arab world. Tensions led to a civil war that affected the entire region and lasted from 1975 until 1990. Since then, the country has remained in political stasis and deeply fragmented, with periodic outbreaks of violence and armed conflict; for example, the 2006 invasion by Israel.. However, during the calm periods, the capital Beirut can

[53] All bulleted figures here are from: "Lebanon." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html

resemble the fashionable "Paris of the East" it was before the civil war.

Map of Lebanon[54]

After two-and-a-half years and 45 failed attempts, Lebanon finally agreed on the last day of October 2016 to install the elderly former army commander Michel Aoun as president. As leader of the most powerful Christian party, President Aoun now faces the challenge of giving and receiving the respect of his former enemies in the tiny country where the Christian minority holds a disproportionately large number of parliamentary seats, versus Shias and Sunnis, due to Lebanon's out-dated electoral system.[55] Aoun's successful presidential bid was made possible by the backing by the influential Shia militant and political movement Hezbollah.

Since the start of the Syrian Civil War, Lebanon has taken in 1.1 million refugees, who now account for about a quarter of the population. The great majority of them are Sunni, which has made their integration as citizens impossible without upending the already

[54] Map from Al Mashriq: http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/900/910/912/maps/lebanon.gif
[55] "Lebanon: Census and sensibility," Economist, Nov 5, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21709535-new-data-reveal-looming-crisis-lebanons-ruling-elite-exposing-fiction

strained sectarian balance; new data indicate that Christians do not make up more than 37% of the population.[56]

Since 2013 – when the most recent political stalemate began – Lebanon has been unable to effectively address any of its recurring crises, ranging from how to manage the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees to more mundane matters of how to pick up the garbage in the streets. Lebanon's political system enables any of the country's sectarian warlords to veto government decisions. In his inaugural address to parliament, President Aoun vowed to defend Lebanon from terrorism, strengthen the military, and take measures to pressure Syrian refugees to return home: "Lebanon is walking through a minefield but is still at a safe distance from the flames in the region."[57]

The Lebanese economy exhibits significant problems. Chronic fiscal deficits have increased Lebanon's debt-to-GDP ratio to rank as fourth highest in the world, although most of the debt is held domestically by Lebanese banks. Lebanon has a free market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition, but corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, complex customs procedures, and high taxes, tariffs, and fees make it difficult to conduct business. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism. Meanwhile, Syrian refugees have increased the labour supply, but have also pushed more Lebanese into unemployment.

One, albeit modest, silver lining an observer can take away from the Lebanese example is that even the longest sectarian wars can end. Although the Lebanese situation remains far from fully resolve, there is a tacit peace between its diverse array of religious and ethnic factions. Lebanon provides an important lesson for other countries in the Arab world.

[56] "Lebanon: Time to talk Taif," Economist, Nov 5, 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21709544-lebanons-political-system-creaking-and-needs-reform-time-talk-taif

[57] Michel Aoun Rises to Lebanese Presidency, Ending Power Vacuum," New York Times, Oct 31, 2016, Thannassis Cambanisoct, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/middleeast/michel-aoun-lebanon-president.html

2.2.7. Libya

- Official title: Libya[58]
- Capital: Tripoli
- Territorial area: 1,759,540 sq km
- Population: 6,541,948 (July 2015 est.)
- Life expectancy: 76.5 years
- Median age: 28.5 years
- Government
  - Type: In transition (provisional government)
  - Chief of State: Chairman, Presidential Council, Fayez al-Sarraj (since December 2015)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj (since December 2015)
- Currency: Libyan Dinar (LYD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $90.89 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $14,200 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: -3.3% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -20.1% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: n/a

Seven times the size of Great Britain by land area but with less than a tenth of the population, at just over six million people, Libya did not emerge as a political entity until the early 1900s, when Italy claimed its as a colony. After World War II the Italians left the then-impoverished country to struggle on its own. Oil was discovered in Libya around 1960 and soon became the country's dominant export and main source of revenue. Libya was ruled under the iron first of Muammar Gaddafi for over 40 years, until he was overthrown and killed in the 2011 Libyan Civil War, in which the United States and European allies intervened on the side of the rebels. Since then, chaos has more or less prevailed in Libya. Various armed militias fight each other in a multifaceted and multi-front conflict, controlling different parts of the territory. The terrorist group Islamic State (ISIS) has developed a significant presence in the country, but did suffer the loss of the city of Sirte in December 2016. In 2015, the interim Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, was created with strong international support. The GNA has promised elections before the end of 2017. This remains to be seen, as a rival administration in Tobruk refuses to concede to its authority.

[58] All bulleted figures here are from: "Libya." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html

Map of Libya[59]

The vast swath of North African desert that today constitutes the state of Libya has previously experienced administration by Romans, Arabs, and Turks, but never as a unified territorial concept prior to Italian colonialism in the early 20th century. Modern Libya was created when Italy conquered the area from the Ottomans in 1912 as a colony. Italy under Benito Mussolini had great plans for Libya. From the late 1920s onwards, Italy took impressive steps to improve Libya's economic and transportation infrastructure. They invested capital and technology in state development and expansion, and the modernisation of cities, the construction of highways and railroads, and also expanded port facilities and irrigation.[60] All of these measures were introduced for the benefit of the Italian-controlled sector of the economy. The fascist development policy adopted by Italy after World War I required capital-intensive "economic colonisation" which aimed to facilitate maximum utilisation of available resources. One of Italy's initial objectives in Libya was to finally solve the issues of overpopulation and unemployment in Italy through emigration to its new undeveloped colony. Once security had been established, Mussolini encouraged something he called "systematic demographic colonisation." All administrative posts, at all levels, were held by Italians. A project

[59] "Libya." The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html

[60] Smeaton Munro, Ion. Through Fascism to World Power: A History of the Revolution in Italy. Ayer Publishing. Manchester (New Hampshire), 1971

initiated by the Libyan governor Italo Balbo led the first 20,000 colonists to Libya in a gigantic convoy in October 1938. More settlers arrived the following year, and in 1940 there were approximately 110,000 Italians in Libya: accounting for about 12% of the total population.[61] After the Italian defeat in World War II, Libya was transferred to UN administration and achieved independence in 1951. The United Nations installed the Emir of Cyrenaica, a political and religious leader, as the King of Libya. He was named King Idris and described himself as a direct descendant of Muhammad.[62]

The new country was extremely poor, and King Idris was frail, ascetic, and a generally weak ruler. When large oil deposits were discovered in the 1960s things began to change economically for Libya, which also started suffering from great political unrest and instability. Following a 1969 military coup, the young army colonel Muammar Gaddafi seized power while the king was in Turkey for medical treatment. The eccentric new leader undertook massive changes in Libya, and began to develop his very own political philosophy, which was a combination of Marxism, Islam, and Third World anti-colonialism.[63] Gaddafi used oil revenues to promote his ideology outside Libya, and fought against Israel and the United States by supporting militant groups around the world and terrorist activities that included the downing of two airliners – one over Lockerbie, Scotland; another in Northern Africa – and a discotheque bombing in Berlin.

All of this led to the imposition of UN sanctions against Libya, which damaged the country's economy. Gaddafi spent the 1990s trying to re-establish good relations with the West, and in the early 2000s Libya managed to break its diplomatic isolation, particularly as rising oil prices increased its economic profile. Gaddafi was overthrown during the Arab Spring of 2011, during which Libya was plunged into civil war and NATO, sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, intervened to support the opposition with a no-fly zone. Gaddafi was killed on 20 October 2011 by rebel forces in a drainage culvert after his convoy has hit by NATO airstrikes.

Libya in 2012 formed a new parliament and elected a prime minister. The country subsequently elected the House of Representatives in 2014; however, remnants of the outgoing legislature refused to leave office and created a rival Islamist-led government, the General National Congress. In October 2015, the UN special envoy to Libya proposed a power-sharing arrangement known as the Libyan Political Agreement, which was signed by the rival governments two months later and endorsed by the United

[61] Chapin Metz, Hellen. Libya: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987
[62] "An Erratic Leader, Brutal and Defiant to the End," New York Times, Neil MacFarquhar, October. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/africa/qaddafi-killed-as-hometown-falls-to-libyan-rebels.html
[63] "King Idris, Ousted In '69 By Qaddafi, Dies In Cairo," New York Times, May 26, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/26/obituaries/king-idris-ousted-in-69-by-qaddafi-dies-in-cairo.html

Nations. The agreement called for the formation of an interim Government of National Accord (GNA) and the holding of general elections within two years.

Since its creation, the Tripoli-based GNA and its nine-member Presidential Council, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, has been disputed several times by different political opponents – especially the previous governing authority, the House of Representatives, based in the eastern city of Tobruk – but also former high-ranking army chiefs and dozens of militias.[64] In October 2016, GNA leadership was challenged by Tripoli militias who attempted a coup against the government, seizing key state buildings and a TV station and pledging they were ready to fight to take power.[65]

Several types of actors compete for power in Libya, including armed militia groups that are backed by various groups of widely-varying "official-ness"; de facto city states, particularly in western and southern Libya; tribes, which are particularly relevant in central and eastern Libya. UN diplomats, with support from Washington, London, and the European Union, have been disappointed with the situation. They have stated that they want the GNA to become more of a "unity government" that is able to bring Libya's different factions together to confront the twin problems of the Islamic State and mass migration to Europe. Up to this point, the GNA has been failing to win mass support and the necessary backing of the House of Representatives government in Tobruk.

During 2016, pro-GNA forces, comprised largely of soldiers from the city of Misrata, were engaged in an offensive against an ISIS stronghold in the city of Sirte. This most recent "Battle of Sirte" began 12 May and concluded about six months later on 6 December. Backed by U.S. air support, GNA forces entering the coastal city were met by waves of artillery, suicide-bombers, and snipers, with clashes erupting around several villages and neighbourhoods in the Sirte area. ISIS reportedly made frequent use of civilians as human shields, which delayed the advance of pro-GNA fighters.[66] In the beginning of December 2016, the last remaining members of ISIS were defeated by the operation, which was originally supposed to last a couple of weeks.

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[64] "The Twin Battle in Libya: Against the Islamic State and for Unity," Washington Institute, Ben Fishman, August 23, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-twin-battle-in-libya-against-the-islamic-state-and-for-unity

[65] "Libya coup attempt as Tripoli militias seek to topple UN-backed government," Guardian, Chris Stephen, October 15,2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/libya-coup-attempt-as-tripoli-militias-seek-to-topple-un-backed-government

[66] Amerikanische Luftwaffe bombardiert IS-Stellungen". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 1 August 2016. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/afrika/libyen-amerikanische-luftwaffe-bombardiert-is-stellungen-14367579.html

On 5 December 2016, Ali Al-Gotrani, a member of the GNA Presidential Council, made a statement declaring that, "Once our country is stable, democracy can take place and all parties can take to the 'safe polls' as the constitution drafting committee would be then resuming work as well as presidential and parliamentary elections would take place."[67]

The capture of Sirte has boosted the authority of the GNA, whose legitimacy is still contested by the rival House of Representatives administration. This government's armed forces are led by an Egyptian-backed military commander, General Khalifa Belqasim Haftar of the Libyan National Army (LNA). General Haftar has concentrated his force's nominal efforts to counter terrorism in the region where Libya's main oil installations are located – where they just so happen to confront the Petroleum Guard Forces (PFG) of General Ibrahim Jadhran who is loyal to the GNA. Contests such as this reveal the true Hobbesian nature of the situation in Libya, which is far more complex than a straightforward struggle against extremism.

It remains uncertain if the House of Representatives and the GNA will agree on any settlement or collaboration in the near-term. These uncertainties sow a fair amount of confusion and disorder in the country, exacerbated by the LNA's refusal to submit to the GNA authority. General Haftar and the LNA are the strongest credible force in Libya that could help to integrate the various militias under government supervision and stabilise the overall political situation in Libya.

There are still many steps to be taken; many compromises to be made before Libya will be back on the right track. Governing institutions must be rebuilt. In the context of Libya's history, some parties long again for a strongman to enforce stability .[68] Many in the eastern part of the country would like to see General Haftar having a prominent political role in the reconstruction of Libya.[69] Haftar's forces have secured relative stability in oil production and exports, and therefore he has the economic and military backing to rebuild the country, these voices argue. Haftar has been described as "Libya's most potent warlord," having fought "with and against nearly every significant faction" in Libya's conflicts; he possesses a "reputation for unrivalled military experience."[70] Haftar's forces have been accused of committing atrocities in Benghazi during the

[67] Libyan forces make final push to retake Sirte from ISIL". Al Jazeera. 2016-08-29, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/libyan-forces-final-push-retake-sirte-isil-160828134612134.html
[68] Al-Gotrani proposes transitional government led by Haftar, Presidential Council shuns commenting, The Libya Observer, December 5, 2016, http://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/al-gotrani-proposes-transitional-government-led-haftar-presidential-council-shuns-commenting
[69] Libya's Haftar says won't work with unity government until militias disbanded, Reuters, May 20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-haftar-idUSKCN0YB2FT
[70] What peace in Libya?, Richard Galustian, Times of Malta, December 6, 2016, http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20161206/opinion/What-peace-in-Libya.633045

offensive.[71] He also has some previous experience in seizing power. In 1969, as a young army officer, he took part in the coup that brought Gaddafi to power; in 2011 he held a senior position in the armed forces that broke with and overthrew Gaddafi. Some dismiss him only as an "Egyptian-backed relic of the old regime with presidential ambitions."[72]

2.2.8. Morocco

- Official title: Kingdom of Morocco[73]
- Capital: Rabat
- Territorial area: 446,550 sq km
- Population: 33,655,786 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 76.9 years
- Median age: 28.9 years
- Government
  - Type: Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
  - Chief of State: King Mohammed VI (since July 1999)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Saadeddine Othmani (since March 2017)
- Currency: Moroccan Dirham (MAD)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $282.8 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $8,400 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 1.8% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -4.0% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 3.3% of GDP (2015)

After more than thirty years of diplomatic isolation in Africa, Morocco was readmitted to the African Union in January 2017. Morocco left the organisation in 1984 after a majority of member states recognised the disputed territory of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that was annexed by Morocco in 1975. Morocco's King Mohammed VI, who had been campaigning over the previous year to re-join the bloc, told African leaders at the AU summit: "Africa is my home, and I am coming back home."

[71] Fighting Islamic State in Libya". The Economist. 14 May 2016.
[72] Anderson, Jon Lee (February 23, 2015). "The Unravelling: Libya's New Strongman". The New Yorker
[73] All bulleted figures here are from: "Morocco." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html

Map of Morocco[74]

The Kingdom of Morocco, the westernmost MENA country covered by the World Values Survey (Mauritania, which is slightly further west, is sometimes considered part of the MENA), has coastline on both the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Morocco is just about the size of Sweden, in terms of territory, and has 34 million inhabitants. The economy is heavily dependent on agriculture and tourism , as the country – unlike its neighbours to the east – does not have any significant gas or oil production. Morocco is the world's third largest exporter of phosphates after China and the United States. The capital of Morocco is Rabat; however, Casablanca is the country's largest city and is often described as its "economic capital."

The Berber people have inhabited Morocco since prehistoric times. Islam came with the Arab conquerors by the late 600s. The Alaouite dynasty, to which the current Moroccan royal family belongs, dates from the 17th century. In 1912, the French imposed a protectorate over the country, replacing the Spanish protectorate that had occupied northern Morocco since 1860. (Spain still possesses two cities, Ceuta and Melilla, and some islands off the North African coast, that are surrounded by Moroccan territory) After many decades of struggling to lift French rule, Morocco successfully negotiated its independence in 1956.

[74] United Nations map of Morocco https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Atlas_of_Morocco#/media/File:Un-morocco.png

Sultan Mohammed V, the current monarch's grandfather, organised the newly independent state as a constitutional monarchy, and in 1957 assumed the title of King of Morocco. When in 1976 Spain withdrew its presence from what is today called "Western Sahara," Morocco extended its de facto control of this territory. This move was at least partially motivated by the fact that West Sahara is home to one of the world's largest phosphate deposits, as well as rich fishing waters, several different mineral deposits, and possibly oil and natural gas. The United Nations does not recognise Morocco as the administering power for Western Sahara, and since 1991 has monitored a ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front, Western Sahara's liberation movement.

Like other countries in the MENA region, Morocco is currently undergoing a demographic transition as people live longer and women have fewer children.[75] Mortality rates for infants, children, and pregnant women have been reduced through better health care, nutrition, hygiene, and vaccination coverage, although disparities persist between urban and rural, rich and poor households. Morocco's shrinking child cohort reflects the decline of its total fertility rate from five in mid-1980s to 2.2 in 2016, which is a result of increased female educational attainment, higher contraceptive use, delayed marriage, and the desire for smaller families. Young adults (persons aged 15-29) make up almost 26% of the total population and represent a potential economic asset if they can find employment. Currently, however, many youths are unemployed or underemployed with jobs in the informal sector that carry little security or benefits.

During the late 20th century, Morocco became one of the world's leading sources of emigration, creating large, widely-dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. This wave of emigration was supported by national authorities as a means of securing remittances for funding national development and as an outlet to prevent unrest in rebellious areas. Most Moroccan labour migrants moved to Algeria, France, Spain, and Italy. In more recent years, Morocco has developed into a transit point for asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa and undocumented workers from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia trying to reach Europe via southern Spain – or its territories, the Canary Islands, as well as Ceuta and Melilla. Figures released by the United Nations reveal that Spain is becoming an increasingly popular route into Europe for migrants, who view it as a safer entry point than Greece or Italy.[76]

[75] Operational Portal, Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation. UNHCR. http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php

[76] "Morocco." The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html

During Arab Spring protests in early 2011, King Mohammed VI responded by implementing a reform programme that included a new constitution, which passed by popular referendum in July 2011. Under the new constitution, some additional powers were extended to the parliament and prime minister; however, ultimate authority still remains in the hands of the king. In November 2011, the Justice and Development Party, a moderate Islamist party, won the largest number of seats in parliamentary elections, becoming the first Islamist party to lead a government in Morocco. In October 2016 parliamentary elections, the Justice and Development Party stayed in power by winning 125 out of 395 seats. This election was boycotted by several parties, which protested the monarchy's still considerable executive powers. These parties also oppose the current electoral system, which they argue does not allow any party to win an outright majority in parliament; parties must instead form coalition governments. Voter turnout was 43% in the most recent election.

2.2.9. Palestine

- Official title: State of Palestine[77]
- Capital: Jerusalem (proclaimed); Ramallah (de facto)[78]
- Territorial area: 6,220 sq km (West Bank + Gaza)
- Population: 4,816,503 (West Bank + Gaza) (2016 est.)[79]
- Life expectancy: West Bank: 75 years
  Gaza Strip: 73.9 years
- Median age: West Bank: 20.8 years
  Gaza Strip: 16.9 years
- Government
  - Type: Parliamentary republic (de jure), but operates as semi-presidential republic (de facto)[80]
  - Chief of State: President Mahmoud Abbas (since May 2005)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah (since June 2014)
- Currency: No official independent currency although the following are used: Israeli New Shekel (ILS), Jordanian Dinar (JOD), U.S. Dollar (USD)[81]
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $21.22 billion (West Bank + Gaza) (2014 est.)
  - Per capita: $4,300 (West Bank + Gaza) (2014 est.)
  - Real growth rate: West Bank: 5.3% (2014 est.)
    Gaza Strip: -15.2% (2014 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -13.5% of GDP (2014 est.)[82]
- Military expenditure: n/a

The State of Palestine is recognised by 136 UN members, and since 2012 has been granted non-member observer state status in the United Nations. The general position of those countries that do not officially recognise Palestine is that the recognition of an independent Palestinian state can only be achieved when state borders are defined, and this territory is governed by a political authority with the capacity to exert full internal and external control. A total of 4.5 million people live in the nation that is both

[77] Unless otherwise noted, bulleted figures here are from:
"West Bank." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html
"Gaza Strip." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html
[78] *Chapter 1, Article 3 of the Basic Law of Palestine* (2002). Ratified 29 May 2002. http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/basic-law/2002-basic-law
[79] "Estimated Population in the Palestinian Territory Mid-Year by Governorate,1997-2016." Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/gover_e.htm
[80] State of Palestine Permanent Observer Mission to the United Nations. *Declaration of Independence* (1988) (UN Doc). United Nations. 18 November 1988. https://web.archive.org/web/20140608203237/http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/cache/offonce/pid/12353
[81] "Currency & Money." VisitPalestine. http://visitpalestine.ps/currency-money/
[82] "West Bank." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/we.html

geographically and politically split between the Gaza Strip on the Mediterranean shoreline, and the West Bank along the Jordan River. Hundreds of proposals and informal draft resolutions for a peaceful two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been put forward since the state of Israel was created in 1948 – so far in vain.

Map of Palestine's West Bank & Gaza

The name "Palestine" is derived from Philistia, a coastal area roughly covering today's Israeli coast and Gaza.[†] Use of the term Palestine to refer to this area is well established in the historical record, dating back to the Greeks since at least the 400s BC as well as the Romans. The exact boundaries of Palestine have varied over time, but in modern usage, it most often describes as the area between the Mediterranean Sea to the west, and the Jordan River and the Dead Sea to the east: all bounded by Lebanon to the north and the Gulf of Aqaba and the Sinai to the south. Today, this area encompasses the State of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

[†]This is described e.g. in "Deuteronomy" and "Joshua" (Old Testament sixth book, which follows the Pentateuch). The degree of hostility between the twelve tribes of Israel and the Philistines, however, was described as "modest and sporadic".

Palestine is of central importance to the three Abrahamic faiths: Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. For 1,300 of the past 1,400 years, these lands have been under Muslim rule. Most Christians and Jews consider Palestine and some of the surrounding areas in Jordan and Lebanon to be the Holy Land of the Old Testament; indeed, the area's religious significance can be viewed as a critical factor making it such politically contested ground

Palestine's Arabs have never had their own independent state, but over the past two hundred years, they have developed a distinct Palestinian identity – while at the same time preserving their place in the larger Arab and Muslim worlds.[83] Around 1900, these Arabs started describing themselves as Palestinians in order to clarify their nationalist aspirations. Politically, Palestine today refers to the state that was created in Resolution 181, passed by the UN General Assembly in 1947.[84]

Resolution 181 contained the partition plan for the British mandate of Palestine into two states: the Jewish state of Israel and a Palestinian Arab state. Under the plan, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza would be governed by Palestine. Israel was awarded 55% of Palestinian territory west of the Jordan River, while the Palestinians got 44%. In 1940, Jews made up about a third of the population in the British mandate, totalling just over 1.5 million people.[85] Resolution 181 intended to create two states – Israel and Palestine – with equal legal standing, but Palestinian Arabs rejected the deal outright as unfair.

As soon as Britain pulled out of Palestine on 14 May 14 1948, neighbouring Arab nations – Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, with expeditionary forces from Iraq – entered Palestine intent on crushing the newly declared State of Israel. By March 1949, Israel had emerged victorious, affirming its sovereignty. Israel now occupied territory accounting for 77% of historic Palestine – 22% more than the UN partition plan had designated. The remaining portions of Palestine were divided between Transjordan (Jordan today), which annexed the West Bank, and Egypt, which gained control of the Gaza Strip.

The First Arab-Israeli War triggered significant demographic change throughout the Middle East. Around 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes in the lands won by Israel in what is referred to as "al Nakba," translating literally to "the

[83] Wibeck, S., 2013, Ett land, två folk, Israel-Palestinakonfliktens historia, Historiska Media, p 34.
[84] Resolution 181: Future Government on Palestine, UN archive, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181%28II%29
[85] FN-förbundet, Globalis, http://www.globalis.se/Konflikter/Palestina

catastrophe."[86] In the three years following the war, about 700,000 Jews immigrated to Israel. The 1948 war was the first Palestinian-Israeli conflict and occurred because of the power vacuum that arose from the liquidation of the British rule in Palestine. The war led to disintegration of the Palestinian community, the beginning of the Palestinian diaspora, and the consolidation of Israel.

Eighteen years later, the First Arab-Israeli War was followed by the Six Day War in 1967. The conflict began with a preventative military operation by Israel from 5-10 June, to counter what the Israelis perceived as an impending attack by Arab nations, which had mustered forces to surround Israel in the weeks prior. The war resulted in 300,000 Palestinians losing their homes. Israel seized Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and parts of the Golan Heights from Syria. Thus, Israel after the Six-Day War controlled all of historic Palestine, plus some, including about one million Palestinians who now lived in Israeli-occupied territory. With the exception of the Sinai (returned to Egypt in 1979), these areas are still administered by Israel today. Following the 1967 war, Israel began establishing numerous settlements – illegal housing developments for Jewish Israelis – on occupied Palestinian land. There are now thousands of these settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza, as well as numerous settlements in the Syrian Golan Heights.

In September 1993, a peace agreement, forged through secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway by Israeli and Palestinian representatives acting without intermediaries, was signed in Washington, D.C. The "Oslo Accords," as they came to be known, forced both sides to come to terms with one another's right to exist. Over seven years, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators struggled to reach an agreement that could end their decades-long dispute. In the many carefully negotiated agreements there were positive developments, but also severe setbacks.[87]

For a start, Israel had to recognise Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as its counterpart in Oslo peace talks. Additionally, Israel agreed to recognise Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by beginning to withdraw from the cities of Gaza and Jericho – essentially exchanging land for peace. For their part, the Oslo Accords stipulated that Palestinians had to recognise Israel's right to exist, and renounce the use of terrorism and calls for Israel's destruction.

[86] Benny Morris, 2004. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, pp. 602–604. Cambridge University Press.
[87] Shattered dreams of Peace, Oslo Peace Accord September 13, 1993, Public Broadcasting Service, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/oslo/negotiations/

Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, mistrust both sides has deepened. Palestinians accused Israel of failing to halt the expansion of Jewish settlements and stalling agreed-upon withdrawals from West Bank territory. Israel accused Arafat and the Palestinian security forces, which were established by Oslo, of not cracking down on militant groups that were trying to sabotage the peace process. The whole peace initiative ended with the last negotiating sessions at Taba, Egypt, in 2001.

The Israel-Palestine conflict has been on-going since the beginning of the 1900s, in what for most observers, appears to be an intractable and never-ending fight. Every turn of the conflict and the relationship between Israel and Palestine – every bomb, every incident, every statement – is monitored and analysed. Jews and Arabs live with different historical narratives that create identity and form political ideologies. The perspectives never seem to meet, and there are always at least two diverging accounts of a single event: one man's martyr is another's terrorist. Navigating the deep entanglement of politics, history, faith, culture, and personal grievances that define the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is treacherous. Since Israel's founding in 1948, twelve U.S. presidents, from Harry Truman to Barack Obama, have all taken a stab at delivering a permanent settlement to the conflict, to no avail. What Donald J. Trump may accomplish is too soon to say.

The civil war in Syria was added an extra layer of complexity to the situation of the Palestinians and Israelis, adding millions of new refugees from Syria to existing populations (also in the millions) of Palestinian refugees who live in gigantic refugee camps throughout the Levant. For example, there are several ghettos in Amman, Jordan home to generations of Palestinian refugees and their descendants: these are stateless people, born in a foreign country and without a home to grant them citizenship. No one knows how long the present situation can and will continue, despite the desire of the international community to achieve a lasting, comprehensive, and peaceful solution. Most proposals currently being pushed by negotiators aim to achieve two independent democratic states existing side-by-side: Israel and a sovereign, contiguous, and viable State of Palestine.

2.2.10. Qatar

- Official title: State of Qatar[88]
- Capital: Doha
- Territorial area: 11,586 sq km
- Population: 2,258,283 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 78.7 years
- Median age: 33 years
- Government
  - Type: Absolute monarchy
  - Chief of State: Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani (since June 2013)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa Al Thani (since June 2013)
- Currency: Qatari Rial (QAR)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $334.5 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $129,700 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 2.6% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -7.8% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: n/a

Qatar is the world's richest country per capita, home to billions of barrels of oil and gas and the media conglomerate Al Jazeera and is hosting football's World Cup in 2022. Qatar is located on a desert peninsula bordered by the Persian Gulf to the north, east, and west, and Saudi Arabia to the south. Qatar sits atop one of the world's largest natural gas fields, which is projected to provide revenue for at least another 300 years. An overwhelming majority of Qatari residents are foreigner nationals; Qatari citizens comprise only 20% of the total population. Qatar is an absolute monarchy where executive, legislative, and judicial powers all end with the Emir. A degree of relaxation of the palace's supreme authority has taken place in recent year, with a 2005 constitution allocating some sharing of power.

[88] All bulleted figures here are from: "Qatar." *World Factbook.* Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html

Map of Qatar[89]

Human habitation of the Qatar Peninsula dates as far back as 50,000 years, when small groups of Stone Age inhabitants built coastal encampments, settlements, and sites for working flint, according to recent archaeological evidence.[90] Other finds include pottery, rock carvings, burial mounds, and a large town that dates from about 500 BC at Wusail, some twenty kilometres north of Doha. A harsh climate, lack of resources – especially potable water, and frequent conflict, seem to have made it inevitable that no human settlement could develop and prosper for any significant length of time on the peninsula prior to the discovery of oil.

Historically, the Qatari peninsula was used predominately as rangeland for nomadic tribes from the Najd and Al Hasa regions in present-day Saudi Arabia, with seasonal encampments around sources of water. In addition, fishing and pearling settlements were established in locations where access to a major well intersected with the coast. Until the late 18th century, the principal towns were on the east coast – Al Huwayla, Al Fuwayrit, and Al Bida; the modern city of Doha developed around the largest of these settlements, Al Bida. The population consisted of nomadic and settled Arabs and a significant number

[89] Map from Nations Online Project, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/qatar-map.htm
[90] Toth, Anthony. "Qatar: Historical Background." A Country Study: Qatar (Helen Chapin Metz, editor). Library of Congress Federal Research Division (January 1993).

of slaves brought from East Africa.

The Qatar Peninsula was ruled by the Portuguese from 1517 to 1538, when they lost it to the Ottomans. Following Ottoman rule, Qatar became a British protectorate during the first half of the 20th century, gaining independence in 1971. The House of Thani has ruled Qatar since the early 19th century. The previous Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, seized power in 1995 while his father was on vacation abroad. During Sheikh Hamad's rule, Qatar began hosting two U.S. military bases, while simultaneously retaining close ties with Hamas and Iran. From the Arab Spring's outset, Qatar has supported and funded rebel movements, particularly in Libya and Syria, but has maintained tight political stability at home. Also during Sheikh Hamad's time in power: the multinational Qatari-owned media group *Al Jazeera* was founded, providing Arabic language coverage of previously taboo subjects as well as conscious support for the toppling of authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring.[91]

In June 2013, Sheikh Hamad announced that he would abdicate power to his fourth son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Since Sheikh Tamim's ascent to power, the government has expanded the roads around the capital, developed a new metro system, and completed the construction of a new airport. A new reform of the Qatari administration was launched with the mandate of enacting increased efficiency and discipline. In contrast to his father's rule, which prioritised raising Qatar's international profile, a focus on domestic affairs has characterised Tamim's government.

Despite their similarities as two oil-rich Sunni Arab states on the Persian Gulf, Qatar has explicitly said it does not want to be part of the Saudi camp in the region's on-going sectarian conflicts. The country has previously had a border dispute with Saudi Arabia,[92] and furthermore does not want to be drawn closer into the Saudi orbit. The desire for greater independence in the sphere of international affairs has been a primary reason motivating Qatar to diversify its alliances in the Arab and Muslim world in recent years, including opening the door to Iran before the lifting of sanctions. Qatar was early in trying to find a regional solution to the conflict in Syria.[93] By backing the Syrian opposition through money and arms, staring in 2011, they hoped to increase pressure for a compromise that would stop the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad in its tracks; they also applied similar techniques to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, with qualified success. However, Qatar's bold, revisionist foreign policy not only failed to generate positive lasting results (Qatari support to Syrian rebel groups has arguably

[91] "Al Jazeera Arabic was the first independent news channel in the Arab world", retrieved December 4, 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/aboutus/
[92] "Saudis and Qatar settle border dispute." BBC News. 21 March 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1233718.stm
[93] Qatar's influence increases in the Middle East, The Guardian, Rime Allaf, December 15, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/15/qatar-influence-middle-east

extended the civil war's duration), but it also alienated its neighbours in the Gulf, which withdrew their ambassadors to Doha in protest in early 2014. After an eight-month diplomatic standoff, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain agreed to return their ambassadors to Qatar, bringing an end to the dispute over Qatar's alleged support for Islamist groups.

As part of its diplomatic rehabilitation, Qatar in 2015 joined the Saudi-led coalition against the Shia Houthi government in Yemen. Many political leaders and scholars around the world view Qatar as a nation that earnestly believes in good international relations, that work through diplomacy and negotiation rather than brute force and violence.[94] The reality is most likely somewhat different from this account: Qatar's foreign policy moves under Sheikh Hamad are part of a calculated strategy to ensure its survival and independence as a small state caught between larger and more powerful neighbours.[95] In this goal, Sheikh Hamad looks to have overreached.

The new Emir, Sheikh Tamim, has turned his focus to domestic affairs. In doing so, he has underlined the importance of a well-educated population and has continued his father's efforts to make Qatar a centre for education and research in the Gulf region; to this end, almost 15% of government expenditure goes to education.

Traditional and conservative values are deeply embedded in Qatari society, and one major challenge the emir faces is gaining popular support for his government's modernisation initiatives. Nine out of ten Qatari citizens are Sunni Muslims, and many adhere to the orthodox direction of Wahhabism – however this doctrine is practiced in a less strict manner in Qatar than in Saudi Arabia, the only other Wahhabi state.

Illustrating the dichotomy of contemporary Qatari Society, 70% of students at Qatar University are female, and across all Qatari universities, 88% of tertiary education students are female.[96] The World Bank has reported that for every Qatari man aged 25 and graduating from university, there are two women graduates of the same age.[97] And yet, the campus of Qatar University is segregated by gender.

As a consequence of high female university enrolment, the labour participation rate for Qatari women has risen to 51% – well above all other countries in the region. The

[94] Qatar's Modern Diplomacy and Al-Jazeera's Role in Middle East's Evolutions over the Recent Decades, MacroThink Institute, No 7, 2016, Ansar Amini, Mehdi Akbarsefat,
http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jsr/article/view/9580
Putin Highlights Qatar's Role in Middle East as Important, Sputnik News, January 18, 2016,
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201601181033325623-putin-qatar-role-middle-east/
[95] Qatar and the Arab Spring, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 67
[96] World Bank Report on tertiary education (2014)
[97] World Bank Report, 2006, cited in "Qatari women find key to greater emancipation", Gulf News March 24, 2007,
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/qatari-women-find-key-to-greater-emancipation-1.167860

equivalent figure for neighbouring Saudi Arabia and Oman is 30%.[98] Unlike its only other Wahhabi counterpart, Saudi Arabia, women in Qatar are allowed to drive themselves, and there are no religious police .[99] As the gender gap has started to close, the country's formerly high birth rate has declined. Responding to this development, the Qatari government has introduced a 60-day maternity leave and also runs a campaign to highlight role models in society. Gender diversity is now part of many companies' strategic agenda. Some scholars suggest that private firms and society at large should enhance incentives to attract and retain women in the workplace; including free nursery services, flexible work schedules, and longer maternity leave.

Qatar has evolved to become a refugee for free speech and individual rights in the MENA region, which has occasionally proven to be a source of irritation for neighbouring regimes. Even so, the Qatari government has been criticised for its own human rights violations, especially its refusal to reform its infamous "kafala" labour system for guest workers and its slowness in investigating an alarming pattern of unexplained migrant worker deaths.[100] Under the kafala system, Qatari employers sponsor their migrant workers' visas, who are then legally bound to work only for their sponsoring employer and are not able to leave the country without their employer's approval. In many cases, employers seize their workers' passports upon entry to Qatar, leaving the latter almost entirely at the former's mercy.[101]

This policy has received intense international scrutiny since Qatar won its bid to host the 2022 World Cup. As a consequence, Qatar has promised to introduce a new law to end the kafala system.

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has given Qatar credit for taking some concrete measures on workers' welfare. The organisation said it saw improved accommodation for migrant workers: most notably the "Labour City" being built in Doha for 100,000 workers. The delegation reported that, "the buildings included canteens, computer rooms, gym facilities and a TV room, and the Labour City benefited from facilities such as a health centre, shops, a police station and green areas."[102] The ILO

[98] Power Women in Arabia: Shaping the Path for Regional Gender Equality, 2016, A.T. Kearney, Inc.
[99] The other Wahhabi state – a kinder, gentler puritanism, Economist June 4, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21699960-kinder-gentler-puritanism-some-other-wahhabi-state
[100] Qatar World Cup 2022: Amnesty hits out at UK silence on human rights, Peter Walker, The Guardian, November 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/qatar-world-cup-2022-amnesty-hits-out-at-uk-silence-on-human-rights-during-visit-greg-hands
[101] UN gives Qatar a year to end forced labour of migrant workers, The Guardian, Robert Booth March 24, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/24/un-gives-qatar-year-end-forced-labour-migrant-workers
[102] Complaint concerning non-observance by Qatar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81), made by delegates to the 103rd Session (2014) of the International Labour

also praised a new system to prevent the non-payment of wages by more than doubling the number of workers paid by bank transfer, to just over 900,000 people.

2.2.11. Tunisia

- Official title: Republic of Tunisia[103]
- Capital: Tunis
- Territorial area: 163,610 sq km
- Population: 11,134,588 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 76.1 years
- Median age: 32.4 years
- Government
  - Type: Parliamentary republic
  - Chief of State: President Beji Caid Essebsi (since December 2014)
  - Head of Government: Prime Minister Youssef Chahed (since August 2016)
- Currency: Tunisian Dinar (TND)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $130.8 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $11,700 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: 1.5% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -4.5% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 2.28% of GDP (2015)

Tunisia – and its ancient predecessor, Carthage – has been variously invaded and occupied over the course of its history by the Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, and French. Modern Tunisia became an independent state in 1956 and has evolved into one of the most open countries in the MENA region and one where women enjoy greater freedoms and respect relative to other MENA countries.. It was in Tunisia that the Arab Spring began in late 2010, with the self-immolation of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, on 17 December 2010. Just four weeks later, on 14 January 2011, long-time Tunisian President Ben Ali relinquished power in the face of mass demonstrations. The Tunisian Revolution catalysed revolts in several other Arab countries; however, only Tunisia emerged from the chaos as the single successfully democratised country. Nevertheless, Tunisia's fragile democracy continues to face significant challenges externally and domestically.

Conference under article 26 of the ILO Constitution, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_459148.pdf

[103] All bulleted figures here are from: "Tunisia." *World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 9 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ts.html

Map of Tunisia[104]

Shortly after achieving independence from France, Tunisia in the early 1960s embarked on a successful strategy focused on bolstering exports, foreign investment, and tourism: all of which have become central to the country's economy and a source of envy to many other countries in the region. More than five decades of authoritarian rule – during which politicians, journalists, and activists suffered imprisonment, torture, and exile – failed to diminish a thriving export economy based on textiles and apparel, food products, petroleum, chemicals and phosphates.[105] But corruption, cronyism, and a downward-spiralling economy eventually culminated with a rapid succession of events beginning in December 2010, leading to the downfall of a decades-long dictatorship and Tunisia's first democratically-elected president. Street protests over high unemployment, widespread poverty, and high food prices escalated in the first days of January 2011, culminating in rioting that led to hundreds of deaths in several Tunisian cities. On 14 January 2011, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country and by the end of the month, a national unity government was formed. Elections for the new Constituent Assembly were held in late October 2011 and an interim president was elected. Finally in 2014, a

[104] Map från Nations Online Project: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/tunisia-administrative-map.htm
[105] Silenced for Decades, 'Victims of Despotism' Air Torture Claims in Tunisia, New York Times, Nov 18, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/africa/silenced-for-decades-victims-of-despotism-air-torture-claims-in-tunisia.html

new constitution was ratified and the first democratic president of Tunisia was elected, Beji Caid Essebsi.

Tunisia's new government has faced challenges in reassuring businesses and foreign investors; bringing budget and current account deficits under control; shoring up the country's financial system; and reducing economic disparities between the more developed coastal region and the impoverished interior. Two successive attacks by Islamic State terrorists during 2015 – in March against the Bardo National Museum, and in June at a beach resort – devastated the already fragile tourism industry. Meanwhile, labour strikes in the phosphate sector slowed Tunisa's economic growth to less than 1% per year in 2015. President Caid Essebsi, a veteran politician whose political career was forged during the days of dictatorship, is viewed by some commentators as out of touch with the new democratic parliamentary system. In 2016, the president appointed his son Hafedh Caid Essebsi to lead the country's ruling party, Nidaa Tounes (translates to "Call of Tunisia), and elbowed his Prime Minister Habib Essid out from office.

Forty percent of Tunisians under age 35 are unemployed – a higher rate than in Egypt. And many feel that the disparities that led to the overthrow of President Ben Ali have only grown worse.[106] In November 2016, the Tunisian government invited politicians and corporate leaders from Europe, the United States, and China to a conference aimed at raising up to $30 billion for 145 projects in Tunisia over the next four years. The idea is to restart the economy, lower unemployment, and ultimately prevent people from again taking to the streets out of frustration and disappointment. France's then-prime minister, Manuel Valls, announced at the meeting: "More than ever we must be at the side of Tunisia, the only example of a successful (democratic) transition after the 2011 Arab Spring."[107] Valls announced that France would invest €1 billion into different projects, while the president of the European Investment Bank (EIB) said it would provide €2.5 billion, "to help the public and private sectors achieve inclusive and durable growth that would benefit youth."

The international community is well aware of the fragility of Tunisian democracy and has sought to support its institutions and defenders. The EU Parliament has agreed to double its assistance to nearly €400 million annually and has called for a "Marshall plan" to support Tunisia's democracy. Meanwhile, the United States doubled the bilateral assistance between 2014 and 2015. However, the governing party Nidaa Tounes has

[106] Tunisian MPs chuck out the prime minister, Economist Aug 3, 2016 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21703331-tunisias-president-consolidates-power-some-fear-decades-dictatorship-cast
[107] Hoping to Preserve Democracy, Tunisia Woos Foreign Investors, New York Times, Nov 29, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2016/11/29/world/middleeast/ap-ml-tunisia-economy.html

been criticised for not implementing reforms that aim to increase economic growth by opening markets to competition and investment. Critics also claim the government has not yet taken the necessary measures to increase transparency and fight corruption, and highlight that it has instead promoted a controversial "economic reconciliation" law that would grant amnesty to all business elites who engaged in shady deals with the old regime.[108]

Some scholars are afraid that real change may never fully reach the country where the Arab Spring started, citing findings on how foreign aid affects recipient countries' political institutions. These researchers argue that foreign aid lacks the power to make dictatorships more democratic or to make democracies more dictatorial; it only amplifies the existing political institutions in recipient countries.[109]

Alternatively, there are parties that believe in encouragement and the possibility of lasting change. At the same time that Nidaa Tounes assumed political power, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize to the four members of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, "for its decisive contribution to the building of a pluralistic democracy in Tunisia in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution of 2011."[110]

[108] Kubinec, Robert, Dec 19, 2016, How foreign aid could hurt Tunisia's transition to democracy. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/how-foreign-assistance-can-hurt-not-help-tunisias-democratic-transition/?utm_term=.a5e8d36d5521

[109] Dutta, N., Leeson, P.T. and Williamson, C.R.,The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions, April 2013, Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences

[110] The Nobel Prize for 2015. The Norwegian Nobel Committee, 10 October 2015. https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2015/press.html

2.2.12. Yemen

- Official title: Republic of Yemen[111]
- Capital: Sana'a
  Aden (site of official govt. in-exile)
- Territorial area: 527,968 sq km
- Population: 27,392,779 (July 2016 est.)
- Life expectancy: 65.5 years
- Median age: 19.2 years
- Government
  - Type: In transition (provisional government)
  - Chief of State: Sana'a govt. (Houthis): President, Supreme Political Council, Saleh Ali al-Sammad (since August 2016)[112]
    Aden govt. (internationally recognised): President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi (since February 2012)
  - Head of Government: Sana'a govt. (Houthis): Prime Minister Abdel-Aziz bin Habtour (since October 2016)[113]
    Aden govt. (internationally recognised): Prime Minister Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr (since April 2016)
- Currency: Yemeni Rial (YER)
- GDP (purchasing power parity)
  - Total: $73.45 billion (2016 est.)
  - Per capita: $2,500 (2016 est.)
  - Real growth rate: -4.2% (2016 est.)
- Budget surplus (+)/deficit (-): -12.3% of GDP (2016 est.)
- Military expenditure: 3.97% of GDP (2013)

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world. In a cruel twist of fate, this conflict-ridden country of almost 25 million people was once referred to as the "Happy Arabia." Yemen's most recent civil war started in 2014 and has killed more than 10,000 civilians and has displaced three million people. Amidst the violence, Yemen is home to some of Arabia's most beautiful and unique scenery, including spectacular mountaintop villages, pristine coral reefs, lush valleys, the mudbrick high-rises of Shibam, and the alien landscape of Socotra island. However, the on-going civil war and risk of terrorism have all but effectively ensured that few – if any – tourists will visit Yemen in the near-to-medium term. The country is described by many as teetering on the brink of total

[111] Unless noted, bulleted figures here are from: "Yemen." *World Factbook.* Central Intelligence Agency. 1 May 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html
[112] "Biography of political leader of the Supreme Council, 'Saleh Al-samad.'" *Yemen Press*. 15 August 2016. http://www.yemenpress.org/yemen/biography-of-political-leader-of-the-supreme-council,-saleh-al-samad.html
[113] "Yemen's Houthis ask former Aden governor to form government." *Reuters*. 2 October 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN1220PB

collapse.[114]

Map of Yemen[115]

Yemen is one of the oldest centres of civilisation in the Middle East, strategically located in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula at a crossroads for different cultures. Large settlements existed in the fertile mountains of northern Yemen as early as 5000 BC. The Greek geographer Ptolemy described Yemen as "Arabia Felix," meaning "fortunate, or happy, Arabia," due to its fertile soil. For a long period, Yemen was the sole producer of coffee in the world.[116]

In 1839, Britain seized and colonised the port of Aden in southwest Yemen in order to set up a coal depot to service their steamers en route to India. After Aden was declared a free zone in 1850, it grew into a "world city" populated by immigrants from India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. Aden's British rulers combined the port city with territories mostly to the east into a single protectorate that would eventually become South Yemen, in 1967. Aden experienced enormous economic growth, and by the 1940s it had become the second-busiest port in the world after New York City.[117]

North Yemen became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and was run as an

[114] Yemen on verge of collapse, UN humanitarian chief warns, BT News, 29 October 2016, http://home.bt.com/news/world-news/yemen-on-verge-of-collapse-un-humanitarian-chief-warns-11364109518997
[115] Nations Online Project: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/yemen-map.htm
[116] Nelly Hanna (2005). Society and Economy in Egypt and the Eastern Mediterranean, 1600–1900: Essays in Honor of André Raymond. American Univ in Cairo Press. p. 124.
[117] Bernard Reich (1990). Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa: A Biographical Dictionary. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 510.

autocratic and semi-medieval monarchy by the Hamidaddin family. The Hamidaddins' formal rule ended in 1962 with a coup by revolutionary republicans – setting off an eight-year civil war that cemented North Yemen as a republic. From monarchy to republic, the North Yemeni position was broadly consistent: it wanted to oust the British from their protectorate in the south and establish a single unified Yemen. In 1967, the British completed its withdraw from South Yemen. Three years after independence, South Yemen was reorganised as a Marxist state, sparking the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of South Yemenis to the country's northern counterpart and contributing to two decades of hostility and periodic armed conflict between the states.

Today's Yemen was formed in 1990 through the merger of North and South Yemen. The rolling collapse of the Soviet Union and its support for likeminded communist regimes pushed South Yemen into near collapse before its merger with North Yemen. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled North Yemen since 1978 through an alliance of Islamists and various clans, retained his position, becoming the first president of the newly unified Yemen. However, the union was fragile and by 1994 the country had fallen into – albeit very brief – civil war, pitting northern unionists against socialist southern separatists; the southern separatists lost decisively, and President Saleh consolidated his control over the entirety of Yemen as a result of the conflict. Saleh's domination of Yemeni politics would not last in perpetuity: falling oil revenues and a decrepit economy, civil uprisings, a growing al-Qaeda presence and the secret U.S. drone war to combat this threat, and other internal problems slowly but surely undermined his rule. During the Arab Spring, Yemeni citizens took to the streets to protest against poverty, unemployment, corruption, and President Saleh's plan to amend the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits – effectively making him president for life.

President Saleh was forced to resign in February 2012 (under pressure by neighbouring Saudi Arabia). His departure marked the beginning of Yemen's slide into its current state of chaos. Saleh's successor, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, held on to his position for less than three years before being forced into exile by the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia religious-political movement and militant group originating in northwest Yemen. For decades, the Houthis had periodically fought against the Saleh government. After his resignation, President Saleh is believed to have reconciled with the Houthis, and has been instrumental in their rise to power. President Hadi's resignation on 21 January 2015 was precipitated by the fall of Sana'a (the capital) to the Houthis in September 2014. Hadi fled to Aden and then Saudi Arabia, and in late March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition began a military intervention to remove the Houthis from power. As of November 2016, over

10,000 people had died in the conflict,[118] and more than three million people have been displaced.[119]

Despite many announced cease-fires and attempts at brokering a peaceful negotiated settlement, little progress has been made in resolving the Yemen's most recent civil war, which has morphed into a proxy war between regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. (The Iranians have been accused of backing the Houthis by Saudi Arabia.) Saudi Arabia claims their coalition is winning the war, having retaken Aden as well as 80% of Yemen's territory. But many of Yemen's largest cities – Sana'a, Taiz, and Ibb – remain in rebel hands.[120]

Peace talks – which have included Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United Nations, the United States, and several other parties – have been complicated by the surprise announcement on 29 November 2016 that the Houthis and their allies intend to create a new government in Yemen. The Houthis initially appeared to have accepted a previous power-sharing proposal by the United Nations and U.S. Secretary of State; this proposal had been rejected by Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who insists he is Yemen's only legitimate president. In April 2017, U.S. Defence Secretary James Mattis said Iranian support for the Houthis was destabilising Yemen, while also promoting the Saudi-American relationship. "Our goal is to push this conflict into UN-brokered negotiations to make sure it is ended as soon as possible," said Secretary Mattis during a short press conference following meetings with King Salman of Saudi Arabia.[121]

While the current civil war in Yemen will someday end in one form or another, the country's history suggests that it will not be the last conflict of its kind. As in many other parts of the MENA region, clan-based thinking, the desire to prestige and retribution, corruption, and a distorted view of religion blend into a deadly combination where the biggest losers are everyday people.

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[118] Deaths at a Yemen funeral, Economist, October 15, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21708695-carnage-yemen-last-attracting-worlds-attention-deaths-yemen
[119] Houthis, in Surprise Move, Form a Government in Yemen, New York Times, November 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/world/middleeast/yemen-houthis.html
[120] No end in sight for Saudi Arabia's southern adventure. Economist, Jan 16th 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21688437-no-end-sight-saudi-arabias-southern-adventure-getting-closer
[121] Cooper, H., April 19 2017, "Jim Mattis, in Saudi Visit, Calls for Political Solution in Yemen", https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/middleeast/jim-mattis-yemen-saudi-arabia .

3. Data Description

3.1 The sample

The World Values Survey data include 13 countries from the MENA region with total 16,422 respondents. Table 1 shows the exact number of cases interviewed face-to-face in each country.

Table 1. Number of respondents in each country

Country	Number of respondents
Algeria	1,200
Bahrain	1,200
Palestine	1,000
Iraq	1,200
Jordan	1,200
Kuwait	1,303
Lebanon	1,200
Libya	2,131
Morocco	1,200
Qatar	1,060
Tunisia	1,205
Egypt	1,523
Yemen	1,000
MENA (N)	16,422

The WVS targets a representative sample of a country's population among those 18 years and older. Table 3.1 presents the actual distribution of the main demographic variables. Most countries have expected gender distributions; however, females are overrepresented in Egypt and underrepresented in Kuwait. The differences in education distributions roughly reflect the countries' levels of economic development.

Survey weights are provided for two countries: Egypt and Libya. In Egypt, the imbalance of the gender distribution is corrected with the help of weights, while in Libya, the demographic distributions are corrected within each governorate.

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3.2. Demographic distribution

3.2.1 Gender distribution

With the notable exceptions of Egypt and Kuwait the survey was carried out with a fairly equal gender distribution across the region. The higher sample-distribution of females in Egypt is not indicative of the actual demographics of the country. According to the latest available census figures for Egypt, 48.97% of the population is female.[122] However, in Kuwait where 64% of respondents were male, the figures are more if not completely representative of the country's demographic reality, which has a male population of 59.6%.[123]

Figure 1. The distribution of gender, age and education in the 13 MENA countries.



3.2.2. Age distribution

Overall, respondents in the MENA region were relatively young compared to global figures. However, this is hardly surprising considering the generally young demographics of the region at large. In terms of inter-regional distribution the numbers are rather cogent. In the age-bracket of 18-30 the lowest rate is at 32% (Jordan) and the highest at 46% (Yemen) with a regional average of 35.8% of respondents belonging to the youngest bracket compared to a worldwide average of 29.2%. The middle bracket (age 31-50)

[122] "Egypt Census Data." Egypt Data Portal. 7 May 2015. http://egypt.opendataforafrica.org/tadpaqg/egypt-census-data
[123] "Kuwait Population." Country Meters. 1 June 2017. http://countrymeters.info/en/Kuwait

contains 43.3% of MENA-respondents compared to a global average of 39.2%. Only 20.5% of respondents were 51 years old or above compared to corresponding global values of 31.4%. As mentioned above this disparity mirrors the demographic reality of the Middle East. However, the inter-regional differences are quite pronounced; with Lebanon and Egypt recording 26% of their respondents as belonging to the oldest bracket against only 11% in Kuwait.

3.2.3. Education

The level of formal education among regional respondents varied greatly both nationally and regionally. For example a stunning 58.5% of Moroccan and 39.8% of Yemenis respondents had received no formal education whatsoever, whereas in Kuwait the same was only true for 1%. It is worth noting that Yemen and in particular Morocco are significant outliers in this regard.. In total 14.4% of MENA respondents (8.9 without Morocco and Yemen) had received no formal education whatsoever which is still significantly higher than the global average of 6.2%. The prevalence of an obtained University degree was highest in Qatar at 34.2% followed by Libya with 28% compared to a worldwide response average of 16.3%. A total of 43% of MENA-respondents placed themselves in the "Low" bracket of Figure 1, 42% in the "Middle" and 16% in the "High".

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3.3. Interviewer falsification analysis

Falsified data is a serious problem in survey research, despite constant development of preventive measures. According to Kuriakose & Robbins,[124] exact or near duplicates occur in about 17% of international surveys in the country-year samples that the authors considered. The risk of there being duplicates in the surveys is higher in non-OECD countries. Generally, collecting data field organizations have greater means to control and prevent interviewer falsification and take responsibility for it. However, several methods enable the detection of plausible fraud, including the recent developments on analysis of near duplicates.[125]

[124] Kuriakose, Noble and Michael Robbins. "Don't get duped: Fraud through duplication in public opinion surveys." *Statistical Journal of the IAOS*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2016). Pp. 283-291. http://content.iospress.com/articles/statistical-journal-of-the-iaos/sji978

[125] Kuriakose, Noble and Michael Robbins. "Don't get duped: Fraud through duplication in public opinion surveys." *Statistical Journal of the IAOS*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2016). Pp. 283-291. http://content.iospress.com/articles/statistical-journal-of-the-iaos/sji978

In this section, we present thorough analyses of the thirteen MENA countries' data quality. In the first part, we follow the Kuriakose & Robbins approach and calculate the number of near duplicates present in each country survey. In the second part, we examine the distribution of several sensitive variables as well as correlations of variables that are known to be strongly related.

3.3.1 Duplicates

Performing checks for duplicates is a longstanding practice in survey research. However, changing answers on just a few variables will prevent the software to detect exact duplication, whereas the probability that two respondents share 99% of their responses is miniscule. As Kuriakose & Robbins demonstrate, the maximum percentage of responses that a respondent shares with any other observation in a sample follows a particular probability distribution (Gumbel distribution), with the percentage match not exceeding 85%. A percentage match higher than 85 and a frequency spike on the right side of the scale indicate a high probability of the cases being duplicated.

We calculated the maximum percentage match for each observation in each of the 13 MENA countries' surveys. Beforehand, we excluded variables with a missing rate exceeding 10% and observations with a missing rate exceeding 25%, thus reducing the probability of having an inflated percentage match due to a large number of missing values. The distribution of the maximum percentage match in each country is presented in figure 2. Table 2 displays the percentage of near duplicates, that is, the observations with a maximum percentage match higher than 85.

Algeria and Bahrain are the two countries that have the most serious problem with duplicates. For both countries, the percentage of duplicates is higher that 10%, and they have clear spikes on the right side of the percentage match scale. Egypt and Kuwait have less severe problems with near duplicates, as their percentage of duplicates is around 5%. Morocco represents an atypical case, with a high average percentage match in general. Thus, despite having a large number of near duplicates, at the same time, the sample percentage match distribution does not follow the pattern that would indicate data imitation. However, the average percent match in Morocco is unexpectedly large and, at least, indicates that the sample is unusually homogeneous.

Small spikes of high percentage matches, which are an indication of likely falsification cases, are also present the data from Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine and Tunisia.

However, the rate of near duplicate cases is low enough to significantly affect statistical results obtained from the data.

Figure 2. Distribution of maximum percentage match in 13 MENA countries



Table 2. Percentage of near duplicates with a maximum percentage match larger than 85%

Country	Duplicates
Algeria	17.9
Bahrain	11.4
Egypt	6.0
Iraq	2.2
Jordan	0
Kuwait	7.3
Lebanon	1.3
Libya	1.0

Morocco	8.8
Palestine	2.6
Qatar	0.0
Tunisia	2.5
Yemen	0.0

In addition to the analysis of near duplicates, we reviewed distributions of several variables with certain expected qualities. It is known that falsifiers generally fail to reproduce actual response distributions because of avoidance of extreme answers (Bredl, et al., 2012). We explored the distribution of several variables in which extreme responses were highly expected. The majority of the 13 MENA countries' data yielded the expected results; however, the distributions of the variables from the Bahrain sample appear highly improbable.

3.3.2. Bahrain – univariate and bivariate distributions

Figure 3 presents the comparison of the distributions from the Bahraini data with the average pattern from other Arabic countries. It is apparent that extreme answers are missing from the Bahraini results.

Figure 3. Bahrain's distribution of answers for questions with a high probability of extreme answers. The average patterns from the other 12 MENA countries are presented as references for comparison.



After having investigated the univariate distributions, we also compared bivariate distributions of variables that were expected to be highly related. The following pairs of questions were used:

- ***Happiness***: "Taking all things together, would you say you are: Very happy, Rather happy, Not very happy, Not at all happy" and "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" The possible answers for the second question ranged from 1 – "Completely dissatisfied" to 10 – "Completely satisfied". Values that entail a higher degree of happiness are coded in opposite directions, and thus a high negative correlation is expected between the two variables.
- ***Income satisfaction***: "How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?". The possible answers ranged from 1 – "Completely dissatisfied" to 10 – "Completely satisfied". "On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes."
- ***Gender equality***: "Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women". "How strongly you agree or disagree with: On the whole, men make better business executives than women do."

Figure 4 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between the specified variables in each of the 13 MENA countries. As one can see, most of the countries demonstrate the expected strong pattern with the absolute magnitude being larger than 0.2. The only exception is the Bahraini sample, in which the correlations are close to zero.

Figure 4. Pearson's correlations between the variables that are expected to be highly correlated in the 13 MENA countries. The used questions are described in the text.



Gender differences in mosque attendance in the Muslim world provide another opportunity for falsification checks. It is well known that Muslim women attend mosques less frequently than men. This fact is reflected in most of the 13 MENA countries, with the majority of females indicating that they almost never attend religious services. However, in Bahrain the distribution of the mosque attendance variable is almost identical between males and females (figure 5).

Figure 5. Self-reported mosque attendance among males and females in Bahrain compared to the average pattern in the other 12 MENA countries.



The conclusion of this analysis is that the data from Bahrain do not exhibit the same level of quality as the data from the other MENA countries. Therefore, we have decided to exclude Bahrain from further analyses of the results in this report. The dataset use in the report consists of 12 MENA countries, with a survey sample of 14,736 interviewees across these countries.

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4. Democracy

4.1. Introduction

How important is it to live in a democracy? This is not something that most people typically worry about. Indeed, in mature Western democracies, the importance of having a democratic system of government is a moot point. Elections come at regular, predictable intervals; the parties and candidates make their pitch to the voters; the voters decide; and the new government forms (or is re-elected) and begins the task of actually governing. The abstract question of how important democracy is remains just that for the average casual citizen: abstract. Scepticism about the fundamental health of the democratic system in an established, multi-generational democracy, when expressed, is typically coincides with election time and can be considered a species of politically-motivated alarmism.

However, in parts of the world where democratic governance is perhaps a more recent phenomenon – if it even exists, the question of "how important is it to live in a democracy?" is a relevant issue that may carry implications of life and death for citizens. The MENA region is one such part of the world where this is true.

This chapter deals with democracy in the MENA region. How is it defined? How does the understanding of democracy in the MENA region compare to its understanding in the West and the rest of the world? Are there certain fundamental values of democracy that are shared? – are there areas of deep disagreement? How does politics impact the lives of people living in the region? Do people consider the countries they reside in to be democratic? Are elections held in a free and fair manner, or is electoral fraud and malpractice pervasive? Do people vote? How does democracy stack up against other political systems, like rule by the military, experts, or one man? And, to what extent are the ethical social values that underpin the democratic system held by individuals?

This chapter explores how the citizens of 12 countries in the MENA region – Algeria, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen – think and feel about these subjects. Overall, this chapter finds that there are some essential and truly universal characteristics of democracy that are shared by East and West, such as the necessity of free and fair elections and the enshrinement of civil rights. There are points of basic disagreement, too; for example, on the appropriate role of religious and military leaders in a democracy. MENA respondents, by and large, do

recognise the limits of the at least nominally democratic systems existing in their countries; however, their desire for democracy is strong – stronger than any affinity for living under an undemocratic political system. They view democracy as a key factor in whether their countries continue to develop economically, but perhaps more importantly, they view it as vital to their own personal lives and the lives of their families.

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4.2 Defining democracy

As a term with a generally positive normative connotation, "democracy" too often lacks descriptive clarity. At a bare minimum, democracy requires an electoral system by which voters choose their leaders – but from here, what democracy entails can take numerous divergent paths. Historically, democracy did not even require that every citizen be allowed to vote; although today, universal and equal suffrage is a firmly-embedded norm of legitimate democratic governance.[126] Most political systems around the world would claim to be democratic, or at least reflective of the "will of the people." Many of these claims to democratic credentials clearly have less to do with the fairness of elections, citizens' political engagement, or the extent of civil liberties than recognition by political actors that existing global norms elevate "democracy" over alternate forms of rule. Democracy is and has been in vogue for the past century or so; consider the fact that North Korea's formal title is the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea."[127]

Compounding the lack of precision in defining democracy are the different versions of it that come with different cultures, and the extent to which the model image of liberal, capitalist democracy is anchored in the experience of the West.[128] When the Bush administration took the United States to war in Iraq in 2003 – Operation "Iraqi Freedom" as it was dubbed – the administration genuinely believed that the Iraqi people would greet U.S. forces as liberators, with flowers in the streets.[129] In short time and at minimal expense, it was believed, Iraq would blossom into a free market-loving, Western-style democracy. Obviously, this did not pan out.

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[126] Article 25.b of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx

[127] Lapidos, Juliet. "The Undemocratic People's Republic of Korea." *Slate*. 1 April 2009. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/04/the_undemocratic_peoples_republic_of_korea.html

[128] Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald. "Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis." *Comparative Sociology* 1.3-4 (2004). http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/uploads/2/9/9/2/2992308/norris_and_inglehart_islamic_culture_and_democratization.pdf

[129] "Meet the Press transcript for 14 September 2003, interview with Vice President Dick Cheney." *Meet the Press*. NBC News. 14 September 2003. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3080244/#.WOS_yMclnY8

One of the key flaws running through George W. Bush's approach to Iraq was his faith in the universalism and therefore exportability U.S. liberal democracy. Hence, while the broad abstract notion of "democracy" may enjoy wide credibility as a standard that most regimes claim to exercise, there are significant disagreements as to what the specifics of democracy should entail in a given case. Admittedly, democracy in Iraq was severely hamstrung by its imposition by a foreign power's military occupation.

This section of the chapter examines the various features that individuals around the world consider to be essential (or not) to democracy, and the extent to which certain views are geographically and culturally anchored. The World Values Survey uses a battery of nine questions (Table 1.) for respondents to describe what they believe democracy does and does not require. These nine questions employ a common question frame that asks respondents to select a number between one and ten to indicate to what extent they believe a given statement represents "an essential characteristic of democracy." The lowest possible score of one indicates the statement "is not an essential characteristic of democracy," while ten designates an essential characteristic. Respondents' answers are then aggregated to produce the mean, or average, response for a given country, region, or the entire global respondent sample. As with other questions in the World Values Survey that employ a 10-point scale, a mean response of 5.5. represent the mid-point value.

4.2.1. Defining democracy, MENA compared to World

The table below shows the mean response to each question in the "Democracy" battery for respondents in all the countries around the world that are covered by the World Values Survey. In face-to face interviews the respondents are asked to evaluate nine propositions, whether they are essential characteristics of democracy or not.

Table 1. Essential characteristics of democracy

Essential characteristics of democracy?	Mean response for all countries, wave 6 61 countries, N = 90.767
V131. Governments tax the rich to subsidize the poor	6.3
V132. Religious authorities interpret the laws	4.3
V133. People choose their leaders in free elections	8.0
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment	7.0

V135. The army takes over when government is incompetent	4.5
V136. Civil rights protect people	7.4
V137. The state makes people's incomes equal	6.0
V138. People obey their rulers	6.0
V139. Women have the same rights as men	7.9

The data confirms the most universally agreed upon feature of democracy is holding free elections in which citizens choose their leaders, with a mean response of 8.0 (out of 10). Gender equality is a close second, at 7.9. Civil rights to "protect people's liberty from state oppression" and state-funded unemployment insurance are also widely considered crucial characteristics of democracy, posting mean responses of 7.4 and 7.0, respectively. Whether the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor via progressive taxation and other general measures, and citizen deference to political leaders are necessary to democracy is more contested. Finally, there appears to be consensus, at least on the global level, that clerics and generals ought not interfere in domestic politics, each respectively obtaining mean responses of 4.3 and 4.5.

A "lowest common denominator" image of global democracy includes free and fair elections, strong civil rights shared by both genders, and at least some modest form of the welfare state as well as distinction between the spheres of church and state. While not downright hostile, it is cool on the notion of an army role in politics and a robust programme of enforcing economic equality. In other words, the image of global democracy that emerges seems to confirm the generic view of democracy: elections, rights, and pluralism. By digging deeper, however, divergences from this lowest common denominator form of democracy emerge among the different parts of the globe.

Figure 1, below, shows the mean responses to each of the "Democracy" variables for the West, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Muslim world, including the MENA region. Questions are in ascending order from left-to-right, so "Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor" at the left and "Women have the same rights as men" at the right. The results for the 12 MENA countries are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter

Figure 1. Essential characteristics of democracy – MENA compared to the World



Mean responses for the MENA and other regions adhere to the trends observed in global mean responses to these questions. "Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws" and "The army takes over when the government is incompetent" uniformly obtain the lowest mean responses in all regions. In the MENA region, the mean response for religious authorities is 5.6, and for the variable on the army, it is 5.3. Both of these mean responses hover near the mid-point value of 5.5, indicating that, on average, MENA respondents believe democracy requires some religious interpretation of the law and that the military may overthrow of the elected government should it fail its duties. These attitudes are most pronounced in the MENA region and they deviate significantly from Western opinion on these topics. The MENA region also demonstrates the most regressive views on whether it is essential in a democracy that women enjoy the same rights as men.

If one compares the MENA region with other Muslim, non Arabic countries, it is noticeable that MENA stresses that religious authorities interpreting the law as an essential characteristic of democracy to a higher extent. They also score substantially

lower on women having the same rights as men, than Muslim non-Arabic countries generally do.

Elsewhere, the MENA region is fairly in line with global means on questions dealing with social security and the welfare state, as well as the necessity of civil rights and free elections to a democracy.

Figure 2. "Western" and "non-Western" democracy



The scatter-plot reveals an interesting pattern. The Western countries (here marked in yellow) scores high on the variables defined as Western democracy while the Muslim countries (red) score high on the three variables defined as non-Western democracy. Within the Muslim societies Tunisia and Turkey are scoring relatively high also on the Western definition of democracy, while Qatar and Jordan are scoring very low on Western democracy and amongst the highest non-Western democracy. However Pakistan and Uzbekistan is also high on non-Western democracy as well as Malaysia. Interestingly some non-Muslim countries are also scoring high on non-Western essential characteristics for democracy, South Africa, Rwanda and Nigeria on the African continent and Belarus and Russia are also low on Western democracy.

Figure 3. Democracy factor scores – World, all countries

	Western Democracy	*Non-Western Democracy*
People choose their leaders in free elections	0.688	
Civil rights protect people from state oppression	0.685	
Women have the same rights as men	0.621	
Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws		0.657
The army takes over when government is incompetent		0.600
People obey their rulers		0.465

When analysing the essential characteristics on democracy, three variables fall out as the essential factors for democracy:

- People choose their leaders in free elections
- Civil rights protect people from state oppression
- Women have the same rights as men

The following three variables are recorded as characteristics in Non-Western countries:

- Religious authorities ultimately interpret the laws
- The army takes over when government is incompetent
- People obey their rulers

In figure 4 to 6 we can see that the three variables labelled as Western democracy in the factor analysis also are supported by many respondents in the MENA region. Some countries in the MENA region actually even have higher mean scores than the West. However they also have high scores on Non-Western democracy (fig 7-9). Likewise the variables characterized as Non-Western are somewhat ubiquitous. However, the variable that religious authorities may interpret the laws are very low in the West. The same goes for letting the army take over when government is incompetent. Neither is there a preference for people to obey their rulers.

Figure 4. Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections – MENA compared to the World



Figure 5. Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression – MENA compared with the World



Figure 6. Democracy: Women have the same rights as men – MENA compared with the World



Figure 7. Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws – MENA compared with the World



Figure 8. Democracy: The army takes over when the government is incompetent – MENA compared with the World



Figure 9. Democracy: People obey their rulers – MENA compared with the World



In short, the values of the West are widely shared also in the Mena region, while the values of the non-Western countries are not shared by the West.

Beside these variables included in the factor scores at figure 3, we have also analysed the other variables included in the battery presented in table 1. These are "Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor", "People receive state aid for unemployment", "State makes people's incomes equal".

In the Western countries most people accept governmental redistributions from the rich to the poor and also that the state supports unemployed, two essential indicators of a welfare state. This is not accepted in Latin America to the same extent, but both Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa accepts this line of reasoning. In Muslim countries, whether Arabic or non-Arabic, a majority also se this as an essential characteristic of a democracy. However, there are big differences within the MENA region, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

The last factor analysed in comparison with other regions worldwide is the statement that the state makes people's incomes more equal is a characteristic of a democracy. This statement has much fewer supporters in the West than in the rest of the world. In the Mena region only Qatar supports this line of reasoning. It is interesting to note that Eastern Europe with its history of the Soviet ideology is relatively high on this statement but so is also Muslim non-Arabic countries.

Figure 10. Democracy: Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor – MENA compared with the World



Figure 11. People receive state aid for unemployment – MENA compared with the World



Figure 12. State makes people's incomes equal – MENA compared with the World



In the following section of the democracy chapter we will analyse the various differences between the countries within the MENA region and try to explain the differences, found above.

4.2.2. Democracy – the MENA way

From the data found in the "Democracy" battery it is possible to construct an image of what democracy means for the typical person living in the MENA region. The most essential features of democracy for respondents in the MENA region are that "people choose leaders in free elections" (V133), and that it includes "civil rights [that] protect people's liberty from state oppression". The mean response across the entire region for V133 is 7.87; for V136, it is 7.38.

Table 2. Essential characteristics of democracies in MENA, averages

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
V131. Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor	Mean	6.56	5.57	5.84	6.84	7.57	6.09
	(N)	(14,285)	(1,034)	(970)	(1,185)	(1,178)	(1,235)
V132. Religious authorities interpret laws	Mean	5.57	5.10	5.23	6.16	5.69	5.24
	(N)	(13,848)	(1,006)	(946)	(1,175)	(1,148)	(1,206)
V133. People choose leaders in free elections	Mean	7.87	8.12	7.86	8.27	7.14	6.83
	(N)	(14,244)	(1,043)	(943)	(1,189)	(1,167)	(1,185)
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment	Mean	6.96	7.22	6.54	7.37	6.70	6.52
	(N)	(14,389)	(1,052)	(970)	(1,194)	(1,184)	(1,219)
V135. Army takes over when government is incompetent	Mean	5.29	4.39	4.40	5.62	5.41	3.94
	(N)	(12,149)	(923)	(928)	(1,159)	(1,132)	(1,194)
V136. Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression	Mean	7.38	7.58	6.19	7.16	6.78	7.01
	(N)	(13,717)	(949)	(917)	(1,167)	(1,135)	(1,207)
V137. State makes people's incomes equal	Mean	6.26	6.74	5.61	6.89	5.54	6.19
	(N)	(14,174)	(1,026)	(957)	(1,185)	(1,181)	(1,241)
V138. People obey their rulers	Mean	6.75	5.78	5.64	5.80	7.60	7.48
	(N)	(14,195)	(1,033)	(961)	(1,175)	(1,188)	(1,231)
V139. Women have same rights as men	Mean	6.94	7.37	6.08	6.60	6.61	6.69
	(N)	(14,443)	(1,044)	(970)	(1,188)	(1,189)	(1,248)

		Country Code					
		Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
V131. Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor	Mean	5.66	5.87	7.96	5.74	7.08	7.27
	(N)	(1,177)	(1,944)	(971)	(1,044)	(1,098)	(1,523)
V132. Religious authorities interpret laws	Mean	3.93	5.84	6.55	5.94	4.52	6.19
	(N)	(1,166)	(1,923)	(892)	(1,040)	(1,018)	(1,523)
V133. People choose leaders in free elections	Mean	6.22	8.05	8.49	6.87	8.56	8.79
	(N)	(1,157)	(1,945)	(1,059)	(1,037)	(1,089)	(1,523)
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment	Mean	5.68	6.77	8.41	5.98	7.89	7.23
	(N)	(1,172)	(1,945)	(1,052)	(1,050)	(1,105)	(1,523)
V135. Army takes over when government is incompetent	Mean	5.50	6.71	6.28	4.67	4.85	-
	(N)	(1,164)	(1,945)	(902)	(1,004)	(1,031)	-
V136. Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression	Mean	6.35	7.73	8.28	6.80	8.24	8.10
	(N)	(1,146)	(1,922)	(894)	(1,024)	(1,083)	(1,523)
V137. State makes people's incomes equal	Mean	5.75	5.57	7.93	5.04	6.47	7.35
	(N)	(1,165)	(1,945)	(948)	(1,043)	(1,084)	(1,523)

V138. People obey their rulers	Mean	5.02	6.28	6.93	8.45	6.86	7.39
	(N)	(1,163)	(1,934)	(955)	(1,050)	(1,092)	(1,523)
V139. Women have same rights as men	Mean	6.96	6.46	7.89	6.96	7.29	7.44
	(N)	(1,164)	(1,973)	(1,075)	(1,052)	(1,113)	(1,523)

		Country Code
		Yemen
V131. Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor	Mean	7.61
	(N)	(926)
V132. Religious authorities interpret laws	Mean	6.42
	(N)	(805)
V133. People choose leaders in free elections	Mean	9.19
	(N)	(907)
V134. People receive state aid for unemployment	Mean	7.43
	(N)	(923)
V135. Army takes over when government is incompetent	Mean	5.27
	(N)	(767)
V136. Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression	Mean	8.11
	(N)	(750)
V137. State makes people's incomes equal	Mean	6.34
	(N)	(876)
V138. People obey their rulers	Mean	8.03
	(N)	(890)
V139. Women have same rights as men	Mean	7.24
	(N)	(904)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Respondents in Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia are more assertive than the region at large in their belief that free elections are essential to democracy, with respective mean responses of 9.19, 8.79, and 8.56. These three countries all changed governments during the Arab Spring – to varying outcomes – with Tunisia and Egypt, but not Yemen, holding at least one free and competitive election since then. The lowest mean responses to V133 are observed in Lebanon (6.22), Kuwait (6.83), and Qatar (6.87). Disillusionment with the electoral process in Lebanon, as previously mentioned in the chapter, is a probable cause for the country's depressed mean response – Lebanese citizens vote in fairly free elections, and not much changes. Kuwait and Qatar are more interesting: both are led by emirs that are at least nominally constrained by parliaments composed of elected and

appointed legislators; however, de facto power remains with the crown. Qatar has yet to hold its first national general election to its Consultative Assembly, approved by a constitutional referendum in 2003.[130] Nonetheless, Kuwait and Qatar are among the most open societies in the MENA region. On the question of whether civil rights designed to protect the individual from state abuse are a crucial part of democracy, Morocco (8.28), Yemen (8.11), and Egypt (8.10) have the highest mean responses in the region. Meanwhile, the opposite end of the scale is rounded out by Palestine (6.19), Lebanon (6.35), and Qatar (6.80)

Free elections and civil rights are considered intrinsic to democracy not just in the MENA region, but globally. V133 "Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections" obtains a total mean response of 8.00 across all surveyed countries (MENA and non-MENA); V136 "Democracy: Civil rights protect people's liberty from state oppression" obtains a mean of 7.40. All in all, respondents in the MENA region are in line with the rest of the world on whether free elections and civil rights are an essential part of democracy.

MENA respondents demonstrate a moderate preference for welfare economics, deference to political leaders, and gender equality as components of democratic governance. V131 "Democracy: Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor," V134 "Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment," and V137 "Democracy: State makes people's incomes equal" deal with features commonly associated with "social democracy" that aim to mitigate inequality in a society. The MENA region records mean responses for these questions as follows: 6.56 for V131, 6.96 for V134, and 6.26 for V137. The MENA region edges out the mean response for the rest of the world (all non-MENA countries surveyed) on V131 and V137, showing a greater appetite for both income redistribution, broadly considered, and progressive taxation "to subsidise the poor," specifically. On the question of state-funded unemployment relief, the MENA region is almost exactly in line with the average response for the rest of the world.

There is a long egalitarian tradition in the Islamic faith, starting with an alms-giving practice known as "zakāt" that is one of the Five Pillars of Islam.[131] The zakāt is effectively a tax on accumulated wealth, which observant Muslims are obliged to pay as part of their social responsibility to the community and is considered an act of piety. Islamic law provides guidance on how funds collected via zakāt are distributed and who

[130] Khatri, Shabina S. "Legislative elections in Qatar postponed until at least 2019." Doha News. 17 June 2016. https://dohanews.co/legislative-elections-in-qatar-postponed-until-at-least-2019/

[131] "Pillars of Islam." Oxford Dictionary of Islam (online). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 (current online version). http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195125580.001.0001/acref-9780195125580-e-1859?rskey=yhmSZe&result=1859

is eligible, essentially boiling down to awarding the zakāt to the poor and needy, as well as emancipated slaves, recent converts, worthy debtors, some religious warriors, and zakāt collectors.[132] The system of taxation and social assistance, including unemployment insurance, instituted during the Rashidun Caliphate (which immediately followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad) under Caliph Umar has been noted as perhaps the earliest precursor to the modern welfare state.[133]

More recently, socialist economics and Marxist political philosophy found wide purchase in the Arab world during the post-colonial era when adapted to the regional context by figures such as President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and Michel Aflaq, principal founder of the Ba'athist movement, among others. These men were guided by a political philosophy combining Arab nationalism, social justice, state ownership of key sectors, and a healthy dose of secularism. This secular element, in addition to paranoid authoritarianism defining most of these nominally republican regimes, has proven to be a liability amid the rise in religious conservatism in the Muslim world over the past few decades. Indeed, a good predictor, in retrospect, of the likelihood of a given country in the MENA region succumbing to an Arab Spring revolution was whether it was a secular republic, versus a hereditary monarchy.[134]

Nevertheless, the tendency for state intervention in the economy to produce more socially just results remains a powerful force in MENA region politics. Of the 12 MENA countries surveyed, the strongest support for V131 "Democracy: Governments tax the rich to subsidise the poor," V134 "Democracy: People receive state aid for unemployment," and V137 "Democracy: State makes people's incomes equal" is found in Morocco, which posts mean responses of 7.96, 8.41, and 7.93 to these questions, respectively. Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen also consistently outperform the regional average on these three questions. On the opposite end of the scale, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, and to a lesser extent, Kuwait, have mean responses to V131, V134, and V137 that are below regional figures. With the particular exception of Morocco's robust support for a redistributive welfare state, there is a discernable trend of a country's support for the measures considered by V131, V134, and V137 correlating with whether it is a secular nationalist republic or a monarchy. GDP per capita also appears to be an important

[132] Von Benda-Beckmann, Franz and Keebet. *Social Security Between Past and Present: Ambonese Networks of Care and Support.* Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2007. 167.
[133] Hamid, Shadi. "An Islamic Alternative? Equality, Redistributive Justice, and the Welfare State in the Caliphate of Umar." Renaissance: Monthly Islamic Journal 13.8 (2003). http://www.monthly-renaissance.com/issue/content.aspx?id=355
[134] Yom, Sean L. and F. Gregory Gause III. "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On." *Journal of Democracy* 23.4 (2012). 74-88. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/15-arab-monarchies-gause-yom.pdf

predictor of support for these policies, with lower GDP per capita corresponding to increased support for redistributive policies.[135]

The MENA region's history of authoritarian government likely contributes to its views on whether citizens' deference to their rulers is necessary to democracy, as measured in V138 "Democracy: People obey their rulers." The mean response for the region to V138 is 6.75, indicating that a notable majority of respondents in the MENA region believe that citizens in a democracy owe their political leaders at least some degree of deference. The greatest support for this position is found in the hereditary monarchies of Qatar (8.45), Jordan (7.90), and Kuwait (7.48) – plus the military dictatorship of Egypt (7.39) and Yemen (8.03), which is currently embroiled in a civil war. The least support is found in Lebanon, Palestine, Algeria, and Iraq, with respective mean responses of 5.02, 5.64, 5.78, and 5.80. Overall, the MENA region shows higher support for civil obedience than non-MENA countries, which collectively have a mean response to V138 of 5.87, versus the MENA's 6.75.

4.2.2.1. Gender and democracy

While MENA respondents may demonstrate a greater preference for equality in the economic affairs than their global peers, on gender equality – as an "essential" feature of democracy – the MENA region lags well behind the rest of the world. The region achieves a mean response of 6.94 to V139 "Democracy: Women have the same rights as men," showing that a modest majority of respondents believe that gender equality is an important part of democracy. However, the mean response for the rest of the world on this question is 8.06; when factoring MENA countries, this figure drops to 7.87. The highest mean responses are found in Morocco (7.89), Egypt (7.44), and Algeria (7.37); the lowest in Palestine (6.08), Libya (6.46), and Iraq (6.60) and Jordan (6.61).

There is a significant gap in responses to V139 between men and women. The table below displays the mean responses to this question when respondents are segregated by sex.

[135] "Middle East: GDP per capita." Global Property Guide. http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/gdp-per-capita.

Table 3. Democracy: Women have the same rights as men (crossed for sex)

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Mean [total]	6.94	7.37	6.08	6.60	6.61	6.69
Mean [female]	7.41	7.91	6.37	7.17	6.87	6.74
Mean [male]	6.51	6.86	5.78	6.09	6.35	6.71

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Mean [total]	6.96	6.46	7.89	6.96	7.29	7.44
Mean [male]	7.13	7.25	8.70	7.04	8.11	7.62
Mean [female]	6.78	5.77	7.09	6.87	6.58	7.27

	Country Code
	Yemen
Mean [total]	7.24
Mean [male]	8.13
Mean [female]	6.33

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

For the MENA region as a whole, male respondents show a mean response of 6.51, versus 7.41 for females. The gender gap is widest in Yemen, Morocco, and Tunisia – countries which incidentally all outperform the MENA region's mean response to the question. Minimal divergence between the sexes is observed in Kuwait and Qatar. Finally, in no country do a greater portion of men than women indicate they believe equal rights for women are an essential part of democracy: a finding that is altogether unsurprising.

What explains the MENA region's underperformance on gender equality as it relates to democracy? One common explanation comes from the traditional gender roles that are a part of Islamic culture. The most visible, perhaps infamous, examples of this are the veiling of women in public spaces, a practice known as "purdah," as well as the segregation of the sexes in public and sometimes private life. Widespread adherence to conservative religious practice in MENA countries may provide the basis for these countries' relatively depressed positive response rate to V139.

One way to test this hypothesis is to see how responses to V139 "Democracy: Women have the same rights as men" matches up with responses to questions on respondents' adherence to traditional viewpoints and religious belief. V79 "Schwartz: Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by one's religion or family" asks respondents whether they identify as a person to whom tradition is important, and to

what extent. The table below compares the mean responses gathered by V79 to those found in V139. Mean responses to V79 range from one to six, with higher values corresponding to decreased respondent identification with traditional values. The main feature of the data presented below to pay attention to is the ordering of countries, listed according to increasing mean response values.

Table 4. Gender equality, democracy and traditional values

V139. Mean responses (less → more gender equality as essential to democracy)	V179. Mean responses (more → less traditional)
Palestine (6.08)	Qatar (1.28)
Libya (6.46)	Jordan (1.65)
Iraq (6.60)	Tunisia (1.82)
Jordan (6.61)	=Libya (1.83)
Kuwait (6.69)	=Egypt (1.83)
MENA (6.94)	Yemen (1.88)
=Lebanon (6.96)	MENA (1.90)
=Qatar (6.96)	Iraq (1.91)
Yemen (7.24)	Kuwait (1.93)
Tunisia (7.29)	Algeria (1.94)
Algeria (7.37)	Morocco (2.01)
Egypt (7.44)	Palestine (2.15)
Morocco (7.89)	Lebanon (2.62)

No correlation between respondents' views on gender equality in a democracy and adherence to traditional values is clearly discernable. For example, Palestine, which holds the least progressive views on whether democracy demands women possess the same rights as men, also has the second lowest portion of respondents who follow traditional values and customs, just behind Lebanon. One issue that may be at play here is the fairly overwhelming support for traditional values across all countries in the MENA region, resulting in an ordering that is statistically inconsequential for the purposes of crossing V139 with V79.

4.2.2.2. Religion and democracy

Another way to test the hypothesis that the opinions expressed in V139 are motivated by religious reasons is to see if identification as a person of faith correlates with a decrease in the portion of respondents who hold gender equality as necessary for democracy. V147 "Religious person" asks respondents "independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are 'a religious person,' 'not a religious person,' or 'an atheist.' For its purposes, this exercise only considers the portion of respondents describing themselves as "a religious person."

Table 5. Gender equality, democracy, and religion

V139. Mean responses (less → more gender equality as essential to democracy)	V147. % answering "a religious person" (more → less religious)
Palestine (6.08)	Qatar (94.1%)
Libya (6.46)	Yemen (90.7%)
Iraq (6.60)	Morocco (89.0%)
Jordan (6.61)	Algeria (84.2%)
Kuwait (6.69)	Iraq (83.5%)
MENA (6.94)	Jordan (80.7%)
=Lebanon (6.96)	MENA (79.4%)
=Qatar (6.96)	Libya (74.0%)
Yemen (7.24)	Palestine (73.8%)
Tunisia (7.29)	Kuwait (73.7%)
Algeria (7.37)	Tunisia (70.5%)
Egypt (7.44)	Lebanon (66.2%)
Morocco (7.89)	-

**No data available for Egypt on V147 "Religious person."*

Again, no discernable pattern is clearly evident in the cross between V139 and V147. If anything, there could be a relationship between decreased religious identification and decreased respondent belief that gender equality is essential for democracy. The inconclusive results found by the cross of V139 "Democracy: Women have the same rights as men" and V147 "Religious person" is mirror in several other survey questions related to religion. Among individual countries in the MENA region, specific local factors are, thus, probably responsible for various responses to V139.

The final two questions to consider from the "Democracy" battery are V132 "Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws" and V135 "Democracy: Army takes over when government is incompetent." V132 and V135 demonstrate the lowest mean responses out of the nine questions included in the battery.

On V132 "Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws," the MENA region obtains a mean response of 5.57, indicating that roughly equal portions of the total regional survey sample views clerical involvement in governing as "essential" and "not essential" to democracy. The highest mean responses to the question are observed in Morocco (6.55), Yemen (6.42), and Egypt (6.19). Lebanon (3.93), Tunisia (4.52), and Algeria (5.10) have the lowest mean responses. Local histories and political circumstances likely play a significant role in shaping the results obtained by V132. For example, Lebanon's minimal preference for granting religious authorities a legal

oversight mandate is almost certainly attributable to its diverse sectarian composition, in which no single religious faction claims an outright majority of the population. Tunisia's apparent moderation on this topic is reflected in the decision by Ennahda (an Islamist party, which obtained the largest share of votes in the country's first parliamentary election after the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime) to refrain from implementing sharia in the new Tunisian constitution[136] – compare this to the course of action undertaken by Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood under similar circumstances.

Whereas the cross of V139 "Democracy: Women have the same rights as men" with V147 "Religious person" failed to establish a correlative relationship between increased religiosity and diminished support for gender equality, a cross of V147 with V132 "Religious authorities interpret laws" does yield a clear positive correlation between increased identification as "a religious person" and support for a clerical role in democratic government. The table below ranks countries on both V132 and V147 side-by-side.

Table 6. Clerical rule and religious identification

V132. Mean responses (less → more clerics in govt as essential to democracy)	V147. % answering "a religious person" (less → more religious)
Lebanon (3.93)	Lebanon (66.2%)
Tunisia (4.52)	Tunisia (70.5%)
Algeria (5.10)	Kuwait (73.7%)
Palestine (5.23)	Palestine (73.8%)
Kuwait (5.24)	Libya (74.0%)
MENA (5.57)	MENA (79.4%)
Jordan (5.69)	Jordan (80.7%)
Libya (5.84)	Iraq (83.5%)
Qatar (5.94)	Algeria (84.2%)
Iraq (6.16)	Morocco (89.0%)
Egypt (6.19)	Yemen (90.7%)
Yemen (6.42)	Qatar (94.1%)
Morocco (6.55)	-

At 66.2%, Lebanon has the smallest portion of respondents confirming they are religious believers on V147: this matches Lebanon's performance relative to other MENA countries on V132, where it has the obtains the lowest mean response, at 3.93 – indicating minimal preference for religious authorities interpreting the law. Across the MENA region, as the percentage of respondents describing themselves as religious rises, support for clerical rule as an essential feature of democracy tracks upward. Yemen and

[136] AFP. "Tunisia's constitution will not be based on Sharia: Islamist party." Al Arabiya News. 27 March 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/27/203529.html.

Morocco have the second and third highest percentages of respondents answering "a religious person" to V147; they have the second and first highest mean responses to V139, respectively.

Two outliers to this positive correlation are Qatar and Algeria, especially. 94.1% of Qatari respondents identify as religious believers – the highest positive response rate in the region. However, this apparent religiosity translates into a fairly subdued, but still significant, level of Qatari support for the proposition in V132 that democracy demands clerical supervision. Algeria has the fourth largest portion of respondents identifying as religious followers, at 84.2%, but the third lowest mean response to V132, at 5.10. The divergence of Qatar and Algeria from the pattern observed across other MENA countries is probably related most to country-specific factors. Qatar has dualistic identity as a country which reveres tradition but also serves as an international hub of commerce; it has both the highest rate of religious adherence, as measured by V147, and the world's highest GDP per capita, at $129,700.[137] Contemporary Algerian politics are doubtlessly shaped by the country's bloody civil war during the 1990s against Islamist insurgents seeking a greater role for Sharia-based governance.

4.2.2.3. Democracy and the military

On V135 "Democracy: Army takes over when government is incompetent," the mean response for the MENA region is 5.29, indicating an at least moderate preference for the military playing a paternalistic role with respect to the democratically-elected government. A score of 5.29 is just below the mid-point value of 5.50 for this question, meaning that respondents who do not favour this particular brand of civil-military relationships just slightly outnumber those who do. V135 describes a situation that is all too common in the MENA region: Algeria's civil war in the 1990s was provoked by a military coup to cancel the results of an election which brought an Islamist party to power. More recently, the Egyptian army has had a pivotal role in the country's two government overthrows since 2011, with the result that Egypt is currently led by the army's former top commander, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Unfortunately, no data is available for Egypt on V135, given the sensitivity of the issue at the time of survey collection.

The greatest support for the position that democracy requires the military to sometimes intervene in the political process is found in Libya (6.71), Morocco (6.28), and Iraq

[137] "Country Comparison: GDP – per capita (PPP)." The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html

(5.62). No other countries obtain a mean response to V135 above mid-point value of 5.50; Lebanon's mean response sits exactly at this point. Libya and Iraq have been riven by sectarian violence and war; their central governments are unable to assert control over vast swathes of their respective countries. The high mean responses found in either country likely reflect respondents' desire for basic security, stability, and "competent" government. The causes behind Morocco's high score are somewhat harder to decipher, given its reputation for relative political moderation.

The lowest mean responses to V135 are found in Kuwait (3.94), Algeria (4.39), and Palestine (4.40). A single comprehensive explanation for these countries' lower mean responses is not immediately clear, although local factors almost certainly at work. First, Palestine lacks an army (as well as a sovereign democracy) to fulfil the role outlined by V135. Algeria's results on V135 are again probably influenced by the country's experience with its 1992 coup and ensuing civil war. Kuwait is widely regarded as one of the better-run countries in the MENA region; moreover, its population's experience with military occupation during the First Gulf War may have cooling effect on any Kuwaiti desire for the army participating in domestic politics.

Many scholars have sought to explain the causal mechanism(s) behind military interventions in domestic politics, or coups, yielding various factors that may elevate or mitigate so-called "coup risk" in a given society.[138] Moreover, it is widely held that one sign of the political maturity of a society is the extent to which the civilian government exercises control over the armed forces; the notion of civilian control is an important, although largely unnoticed, norm in healthy democratic systems. A general explanation (or at least factor) for why the military may decide to intervene in the domestic political sphere may reside in its credibility relative to that of the civilian government. In much of the MENA region – and the rest of the world, for that matter – the armed forces are the most highly regarded state institution in the public's eye, often in stark contrast with the elected government. The very framing of V135 underscores this dynamic: respondents are asked whether they believe an essential characteristic of democracy is that when the "government is incompetent," the "army takes over."

The following table presents data gathered from V109 "Confidence: The armed forces" and V115 "Confidence: The government (in your nation's capital)," specifically the percentages of respondents in 11 MENA countries expressing either "a great deal" or

[138] See: Finer, S.E. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. Boulder: Westview, 1962.
Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer. "Towards a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk." Journal of Conflict Resolution 47.5 (2003). 594-620. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.718.2925&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Rouquié, Alain. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkley: University of California Press, 1987. E-book. http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft9b69p386;brand=ucpress

"quite a lot" of confidence in their country's armed forces or national civil government, depending on the question. In both V109 and V115, respondents are asked to describe their level of confidence in a given institution with one of four possible answers: "a great deal," "quite a lot," "not very much," or "none at all." The column furthest to the right of the table shows the difference in confidence between the armed forces and civil government.

Table 7. Confidence in military vs. civil government

	V109. Confidence: The armed forces	V115. Confidence: The govt (in your nation's capital)	Net confidence (armed forces – civil govt)
	% answering "a great deal"/ "quite a lot"	% answering "a great deal"/ "quite a lot"	V109 – V115 (percentage point difference)
TOTAL	64.3%	41.8%	22.5
Algeria	57.2%	38.8%	18.4
Palestine	48.6%	40.7%	7.9
Iraq	61.1%	39.7%	21.4
Jordan	90.9%	55.6%	35.3
Kuwait	74.3%	63.0%	11.3
Lebanon	47.0%	27.9%	19.3
Libya	52.4%	24.5%	27.9
Morocco	77.6%	47.7%	29.9
Qatar	95.4%	83.4%	12.0
Tunisia	63.2%	19.3%	43.9
Yemen	41.6%	29.7%	11.9

In every country in the region, public confidence (as measured by this survey) in the armed forces is higher than confidence in the civilian government. For the MENA region as a whole, 64.3% of respondents express either a "great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence in the military, versus 41.8% for the government. The largest confidence gap is observed in Tunisia (43.9 percentage points) and Jordan (35.3 percentage points); however, these two cases are slight outliers. Confidence in the armed forces is extremely high in Jordan (90.9%), while confidence in civil government is very low in Tunisia (19.3%) – skewing the confidence gap found in either country.

Figure 13 "Confidence gap and preference for military rule" plots the confidence gap between the armed forces and civil government for each country against their mean response to V135 "Democracy: Army takes over when government is incompetent."

Figure 13. Confidence gap and preference for military rule



With the exceptions of Tunisia and Jordan, a clear positive correlation is evident between increased disparity in public support for the military versus civilian government and respondents' approval of the proposition that in a democracy, the army must sometimes intervene in politics. Palestine and Kuwait have the first and second lowest confidence gaps, at 7.9 and 11.3 percentage points, respectively have the third and first lowest mean responses to V135, at 4.40 and 3.94 (Algeria has the second lowest mean response to V135, 4.39). At the opposite end of the graph, Libya and Morocco's fourth and third highest confidence gaps (27.9 and 29.9 percentage points) earn them the first and second highest mean responses to V135.

The results found in Figure 13 might lend support to the argument that MENA citizens' support for democracy is contingent upon its ability to produce good results for the people, and that failing this perceived duty, a suspension of democratic rule may be warranted. Even further, this suspension of rule by an elected government via a military coup may in fact be closer to the essence of "democratic" government, in that it reflects more accurately the rule of the people.

A necessary disclaimer: the mere fact that the military is more respected than the government does not alone provide sufficient justification for rule by the generals. Furthermore, when compared to other questions in the "Democracy" battery (V131-139), mean responses on V135 are typically the lowest of the nine questions.

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4.3. Impact of politics and democracy on personal life

Politics, by definition, has an impact in the lives of everyday people. This being said, in today's large and complex democracies, politics often feels removed from the daily life and activity of most people. Every once in a while, some issue of major importance or with a wide impact will be addressed by national leaders – like a decision to go to war, or give a tax rebate. However, more often than not, the legislative and decisionmaking processes at this level have little to no immediate effect for most constituents. The accountability to the voters engendered by a democratic political system fosters an aversion among political leaders to the kinds of risk that could deeply impact the lives of a great number of said voters

Now, all this is more true in an established, mature democracies and for those citizens not living on the periphery of society, for whom the decision to extend the eligibility period for unemployment insurance, for example, could mean the difference between paying the rent and sleeping on the streets. In less developed democracies, as well as authoritarian countries, the stakes are higher in the political arena: strict voter accountability and the risk aversion by politicians that comes with it, is lacking, and often violence motivated by politics is a very real threat. This situation more aptly describes the circumstances in the monarchies, authoritarian regimes and developing democracies that populate the MENA region.

4.3.1. Politics

In examining the extent to which residents in the MENA region value democracy, this section starts by looking at how important these respondents consider "politics" to be in their lives. This topic is the subject of V7 "Important in life: Politics." Respondents are asked to describe the importance of politics in their lives with one of four answer choices: "very important," "rather important," "not very important," or "not important at all." Results for the 12 MENA countries covered by this survey are shown below.

Table 8. Important in life: Politics

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very important	21.8%	21.5%	17.0%	12.4%	14.6%	33.2%
Rather important	28.9%	20.0%	34.0%	30.2%	25.6%	29.3%
Not very important	23.6%	23.7%	30.3%	29.4%	25.1%	21.9%
Not at all important	25.8%	34.8%	18.8%	28.1%	34.7%	15.6%
(N)	(14,736)	(1,137)	(985)	(1,189)	(1,195)	(1,225)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Very important	22.1%	28.9%	6.8%	29.3%	19.5%	31.0%
Rather important	27.4%	30.7%	10.3%	38.0%	21.2%	44.0%
Not very important	25.3%	21.3%	24.2%	20.5%	27.7%	14.0%
Not at all important	25.2%	19.2%	58.8%	12.3%	31.6%	11.0%
(N)	(1,133)	(2,042)	(1,092)	(1,056)	(1,190)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very important	14.8%
Rather important	30.4%
Not very important	25.5%
Not at all important	29.3%
(N)	(969)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the MENA region, 50.7% of respondents stated that politics are either "very important" or "rather important" in their lives. Politics appear to be a central concern in Egyptian life, with 75% of respondents choosing one of these two answer choices. The wealthy Gulf states of Qatar and Kuwait had the second and third highest positive response rates to V7, at 67.3% and 62.5%, respectively. By a clear margin, Moroccans are affected the least in their personal lives by politics, with only 17.1% of respondents reporting politics are either "very" or "rather" important in their lives. Jordan and Tunisia come in with the second and third lowest positive response rates, at 40.2% and 40.7%.

The open-ended wording of V7 ("indicate how important [politics] is in your life") means that its results should not be taken as a measure of respondents' political engagement – or apathy. One should approach the figures above with the recognition that respondents may have different understandings of what constitutes "politics" as well as "important."

It is expected that Egypt would have a significant portion of respondents stating that "yes, politics are an important part of my life," given the country's recent history of popular revolution and counter-revolution. Politics, at its most basic level, of the citizen, has played an incredibly decisive role in the direction Egypt has taken in recent years and during the time this survey was completed, 2012. Much the same can be said of Libya's results, with 59.6% of respondents reporting positive responses to V7.

However, following this logic, Tunisia's relatively low positive response rate of 40.7% is surprising, especially in light of the fact that Tunisia has enjoyed arguably the only

successful transition to democracy out of the Arab Spring. One way to interpret this result is that the revolution simply was not felt by as many people as the typical outside observer would believe. Another way is that the events of the revolution are not included in the definition of "politics" for at least some members of the survey sample. For whatever reason, how events unfolded during the Arab Spring in a particular country does not appear strongly predictive of how respondents described the importance of politics in their lives.

4.3.2. Democracy

V140 "Importance of democracy" aims directly for the main topic of this section of the chapter: asking respondents, on a scale from one to ten, "how important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically." Results for V140 are shown in the table below.

Table 9. Importance of democracy

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Not at all important	2.6%	2.6%	3.4%	1.2%	1.3%	3.1%
2	0.9%	0.9%	2.2%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%
3	1.3%	1.7%	1.6%	2.6%	1.3%	1.1%
4	1.8%	3.1%	1.8%	3.9%	1.1%	1.7%
5	7.0%	7.0%	9.6%	6.3%	6.7%	8.6%
6	6.4%	6.1%	8.4%	7.3%	6.3%	8.4%
7	8.7%	10.1%	9.9%	11.4%	11.4%	10.3%
8	11.1%	11.9%	13.9%	16.7%	14.7%	7.4%
9	13.2%	13.2%	13.0%	18.3%	12.5%	8.9%
Absolutely important	47.0%	43.3%	36.3%	31.4%	43.6%	49.7%
(N)	(14,630)	(1,113)	(971)	(1,190)	(1,188)	(1,263)
Mean	8.27	8.12	7.78	7.95	8.29	8.17
Standard Deviation	2.26	2.32	2.44	2.13	2.07	2.37
Base mean	(14,630)	(1,113)	(971)	(1,190)	(1,188)	(1,263)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Not at all important	0.6%	5.3%	1.0%	4.9%	3.8%	0.7%
2	0.4%	2.1%	0.1%	0.7%	0.3%	0.4%
3	1.4%	2.2%	0.3%	1.0%	0.8%	0.2%
4	2.2%	1.6%	1.5%	1.3%	1.4%	0.6%
5	5.7%	6.0%	12.6%	6.7%	8.6%	1.4%
6	13.6%	5.2%	6.1%	5.7%	4.7%	3.1%
7	14.6%	6.3%	5.6%	5.5%	7.7%	7.0%
8	12.5%	8.9%	8.7%	9.3%	7.0%	11.8%
9	15.5%	9.4%	8.1%	10.2%	5.3%	25.9%
Absolutely important	33.4%	53.0%	55.9%	54.6%	60.5%	48.9%
(N)	(1,184)	(2,030)	(1,069)	(1,049)	(1,137)	(1,523)

Mean	8.01	8.13	8.49	8.34	8.46	8.95
Standard Deviation	1.96	2.68	2.09	2.49	2.38	1.51
Base mean	(1,184)	(2,030)	(1,069)	(1,049)	(1,137)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Not at all important	1.9%
2	1.0%
3	0.8%
4	2.1%
5	7.6%
6	3.2%
7	5.7%
8	11.3%
9	18.0%
Absolutely important	48.6%
(N)	(913)
Mean	8.49
Standard Deviation	2.13
Base mean	(913)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

In assessing the results of V140 "Importance of democracy," the figures to focus on are the mean responses. The mean response for each country is expressed as a number between 1 and 10, corresponding to possible responses a respondent may choose to describe how important it is to him/her to live in a democracy. An answer choice of 1 is the lowest possible response, indicating it is "not at all important" that the respondent live in a democracy; conversely, a score of 10 indicates it is "absolutely important."

The mean (or average) response for the MENA region to V140 is 8.27, indicating that the typical respondent from the region believes it is very important that he/she lives in country that is governed democratically.

Egypt has the highest mean response, at 8.95. Morocco and Yemen tie for second, at 8.49. None of these countries is currently ruled by a democratically-elected government. Egypt's first and only democratically-elected president, Mohamed Morsi, served for one year and three days before being deposed in a military coup on 3 July 2013 led by his then defence minister and now current President of Egypt, General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.[139] Morocco is a constitutional monarchy led by King Mohammed VI; the country emerged from the Arab Spring relatively unscathed, largely due to adept political manoeuvring by

[139] Kingsley, Patrick. "How Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's first elected president, ended up on death row." The Guardian. 1 June 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/mohamed-morsi-execution-death-sentence-egypt

the palace.[140] Yemen today is embroiled in a civil war serving as a proxy front between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and which started after the Houthis, a Shia insurgent movement, managed to oust Yemen's transitional leader, President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi took power from Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose almost 22 years as President of Yemen ended as a result of Arab Spring protests; Hadi was formally inaugurated as president on 27 February 2012 after winning an uncontested election.[141]

At the opposite end of V140 results, Palestine (7.78), Iraq (7.95), and Lebanon (8.01) have the first, second, and third lowest mean responses, respectively. In each of these three cases, there are readily available explanations for what might be depressing their scores relative to other MENA countries. The Palestinian desire for statehood and self-determination likely takes precedent over the shape of the government for their as of yet unrealised state. Moreover, the last time Palestine held a general election was in 2006, which witnessed hard-line Hamas win over the more establishment Fatah. An ensuing rift between the two parties has led the next Palestinian general election to be postponed indefinitely; meanwhile, the prospect of Palestinian statehood has drifted further into doubt.[142] Disillusionment with the democratic process is almost certainly a factor at play in Lebanese and especially Iraqi responses to V140 – both countries that have bloody histories of sectarianism and intractable civil politics.

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4.4. Is this country being run democratically?

Overall, there is little deviation in mean responses for individual nations from the mean response for the MENA region as a whole. The idea of democracy is viewed positively by the substantial majority of respondents in all countries surveyed. However, these views have failed to translate to concrete and lasting democratic governance in the region. V141 "How democratically is this country being governed today" asks respondents to report their views on the actual practice of democratic government in their respective countries currently, using the same 1 to 10 scale employed in V140. The results, displayed below, are markedly different from the previous question.

[140] Yom, Sean L. and F. Gregory Gause III. "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On." *Journal of Democracy* 23.4 (2012). 74-88. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/15-arab-monarchies-gause-yom.pdf
[141] "Yemen profile – Timeline." *BBC News*. 1 March 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14704951
[142] Melhem, Ahmad."Palestinian elections on hold until further notice." *Al-Monitor*. 28 October 2014. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/10/palestine-presidential-parliamentary-elections-on-hold.html

Table 10. How democratically is this country being governed today

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon
Not at all democratic	16.5%	6.2%	18.6%	8.1%	3.0%	6.2%
2	7.6%	3.7%	7.4%	14.9%	1.7%	5.0%
3	9.3%	6.1%	9.2%	13.7%	3.4%	6.6%
4	8.6%	8.5%	12.4%	11.3%	4.5%	11.0%
5	16.7%	23.5%	19.4%	15.2%	17.9%	12.9%
6	11.3%	12.7%	13.4%	13.8%	13.5%	19.3%
7	11.4%	15.3%	8.2%	12.8%	19.1%	15.8%
8	7.9%	11.8%	5.5%	7.0%	14.4%	9.9%
9	4.4%	4.4%	2.5%	2.4%	8.8%	6.1%
Completely democratic	6.2%	7.7%	3.4%	0.8%	13.5%	7.0%
(N)	(12,105)	(1,084)	(968)	(1,179)	(1,165)	(1,174)
Mean	4.90	5.79	4.46	4.58	6.69	5.76
Standard Deviation	2.70	2.34	2.46	2.23	2.22	2.39
Base mean	(12,105)	(1,084)	(968)	(1,179)	(1,165)	(1,174)

	Country Code				
	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
Not at all democratic	32.0%	16.5%	25.7%	23.0%	12.4%
2	7.0%	10.6%	6.3%	10.2%	8.8%
3	8.1%	12.5%	12.3%	10.5%	11.3%
4	7.1%	7.9%	11.8%	7.0%	6.6%
5	12.7%	26.5%	19.2%	8.5%	19.4%
6	6.5%	9.6%	9.2%	8.7%	10.3%
7	8.0%	6.8%	9.0%	10.2%	10.1%
8	4.7%	4.7%	3.8%	10.9%	7.4%
9	2.3%	2.1%	0.6%	7.5%	8.2%
Completely democratic	11.6%	2.7%	2.0%	3.4%	5.6%
(N)	(1,991)	(1,040)	(1,103)	(1,523)	(878)
Mean	4.31	4.29	3.93	4.58	5.08
Standard Deviation	3.12	2.34	2.36	2.91	2.68
Base mean	(1,991)	(1,040)	(1,103)	(1,523)	(878)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Again, the main figure to pay attention to here is the mean response. The mean response for the MENA region as a whole is 4.90; a mid-point score of 5.5 would indicate conditions that fall exactly between being "completely democratic" and "not democratic at all." A mean of 4.90 indicates conditions across the region that are slightly more undemocratic than democratic.

Of the countries surveyed, the highest mean response belongs to Jordan, at 6.69, indicating that Jordanian respondents, on average, view their country as moderately democratic. While Jordan has an elected national parliament, ultimate power still rests

with the country's monarch, King Abdullah II, who is widely seen as the one figure that holds credibility with all Jordanian constituencies.[143] Somewhat surprisingly, the lowest mean response is found in Tunisia, at 3.93 – apparently in spite of the country's nominally successful transition to multiparty democracy. As with the depressed mean responses for Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine on V140 "Importance of democracy," Tunisia's comparatively low score on V141 may well reflect respondents' disillusionment with the new realities of the democratic process.

Individual country mean responses conform less closely to the regional mean on V141 "How democratically is this country being governed today" versus V141. Still, the range of mean responses between MENA countries is not particularly wide. Overall, these countries have significant deficits in democratic governance, which is reflected in the survey data. Out of the 10 countries surveyed on V141, only Algeria (5.79), Jordan (6.69), and Lebanon (5.76) obtain mean responses that surpass the mid-point value of 5.50; these three are the only countries where, on balance, the current system of rule is seen as more democratic than undemocratic by citizens.

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4.5 Elections

Elections are the most basic and essential part of any democratic political system – liberal or illiberal. Broadly described, elections provide a process of decisionmaking by which a polity (in this case, an entire country) chooses its leaders.[144] This decisionmaking process is crucial to any system of government claiming to be a democracy because it is the main process by which the system and its leaders obtain the legitimacy and mandate to rule over people.

According to political theorist S.M. Lipset, legitimacy "involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society."[145] It is an acknowledgement by the governed of the authority of those doing the governing: regardless of whether the citizen agrees with the political positions of his or her country's leadership, that person accepts the leadership's right to rule. Political leaders who are widely perceived as legitimate are able to secure the public voluntary compliance with a country's laws as well as the

[143] Yom, Sean. "Jordan: The Ruse of Reform," *Journal of Democracy* 24.3 (2013). 127-139. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/512746
[144] Webb, Paul David, Heinz Eulau, and Roger Gibbins. "Elections (political science)." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. 17 August 2011. https://global.britannica.com/topic/election-political-science.
[145] Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (2nd ed.). London: Heinemann, 1983. 64.

payment of taxes. Legitimacy furthermore encourages the losing side of an election to accept their loss, ensuring the peaceful transfer of power that is a hallmark of developed democracies.[146]

Elections provide just one source of political legitimacy; political systems other than democracy promote their own different mandate claims. China is an interesting case providing several examples of alternative, non-democratic sources of legitimacy, and how these claims interact with one another and change over time. In China, the Communist Party (CCP) is virtually synonymous with the government of China, and it at least aspires to be synonymous with the concept of China as a nation itself. Over the past decades of China's extraordinary economic growth, the CCP has tied its legitimacy to its ability to generate said economic growth, lifting millions of Chinese out of poverty and into the middle class.[147] This marriage of economic performance to a mandate to govern in China is different from how a U.S. president's ability, for example, to grow the economy may determine his and his party's chances in the next election, in that if the president's party fails to perform, voters can choose to elect the other party to replace them. "Replacement" of the party in power in China could very well mean the end of that country's entire current political system.

China's Communist leadership supplements its claim to legitimacy by advertising its revolutionary credentials (important in a communist regime) and by making the appeal to tradition; in this case the tradition of Chinese emperors ruling according to the Confucian doctrine of the "mandate of heaven."[148] The immediate costs of staking a given system of government's legitimacy on material performance as well as forceful coercion, as authoritarian regimes like the Chinese do, may and frequently are higher than the costs associated with deriving legitimacy from free and fair elections. However, authoritarian regimes are willing to bear these costs in most cases because of one particular trait of electorally-based legitimacy that presents them an existential risk: the risk of losing elections and being forced from power.

The solution that existing and would-be autocrats, and even supposed democrats, have developed to this particular problem is to manipulate the elections through a range of techniques that includes legal (i.e., biasing media coverage against opposition candidates) and illegal (i.e., bribing voters for their vote) measures, which can be deployed at any

[146] Norris, Pippa. "Why electoral integrity matters for legitimacy." PowerPoint presentation.
See also: Norris, Pippa. *Why Electoral Integrity Matters*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
[147] Weiwei, Zhang. "In China, Unlike Trump's America, Political Legitimacy Is Built On Competence And Experience." *Huffington Post*. 3 March 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-communist-party-rule_us_58b7363fe4b019d36d1052ed
[148] Yang Ruan, Lotus. "The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy." *The Diplomat*. 30 September 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-chinese-communist-party-and-legitimacy/

stage of the process – from the years leading up to an election to when the votes are being counted. This section considers a selection of manipulation techniques it refers to as "electoral malpractice," as well as their corollary, "electoral integrity" factors – factors that reinforce the fairness of an election. This section also covers voter participation in elections in the MENA region.

4.5.1. Electoral practice and malpractice

Pippa Norris, founding director of the Electoral Integrity Project, has worked extensively on issues which she helpfully summarises as "electoral integrity" and "electoral malpractice," and has frequently used survey data from the World Values Survey in her work. Actors in a position of political authority possess what Norris refers to as a "menu of manipulation," from which they can select the means to favour their preferred faction(s) and disadvantage their competitors in an electoral setting ; specific measures at their disposal will be discussed in greater detail later in the section.

The use of electoral malpractice (the techniques included in the "menu of manipulation") may deliver real benefits to a political actor, at least in the short run, by providing a nominal popular mandate to bolster their position. However, in the long-run, such techniques damage electoral integrity, and thus, the legitimacy of the entire political system.[149] The MENA region is among the parts of the world where this approach to elections is prevalent: democracy tends to be used instrumentally, as a means of ratifying the status quo.

The World Values Survey uses a number of questions to gauge electoral integrity and electoral malpractice in the countries it covers. Because, the World Values Survey is a mass survey of common, everyday people, it provides a unique perspective on these phenomena that is different from the more typical expert-based assessments of countries' electoral practices.[150] The approach taken here allows a broad view on the election system, exploring how individuals personally relate to it. The drawback of this approach, versus expert assessments, is that the more-hidden forms of electoral malpractice, like partisan gerrymandering, may go unnoticed by the general public – electoral malpractice and media censorship often go hand-in-hand, too.

[149] Norris, Pippa. "Why electoral integrity matters for legitimacy." PowerPoint presentation.
[150] Norris, Pippa. "Are There Global Norms and Universal Standards of Electoral Integrity and Malpractice? Comparing Public and Expert Perceptions." HKS Working Paper No. RWP12-010. 20 March 2012. 11-12. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2087611

The battery V228A-I "How often in country's elections" includes five questions that serve as measures of electoral malpractice, and four that measure electoral integrity. Respondents are asked to describe how often each one of these electoral malpractices and practices of electoral integrity occurs in their country's elections with either "very often," "fairly often," "not often," or "not at all often." This division of questions between electoral integrity and electoral malpractice is as follows:

Electoral malpractice:

- V228B. "Opposition candidates are prevented from running"
- V228C. "TV news favours the governing party
- V228D. "Voters are bribed"
- V228G. "Rich people buy elections"
- V228H. "Voters are threatened with violence at the polls"

Electoral integrity

- V228A. "Votes are counted fairly"
- V228E. "Journalists provide fair coverage of elections"
- V228F. "Election officials are fair"
- V228I. "Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections"

The table below displays the results of V228A-I in the ten countries where respondents were surveyed on this battery.

Table 11. How often in country's elections: ...

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
V228A. Votes are counted fairly	Very often	24.8%	16.6%	38.8%	28.8%	16.5%	45.6%
	Fairly often	34.7%	31.5%	42.5%	35.1%	39.4%	31.3%
	Not often	22.6%	30.9%	11.1%	22.0%	22.0%	10.7%
	Not at all often	17.8%	21.0%	7.6%	7.6%	22.1%	12.4%
	(N)	(10,448)	(813)	(855)	(1,105)	(1,081)	(1,055)
V228B. Opposition candidates are prevented from running	Very often	13.0%	15.3%	8.0%	11.3%	10.0%	14.8%
	Fairly often	29.0%	23.6%	37.8%	29.1%	32.0%	25.0%
	Not often	28.2%	21.2%	22.3%	33.9%	23.3%	21.8%
	Not at all often	29.8%	39.8%	31.9%	25.7%	34.7%	38.3%
	(N)	(9,628)	(673)	(838)	(991)	(991)	(1,012)
V228C. TV news favours the governing party	Very often	24.4%	29.1%	23.9%	19.2%	17.5%	28.3%
	Fairly often	33.1%	31.5%	43.7%	39.8%	29.1%	37.4%
	Not often	26.6%	22.4%	22.1%	31.2%	30.0%	24.4%
	Not at all often	15.9%	17.0%	10.4%	9.8%	23.3%	9.9%
	(N)	(9,283)	(771)	(884)	(1,117)	(1,003)	(1,090)

V228D. Voters are bribed	Very often	25.4%	34.7%	21.3%	16.4%	44.8%	16.6%
	Fairly often	33.4%	28.1%	45.6%	33.5%	35.6%	30.1%
	Not often	25.4%	20.1%	19.4%	36.7%	12.3%	30.5%
	Not at all often	15.9%	17.1%	13.8%	13.4%	7.3%	22.7%
	(N)	(10,225)	(730)	(856)	(1,086)	(1,105)	(976)
V228E. Journalists provide fair coverage of elections	Very often	20.0%	19.5%	28.8%	21.9%	15.7%	24.0%
	Fairly often	37.0%	32.9%	45.1%	37.5%	44.2%	31.8%
	Not often	29.7%	29.1%	20.8%	32.9%	28.4%	30.9%
	Not at all often	13.3%	18.6%	5.4%	7.7%	11.8%	13.2%
	(N)	(10,213)	(770)	(876)	(1,124)	(1,054)	(1,012)
V228F Election officials are fair	Very often	20.0%	18.2%	25.1%	25.6%	11.0%	39.2%
	Fairly often	33.9%	29.8%	41.5%	31.9%	43.4%	28.8%
	Not often	29.0%	29.0%	24.0%	25.7%	30.0%	20.1%
	Not at all often	17.0%	23.0%	9.4%	16.8%	15.6%	11.9%
	(N)	(10,081)	(773)	(838)	(1,072)	(1,055)	(1,005)
V228G. Rich people buy elections	Very often	26.9%	33.6%	18.8%	18.3%	44.5%	19.6%
	Fairly often	33.6%	31.5%	43.1%	32.0%	35.6%	28.0%
	Not often	24.4%	18.8%	24.1%	33.2%	14.4%	28.1%
	Not at all often	15.1%	16.0%	14.0%	16.4%	5.5%	24.4%
	(N)	(10,096)	(717)	(847)	(1,058)	(1,118)	(987)
V228H. Voters are threatened with violence at the polls	Very often	10.3%	12.3%	6.2%	8.2%	6.9%	6.4%
	Fairly often	23.4%	17.0%	26.8%	21.1%	23.0%	13.1%
	Not often	24.7%	17.6%	25.4%	22.5%	19.7%	18.0%
	Not at all often	41.6%	53.1%	41.6%	48.3%	50.4%	62.5%
	(N)	(9,823)	(731)	(822)	(1,040)	(1,030)	(949)
V228I. Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections	Very often	29.4%	31.3%	39.0%	38.7%	25.9%	29.1%
	Fairly often	32.9%	27.3%	37.1%	28.5%	38.8%	22.8%
	Not often	23.7%	17.9%	18.3%	20.3%	23.7%	26.9%
	Not at all often	14.0%	23.5%	5.5%	12.5%	11.7%	21.2%
	(N)	(9,757)	(681)	(867)	(1,021)	(1,009)	(911)

		Country Code				
		Lebanon	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
V228A. Votes are counted fairly	Very often	17.2%	33.8%	10.4%	17.1%	15.5%
	Fairly often	37.5%	31.1%	36.6%	32.6%	32.9%
	Not often	26.1%	19.4%	35.8%	27.8%	24.5%
	Not at all often	19.2%	15.6%	17.2%	22.4%	27.1%
	(N)	(1,081)	(1,553)	(721)	(1,424)	(760)
V228B. Opposition candidates are prevented from running	Very often	17.4%	20.7%	9.9%	10.3%	5.6%
	Fairly often	30.2%	28.3%	29.1%	30.7%	21.1%
	Not often	31.7%	27.0%	37.1%	37.9%	20.3%
	Not at all often	20.7%	23.9%	23.9%	21.2%	53.1%
	(N)	(1,042)	(1,448)	(649)	(1,338)	(646)
V228C. TV news favours the governing party	Very often	-	25.8%	36.7%	13.2%	36.9%
	Fairly often	-	27.4%	31.6%	28.0%	34.6%
	Not often	-	25.9%	23.5%	35.4%	16.1%
	Not at all often	-	20.9%	8.1%	23.4%	12.3%
	(N)	-	(1,544)	(765)	(1,396)	(713)
V228D. Voters are bribed	Very often	35.0%	18.6%	23.2%	21.2%	26.1%
	Fairly often	36.3%	24.0%	37.2%	30.6%	41.2%
	Not often	20.9%	26.8%	28.9%	33.2%	18.7%
	Not at all often	7.8%	30.6%	10.7%	15.0%	14.0%
	(N)	(1,101)	(1,458)	(717)	(1,437)	(759)
V228E. Journalists provide fair coverage of elections	Very often	20.0%	29.7%	7.8%	14.9%	6.8%
	Fairly often	38.7%	32.4%	34.8%	39.2%	31.9%
	Not often	28.9%	24.3%	38.4%	32.5%	35.5%
	Not at all often	12.4%	13.6%	19.1%	13.5%	25.8%
	(N)	(1,082)	(1,579)	(745)	(1,397)	(574)
V228F Election	Very often	15.1%	26.8%	7.7%	14.5%	8.2%

officials are fair	Fairly often	33.9%	32.6%	29.5%	36.7%	27.4%
	Not often	32.0%	25.2%	38.6%	34.8%	34.8%
	Not at all often	19.1%	15.4%	24.3%	13.9%	29.6%
	(N)	(1,060)	(1,531)	(692)	(1,397)	(658)
V228G. Rich people buy elections	Very often	40.1%	23.0%	29.1%	18.1%	28.0%
	Fairly often	31.1%	30.2%	33.7%	31.7%	45.4%
	Not often	20.3%	21.3%	26.9%	34.7%	17.7%
	Not at all often	8.5%	25.6%	10.4%	15.5%	8.9%
	(N)	(1,083)	(1,460)	(685)	(1,397)	(744)
V228H. Voters are threatened with violence at the polls	Very often	14.4%	18.6%	4.9%	9.2%	9.9%
	Fairly often	31.0%	24.0%	20.0%	30.1%	21.4%
	Not often	35.8%	24.0%	27.7%	31.6%	19.4%
	Not at all often	18.7%	33.4%	47.4%	29.0%	49.2%
	(N)	(1,063)	(1,500)	(635)	(1,338)	(715)
V228I. Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections	Very often	16.2%	46.2%	18.3%	11.3%	35.8%
	Fairly often	37.1%	30.2%	29.1%	42.7%	27.9%
	Not often	32.0%	15.6%	36.5%	30.5%	17.5%
	Not at all often	14.7%	7.9%	16.1%	15.5%	18.8%
	(N)	(1,026)	(1,534)	(654)	(1,366)	(687)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Most of these questions are highly susceptible to being skewed by respondents' political opinion/affiliation

4.5.1.1. Electoral practice and malpractice, MENA compared to World

Figure 14. How often in country's elections…



4.5.2. Voter participation in elections

V226 and V227 ask respondents on their frequency of voting in local and national-level elections, and employ a common question frame: "When elections take place, do you vote 'always,' 'usually,' or 'never?'" Results are displayed in the table below.

Table 12. Vote in elections: Local and national levels

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
V226. Local elections	Always	36.8%	26.1%	48.5%	58.1%	47.25	27.5%
	Usually	26.0%	33.4%	22.4%	19.5%	16.2%	35.4%
	Never	35.4%	40.5%	29.1%	22.5%	36.6%	37.1%
	(N)	(13,473)	(1,156)	(979)	(1,167)	(1,200)	(1,218)
V227. National elections	Always	41.7%	28.4%	57.8%	60.3%	49.1%	35.6%
	Usually	25.7%	33.4%	20.9%	16.7%	16.8%	32.3%
	Never	32.6%	38.2%	21.2%	23.0%	34.1%	32.1%
	(N)	(14,578)	(1,151)	(975)	(1,172)	(1,200)	(1,217)

		Country Code					
		Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
V226. Local elections	Always	34.7%	46.5%	17.6%	-	9.2%	49.0%
	Usually	36.7%	27.2%	23.3%	-	18.1%	31.4%
	Never	28.6%	26.3%	59.1%	-	72.7%	19.6%
	(N)	(1,143)	(2,040)	(1,033)	-	(1,180)	(1,523)
V227. National elections	Always	37.2%	46.9%	16.1%	46.7%	19.1%	46.1%
	Usually	34.0%	24.8%	20.9%	26.1%	33.9%	28.6%
	Never	28.7%	28.3%	63.0%	27.3%	47.0%	25.3%
	(N)	(1,149)	(2,047)	(1,025)	(1,056)	(1,178)	(1,523)

		Country Code
		Yemen
V226. Local elections	Always	55.8%
	Usually	15.8%
	Never	28.4%
	(N)	(834)
V227. National elections	Always	55.4%
	Usually	16.7%
	Never	27.9%
	(N)	(885)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the MENA region, 36.8% of respondents say they "always" vote in local elections; 26.0% "usually" vote, and 35.4% "never" vote – roughly equal to the portion of respondents who reportedly vote in every local election. Turnout is only just slightly

higher for national elections: 41.7% of MENA respondents say they vote in every election; 25.7% "usually" vote; and 32.6% "never" vote.

Countries showing the lowest and highest rates of voter participation are fairly consistent for both local and national elections. Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria have the lowest portion of respondents who report they vote "always" and "usually" in local elections, at 27.3%, 40.9%, and 59.5%, respectively. In regards to national elections, Tunisia and Morocco alternate their relative positions, but all three countries retain the distinction of having the lowest voter participation rates in the MENA region. Only 37.0% of Moroccan respondents say they vote "always" and "usually" in national elections – 53.0% of Tunisians and 61.8% of Algerians report the same.

Egypt (80.4%), Iraq (77.6%), and Libya (73.7%) have the highest portion of respondents stating they "always" and "usually" vote in local elections. Libya loses its third place spot on the question of national elections, where Palestine (78.7%), Iraq (77.0%), and Egypt (74.7%) have the highest voter participation rates in the region.

The trends that can be observed at the high and low ends of voter participation among MENA countries suggest an overarching regional pattern – with necessary country-specific disclaimers. Within the past decade, roughly, Egypt, Iraq, and Libya underwent wholesale changes to their political systems towards greater democratic governance: Egypt and Libya because of the Arab Spring, and Iraq as a result of the 2003 U.S. invasion. Obviously, these three countries have all experience democratic backslide since then; however, it would still be fair to conjecture that a certain political consciousness in Iraq, Egypt, and Libya remains elevated as a result of these events, compared to other MENA countries. A greater political saliency – that is, a recognition of the ability of politics to impact lives – is probably also present in Palestine, owing to its decades-long campaign for national recognition. At the low end of voter participation, Morocco and Algeria are emblematic of the two most common (and undemocratic) forms of government in the MENA region: the authoritarian republic and the monarchy. That voter participation is low in these two countries is not particularly surprising: elections in countries like these tend to produce a predetermined result, or may fail to fundamentally alter the status quo. The exception to the notion that voter participation is determined by a political system's "democratic-ness" is Tunisia. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) *Democracy Index*, Tunisia is the only democracy in the MENA region, except Israel,[151] and yet the country ranks at or near the bottom of voter participation as measured by the World Values Survey.

[151] Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). *Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the "deplorables."* 2017. http://pages.eiu.com/rs/783-XMC-194/images/Democracy_Index_2016.pdf

4.5.2.1. Are voter participation figures inflated?

The total percentage of respondents in the MENA region who report voting "always" and "usually" in national elections is 67.4%. Given the region's democratic deficit, this figure – and the equivalent figures gathered for individual MENA countries – seems high, especially when one considers the fact that 67.4% is higher than the 54.6% of the voting age population that voted in the 2016 U.S. general elections.[152] It is therefore worth looking at how the voter participation figures gathered by the World Values Survey via self-reporting by survey respondents compares to more official data.

The intergovernmental organisation, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), maintains a database of voter participation data from presidential and parliamentary elections around the world since 1945. This database is used as the primary non-WVS source for voter turnout data in this discussion.

Two types of figures provided by International IDEA's *Voter Turnout Database* are relevant to the discussion here in this section: "registered voter turnout" and "voting age population (VAP) turnout." Registered voter turnout is the percentage of people who are officially registered to vote that voted in a given election. VAP turnout is the percentage of all potential eligible voters (registered and not registered) that voted in a given election. Except in cases where either electoral rolls or the estimated number of eligible voters is not accurate, VAP turnout should be lower and at most equal to registered voter turnout. The International IDEA data for Iraq (2014) and Lebanon (2009) shows that VAP turnout has in fact higher than registered voter turnout; in cases such as these International IDEA, in a disclaimer, recommends placing more weight upon registered voter turnout figures.

In making a comparison between voter participation data from the World Values Survey versus vetted data from International IDEA, this section looks at V227 "Vote in elections: National level," the combined percentage of respondents reporting that they "always" or "usually" vote. Combining the percentages of respondents who "always" or "usually" vote produces a figure that represents a high-water mark for potential voter participation in a given country; the actual voter turnout that could be expected in an election would very likely be lower than this figure since at least some "usually vote" respondents can be expected to not vote.

[152] Voter Turnout Database: United States. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). http://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/295/40

Because the World Values Survey covers a survey sample that is supposed to representative of the country as a whole – and is not a survey of registered voters only, the more relevant of the two figures provided by the *Voter Turnout Database* is going to be VAP turnout, with the exceptions of Iraq, Lebanon, and possibly Kuwait. The table below shows voter participation in nationwide elections as determined by V227, and registered voter turnout and VAP turnout provided by the *Voter Turnout Database*. The years listed in parentheses indicate the year in which either the survey data was collected (in the case of the second column) or the year in which a national parliamentary election was held (third and fourth columns). This section has paired up World Values Survey data to the closet national election year.

Table 13. Comparing voter participation figures[153]

	% of respondents that vote "always" & "usually" in national elections	Registered voter turnout	Voting age population (VAP) turnout
Algeria	61.8% (2014)	43.1% (2012)	38.7% (2012)
Palestine	78.7% (2013)	77.7% (2006)	57.7% (2006)
Iraq	77.0% (2012)	*60.5% (2014)	*76.8% (2014)
Jordan	65.9% (2014)	56.5% (2013)	34.1% (2013)
Kuwait	67.9% (2013)	†51.9% (2013)	†12.9% (2013)
Lebanon	71.2% (2013)	*54.0% (2009)	*66.3% (2009)
Libya	71.7% (2013)	61.6% (2012) 41.7% (2014)	48.7% (2012) 15.6% (2014)
Morocco	37.0% (2011)	45.4% (2011)	28.7% (2011)
Qatar	72.8% (2010)	-	-
Tunisia	53.0% (2013)	67.4% (2014)	45.4% (2014)
Egypt	74.7% (2012)	62.0% (2012)	55.0% (2012)
Yemen	72.1% (2013)	75.0% (2003)	71.3% (2003)

**Estimated VAP turnout was greater than registered voter turnout in Iraq (2014) and Lebanon (2009) – a counterintuitive result that is, by definition, not possible. A disclaimer from the International IDEA Voter Turnout Database explains, "this anomaly usually lies either in the inaccuracy of the electoral roll, or in the estimated number of eligible voters."*[154]

†The major decrease in voter participation in Kuwait from "Registered voter turnout" to "VAP turnout" most likely reflects the fact that a minority of Kuwait's population are Kuwaiti citizens and therefore allowed to vote in elections.[155] *The VAP turnout figure is probably based on an estimate of VAP based off the country's entire population and not exclusively vote-eligible citizens.*

The first important observation is that the V227 data on voter participation is almost uniformly significantly higher than the equivalent registered voter turnout and VAP

[153] *Voter Turnout Database*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout
[154] *Voter Turnout Database*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). http://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout
[155] Kuwait Population (2017). World Population Review. 2017. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kuwait-population/

turnout for a given year. Only in Morocco is the percentage of respondents answering "always" and "usually" to V227 less than registered voter turnout, and even then, voter participation as measured by V227 is still higher than voter turnout when adjusted to the voting age population. In Palestine and Iraq, V227 figures were consistent with at least one of the two International IDEA voter turnout metrics, but in both cases, it is the less accurate metric that V227 data matches.

The only country where V227 voter participation data is plausibly consistent with real-world voter turnout (registered voter and VAP) is Yemen. 72.1% of Yemeni respondents, in 2013 when the survey was conducted, said they either "always" or "usually" vote in national elections. During Yemen's most recent parliamentary election in 2003, registered voter turnout was 75.0% and VAP turnout was just marginally less, at 71.3%. Taken at face value, this comparison suggest that the World Values Survey's findings on voter participation in Yemen accurately reflect actual turnout. However, the ten-year gap between the collection of survey data and Yemen's most recent parliamentary election creates a problem that more than likely exists for the responses from other MENA countries.

It is highly probable that some not insignificant portion of the Yemeni survey sample answered V227 "Vote in elections: National level" has never been offered the opportunity of an election to vote in or abstain. Consider that in Qatar, which has never held a general election for parliament, 72.8% of respondents say they always or usually vote. The MENA region's experience with democratic governance and elections is minimal; many if not most citizens of the region have never voted in an election that would meet Western electoral standards of being "free and fair." Hence, when respondents – who live in a country that does not hold elections, or where elections are widely viewed as having no real impact on public policy – are asked, "when elections take place, do you vote 'always,' 'usually,' or 'never?,'" they are likely basing their answers off a hypothetical scenario rather than their actual voting history. In other words, people are answering V227 on how they would like to vote, versus how they actually vote.

This mechanism is probably at work across all countries surveyed by the World Values Survey – not just countries with minimal experience holding elections. During U.S. congressional elections in 2010, 38.5% of the voting age population voted; the next year when the World Values Survey was conducted in the United States (2011), 79.9% of respondents said either they "always" or "usually" vote, with 58.9% "always" voting. One possibility is that the World Values Survey has inadvertently chosen survey samples that disproportionately contain likely voters, not just in the United States but in virtually

every country covered. The more probable case is that there are many respondents who do not vote, or rarely vote, reporting that they do in fact vote.

Why would respondents living in countries that hold free and regular elections misrepresent their voting history? It is fair to say that voting is widely seen as a key component of an individual's civic duty, and that in the interview setting in which responses to V226 and V227 "Vote in elections: Local and national levels" were gathered, at least some respondents may have been embarrassed to admit they do not vote often or at all. Determining the forces at work in inflating the responses to these two questions is worth further future exploration.

4.5.3. Importance of elections, for the individual and country

The following two questions, V228J and V228K, attempt to narrow respondents' views on the importance of democracy as it relates to more specific issues. V228J "Degree of importance: having honest elections makes a lot of difference in you and your family's lives" asks respondents how important of a factor they believe "having honest elections" is in making a difference in the life of their family. Free and honest elections are a baseline requirement of a genuine democracy.

Table 13. Degree of importance: having honest elections makes a lot of difference in you and your family's lives

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very important	64.5%	53.2%	56.1%	60.3%	64.4%	65.4%
Rather important	14.3%	13.8%	14.9%	17.0%	11.1%	13.2%
Not very important	1.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	1.6%
Not at all important	19.5%	32.4%	28.4%	22.2%	24.0%	19.8%
(N)	(12,773)	(1,200)	(993)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,243)

	Country Code				
	Lebanon	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
Very important	44.9%	73.8%	60.1%	81.5%	74.8%
Rather important	16.6%	12.9%	15.8%	16.3%	12.1%
Not very important	2.3%	2.6%	0.4%	1.7%	5.4%
Not at all important	36.2%	10.8%	23.7%	0.5%	7.7%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,009)	(1,205)	(1,523)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Palestine 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the region, the positive response rate for V228J "Degree of importance: having honest elections makes a lot of difference in you and your family's lives" is high, with 78.8% of MENA respondents answering either "very important" or "rather important." Regardless of how they perceive the level of democracy to be in their country (measured in V141), the large majority of MENA respondents recognise the stakes involved in their respective political systems.

The portion of respondents selecting these two answers is particularly elevated in countries that experienced a change of government as a result of the Arab Spring. 97.8% of Egyptians, 86.9% of Yemenis, 86.7% of Libyans, and 75.9% of Tunisians indicate that holding fair and honest elections has a real impact on their life and the life of their families. Lebanese respondents take the dimmest view on the relevance of elections to their personal lives, with 61.5% of respondents choosing either "very important" or "rather important." This result might be expected given Lebanon's repeated cycles of political crisis as evidenced by the rapid succession of governments the country has had over the past several years.

One interesting feature of the V228J data is the uniform scarcity of respondents in all countries choosing "not very important" as their answer. It would appear that respondents whose lives are un-impacted by the democratic election process are unambiguous about how little elections matter to them and their family.

Table 14. Importance of having honest elections in whether or not this country develops economically

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very important	68.1%	57.5%	59.3%	65.8%	70.2%	68.5%
Rather important	14.5%	17.7%	15.5%	15.5%	11.0%	14.2%
Not very important	1.9%	1.6%	0.5%	0.3%	2.2%	2.3%
Not at all important	15.5%	23.2%	24.6%	18.3%	16.7%	15.1%
(N)	(12,766)	(1,200)	(978)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,233)

	Country Code				
	Lebanon	Libya	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
Very important	52.2%	78.2%	64.1%	80.4%	74.2%
Rather important	14.7%	11.3%	16.2%	18.0%	12.4%
Not very important	3.3%	2.8%	0.4%	1.2%	3.8%
Not at all important	29.8%	7.7%	19.3%	0.4%	9.6%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,027)	(1,205)	(1,523)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Palestine 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

When asked about whether they believe "honest elections are an important factor" in whether their countries develop economically, 82.6% of respondents in the MENA region said elections are an important factor, with 68.1% saying they are "very important." The results of this variable are very similar to those found in the previous questions, V228J: for example, few respondents in any country choose "not very important" to describe their views on the causal relationship between fair elections and economic development. Likewise, Egypt (98.4%), Libya (89.5%), and Yemen (86.6%) have the greatest portions of respondents answering either "very important" or "rather important." Lebanon has the lowest positive response rate, at 66.9%.

That democratic politics and economic growth are intimately connected to one another is an argument which motivated the initial protests of the Arab Spring; it is also the guiding principle behind U.S. foreign policy since World War II and for liberalism, and especially neoliberalism. The data displayed in the table strongly suggests the notion that democracy, or at least democratic practices, is necessary for economic success is one that enjoys broad currency with people living in the MENA region.

***

4.6. How people rate different political systems

V127-130 ask respondents to rate four different political systems, in regards to how the respondent believes each system would be "as a way of governing [his/her] country," with one of the following answer choices: "very good," "fairly good," "fairly bad," or "very bad." Each political system is presented with a descriptive statement, presented below with a summary descriptor in parentheses:

- V127 (Strong leader): "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections"
- V128 (Experts): "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country"
- V129 (Army): "Having the army rule"
- V130 (Democracy): "Having a democratic political system"

The table below presents the results of V127-130.

Table 15. Best ways of governing my country

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
V127. Strong leader*	Very good	24.1%	10.2%	15.2%	13.1%	15.6%	25.6%
	Fairly good	21.0%	12.8%	25.8%	21.4%	26.8%	22.1%
	Fairly bad	25.0%	28.2%	32.1%	43.3%	30.8%	27.7%
	Very bad	29.9%	48.9%	27.0%	22.1%	26.8%	24.6%
	(N)	(12,710)	(955)	(916)	(1,152)	(1,120)	(1,187)
V128. Experts*	Very good	30.3%	11.8%	22.0%	29.4%	14.5%	26.0%
	Fairly good	37.1%	28.8%	41.1%	43.6%	36.5%	34.5%
	Fairly bad	19.8%	25.5%	24.1%	21.6%	29.5%	27.5%
	Very bad	12.9%	34.0%	12.7%	5.3%	19.5%	12.0%
	(N)	(12,546)	(942)	(926)	(1,160)	(1,138)	(1,204)
V129. Army*	Very good	13.9%	6.7%	9.4%	6.7%	7.0%	5.0%
	Fairly good	22.8%	17.0%	23.3%	18.1%	21.6%	17.2%
	Fairly bad	31.0%	29.6%	38.5%	49.4%	36.8%	27.6%
	Very bad	32.4%	46.7%	28.8%	25.8%	34.6%	50.3%
	(N)	(10,235)	(882)	(909)	(1,133)	(1,105)	(1,176)
V130. Democracy*	Very good	59.1%	59.0%	48.3%	53.2%	51.1%	52.3%
	Fairly good	30.9%	31.0%	41.2%	35.6%	38.9%	30.2%
	Fairly bad	5.8%	5.6%	5.5%	9.1%	7.8%	11.6%
	Very bad	4.2%	4.4%	5.0%	3.1%	2.2%	5.9%
	(N)	(13,152)	(1,051)	(932)	(1,165)	(1,146)	(1,194)

		Country Code					
		Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
V127. Strong leader*	Very good	19.9%	18.8%	12.9%	31.0%	71.1%	10.0%
	Fairly good	36.7%	16.9%	8.6%	17.3%	22.6%	19.2%
	Fairly bad	24.3%	17.8%	21.2%	27.8%	3.6%	34.3%
	Very bad	19.1%	46.4%	57.3%	23.9%	2.7%	36.5%
	(N)	(1,094)	(2,002)	(869)	(1,054)	(1,523)	(839)
V128. Experts*	Very good	28.0%	30.6%	31.5%	38.9%	57.7%	29.9%
	Fairly good	37.3%	36.6%	39.1%	37.8%	30.3%	48.2%
	Fairly bad	25.2%	18.2%	11.4%	13.4%	8.4%	13.9%
	Very bad	9.5%	14.6%	18.0%	9.9%	3.6%	8.0%
	(N)	(1,096)	(1,950)	(746)	(1,026)	(1,518)	(840)
V129. Army*	Very good	23.2%	29.1%	-	18.7%	-	3.9%
	Fairly good	30.8%	31.0%	-	18.8%	-	18.9%
	Fairly bad	29.0%	18.1%	-	27.9%	-	33.9%
	Very bad	17.0%	21.9%	-	34.7%	-	43.3%
	(N)	(1,069)	(2,022)	-	(1,066)	-	(873)
V130. Democracy*	Very good	44.8%	67.5%	74.7%	63.4%	70.3%	53.9%
	Fairly good	35.4%	21.0%	23.2%	29.8%	28.6%	35.5%
	Fairly bad	11.2%	4.3%	1.5%	3.3%	1.0%	5.9%
	Very bad	8.6%	7.3%	0.6%	3.4%	0.1%	4.7%
	(N)	(1,123)	(1,981)	(1,039)	(1,107)	(1,518)	(896)

**The terms used to refer to political system types in the table are modified from their original formulation in the respondent questionnaire. These political systems are described in the questionnaire as follows:*

- *Strong leader = "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections"*
- *Experts = "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country"*
- *Army = "Having the army rule"*
- *Democracy = "Having a democratic political system"*

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Of the four government types surveyed, the most popular is a "democratic political system" (V130), with 90.0% of MENA respondents stating it is either "very good" or "fairly good." In every country, democracy enjoys the highest favourability of any of the four political systems. In contrast, rule by the army (V129) is the least popular government type in the region, with 36.7% of respondents describing it as "very" or "fairly good" and 63.4% describing it as "very" or "fairly bad." Army rule is not the least popular political system across all countries: it faces competition for this title from V127 "Political system: Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections." Across the MENA region, despotism gains favourable reviews from 45.1% of respondents.

To better visualise the results of V127-130, Figure 15 below shows the breakdown of responses for each of the 11 countries surveyed. (Qatar is missing).

Figure 15. Political systems



V130 "Political system: Having a democratic political system" gains the greatest support in Egypt, with a nearly unanimous majority of respondents, 98.9%, stating that democracy is either "very" or "fairly good." However, Egypt also has the highest portion of respondents expressing favourable views about strongman leadership, at 93.7%, and for that matter, "having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country," at 88.0%. Unfortunately, data is not available on Egyptian opinion on "having the army rule." Egyptian responses to this battery are obviously self-contradictory and may be influenced by the country's increasingly repressive political climate in which respondents may feel pressured to validate their current system of strongman rule in particular.

Elsewhere, particularly robust support for "having a democratic political system" is found in Morocco and Tunisia, where 97.9% and 93.2% of respondents express favourable views. In Jordan, Algeria, Palestine, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya, the portion of respondents who believe democracy is "very" or "fairly good" is very consistent, only ranging between 88.5% and 90.0%. Lebanon and Kuwait show the lowest, but still healthy, support for "having a democratic political system," at 80.2% and 82.5%, respectively. These two countries rank among the most democratic in the MENA region, according to Freedom House, and their relatively depressed support for democracy likely reflects alienation arising from their greater familiarity with the concrete realities of this form of governance.[156]

In all 11 MENA countries but Egypt, rule by "experts" is the second most popular political system, after democracy. V128 "Political system: Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country" essentially describes a technocracy, a concept of governance that remains underdeveloped and which *The Economist* rightly labels "stretchy."[157] Contemporary Singapore, which its unique blend of political and expert inputs in its policy and decisionmaking apparatus, is perhaps the best and most successful example of a technocracy. Support for this political system is greatest in Egypt (88.0%), Yemen (78.1%), and Tunisia (76.5%); support is lowest in Algeria (40.6%), Jordan (51.0%), and Kuwait (60.5%).

Technocracy's appeal comes from its promise of competent, merit-based governance – something that is surely attractive to countries hamstrung by political dysfunction. Its

[156] *Freedom in the World 2017*. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017
[157] "Technocrats: Minds like Machines." *The Economist*. 19 November 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/21538698

drawback is that it tends to be anti-democratic. The entire premise of rule by experts rejects the notion of the "wisdom of the crowd" that lies at the heart of any argument for democracy. Technocracy is also an aggressively modern and secular model of governance in that it explicitly privileges knowledge and expertise alone over tradition. Still, technocracy need not be totally irreconcilable with a system of democratic rule. In most developed democracies, for example, central bank governors are not chosen by the voters but are instead appointed on the meritocratic basis of their professional knowledge and experience.

Whether in the form of a hereditary monarch or an authoritarian republican, the majority of countries in the MENA region exhibit "strongman" political leadership. Naturally, the region's relationship with despots is complicated, and their perceived track record is not uniformly negative (if it was, there would surely be fewer of them in power). In a part of the world where elected politics frequently deviate towards serving as a venue for tribal-based politics, authoritarian leaders are seen by a significant portion of the population as a bulwark against radical elements in a society. This is a common claim for legitimacy among the Arab world's secular republican dictatorships, and was vividly illustrated in Egypt's so-called "popular" coup in 2013. On the eve of overthrowing Egypt's only democratically-elected leader, the Egyptian Armed Forces released a short statement on their Facebook page titled "The Last Hours," that reads:

> The Supreme Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces had mentioned before that it's better for us to die rather than seeing the Egyptian People being threatened or horrified, and we swear that we would sacrifice our lives and our blood for Egypt against every terrorist or extremist or ignorant. Long live Egypt.[158]

The Egyptian episode highlights another important aspect of public support for secular authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, which is their backing by the country's liberal cosmopolitan elites, who recognize their positions are not shared by the majority of citizens. In Egypt as well as Tunisia, Arab Spring revolutions led to the empowerment of Islamist parties via the ballot box. Egypt's economic and political elites mobilized their support behind the military establishment to depose the country's Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, with evidence suggesting they conspired to engineer fuel

[158] Egyptian Armed Forces. "The Last Hours (Facebook post)." Facebook. 3 July 2013. https://www.facebook.com/Egyptian.Armed.Forces.Admins/posts/633415760005031

shortages in the coup's lead-up as way of eroding popular support for Morsi's government.[159]

Perhaps not surprisingly then, the greatest support for "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" is found in Egypt, with 93.7% describing this system of rule as "very" or "fairly good." Runner-up status goes to Lebanon, at 56.6%, and Tunisia, at 48.3%. The lowest positive response rates to V127 are found in Morocco (21.5%), Algeria (23.0%), and Yemen (29.2%). Because strongman leadership is most commonly associated with secular dictators in the image of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hafez al-Assad, and Saddam Hussein, an more specific additional question on how respondents view monarchies could be helpful in deciphering whether MENA respondents are including this category of political leadership in their estimation of strongmen rulers. This particular line of inquiry is warranted by Morocco's especially low support for this leadership type, which stands in stark contrast to the fairly solid claim to legitimacy of the country's ruling Alaouite dynasty as the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.[160]

The most common variant of authoritarian ruler is the military-officer-turned-president. In seven of the nine MENA countries where respondents were asked whether it would be good or bad "having the army rule," this government type obtained the lowest portion of respondents reporting it would be "very" or "fairly good." Algerian and Libyan respondents favoured rule by strongmen, in general, over military rule. Libya incidentally had the highest portion of respondents reporting "very" or "fairly good" on V129 "Political system: Having the army rule," at 60.1% – in spite of the fact that their now-dead former dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, was notably a product of the Libyan Army officer corps. Even so, Libyan approval of military rule is in line with their responses to V135 "Democracy: Army takes over when government is incompetent," in which the country scored the region's highest mean response of 6.71. Lebanon has the second highest portion of respondents describing military rule as "very" or "fairly good," at 54.0%, followed by Tunisia, at 37.5%. Kuwait (22.2%), Yemen (22.8%), and Algeria (23.7%) have the lowest positive response rates to the question. Given the reputation that military juntas in the MENA region and the rest of the world have earned for brutality (and often mismanagement), it is unsurprising that respondents across the region demonstrate minimal preference for this political system type.

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[159] Korotayev, Andrey, Leonid Issaev, and Alisa Shishkina. "Egyptian coup of 2013: an 'econometric' analysis." *Journal of North African Studies* 21.3 (2016). 346. https://www.academia.edu/25995601/Egyptian_coup_of_2013_an_econometric_analysis

[160] Yom, Sean L. and F. Gregory Gause III. "Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On." *Journal of Democracy* 23.4 (2012). 74-88. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/15-arab-monarchies-gause-yom.pdf

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4.7 Emancipation and democracy

This section of the chapter examines the core values possessed by citizens that are an essential characteristic of a mature liberal democracy. These are "emancipative values" – a concept borrowed from Christian Welzel, a political scientist at the Leuphana University of Lüneburg in Germany and a member of the World Values Survey executive committee. Emancipative values include four key domains: autonomy, choice, equality, and voice. Each of these value domains is scored by an index, with each index composed from select questions in the World Values Survey.[161]

To be clear, the presence of all four emancipative values within a society is not a sufficient condition for democracy. There are other, more objective material factors that can accelerate or inhibit democratisation – these factors may also influence people's adoption of emancipative values in a similar way. While emancipative values alone are not sufficient for the establishment or growth of a healthy liberal democracy, they are a necessary condition. That is to say, the values of autonomy, choice, equality, and voice will be widely and deeply held by the citizenry of any established democracy.

4.7.1. Emancipative values

Table 16. Emancipative values index

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
0-0.1	6.9%	5.6%	5.8%	7.7%	10.8%	2.0%
0.1-0.2	19.6%	15.0%	20.5%	26.3%	29.0%	13.4%
0.2-0.3	28.7%	22.8%	27.8%	29.0%	30.6%	32.2%
0.3-0.4	23.4%	26.0%	23.0%	20.8%	16.9%	26.9%
0.4-0.5	14.1%	19.9%	15.2%	11.0%	9.2%	15.3%
0.5-0.6	5.4%	7.4%	6.0%	3.8%	2.5%	7.2%
0.6-0.7	1.6%	2.7%	1.5%	1.0%	0.8%	2.5%
0.7-0.8	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%
0.8-0.9	*	-	-	0.1%	-	-
(N)	(14,968)	(1,173)	(998)	(1,196)	(1,200)	(1,188)
Mean	0.29	0.32	0.29	0.27	0.25	0.32
Standard Deviation	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
Base mean	(14,968)	(1,173)	(998)	(1,196)	(1,200)	(1,188)

[161] Welzel, Christian, (February 2013). Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation. Cambridge University Press.

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
0-0.1	1.2%	8.7%	1.9%	9.3%	8.0%	2.3%
0.1-0.2	6.4%	25.5%	11.7%	20.5%	17.7%	16.2%
0.2-0.3	14.4%	32.0%	33.5%	32.1%	31.7%	31.3%
0.3-0.4	26.5%	18.7%	27.9%	22.0%	28.3%	30.5%
0.4-0.5	30.1%	10.5%	16.3%	12.3%	11.0%	13.6%
0.5-0.6	15.9%	3.4%	6.1%	2.7%	2.7%	5.3%
0.6-0.7	4.6%	0.9%	2.2%	1.1%	0.6%	0.8%
0.7-0.8	0.8%	0.3%	0.4%	0.1%	-	0.1%
0.8-0.9	0.1%	-	-	-	-	-
(N)	(1,200)	(2,120)	(1,133)	(1,060)	(1,188)	(1,523)
Mean	0.40	0.26	0.32	0.27	0.28	0.30
Standard Deviation	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.12
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,120)	(1,133)	(1,060)	(1,188)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
0-0.1	21.0%
0.1-0.2	31.7%
0.2-0.3	23.5%
0.3-0.4	12.9%
0.4-0.5	6.7%
0.5-0.6	3.1%
0.6-0.7	0.9%
0.7-0.8	0.1%
0.8-0.9	-
(N)	(989)
Mean	0.22
Standard Deviation	0.14
Base mean	(989)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco 2011,Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

Figure 16. Emancipative values index



Figure 17) Emancipative values index, with specific countries



Whereas responses for the EV-index remain largely consistent throughout the MENA, it is worth noting that the national differences are much more pronounced when examining the sub-indices. Bahrain and Egypt exhibit relatively limited adherence to emancipative values in general. However, both countries also display the most positive attitudes in the MENA for independence on the Autonomy index with 44.8 % (Bahrain) and 49.5 %

(Egypt) of respondents locating themselves between 0.5 and 1 against a regional average of 34.3%. This suggests that Bahrainis and Egyptians want their children to be independent individuals rather than obedient to a much higher extent than is the case for their regional neighbours (including Lebanon).

4.7.1.1. Autonomy

Autonomy is measured through a series of questions concerning important qualities when raising children. The respondents are presented with several traits and then asked to rate how desirable they are, if manifested in their own children. The four variables that are measured through the autonomy index are: Independence, imagination/ingenuity, tolerance and responsibility. Most of these are individualistic and liberal traits so in general a high score would indicate a willingness for children to become open-minded, free-thinking and independent. Conversely a low score suggests a preference for tradition, stability and hierarchy. However, the fourth quality, responsibility, is not a quality exclusive to either individualists nor people of liberal dispositions. The data confirms that the notion of personal responsibility is important even to hierarchical traditionalists who otherwise scored low. For example, do they wish their children to be independent and free-thinking or is it more important that they are obedient? Should they be religious? Is imagination necessary? What about determination and perseverance?

MENA respondents show a clear disposition towards valuing obedient rather than independent behaviour in their children. However, the same is largely true across the world with 55.2% of global respondents situating themselves on the lower half of the spectrum against a MENA average of 66.4%. In international terms the West and in particular Northern Europe are in fact the real outliers in that these countries clearly favour their children to be independent. Overall, the MENA data is consistent; all countries record a majority of the population favouring obedience over independence. That being said there are still noteworthy disparities. Egypt displays the highest regional numbers for independence with 49.5% of respondents and Yemen the lowest with only 16.6%.

Table 17. Autonomy sub-index

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
0-0.1	28.5%	34.2%	29.6%	41.3%	35.6%	29.4%
0.3-0.4	37.9%	33.6%	34.2%	37.5%	33.1%	34.8%
0.6-0.7	27.8%	23.6%	29.7%	17.3%	24.9%	28.5%

0.9-1	5.8%	8.7%	6.5%	3.8%	6.4%	7.2%
(N)	(15,222)	(1,200)	(1,000)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)
Mean	0.37	0.36	0.38	0.28	0.34	0.38
Standard Deviation	0.29	0.32	0.30	0.28	0.31	0.31
Base mean	(15,222)	(1,200)	(1,000)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
0-0.1	10.8%	37.0%	15.6%	33.3%	19.3%	8.9%
0.3-0.4	50.7%	38.5%	40.5%	38.3%	36.6%	41.6%
0.6-0.7	32.7%	20.2%	34.6%	23.5%	37.6%	45.7%
0.9-1	5.8%	4.2%	9.3%	4.8%	6.6%	3.8%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,131)	(1,200)	(1,060)	(1,205)	(1,523)
Mean	0.45	0.31	0.46	0.33	0.44	0.48
Standard Deviation	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.24
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,131)	(1,200)	(1,060)	(1,205)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
0-0.1	50.0%
0.3-0.4	33.4%
0.6-0.7	13.5%
0.9-1	3.1%
(N)	(1,000)
Mean	0.23
Standard Deviation	0.27
Base mean	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco 2011,Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

Figure 18) Autonomy sub-index



4.7.1.2. Choice

Perceptions on choice are measured by asking whether certain context sensitive individual behaviours are acceptable or not. For example, is homosexuality, abortion and divorce always justifiable or never? The Choice Sub-index asks to what extent the following behavioural factors are justifiable or not:

- Homosexuality
- Abortion
- Divorce

Perceptions on the right to individual choices are distinctly negative in the MENA with 93.1% of respondents recording low scores (i.e 0-0.5) compared to 76.7% globally. However, even if this gap is significant, the disparities between the MENA-region and the world at large are not so big as the differences between the world and northern Europe which account for a substantial part of pro-choice responses. A good example is Sweden which displays the highest acceptance of individual behaviour in the world; 46% of its respondents identify with the highest possible value on the scale (0.9-1.0). The Choice index is also where we find the most substantial variations in emancipative values within the MENA. Lebanon is the most accepting of individual behaviour with 15.4% answering positively (i.e 0.5-1.0) whereas in Jordan, the least accepting country, only 1.1% of respondents where positive.

Table 18. Choice sub-index

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
0-0.1	40.9%	32.8%	41.3%	32.5%	47.0%	31.3%
0.1-0.2	23.0%	23.8%	27.0%	29.9%	29.3%	13.0%
0.2-0.3	15.3%	15.2%	17.3%	17.0%	15.9%	22.0%
0.3-0.4	8.1%	8.2%	6.6%	6.4%	4.3%	14.2%
0.4-0.5	5.7%	9.0%	4.1%	7.0%	2.4%	10.3%
0.5-0.6	3.4%	4.4%	2.8%	4.8%	0.8%	3.8%
0.6-0.7	1.8%	2.3%	0.8%	1.6%	0.2%	3.2%
0.7-0.8	0.9%	1.4%	0.1%	0.6%	-	0.9%
0.8-0.9	0.6%	1.2%	-	0.1%	0.1%	1.3%
0.9-1	0.4%	1.8%	-	-	-	-
(N)	(13,222)	(1,124)	(991)	(1,182)	(1,200)	(1,198)
Mean	0.18	0.22	0.15	0.19	0.12	0.23
Standard Deviation	0.19	0.23	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.21
Base mean	(13,222)	(1,124)	(991)	(1,182)	(1,200)	(1,198)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Yemen
0-0.1	25.0%	50.1%	43.0%	51.8%	46.8%	43.8%

0.1-0.2	19.7%	20.0%	19.6%	24.3%	26.4%	22.8%
0.2-0.3	15.1%	12.4%	17.0%	11.2%	14.4%	11.6%
0.3-0.4	11.1%	7.7%	13.8%	5.5%	5.6%	5.1%
0.4-0.5	13.8%	3.8%	3.5%	2.3%	1.6%	5.9%
0.5-0.6	8.6%	2.9%	0.9%	2.2%	2.2%	4.0%
0.6-0.7	3.2%	0.9%	1.2%	1.3%	2.6%	3.3%
0.7-0.8	2.5%	0.9%	0.5%	0.8%	0.1%	1.7%
0.8-0.9	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%	1.7%
0.9-1	0.4%	0.9%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	-
(N)	(1,200)	(2,059)	(1,128)	(1,059)	(1,148)	(933)
Mean	0.27	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.14	0.19
Standard Deviation	0.22	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.21
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,059)	(1,128)	(1,059)	(1,148)	(933)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco 2011,Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

Figure 19. Choice sub-index



Figure 20. Choice sub-index, with specific countries



4.7.1.3. Equality

The index is made from questions mapping various perceptions relating to gender equality, which can arguably be considered the most basic area of equality – over equality in income. The Equality Sub-index measures the following factors:

- V51. "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do"
- V52. "A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl"
- V53. "On the whole, men make better business executives than women do"

The biggest differences in EV's between MENA and the world at large are found within the Equality-index. A full 73.7% of MENA-respondents are found on the bottom half of the index (i.e 0-0.5) compared to a global average of 47%. Conversely only 26.2% are found on the upper half (i.e 0.5-1) against 53.1% globally.

Table 19. Equality sub-index

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
0-0.1	12.1%	16.2%	10.2%	4.3%	12.7%	13.9%
0.1-0.2	8.4%	9.3%	7.3%	13.3%	7.5%	9.6%
0.2-0.3	18.7%	18.3%	20.9%	20.8%	20.6%	18.0%
0.3-0.4	21.9%	17.8%	21.5%	24.6%	25.4%	19.4%
0.4-0.5	12.6%	9.1%	12.7%	12.6%	14.7%	13.2%
0.5-0.6	5.3%	3.7%	5.1%	5.1%	5.9%	5.2%
0.6-0.7	8.3%	8.6%	10.4%	7.8%	7.2%	9.3%
0.7-0.8	6.8%	9.0%	6.9%	6.2%	3.0%	6.6%
0.8-0.9	3.4%	4.5%	2.4%	3.3%	1.8%	3.4%
0.9-1	2.4%	3.6%	2.6%	2.2%	1.2%	1.3%
(N)	(15,023)	(1,167)	(991)	(1,198)	(1,200)	(1,284)
Mean	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.34	0.36
Standard Deviation	0.25	0.28	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.25
Base mean	(15,023)	(1,167)	(991)	(1,198)	(1,200)	(1,284)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
0-0.1	3.7%	15.9%	6.0%	10.1%	10.4%	18.3%
0.1-0.2	4.3%	7.8%	5.2%	7.8%	6.1%	9.8%
0.2-0.3	10.7%	19.0%	17.4%	26.1%	20.3%	15.8%
0.3-0.4	17.9%	21.4%	19.7%	21.0%	23.0%	27.8%
0.4-0.5	16.7%	11.3%	14.3%	10.1%	13.1%	14.0%
0.5-0.6	7.9%	5.6%	4.6%	8.4%	4.9%	3.0%
0.6-0.7	14.6%	8.1%	9.0%	9.2%	8.0%	3.2%
0.7-0.8	12.9%	5.7%	9.3%	5.0%	6.9%	6.3%
0.8-0.9	5.8%	3.2%	9.3%	1.8%	4.1%	1.0%
0.9-1	5.5%	2.1%	5.2%	0.7%	3.2%	0.9%
(N)	(1,190)	(2,121)	(1,125)	(1,060)	(1,180)	(1,523)
Mean	0.51	0.35	0.47	0.35	0.39	0.31
Standard Deviation	0.25	0.25	0.28	0.23	0.26	0.23
Base mean	(1,190)	(2,121)	(1,125)	(1,060)	(1,180)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
0-0.1	18.7%
0.1-0.2	13.8%
0.2-0.3	18.8%
0.3-0.4	22.2%
0.4-0.5	8.8%
0.5-0.6	4.7%
0.6-0.7	6.0%
0.7-0.8	4.5%
0.8-0.9	1.3%
0.9-1	1.2%
(N)	(984)
Mean	0.30
Standard Deviation	0.24
Base mean	(984)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco 2011,Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

Figure 21. Equality sub-index



Figure 22. Equality sub-index, with specific countries



4.7.1.4. Voice

The Voice Sub-index measures attitudes of individual expression such as: freedom of speech, influence on government, workplace and community. This index is composed of survey questions that ask respondents to describe the extent to which they feel they have the power to engage with the following factors:

- Freedom of speech
- Influence the government
- Influence the workplace
- Influence the community

Despite an overall difference of about 10% on both the lower and higher ends of the chart the ”voice-index” is still where MENA attitudes aligns the most with global trends. 87.7% of regional respondents are low-scorers(0-0.5) compared to a global average of 75.4%. The interregional differences are quite pronounced. Respondents in Lebanon and Algeria give the most positive answers in the MENA with 27.5% and 26.3% of survey participants situating themselves on the upper half of the scale(i.e 0.5-1.0). In relatively stark contrast, correspondingly positive attitudes in Tunisia and Yemen (the most negative in the region) are provided by only 5.2% and 6.2% of the countries respondents.

Table 20. Voice sub-index

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon
0-0.1	34.3%	19.1%	28.5%	31.2%	45.3%	17.6%
0.1-0.2	24.5%	22.1%	20.4%	30.3%	19.6%	18.0%
0.2-0.3	8.5%	6.4%	13.0%	7.2%	10.6%	6.2%
0.3-0.4	7.8%	10.5%	7.5%	6.5%	5.4%	14.2%
0.4-0.5	12.6%	15.6%	16.4%	15.1%	9.9%	16.4%
0.5-0.6	4.1%	9.8%	3.6%	3.8%	3.0%	6.9%
0.6-0.7	3.4%	6.6%	4.9%	2.5%	3.2%	6.4%
0.7-0.8	1.4%	2.6%	3.2%	1.6%	0.6%	3.3%
0.8-0.9	2.5%	5.5%	1.8%	1.4%	1.7%	7.8%
0.9-1	0.9%	1.8%	0.7%	0.3%	0.7%	3.1%
(N)	(13,547)	(1,125)	(970)	(1,181)	(1,196)	(1,180)
Mean	0.23	0.34	0.26	0.22	0.18	0.37
Standard Deviation	0.24	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.28
Base mean	(13,547)	(1,125)	(970)	(1,181)	(1,196)	(1,180)

	Country Code					
	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
0-0.1	21.1%	34.9%	27.7%	57.9%	47.1%	53.5%
0.1-0.2	41.2%	32.8%	27.4%	14.1%	15.6%	17.1%
0.2-0.3	4.9%	4.0%	8.8%	9.4%	14.0%	10.9%
0.3-0.4	9.7%	10.7%	5.6%	5.4%	5.3%	3.3%

0.4-0.5	14.1%	9.7%	16.0%	7.9%	9.2%	8.9%
0.5-0.6	3.0%	3.5%	3.2%	2.2%	3.3%	3.5%
0.6-0.7	2.8%	1.0%	4.6%	1.3%	2.7%	1.4%
0.7-0.8	1.4%	1.2%	1.2%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
0.8-0.9	1.2%	1.2%	3.8%	1.1%	2.4%	0.7%
0.9-1	0.6%	0.9%	1.7%	0.2%	-	0.2%
(N)	(2,095)	(1,045)	(1,057)	(1,186)	(1,523)	(989)
Mean	0.24	0.20	0.26	0.13	0.18	0.15
Standard Deviation	0.20	0.21	0.25	0.20	0.22	0.20
Base mean	(2,095)	(1,045)	(1,057)	(1,186)	(1,523)	(989)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Figure 23. Voice sub-index



Figure 24. Voice sub-index, with specific countries



4.7.2. Drivers of emancipative values

We lack the proper tools to account for the underlying causes and drivers of specific values. Nor do we know the extent to which these individual drivers are relevant to the results of each country. Undoubtedly these vary greatly between each country although some are bound to be more common than others. Ultimately, it is still largely a matter of guesswork. Hereunder, we account for factors that can be empirically justified and that we deem likely to have affected the results of the WVS findings.

4.7.2.1. Geography

Given the vastly varying geopolitical, socioeconomic and demographic history of the region, neither Lebanon's relative optimism nor Yemen's scepticism are especially surprising when examined from a geographical standpoint. As mentioned above, the "west" and particularly Europe is where adherence to emancipative values is strongest. Regardless of whatever political legitimacy and influence Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" might have accrued, he is fundamentally wrong in concluding that cultural

norms, ideas and identities are geographically fixed.[162] They are of an intrinsically ephemeral nature and not physically tangible factors. As such, national boundaries and border controls are of little concern to their dissemination among people; especially since the advent of globalization. However, that is not to say that geography and distance does not matter, especially from a historical perspective. At least part of the higher EV results seen in the Mediterranean MENA countries should be attributed to their geographical and historical proximity to Europe. Through trade, tourism, colonialism and war these countries have been continually linked to the "high-scoring" Europeans across the pool. Countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon have been much more exposed to emancipative ideas and values than their more sheltered MENA neighbours. Lebanon's recent history has been so intertwined with that of Europe that Beirut is still referred to as the "Paris of the East". By contrast, Yemen the lowest scoring MENA country has always been geographically isolated from the proximity-based flow of "western" EV's. Nonetheless, to attribute all of Lebanon's and Yemen's "outlier" characteristics to geography would be ignorant, considering the markedly different results obtained in Egypt, whose history has been similarly subjected to foreign influence

4.7.2.2. Governance and politics

In a region so rife with political turmoil and instability as the MENA, it would be impossible to exempt governance as a determining factor in the incubation and propagation of certain values. Needless to say, when countries experience socio-political upheaval and the future is fraught with insecurity, its people generally strive for a return to stability, order and safety. These values have long been the main selling points for authoritarian regimes that view political change & democracy as naïve, foreign and dangerous ideas without any anchoring in reality. To an extent, they are right. As has been demonstrated through the Afghanistan and Iraq-wars and more recently and broadly through the Arab spring, change is never easy. It takes great political maturity and high levels of societal and inter-personal trust for a democracy to function properly. These are attributes that have never been prevalent within the MENA and that takes a long time to develop. Merely replacing a despot with a democratic framework is not the recipe for success that the westerners in Iraq & Libya once thought. The Egyptians have learnt that the democratic election of an organized party is not an insurance of said party's competence or even will to properly govern a country. What typically follows is an increase in conservative "safe" values which are seen as better than the chaos associated

[162] Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996

with emancipation & liberalism. Egypt is a perfect example, for decades opposition to the repressive military dictatorship under Mubarak increased. People were unsure and divided on what they really wanted apart from the removal of dictatorship. Capitalising on the liberating & progressive spirit of the Arab-spring they duly toppled Mubarak and took to the polls. The sheer ineptitude and repression of the Morsi-regime took the world (Egyptians most of all) by surprise. The bedlam of Morsi's brief tenure proved so harmful that the military faced little opposition when they retook control of the state-apparatus and installed Sisi whose methods and rule represents everything that the people originally wanted to change when they ousted Mubarak.

It shouldn't then, be particularly surprising that a region that has witnessed so much recent turmoil as the MENA should be wary of emancipative values and their political implications.

4.7.2.3. Demographics and religion

As mentioned above, conservative values commonly reflect negative attitudes towards change and a longing for things to return to the way they were. This is of course not limited to political attitudes but also encapsulates social and economic perceptions. Generalizations are necessary and even intrinsic to sound research practice. However, it is important to recognize both the interconnected nature of concepts such as politics, economy and society whilst also acknowledging how they independently affect the individual. A person can be politically progressive but socially conservative or vice-versa. The same can be said for religion and liberalism. Today the societal and political aspects of the MENA-regions predominant religion, Islam, have become a topic of much debate across a wide variety of academic disciplines. It has been blamed for everything from terrorism to inequality and its 1.5 billion adherents are increasingly being viewed with suspicion around the world. However, there are many who would identify themselves as devout Muslims whilst simultaneously subscribing to a distinctly liberal ontology and many ultra-conservatives who are atheist. As such the socio-political and economic woes of the Middle-East cannot simply be explained by some alleged backwardness associated to Islam. For this reason it is imperative that we establish that there is a clear divide between secular and liberal values and between traditional and religious values. Though they may share many attributes they are not the same, and mistakes here are often dangerous. When a country experiences large shifts in its demography social strains inevitably follow

4.3.6. Emancipative values, MENA compared to World

Compared as a region against the global average, the MENA region scores significantly lower in Emancipative values (EV). On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 signifies little or no presence of emancipative values and 10 complete permeation of said values, 77.2 % of MENA-respondents situated themselves on the lower half of the spectrum and less than 2% identify themselves within the upper third. The corresponding global (including Africa and other developing regions) average for Emancipative values lies at 50.9% and 14.1% respectively. Furthermore, certain countries such as Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco typically display much stronger emancipative attitudes than the MENA average and singlehandedly accounts for the aforementioned upper third even registering statistically within the region at large. In contrast, Yemen record the lowest support for EV's with 75.4% of respondents situated within the bottom third on the spectrum.

The MENA-region is hardly unique in its dim views on EV's. Africa and large parts of Asia record similar albeit not as pronounced attitudes. Indeed, when considering these values on a global per-capita average, MENA is perhaps not so much of an outlier as the "western" Europe and North-America are on the opposite end of the scale. Removing western nations from the global figures provides a drastically different result in terms of EV's. From this view, MENA is not so much a conservative bubble as the West is a liberal one.

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4.8. Conclusion

So, what is "democracy," MENA-style?

To return to a point made earlier in this chapter, one of the lessons made tragically clear by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and subsequent occupation, the West's preferred formula of liberal democracy and free market economics is not eminently or self-evidently exportable – especially at the end of a gun. The Bush administration led the United States and its allies to war in Iraq with a minimal force under the flawed assumptions that the reconstruction would, in effect, pay for itself via "oil revenues, recovered assets, international trade, [and] direct foreign investment,"[163] and that democracy would readily take root in Iraq, transforming the country overnight into a

[163] "Pentagon Briefing with Def. Sec. Donald Rumsfeld (transcript)." CNN. Aired 2 October 2003. http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0310/02/se.01.html

beacon of freedom in the Middle East – criticism that this vision of democratization was incompatible with the realities of Iraq was dismissed as "cultural condescension."[164]

While it much be acknowledged that Iraq has become more democratic than it was under the reign of Saddam Hussein, the country's transition has fallen far short from the aspirations of D.C. decision makers on the eve of March 2003. A primary contributing factor to ISIL's lightning advance across most of western Iraq in 2014 was the alienation of the Sunni Iraqis living there, from an increasingly sectarian Shia government in Baghdad, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Ignoring the invasion-by-a-foreign-power context of the Iraqi democratization project for a minute, what kind of democracy might a successful transition have produced? From V131-139, an image of a "MENA-style democracy" can be produced, to include the following elements:

- Political representatives are elected by universal suffrage in free and fair elections. (V133)
- State power is formally restrained by the constitution, which includes civil rights protections for citizens. However, depending on the specific country these rights may or may not be fully equal for men and women. Moreover, while citizens are safeguarded from state abuse, they owe deference to their political leaders once elected. (V136, V138, V139)
- A robust social welfare state that provides services like unemployment insurance and works to smooth income levels via redistributive policies, including a system of progressive taxation. Unlike the European welfare state, the MENA-style welfare state is based not on the ideas of the early 20th century labour movement or a secular liberal conception of state responsibility, but a long tradition of charity and egalitarianism in Islamic culture. (V131, V134, 137)
- Religious clerics have an advisory role to play, at minimum, when it comes to the legislative process, and in some countries, may possess powers that are functionally equivalent to judicial review of the laws passed by the elected legislature. (V132)
- Under special and fairly rare circumstances, the armed forces may be warranted in deposing the democratically-elected government, should it be perceived as grossly incompetent and failing in its essential duties.

[164] "Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy (transcript)." Office of the Press Secretary, the White House. 6 November 2003. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html

One final lingering question is whether the image of MENA-style democracy above describes survey respondents' idea vision of "democracy" or government in general. Any scepticism on whether MENA respondents' answers are motivated by a genuine belief in democracy is exacerbated by the results found in V132 "Democracy: Religious authorities interpret laws" and V135 "Army takes over when government is incompetent." The principles outlined in these two questions – clerical rule and the justifiability of military intervention in domestic politics – openly conflict with the values of a free and democratic country, at least from the Western perspective. Agreement with either of these statements may suggest an understanding of democracy as a means to an end, versus an end in itself. The next selection of questions deals with government types more generally, from which a clearer view may emerge of how people living in the MENA region judge democracy.

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5. Economics

5.1. Introduction

Seven of the 12 countries of the World Values Survey, Wave Six answered a supplementary battery on citizens' views on economic and social policy, including questions on public services, social security, corruption, job satisfaction, entrepreneurialism and work, unemployment, borrowing money, and educational performance. These seven countries are Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen. Altogether 8,308 people were interviewed on this economics-centric battery.

Table 1. Number of respondents in the Silatech module

Country	Number of respondents (N)
Algeria	1,200
Iraq	1,200
Jordan	1,200
Kuwait	1,303
Lebanon	1,200
Tunisia	1,205
Yemen	1,000
TOTAL (MENA)	8,308

Overall, this chapter finds a region that is beset by major challenges but with some modest country-specific bright spots.

On public and social services, MENA citizens largely believe their roads and schools are adequate. On the other hand, a majority of respondents express dissatisfaction with the quality of their healthcare, leaving significant room for improvement if governments in the region choose to act. Despite the affinity found in the previous chapter, "Democracy," for the redistributive programmes of the modern welfare state, roughly half of people surveyed do not have social security. In terms of quality of life, Chapter 5 finds that respondents describe their housing situation as mostly adequate, but that their physical surroundings are severely lacking in aesthetically pleasing qualities. Increased stress on water supplies and the environment in general in the MENA region is virtually guaranteed as a result of climate change and population growth in the coming decades.

Corruption in both business and government is a serious problem, and as the Arab Spring illustrated, one that has the potential to cause enormous political, social, and economic upheaval if left to fester. Public perceptions of corruption are high, and most respondents

in the MENA region believe the situation is only getting worse and that their governments are not doing enough to combat the problem.

Job satisfaction is fair across the MENA region, with government jobs viewed as vastly more desirable than working in the private sector. This preference is reflective of the over-inflated public sectors operating in most MENA countries, which of course poses problems for the medium-to-long term sustainability of national account balances. Generally, patterns of work very across countries: in places such as Yemen, the informal economy accounts for a significant portion of the labour force and economic output – in such cases, it is more difficult to harness private earnings through taxation for the benefit of society at large. Given the large preference for government jobs, it also makes sense that rates of small business creation are relatively low in most countries in the region.

Borrowing patterns in the MENA region mirror the general weakness and lack of diversity in the region's economies. The most prevalent reasons for borrowing among MENA respondents are for household consumption goods and emergencies, rather than more healthy capital investments – although borrowing for home improvements is a bright spot. Most lending comes from borrowers' family and friends, followed by commercial and public banks. As to whether schools and universities sufficiently prepare their students for entering the job market and starting their own businesses, respondents in the MENA region are fairly evenly split. Even if the educational system does prepare its graduates for the workforce – and a healthy portion of MENA residents hold university degrees – the problem is often not a lack of work skills but overqualification. Highly-skilled and high-paying jobs are hard to come by in many MENA countries, and positions are often assigned according to personal and family connections rather than merit alone.

Amidst all of this, the context for the MENA region's ills of social alienation, economic immobility, sectarianism, and violent conflict becomes clearer. Still, this chapter's exploration should also, at the very least, point to some of the key areas in which improvement can and should be made.

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5.2. Public services, social security, and quality of life

This chapter starts by looking at public services, social security, and the environmental factors impacting quality of life in the MENA region. A major theme in this section is how the level of public social provisions, such as good school, roads, and hospitals, can

function as a measure of a country's development. Public services are intended to provide for goods that a society judges should be made available to all, regardless of income or ability. Often times, these are goods that no single private actor could efficiently provide on its own. Asides from roads, schools, and hospitals, other examples of public service goods include fire-fighters, police, the armed forces, post offices, the electric grid, and environmental protection – to name a few. Adequate provision of goods such as these is arguably necessary condition for a just and prosperous society.

5.2.1. Satisfaction with public services

MN_228S1-S8 ask respondents to describe their level of satisfaction with a range of factors in the city or area in which they live. These questions employ a common question frame: "In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of the following?"

This section will first deal with MN_228S1, S2, S3, and S6, discussing the remainder of the battery later in 5.2.3. "Quality of life and environment." This initial set of questions deals with services provided directly by the state – specifically, roads and public transportation, schools, and healthcare. These services are among the visible elements of public administration. Unlike the state's provision of security via the military and intelligence agencies, roads, schools and hospitals have a large tangible impact on people's daily lives. Hence, these public services present a significant opportunity for the government to gain, or lose, credibility and respect in the eyes of its citizens.

The table below shows the results of MN_228S1 "In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the quality of the following?: The public transportation system" and MN_228S2 "…The roads and highways."

Table 2. Satisfaction with transportation infrastructure

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
MN_228S1. The public transportation system	Satisfied	51.8%	42.4%	53.0%	69.0%	67.1%	45.1%
	Dissatisfied	48.2%	57.6%	47.0%	31.0%	32.9%	54.8%
	(N)	(7,762	(1,162)	(975)	(1,193)	(1,087)	(1,163)
MN_228S2. The roads and highways	Satisfied	46.9%	42.4%	44.0%	62.8%	59.2%	41.2%
	Dissatisfied	53.1%	57.6%	56.0%	37.1%	40.8%	58.7%
	(N)	(7,854)	(1,156)	(974)	(1,196)	(1,198)	(1,153

	Country Code

		Tunisia	Yemen
MN_228S1. The public transportation system	Satisfied	41.3%	44.5%
	Dissatisfied	58.6%	55.5%
	(N)	(1,182)	(1,000)
MN_228S2. The roads and highways	Satisfied	37.1%	38.9%
	Dissatisfied	62.9%	61.1%
	(N)	(1,177)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

On both questions, respondent satisfaction with their local transportation infrastructure is split roughly 50-50, with slightly higher satisfaction reported with "public transportation" versus "roads and highways."

51.8% of respondents in the seven MENA countries surveyed said they are "satisfied" with the public transportation system in the area they live. Jordanians are the most satisfied, at 69.0%, followed closely by Kuwait, at 67.1%. At 41.3%, Tunisians are the least satisfied with they public transit networks. Algeria (42.4%), Yemen (44.5%), and Lebanon (45.1%) show roughly comparable satisfaction levels in the low-to-mid 40 percent range.

The modestly high satisfaction with public transportation found in the surveyed countries is surprising given than almost none in fact have a functional metro system. Interestingly, Algeria, which has the second lowest satisfaction rate on MN_228S1, is the only country of the seven surveyed on this question that possesses a metro system: the Algiers Metro, inaugurated in 2011.[165] The massive capital investments required to build and operate a metro system pose a significant obstacle to their development in general.

While the prosperous Gulf states may be able to front the bill of getting cars off the road and moving people by mass transit, for most MENA countries, the cost is simply prohibitive. Overall, public transportation options across the MENA region are limited to mostly private minibuses and taxis – even public bus networks are a relatively recent development for most countries.[166]

[165] "Alger metro inaugurated." Railway Gazette. 31 October 2011. http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/single-view/view/alger-metro-inaugurated.html

[166] "Transport in the Middle East: Let's go together." Economist. 10 March 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21694542-public-transport-all-rage-region-more-desperately-needed-lets-go

Rapid population growth and urbanisation over the coming decades will continue to place stain on already overburdened roads and highways.[167] Just under half – 46.9% – of MENA respondents report being satisfied with the roads where they live, with Jordan and Kuwait again demonstrating the highest satisfaction rates, at 62.8% and 59.2% respectively. The lowest satisfaction is found in Tunisia (37.1%) and Yemen (38.9%).

Outskirts of Cairo, illustrating typical road-centric planning in new developments[168]



MN_228S3 and MN_228S6 respectively deal with respondents' satisfaction with the schools and the quality of healthcare available where they live. As stated earlier, education and healthcare are an essential area of state responsibility in most countries: efficient and effective provision of these vital services is a mark of good governance. The results of MN_228S3 and MN_228S6 are displayed below.

Table 3. Satisfaction with education and healthcare

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
MN_228S3. The schools	Satisfied	59.6%	50.3%	62.9%	68.8%	66.1%	63.2%
	Dissatisfied	40.3%	49.7%	37.2%	31.2%	33.9%	36.8%
	(N)	(7,844)	(1,152)	(982)	(1,192)	(1,190)	(1,153)
MN_228S6. The quality of healthcare	Satisfied	46.4%	33.9%	49.0%	75.5%	62.5%	39.3%
	Dissatisfied	53.7%	66.1%	51.0%	24.5%	37.5%	60.7%
	(N)	(7,860)	(1,165)	(978)	(1,200)	(1,181)	(1,142)

	Country Code

[167] "Transport in the Middle East: Let's go together." Economist. 10 March 2016. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21694542-public-transport-all-rage-region-more-desperately-needed-lets-go

[168] "New Cairo City." 30°00'33.2"N 31°24'36.8"E. Google Maps. 2017.

		Tunisia	Yemen
MN_228S3. The schools	Satisfied	59.1%	45.1%
	Dissatisfied	40.8%	54.9%
	(N)	(1,175)	(1,00)
MN_228S6. The quality of healthcare	Satisfied	38.0%	22.5%
	Dissatisfied	62.1%	77.5%
	(N)	(1,194)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The respondent satisfaction rate for local schools across the MENA region can be described as adequate; 59.6% of MENA respondents report being "satisfied" with the quality of schools in their areas. However, this still leaves 40.3% "dissatisfied." Consistent with the findings on transportation, Jordanian and Kuwaiti respondents are the most satisfied with the performance of their schools, at 68.8% and 66.1%. Respondents in Yemen (45.1%) and Algeria (50.3%) are the least satisfied with their schools. Still, on a positive note, Yemen is the only country surveyed to have a net negative satisfaction rate on this topic.

It is well understood that education is the cornerstone of any modern economy, especially in an increasingly interconnected and technology-dependent world. Employers need competent, skilled workers, and it is the job of a country's educational system to prepare its students for the job market.[169] how well these educational systems fulfil these needs is explored in greater depth later in this chapter. To demonstrate here the intimate connection between education and economic development, countries' rate of local school satisfaction can be crossed with their GDP per capita.

[169] Radcliffe, Brent. "How Education And Training Affect The Economy." Investopedia. http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/education-training-advantages.asp

Figure 1) School satisfaction (MN_228S3) and GDP per capita[170]



**Kuwait excluded from dataset*

The cross of school satisfaction as measured by MN_228S3 with GDP per capita in Figure 1 yields a clear positive correlation. Kuwait is excluded from this graph because of the skewing impact of its extremely high GDP per capita of $71,300 – compared to the other six countries' average of $12,500. Among the countries shown, Lebanon has the highest GDP per capita ($18,500) and the second highest satisfaction rate for its schools (63.2%); Yemen is at the opposite corner of the graph with a GDP per capita of $2,500 and 45.1% school satisfaction. Jordan is an outlier, with the second lowest GDP per capita ($11,100) but the highest school satisfaction rate, at 68.8%.

Moving along to respondents' satisfaction with the quality of their healthcare, Jordan again beats all other countries, with 75.5%. Jordan is regarded as a leading healthcare provider in the MENA region and a destination for medical tourism: in 2007, medical tourism generated over $1 billion in revenues with more than 250,000 seeking care.[171] Overall, the MENA region's respondents are slightly more dissatisfied than satisfied with the quality of care available, 46.4% versus 53.7%. Yemenis and Algerians are the least satisfied with their healthcare, with 22.5% and 33.9% of respondents reporting being "satisfied." After Jordan, Kuwait (62.5%) is the next most satisfied country.

How does respondent satisfaction with their healthcare stack up against outcomes? One simple way to determine this is to look for a correlation with life expectancy.

[170] "Country Comparison: GDP per capita." World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
[171] "Jordan." Medical Tourism Index. https://www.medicaltourismindex.com/destination/jordan/

Figure 2. Healthcare satisfaction and life expectancy[172]



Figure 2 shows a mild positive correlation between what are in essence respondents' opinions on the quality of healthcare where they live and life expectancy; however, this relationship is not as strong as the one found by Figure 1 between school satisfaction and GDP per capita. Jordan's 75.5% earns it only the third lowest life expectancy (74.1 years) of the seven countries – although the countries with higher life expectancy are tightly clustered around this same range. Yemen's 22.5% healthcare satisfaction rate is matched by its particularly poor life expectancy of 65.7 years. On the other hand, Iraqis report being satisfied with their healthcare despite a similarly low life expectancy of 68.9 years. Iraqi results are probably skewed by the prolonged conflict that has defined the country's past one-and-a-half decades – which has certainly decreased the quality of care[173] but also maybe patient expectations.

5.2.1.1. Lack of basic needs as proxy measure

The battery V188-191 can function as a proxy measure of the social development in a given country. The questions in this battery employ a common question frame that asks

[172] Annex B: Tables of Health Statistics by Country, WHO Region and Globally. World Health Organisation (WHO). 2016. http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2016/EN_WHS2016_AnnexB.pdf?ua=1
[173] Al Hilfi, TK, Lafta R, and Burnham G. "Health services in Iraq." The Lancet (16 March 2013). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23499042

respondents “In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family…,” followed by “gone without enough food to eat” (V188), “felt unsafe from crime in your own home” (V189), “gone without needed medicine or treatment that you needed” (V190), or “gone without a cash income” (V191). Respondents can answer with either “often,” “sometimes,” “rarely,” or “never.” Because it is covered in the chapter on local and state security, this discussion will exclude V189 “Felt unsafe from crime in your own home”; this factor is moreover not immediately related to the main topic of social welfare being covered here.

That a society can be judged by how it treats its weakest and most vulnerable members is a common dictum, and it guides the present exploration of the findings of V188, V190, and V191. In most cases, people going hungry, without medical treatment or income can be ascribed to a failure of social policy, a national lack of wealth, or some combination of the two. Even in rich countries, most notably the United States, deep poverty can exist – but in this case the first cause is primarily to blame.

The results of V188-191 for all 12 MENA countries are displayed in graphical form below, in order of least to greatest portion of respondents answering “never” and “rarely.”

Figure 3. In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without:



In interpreting the results for V188, V190, and V191, a line can be drawn between the responses "often" and "sometimes," and "rarely" and "never" to distinguish states of severe poverty from relative affluence, or at least not poverty. This line is present in Figure 3.

Across all MENA countries surveyed, 13.8% of respondents report they or their families have either "often" or "sometimes" "gone without enough food to eat." Egypt (21.6%), Jordan (21.4%), and Lebanon (20.9%) have the greatest portion of respondents going hungry; at the opposite end of the scale are the wealthy Gulf states of Qatar (2.4%) and

Kuwait (5.8%), and Tunisia (7.8%). Rising food prices – and people's subsequent inability to meet these prices – were an important causal factor behind the Arab Spring.[174] On V190 "Gone without needed medicine or treatment that you needed," a larger portion of MENA respondents answered "often" or "sometimes": 20.7%. Just over half of Moroccan respondents, 50.3%, say they or their families have had to forgo medicine and treatment they need on a relatively frequent basis; Yemen (36.6%) and Egypt (23.9%) come second and third in this metric.

With a mere 0.9%, Qatar has again has the lowest portion of respondents answering "often" or "never" in regards to abstaining to medical care. This prosperous kingdom also has the lowest figures in response to V191, on whether the respondent or his/her family has "gone without a cash income" in the past 12 months, at 3.8%. The MENA region's rate for this question is 23.8% - almost a quarter of all respondents. Morocco has the highest portion of respondents at least periodically going without a cash income, at 53.6%. This number probably explains the roughly similar portion of Moroccans forgoing medical care, and this mechanism very likely applies to the other MENA countries.

By averaging the percentage of respondents answering "often" and "sometimes" on V188, V190, and V191 for each country it is possible to derive a single figure that roughly indicates the level of severe poverty in a given society. Note: because this figure is produced by averaging the percentages for each question rather than the aggregate number of respondents, this figure is rough at best. Understanding this disclaimer, a cross can be made to determine whether a correspondence exists between these World Values Survey findings on poverty and an outside metric: the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index (HDI).

[174] Cambanis, T.,. "The Arab Spring was a revolution of the hungry." Boston Globe. 23 August 2015. https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2015/08/22/the-arab-spring-was-revolution-hungry/K15S1kGeO5Y6gsJwAYHejI/story.html

Figure 4. Lack of basic needs and HDI[175]



Figure 4 displays a strong negative correlation between an increased portion of respondents saying they have gone without food, medicine, and cash, and higher HDI scores. In other words, a higher HDI corresponds to a smaller percentage of respondents answering "often" and "sometimes" on V188, V190, and V191; a lower HDI corresponds to a higher percentage. The HDI provides a comprehensive metric for assessing a country's level of development, and is composed of three primary dimensions: health, education, and material standard of living. These three dimensions dovetail with some of the themes explored by this particular section. Finally, the HDI is scaled to provide country scores from 0.0 to 1.0 – from the low to high. The cross of HDI with V188, V190, and V191 in Figure 4 confirms that these three World Values Survey questions can be used as a proxy measure of social development in a given country.

5.2.2. Social security

Social security registration across the region, with 29.4% of respondents confirming ("yes") they are registered for social security through their employer. For the region as a whole, "not applicable (not active persons)" is the most prevalent answer choice, at 34.3%), and it accounts for roughly half of respondents in Algeria (49.6%), Iraq (51.1%), Yemen (55.1%), and Jordan (56.4%).

[175] "Table 1. Human Development Index and its components." Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone. UN Development Programme, 2016. 198-201. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf

Table 4. Are you registered through your employer with the social security in your country?

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Yes	29.4%	36.2%	13.3%	21.7%	51.2%	32.8%
No	31.9%	14.2%	35.6%	21.9%	21.3%	67.2%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	34.3%	49.6%	51.1%	56.4%	-	-
No answer	4.3%	-	-	-	27.6%	-
(N)	(8,308)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
Yes	27.6%	20.0%
No	37.8%	24.9%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	34.6%	55.1%
No answer	0.1%	-
(N)	(1,205)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Kuwait has the highest rate of social security registration with 51.2% of respondents answering "yes." Algeria follows as a distant second, at 36.2%. The lowest rates of social security registration are found in Iraq (13.3%), Yemen (20.0%), and Jordan (21.7%). Removing non-active and "no answer" respondents from MN_230A produces data that is easier to interpret. These revised results are shown below.

Table 5. Are you registered through your employer with the social security in your country? (excl. "not applicable" & "no answer")

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Yes	48.0%	71.7%	27.3%	49.7%	70.7%	32.8%
No	52.0%	28.3%	72.7%	50.3%	29.3%	67.2%
(N)	(5,095)	(605)	(587)	(523)	(944)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
Yes	42.2%	44.5%
No	57.8%	55.5%
(N)	(787)	(449)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Now, 48.0% of MENA respondents indicate they are registered for social security in their country. Excluding non-active persons shifts the relative position of the countries, with respect to their rates of social security registration. Algeria takes first place, with 71.7% of its active population registered – just overtaking Kuwait, which now stands at 70.7%. Iraq (27.3%) and Lebanon (32.8%) have the first and second lowest rates of social security registration.

In many ways, the provision of social security is a measure of a state's maturity. An effective system of taxation and service provision is required for governments to create and sustain a broad system of welfare for their retired and vulnerable citizens. Among Western and developed countries especially, a generous welfare state is considered the hallmark of these countries' "Western" or "developed" status.

5.2.3. Quality of life and environment

Clean water and air, and quality housing are issues of both the environment and quality of life. These topics are covered as part of the same battery of questions that includes the questions covered earlier in the section dealing with satisfaction with transportation infrastructure, schools, and healthcare: MN_228S1-S8. As with these earlier questions, the topics covered here use the same question frame, asking respondents to describe whether they are "satisfied" or "dissatisfied" with a particular factor in the area where they live.

The results of MN_228S4 "The quality of air," MN_228S5 "The quality of water," MN_228S7 "The quality of housing," and MN_228S8 "The beauty or physical setting."

Table 6. Satisfaction with quality of air, water, & housing, and beauty of physical surroundings

		TOTAL	Country Code				
			Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
MN_228S4. The quality of air	Satisfied	61.7%	58.9%	64.4%	75.3%	65.0%	43.2%
	Dissatisfied	38.3%	41.1%	35.5%	24.7%	35.0%	56.7%
	(N)	(7,818)	(1,130)	(975)	(1,195)	(1,171)	(1,156)
MN_228S5. The quality of water	Satisfied	50.4%	49.7%	55.2%	-	70.9%	41.0%
	Dissatisfied	49.6%	50.4%	44.8%	-	29.2%	59.0%
	(N)	(6,660)	(1,166)	(978)	-	(1,176)	(1,143)
MN_228S7. The quality of	Satisfied	53.4%	30.6%	41.7%	79.8%	64.3%	48.0%
	Dissatisfied	46.7%	69.4%	58.3%	20.2%	35.8%	52.0%

housing	(N)	(7,874)	(1,167)	(980)	(1,200)	(1,181)	(1,152)
MN_228S8. The beauty or physical setting	Satisfied	48.6%	50.9%	33.4%	75.2%	55.5%	43.9%
	Dissatisfied	51.4%	49.2%	66.5%	24.9%	44.5%	56.1%
	(N)	(7,500)	(974)	(965)	(1,200)	(1,130)	(1,036)

		Country Code	
		Tunisia	Yemen
MN_228S4. The quality of air	Satisfied	51.2%	76.3%
	Dissatisfied	48.7%	23.7%
	(N)	(1,191)	(1,000)
MN_228S5. The quality of water	Satisfied	37.1%	49.3%
	Dissatisfied	62.9%	50.7%
	(N)	(1,197)	(1,000)
MN_228S7. The quality of housing	Satisfied	54.2%	51.9%
	Dissatisfied	45.8%	48.1%
	(N)	(1,194)	(1,000)
MN_228S8. The beauty or physical setting	Satisfied	44.7%	30.5%
	Dissatisfied	55.2%	69.5%
	(N)	(1,195)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

First, how do respondents in the MENA region feel about the quality of the air and water in their communities? 61.7% of MENA respondents say they are satisfied with their water quality, with Yemen (76.3%) and Jordan (75.3%) leading in satisfaction. This, despite the fact that they are among the most water-poor countries in the world.[176] Lebanon and Tunisia are the least satisfied with their water quality, at 43.2% and 51.2% satisfaction, respectively. On air quality, fewer MENA respondents express satisfaction, at 50.4%. Kuwaits (70.9%) and Iraqis (55.2%) are the most satisfied with their local air quality; Tunisians (37.1%) and Lebanese (41.0%) are again the least satisfied. With its hot desert climate and lack of vegetation in many areas, combined with a heavy dependence on automobiles, the MENA region frequently experiences smoggy weather conditions.

Air and water are crucial issues for the MENA region. This part of the world is already severely stressed in terms of access to water; and unfortunately, this situation is guaranteed to get much worse because of climate change.[177] A study released in 2016 projects that portions of the region could become virtually uninhabitable, with summertime temperatures potentially reaching 50 °C on a regular basis by the end of the

[176] "World water resources by country." Review of World Water Resources by Country. Rome: UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), 2003. http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4473e/y4473e00.htm#Contents
[177] Vidal, John. "Middle East faces water shortages for the next 25 years, study says." Guardian. 27 August 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/27/middle-east-faces-water-shortages-for-the-next-25-years-study-says

century.[178] Population is moreover expected to continue to rise swiftly during this period. All of this puts extreme stress on limited natural resources, spurring people to move into overcrowded cities or leave the region entirely for somewhere more hospitable. Already, this phenomena is playing out in the on-going migration crisis from the Middle East and Africa to Europe; global warming and increased water scarcity are also contributing factors to popular unrest and armed conflict in the region.[179]

On an ambiguously positive note, there is an interesting upside to water and climate change-driven conflict. Researchers who tracked atmospheric pollutants with sophisticated satellite monitoring since 2004 report that the levels of these pollutants have dropped precipitously in Syria and Iraq since the Arab Spring revolts and ensuing civil war and the rise of ISIS. As more and more people have been displaced by the conflict, the researchers say that air pollutants have spiked in areas that have received large numbers of refugees, such as Lebanon, in a manner that is consistent with their arrival.[180]

Moving along to the final two factors: housing and the aesthetic quality of physical settings. 53.4% of MENA respondents report feeling satisfied with their quality of housing. As is the pattern with other questions in this battery, Jordan and Kuwait show the highest satisfaction levels; meanwhile, Algeria and Iraq are the least satisfied. When rating the "beauty or physical setting" of the area in which they live, respondents across the region are slightly more dissatisfied than satisfied. Jordanians and Kuwaits are the most pleased among the seven countries with the visual quality of their surroundings, at 79.8% and 63.4%. Yemenis and Iraqis, on the other hand, are the most dissatisfied with the beauty of where they live, with only 30.5% and 33.4% satisfied. The aesthetic quality of where one lives is an important factor in quality of life that is too often missed in discussion and policymaking in this subject, and is entirely missed by metrics like GDP per capita and even HDI.

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[178] Frangoul, Anmar. "Climate change could make North Africa and Middle East 'uninhabitable'." CNBC 4 May 2016. http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/04/climate-change-could-make-north-africa-and-middle-east-uninhabitable.html
[179] Climate Change in the Middle East & North Africa. The World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/mena-climate-change#1
Martino, Alyssa. "Water Scarcity Is Helping Radicalize the Middle East." VICE News. 25 April 2015. https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/is-water-scarcity-radicalizing-the-middle-east-235
[180] McGrath, Matt. "Middle East conflict drastically 'improves air quality'." BBC News. 21 August 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-34002865

5.3. Corruption

The World Values Survey employs a selection of questions to gauge perceptions of corruption in the countries it covers. These questions are: MN_228M, MN_228N, MN_228O, MN_228P, and MN_228Q. Corruption can be broadly defined as unethical or dishonest conduct by people in positions of power, whether in government or the private sector, and covers a range of specific practices, such as soliciting bribes, embezzlement, and favouring certain privileged interests.[181] Economists view corruption as inherently inefficient because it allocates resources in manner that is antithetical to fair pricing, quality, and the free and equal access to information. High levels of corruption within a society are understood to have a corrosive impact on democracy and rule of law and on a society's wealth – with the exception, perhaps, of the direct beneficiaries of corrupt practices.[182] Hence, the level of corruption in a society tends to correlate with state strength or weakness.

5.3.1. How widespread is corruption?

MN_226M and MN_228N ask respondents to rate "how widespread" they believe corruption to be within their country's businesses and government, respectively, with a number between 1 and 10. A rating of 1 describes either no or low corruption, while 10 means high corruption. The results of MN_228M "How widespread: Corruption is within businesses in your country" are displayed in the table below.

Table 7. How widespread: Corruption is within businesses in your country

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
None/ low corruption	2.7%	2.2%	0.3%	1.3%	9.0%	1.2%
2	2.9%	1.5%	3.1%	1.5%	7.7%	3.3%
3	3.8%	3.5%	5.5%	1.7%	5.4%	3.3%
4	5.1%	6.1%	6.8%	2.2%	7.1%	5.7%
5	13.9%	14.5%	12.9%	15.7%	21.0%	9.6%
6	10.4%	9.4%	12.0%	11.0%	12.0%	12.2%
7	15.1%	12.6%	22.3%	17.3%	12.7%	14.4%
8	13.3%	11.3%	17.1%	16.8%	7.7%	13.1%
9	8.7%	6.9%	9.3%	11.2%	3.5%	10.1%
High corruption	24.1%	31.9%	10.7%	21.3%	13.9%	27.0%
(N)	(7,876)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,188)	(1,200)
Mean	7.04	7.29	6.70	7.32	5.67	7.28
Standard Deviation	2.46	2.48	2.10	2.12	2.71	2.39

[181] "Corruption." Investopedia. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corruption.asp
[182] "What is Corruption?" Transparency International. https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define

Base mean	(7,876)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,188)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
None/ low corruption	2.0%	2.1%
2	1.3%	1.9%
3	4.5%	2.5%
4	4.9%	3.0%
5	12.6%	10.1%
6	8.2%	7.6%
7	12.1%	15.3%
8	12.3%	16.5%
9	6.9%	14.5%
High corruption	35.1%	26.7%
(N)	(1,195)	(911)
Mean	7.47	7.57
Standard Deviation	2.48	2.28
Base mean	(1,195)	(911)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

In the 7 MENA countries surveyed on MN_228M, 24.1% of respondents reported a high level of corruption (10) in business. At 46.1%, almost half of respondents indicated a level of business corruption from 8 to 10. In contrast, only 9.4% of respondents chose to describe the level of business corruption with a rating between 1 and 3, which would indicate a low level of corruption.

The average/mean response for MENA respondents to MN_228M is 7.04, indicating perceptions of a moderately high level of corruption within the business community. Yemen has the highest mean, at 7.57, followed by Tunisia, at 7.47; it should be mentioned that more than a third of Tunisian respondents selected 10 (high corruption) as their answer. The country where corruption was viewed the least problematic is Kuwait with a mean response of 5.67 and only 25% of respondents regarding it as widespread (8-10).

Iraq is an interesting case with the lowest portion of respondents stating they believed there was no corruption (1), at 0.3%, while at the same time having the lowest portion of respondents choosing the highest bracket (10), at 10.7%. The country has the second lowest mean response of the 7 MENA countries, at 6.70. Iraqi responses to MN_228M are fairly clustered around the upper middle range of the scale.

The next table, included below, shows the results for MN_228N "How widespread: Corruption is within the government in your country." This question is virtually the same as MN_228M except for the fact that it asks respondents to gauge the level of corruption

in "government," versus businesses. The same 10-point scale is used for respondents to report their perceptions of corruption.

Table 8) MN_228N. How widespread: Corruption is within the government in your country

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
None/ low corruption	2.8%	2.0%	0.2%	3.2%	9.3%	0.5%
2	2.4%	1.6%	1.5%	1.4%	6.0%	2.0%
3	3.7%	4.6%	3.5%	2.7%	7.5%	3.4%
4	4.5%	5.8%	4.6%	3.2%	6.9%	5.2%
5	12.0%	13.4%	10.7%	11.5%	17.5%	10.4%
6	9.7%	8.6%	9.7%	9.5%	11.2%	12.2%
7	13.0%	10.2%	17.0%	16.1%	13.3%	13.7%
8	14.5%	9.8%	22.3%	18.8%	7.5%	13.3%
9	10.7%	9.5%	15.2%	11.6%	4.3%	11.9%
High corruption	26.5%	34.5%	15.4%	22.0%	16.4%	27.4%
(N)	(7,883)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,181)	(1,200)
Mean	7.24	7.41	7.31	7.29	5.82	7.44
Standard Deviation	2.47	2.53	2.02	2.31	2.80	2.26
Base mean	(7,883)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,181)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
None/ low corruption	3.2%	0.5%
2	2.9%	1.0%
3	2.5%	1.5%
4	3.1%	2.6%
5	12.1%	7.1%
6	10.8%	4.8%
7	10.7%	10.2%
8	12.0%	20.5%
9	6.3%	19.0%
High corruption	36.4%	32.8%
(N)	(1,192)	(928)
Mean	7.46	8.16
Standard Deviation	2.57	1.95
Base mean	(1,192)	(928)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The results of MN_228N are very similar to those of MN_228N. The mean response for the MENA region is slightly elevated, at 7.24, and the number of respondents choosing to describe the level of corruption in government as a value between 8 and 10 increased by 5.6 percentage points from MN_228M to 51.7%. The portion of respondents reporting low corruption in government (1 to 3) decreased slightly, to 8.9%. Yemen retained its

rank, possessing the highest mean response to the question, at 8.16, while Kuwait also kept its position at the opposite end of the scale with a mean response of 5.82.

Figure 5. How widespread: Corruption is within businesses in your country



Figure 6. How widespread: Corruption is within the government in your country



Figures 5 and 6 respectively plot the results of MN_228M and MN228N, on the extent of corruption within business and government. The amount of corruption reported increases

along the x-axes of the graphs, and the percentage of respondents choosing a corresponding amount of corruption is tracked by the y-axes.

Again, values are more or less consistent when comparing corruption in business and government. However, there are two exceptions, which can be clearly distinguished from the visualisation provided by Figures 5 and 6. Both Iraq and Yemen saw huge spikes in the upper bracket (8 to 10): the number of Iraqi respondents selecting answers this range of answers increased by 15.8 percentage points, from 37.1% to 52.9%; Yemeni responses experienced a 14.6 percentage point jump from 57.7% to 72.3%.

Table 9. Mean responses

	Mean response to MN 228M Corruption in business	Mean response to MN 228N Corruption in government
TOTAL	7.04	7.24
Algeria	7.29	7.41
Iraq	6.70	7.31
Jordan	7.32	7.29
Kuwait	5.67	5.82
Lebanon	7.28	7.44
Tunisia	7.47	7.46
Yemen	7.57	8.16

To sum up the findings on business and government corruption in MN_228M and MN_228N, in six of the seven countries reporting results here, respondents indicated corruption within government to be higher than in business. The exception is Tunisia, which showed a negligible decrease from MN_228M to MN_228N of 0.01. The breakdown of responses by country to both MN_228M and MN_228N is further visualised by Figure 7 below.

Figure 7. Corruption in private and public sectors in MENA



Respondents answered the questions "How widespread do you think that corruption is within businesses/ government in your country. 10 points scale from 1- None/low corruption to 10- High corruption was divided in 5 categories.

5.3.2.1. Perceptions of corruption and income

A common refrain is that power corrupts. So then, do perceptions of corruption differ among the rich and powerful, compared to those of less means? Do the rich have special insight into corrupt practices? The table below tests this proposition by crossing the results found by MN_228M "How widespread: Corruption is within businesses in your country" and MN_228N "How widespread: corruption is within the government in your country" with respondents' self-reported subjective income.

Table 10) Subjective income and perceptions of corruption

	MN_228M. Corruption in business % of those who say corruption is high (8-10 on scale)			MN_228N. Corruption in government % of those who say corruption is high (8-10 on scale)		
	Subjective income					
	Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Algeria	53%	48%	47%	56%	54%	43%
Iraq	44%	34%	34%	63%	48%	50%
Jordan	50%	50%	46%	54%	52%	51%
Kuwait	33%	21%	25%	34%	26%	24%
Lebanon	48%	49%	54%	49%	52%	58%
Tunisia	63%	48%	49%	60%	50%	64%
Yemen	57%	58%	61%	72%	75%	64%

In general perceptions of corruption in the public and private sector are relatively stable across income groups, with a slight decrease in corruption perceptions as income increases. On corruption in business, this decrease is most pronounced in Tunisia, where 63% of lower income respondents described corruption in business as high (8-10), dropping to 48% and 49% of middle and higher income respondents choosing the same answer. On corruption in government, both Algeria and Iraq experience a 13-percentage-point decrease from low-to-high income respondents answering 8-10. The exception to this trend is Lebanon, which shows an increase in corruption perceptions in both public and private sectors as incomes rise.

What could be the mechanism explaining the fairly consistent inverse relationship between higher incomes and increased perceptions of corruption? On possibility is that the business and government actors that lower income individuals tend to deal with more frequently than their wealthy peers are simply more given to corruption. Another possibility, perhaps, is that high-income respondents are more inured to practices seen as corrupt as the less well-off, and that they are in fact practitioners of corrupt ways: the logic here would be that "it is not corruption when I do it."

5.3.2. Is corruption worsening in this country?

The following table shows results for MN_228O "Level of corruption in this country than it was five years ago," which asks respondents to select a number between 1 and 10 to describe whether they believe corruption has lessened or increased in their country compared to five years ago. Lower values correspond to a lessening of corruption, and higher values correspond to increased corruption, versus five years ago. Using this scale, a mean of 5.5 would be the mid-point, indicating a level of corruption that is unchanged from five years ago.

Table 11. Level of corruption in this country than it was five years ago

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Level is lower	4.2%	2.0%	0.8%	3.1%	14.5%	0.9%
2	3.8%	2.9%	3.3%	4.2%	7.9%	2.7%
3	4.8%	6.3%	5.8%	4.0%	7.6%	3.0%
4	6.0%	7.9%	6.2%	4.1%	9.8%	6.8%
5	14.6%	17.3%	11.3%	14.0%	19.4%	11.6%
6	9.3%	9.2%	11.3%	9.2%	9.0%	12.8%
7	13.0%	10.7%	19.2%	15.8%	8.6%	15.2%
8	12.0%	9.2%	16.1%	13.5%	6.3%	13.4%
9	8.7%	6.5%	11.7%	11.2%	3.3%	8.3%

Level is Higher	23.6%	27.9%	14.3%	20.8%	13.5%	25.3%
(N)	(7,872)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,204)	(1,200)
Mean	6.80	6.86	6.85	6.93	5.19	7.19
Standard Deviation	2.65	2.61	2.25	2.51	2.88	2.32
Base mean	(7,872)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,204)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
Level is lower	5.5%	1.1%
2	4.2%	0.7%
3	3.4%	3.5%
4	3.3%	3.5%
5	12.7%	15.3%
6	8.2%	4.4%
7	12.0%	9.9%
8	12.3%	14.4%
9	4.8%	17.8%
Level is Higher	33.5%	29.6%
(N)	(1,196)	(890)
Mean	7.11	7.69
Standard Deviation	2.79	2.27
Base mean	(1,196)	(890)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The average response for the MENA region is 6.80, meaning that respondents believe that corruption has worsened. Indeed, only Kuwait displays a mean response that is below the mid-point, and only by 0.31 points – reflecting almost no change from five years ago. On MN_228O, Yemen again leads the pack (not a positive distinction), with 76.1% of respondents reporting they believe corruption has increased, generating a mean response of 7.69.

5.3.3. Evaluating efforts to fight corruption

So, how are efforts to curb corruption going? According to MN_228P "Government of your country is doing enough to fight corruption," there is significant room for improvement. On the question of whether governments are doing enough on this subject, MN_228P offers respondents to choose one of three options to describe their opinion: "Yes, doing enough"; "Trying, but could do more"; "No, not doing enough."

Figure 8. Government of your country is doing enough to fight corruption



Only 16% of MENA respondents believe that governments in the region are doing enough to fight the problem. 45% agreed that while their governments are trying to reduce corruption, they could be doing more; and 39% of respondents believe their governments are not doing enough.

The country where people are the most satisfied with the government's anti-corruption efforts actions is Kuwait, with 29% stating that the government is doing enough and 25% reporting the exact opposite ("No, not doing enough"). Tunisia had the smallest portion of respondents who believe the government is doing enough to combat corruption, at 9%. A plurality of respondents – if not an outright majority – in Algeria, Jordan, and Kuwait agreed with the proposition that their governments are "trying, but could do more" on the issue of corruption. In Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen, "No, not doing enough" is the most popular response.

5.3.4. Bribe giving

Although corruption is clearly viewed as a significant problem in MENA countries, when asked about the specific practice of bribery, responses are at least somewhat depressed when compared to the results from the previous questions on the topic of corruption. The

table below displays results from MN_228Q "Faced with (last year): People give a bribe/present to solve their problems which are supposed to be for free," which prompts the respondent to answer whether in the past year he or she has faced a situation where they had to pay a bribe or provide a "gift" for a service that is supposed to be free.

Table 12. Faced with (last year): People give a bribe/present to solve their problems which are supposed to be for free

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Never/ Very rarely	41.8%	23.2%	74.3%	42.6%	24.7%	48.1%
Rarely	28.4%	32.2%	13.6%	32.5%	37.8%	25.3%
Often	19.1%	25.9%	6.3%	18.1%	27.8%	12.8%
Very often	10.6%	18.7%	5.8%	6.8%	9.8%	13.8%
(N)	(7,016)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,211)	(1,200)	(1,205)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Never/ Very rarely	37.4%
Rarely	29.2%
Often	24.6%
Very often	8.8%
(N)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

In the MENA region, 41.8% of respondents indicated they have either "never" or "very rarely" been faced with having to pay a bribe in the past 12 months, with another 28.4% describing this situation as a "rare" occurrence. 10.6% of MENA respondents reported they had to pay bribes "very often." Of the seven MENA countries surveyed, Jordan has the highest proportion of respondents answering MN_228P with "never/very rarely" at 74.3%; Tunisia comes second at 48.1%. Strangely, Tunisia demonstrates the second highest means for both MN_228M and MN_228N, on the pervasiveness of corruption in business and government. Kuwait also deviates somewhat from its performance in the previous metrics on corruption – but in the opposite direction of Tunisia – putting up figures for MN_228Q that hew closely to regional averages. Algeria suffers the worst performance in response to MN_228Q with a combined total of 44.6% of respondents being solicited for bribes either "often" or "very often" in the past 12 months.

5.3.5. Limits of mass surveys on corruption

Are the perceptions of corruption found by the World Values Survey well founded? One alternative tool for measuring corruption is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published each year by Transparency International, an anti-corruption advocacy group.[183] The CPI "measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption" in countries around the world – similar to MN_228N "How widespread: Corruption is within the government in your country – but unlike the World Values Survey relies upon a narrower set of expert opinion.[184] Specifically, Transparency International's annual CPI aggregates the results of 13 different surveys on corruption that derive their country assessments from political and economic analysts, business leaders, and other experts in the field. This is markedly different from the type of survey that the World Values Survey conducts, which relies on interviews with a representative sample of the general population in each country it covers.[185] The methodology of either the World Values Survey or the CPI presents its own advantages and limitations, and this is evident when comparing the results of these two surveys on the topic of corruption.

The table below compares the results of MN_228N with the score and rank provided by the 2016 CPI for the seven MENA countries surveyed. The CPI uses a scale from zero (very high corruption) to 100 (very low corruption) to assign scores to the 176 countries it covers, and then ranks countries based on these scores. In 2016, Denmark, New Zealand, and Finland rounded out the first, second, and third places of the CPI; North Korea, South Sudan, and finally, Somalia placed at the end of the rankings.

Table 13. MN_228N vs. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Rank according to MN_228N (mean response)	Rank according to 2016 CPI report (CPI rank [CPI score])
Kuwait (5.82)	Jordan (57th [48/100])
Jordan (7.29)	Kuwait (=75th [41/100])
Iraq (7.31)	Tunisia (=75th [41/100])
Algeria (7.41)	Algeria (108th [34/100])
Lebanon (7.44)	Lebanon (136th [28/100])
Tunisia (7.46)	Iraq (166th [17/100])
Yemen (8.16)	Yemen (170th [14/100])

[183] "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016." Transparency International. 25 January 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table
[184] "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016." Transparency International. 25 January 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table
[185] "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016: Full Source Description." Transparency International. 25 January 2017. https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

**MN_228N is among an addendum of questions which only respondents in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen were surveyed on. Hence, the WVS dataset on public corruption is restricted to the MENA region, whereas the CPI is global in scope.*

First, the similarities between the findings of World Values Survey and this report, and Transparency International's 2016 CPI: Among the seven countries, Algeria, Lebanon, and Yemen maintain their relative positions in both surveys. Moreover, the CPI scores are broadly consistent with the data found in MN_228N, with public sector corruption broadly found to be fairly widespread in MENA countries. None of the seven countries obtains a mean response or CPI score that surpasses the mid-point values of either metric (for MN_228N, this value is 5.5; for the CPI, 50/100).

Now, the differences: Kuwait and Jordan alternate between first and second places from MN_228N in the 2016 CPI, with Kuwait's CPI score dropping somewhat dramatically compared to its performance in MN_228N. At 57th place in the 2016 CPI, Jordan in fact ranks near the 68th percentile of the 176 countries the CPI covers, and with a score of 48, very near the mid-point value of 50. Iraq takes tumble for its 3rd place position in MN_228N to 166th place in the CPI rankings, as the 10th most corrupt country in the world. Finally, Tunisia jumps from 6th place on MN_228N to being tied with Kuwait in the CPI, with a score of 41 placing both countries 75th in the rankings.

The shared broad trend of high corruption in the MENA region and the discrepancies between government corruption levels as determined for the individual countries speaks to the inherent slipperiness of the topic of corruption. It is almost universally agreeable that corruption is bad and intimately linked to state weakness; however, it is simultaneously difficult for many observers to pinpoint what exactly constitutes corruption. Consider that in MN_228Q, an overwhelming majority of respondents in the MENA region said they had either "never" or "rarely" been faced with paying a bribe within the past year. Yet, a similar overwhelming majority also reported corruption levels are high in their countries, in MN_228M and MN_228N, and that the situation is getting worse (see: MN_228O).

Almost by definition, acts of corruption tend to go unseen by the typical outside observer. They are acts in which people in positions of authority use their power to enrich or benefit themselves personally or their families: there is an imbalance of access to information about these kinds of transactions. Being extorted for a bribe by a public official is one of the most visible forms of corruption. The more subtle forms of corruption – such as embezzling state or company funds, using family ties to get a job,

regardless of qualifications, or favouritism in contract bidding – are not only harder to detect, but also tend to be more difficult to prove or combat, as well as more common.

This of course presents difficulties for a mass survey like the World Values Survey, which relies upon data collected from average individuals who, chances are, not involved in the sort of corruption schemes that are hard for outside observers to detect. Moreover, the individuals who are in fact involved in some corrupt practice, such as nepotism, may not consider (knowingly or unknowingly) their actions a form of corruption but instead just "the way things are done" in their society. Hence, surveys based on objective, dispassionate expert assessment are probably closer to the mark on an issue like corruption. Still, this is not to say that the insights gathered by the World Values Survey here are not valuable. The public's perceptions matter: the popular belief that existing Arab governments were irreconcilably corrupt was one of the central motivating factors behind the Arab Spring revolts of 2011.[186]

***

5.4. Job satisfaction

Respondents' satisfaction with their current primary employment is measured by two questions, MN_233A and MN_233B, covering two different but interrelated areas: the first, regarding satisfaction over salaries and benefits; the second, regarding the opportunities for professional development and promotion. Both questions offer respondents four options to describe their degree of satisfaction on these issues: "strongly satisfied," "fairly satisfied," "fairly dissatisfied," and "strongly dissatisfied."The table below displays the results from MN_233A "Degree of satisfaction: Salary and benefits of your current primary job."

Table 14. Degree of satisfaction: Salary and benefits of your current primary job

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Strongly satisfied	14.7%	11.6%	16.0%	14.0%	28.1%	10.9%
Fairly satisfied	44.9%	41.3%	47.7%	48.8%	50.9%	40.9%
Fairly Dissatisfied	24.2%	21.9%	26.4%	21.6%	14.3%	31.2%
Strongly Dissatisfied	16.2%	25.2%	9.9%	15.7%	6.7%	17.0%
(N)	(5,004)	(567)	(587)	(523)	(986)	(1,200)

	Country Code

[186] Cook, Steven. "Corruption and the Arab Spring." Brown Journal of World Affairs 18.2 (2012). https://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-world-affairs/sites/brown.edu.initiatives.journal-world-affairs/files/private/articles/18.2_Cook.pdf

	Tunisia	Yemen
Strongly satisfied	11.3%	3.8%
Fairly satisfied	47.5%	35.0%
Fairly Dissatisfied	23.1%	31.8%
Strongly Dissatisfied	18.1%	29.4%
(N)	(692)	(449)

**Kuwait and Lebanon's comparatively larger sample sizes (N) are primarily attributable to the number of inactive/irregular workers in the other five countries.*

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

59.6% of respondents in the seven MENA countries surveyed state they are satisfied with the salary and benefits of their current primary jobs. Kuwait has the largest percentage of respondents who report they are "strongly satisfied" with their salary and benefits, at 28.1%, and satisfied in general, at 79.0%. The country also has the lowest portion of respondents expressing strong dissatisfaction, with only 6.7%.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, Yemen has the lowest level of respondent satisfaction, with only 3.8% stating they are "strongly satisfied" with their current job's salary and benefits, with a further 35.0% "fairly satisfied." Yemen is also the only country in which "dissatisfied" respondents outnumber those who are satisfied with their current salary and benefits.

Table 15. Degree of satisfaction: Opportunities for professional development/promotion in your current primary job

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Strongly satisfied	13.4%	11.5%	13.1%	15.7%	22.7%	11.2%
Fairly satisfied	43.9%	37.6%	46.2%	47.6%	50.4%	44.7%
Fairly Dissatisfied	25.8%	27.2%	29.1%	23.7%	18.4%	30.3%
Strongly Dissatisfied	16.9%	23.8%	11.6%	13.0%	8.5%	13.8%
(N)	(4,948)	(567)	(587)	(523)	(930)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
Strongly satisfied	12.9%	1.1%
Fairly satisfied	42.1%	31.4%
Fairly Dissatisfied	20.4%	34.1%
Strongly Dissatisfied	24.7%	33.4%
(N)	(692)	(449)

**Kuwait and Lebanon's comparatively larger sample sizes (N) are primarily attributable to the number of inactive/irregular workers in the other five countries*

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Displayed above, the results of MN_233B "Degree of satisfaction: Opportunities for professional development/promotion in your current primary job" demonstrate close parity to the results from MN_233A. 57.3% of MENA respondents reported being "strongly" or "fairly" satisfied with the opportunities for promotion and professional development at their current jobs, and as with MN_233A, Kuwait and Yemen round off either end of the spectrum. Kuwait has 73.1% percent of respondents satisfied with their employment's professional advancement opportunities. While 31.4% of Yemenis stated they are "fairly satisfied," a paltry 1.1% expressed "strong" satisfaction.

Compared side-by-side, satisfaction with promotion/career development opportunities (MN_233B) is slightly lower than salary/benefits satisfaction (MN_233A) in all MENA countries surveyed, except Jordan and Kuwait.

5.4.1. Preferred sector of employment

The table below shows the results of MN_228L "If you had your preference, in which of the following would you prefer to work?" Respondents are offered three possible answer choices: "to work as an employee in the public sector"; "to work as an employee in the private sector"; "to be self-employed."

Table 16. If you had your preference, in which of the following would you prefer to work?

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
To work as an employee in the public sector	51.9%	49.2%	74.0%	52.0%	62.0%	23.6%
To work as an employee in the private sector	14.1%	12.6%	7.9%	10.2%	15.4%	35.9%
To be self-employed	34.0%	38.2%	18.0%	37.8%	22.7%	40.5%
(N)	(7,669)	(1,200)	(982)	(1,200)	(1,133)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
To work as an employee in the public sector	48.6%	62.2%
To work as an employee in the private sector	5.3%	7.9%
To be self-employed	46.1%	29.9%
(N)	(1,205)	(749)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Just over half, 51.9%, of respondents in the seven MENA countries indicated their preference to work in the public sector, followed by 34.0% choosing self-employment and only 14.1% in the private sector. Probably motivated by the political dysfunction characterising its government, Lebanon is the only country in which most respondents do not have first preference for public sector employment; self-employment leads instead at 40.5%, followed by private sector employment at 35.9% and finally, the public sector at 23.6%. Iraq possesses the greatest percentage of respondents preferring public sector work, at 74.0%, as well as the smallest portion favouring self-employment, at 18.0%. Tunisian respondents demonstrate the highest preference for self-employment, at 46.1%. Overall, jobs in the public sector as well as self-employment tend to be vastly more popular among MENA respondents than work in the private sector.

5.4.2. Is job satisfaction higher in the public or private sector?

The similarity of responses to MN_233A and MN_233B, on job satisfaction as it relates to salary/benefits and promotions, suggests these two incentives are closely correlated. An assumption can therefore follow that the desirability of different sectors of employment, as measured in MN_228L, is causally related to the perceived salary, benefits, and opportunities for professional development available at jobs in these sectors. According to this assumption, the majority-preference for public sector employment observed in MN_228L indicates the job benefits considered in MN_233A and MN_233B are greater in the public, versus private, sector. To help assess this hypothesis, results from V230 "Sector of employment" are shown below, which asks respondents to characterise their type of employment.

Table 17. Sector of employment

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Government or public institution	35.0%	48.4%	22.3%	44.5%	78.0%	16.9%
Private business or industry	40.2%	51.6%	21.0%	53.8%	20.8%	68.2%
Private non-profit organisation	4.2%	-	3.8%	1.7%	1.2%	14.9%
MX, EC: Autonomous/ Informal sector; PE, CH: Other	20.6%	-	52.9%	-	-	-
(N)	(5,671)	(605)	(1,164)	(517)	(895)	(806)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen

Government or public institution	27.6%	17.8%
Private business or industry	70.2%	23.0%
Private non-profit organisation	2.2%	4.1%
MX, EC: Autonomous/ Informal sector; PE, CH: Other	-	55.1%
(N)	(684)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The country that recorded the highest levels of satisfaction in MN_233A and MN_233B, Kuwait, has the highest percentage of respondents working for the government and public institutions, 78.0%. This correlation appears to support the assumption that the public sector holds an advantage over the private when it comes to employment perks and benefits, at least for most of the countries considered here. In MN_228L, 62.0% of Kuwaiti respondents indicated a preference for "work as an employee in the public sector" – virtually tied to Yemen's 62.2%. Yemen, which has the lowest levels of job satisfaction among surveyed countries, also has the second lowest percentage of respondents working in the public sector, at 17.8%, as well as the largest percentage working in the informal sector.

The cross of job satisfaction and employment sector in Figure 9, below, supports the broad hypothesis that in the MENA region, the public sector outcompetes the private on job satisfaction. The graph's measure of job satisfaction is a composite of MN_233A "Degree of satisfaction: Salary and benefits of your current primary job" and MN_233B "Degree of satisfaction: Opportunities for professional development/promotion in your current primary job." Respondents are divided according to how they reported their sector of employment in V230, and percentage of respondents in each sector who are satisfied with their work's salary, benefits, and opportunities for professional development is tallied by the coloured bars. A quick note: excluded from this cross is the V230 answer choice, "MX, EC: Autonomous/Informal sector; PE, CH: Other."

Figure 9. Job satisfaction & sector of employment



**The absolute number of respondents in all countries surveyed selecting "Private non-profit organisation" to describe their primary employment is significantly lower than for "Govt/public institution" or "Private business/industry"*

†No respondents in Algeria chose "Private non-profit organisation" to describe their employment status

In Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia job satisfaction was higher among respondents working in the government versus those working in the private sector, with the greatest disparity observed in Tunisia. Tunisia, in fact, scores the second highest public sector job satisfaction rate, at 74.4%, just behind Kuwait's 74.4%.

Jordan and Yemen are the only countries where job satisfaction is lower in the public versus private sector – in Jordan, it is just barely so, with a difference of 3.3 percentage points. Despite the fact that a clear majority of Yemeni respondents, 62.2%, said they would prefer working in the public sector in MN_228L, Yemen's job satisfaction of 27.3% among public sector employees is well below all other countries surveyed. In each sector of employment in Figure 9, Yemen has the lowest rates of job satisfaction.

That public sector jobs would be more desirable and demonstrate higher job satisfaction than private sector alternatives in most MENA countries is perhaps unsurprising given that these jobs are typically attended by better benefits, work leave policies, and shorter hours in many parts of the world.[187] Within the MENA region, public sector employees

[187] Kabbani, Nader and Leen Al-Habash. "Raising Awareness of Alternatives to Public Sector Employment among Syrian Youth (Working Paper No. 387)." Working Paper Series. Economic Research Forum. March 2008. 4. https://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/387_Kabbani_Habbash.pdf

can sometimes expect to earn 30% more in wages, compared to their private sector peers.[188]

As the only country in which more respondents expressed their preference for both private sector and self-employment than working in the public sector, according to MN_228L, Lebanon merits final special attention in this portion of the chapter. The low desirability of public sector jobs found in MN_228L (23.6% of Lebanese respondents express a preference for this sector) is seemingly contradicted by the modestly high job satisfaction rate of Lebanese public workers, at 65.8%, which is higher than the private sector satisfaction rate of 60.2%.

While the public sector offers employees in Lebanon more benefits, wages are stagnant; the public sector salary scale has not been revised for several years now.[189] The desirability of public sector employment in Lebanon is furthermore likely depressed by the country's political dysfunction and sectarianism.

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5.5. Entrepreneurialism, work, and unemployment

The set of questions discussed in this section of this chapter of the report deal with MENA respondents' attitudes on entrepreneurialism, work, and unemployment.

5.5.1. Attitudes on entrepreneurialism

The first question to be considered, MN_234A "Have a business/have taken steps to start a business (by yourself/with others) during last year," asks respondents whether they own or plan to establish their own business. The three possible answer choices are shown in the table below.

[188] Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, Guilio de Tommaso, and Amitaba Mukherjee, "An International Statistical Survey of Government Employment and Wages (Policy Research Working Paper 1806)." World Bank. August 1997. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/300221468739461854/An-international-statistical-survey-of-government-employment-and-wages

[189] Jaoude, Hicham Abou. Labour Market and Employment Policy in Lebanon. European Training Foundation (ETF). 2015. http://www.etf.europa.eu/webatt.nsf/0/33A1850E6A358308C1257DFF005942FE/$file/Employment%20policies_Lebanon.pdf

Table 18. Have a business/have taken steps to start a business (by yourself/with others) during last year

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
I already have an established business	12.6%	11.4%	5.9%	18.4%	19.1%	11.6%
I have taken steps to establish a new business	14.3%	12.1%	10.5%	22.8%	25.0%	9.4%
I have not taken any steps to establish a business	73.1%	76.5%	83.6%	58.8%	55.9%	79.0%
(N)	(6,250)	(605)	(1,200)	(1,040)	(1,200)	(1,205)

	Country Code
	Yemen
I already have an established business	8.7%
I have taken steps to establish a new business	4.5%
I have not taken any steps to establish a business	86.8%
(N)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the region, 12.6% of respondents report being business owners already at the time of the survey, while another 14.3% state they have taken steps towards starting a business. On both of these answer options, the highest positive response rate comes from Lebanon with 19.1% and 25%, respectively. Iraq has the lowest portion of respondents who have their own business, at 5.9%, while Yemen has the lowest portion stating they have taken steps towards establishing a business, at 4.5%. 73% of MENA respondents neither own a business nor have they taken steps to establish one.

One factor that can motivate the decision to start one's own business is a gap in the labour market between supply and demand. That is, a lack of job opportunities in the labour market may compel people to try starting their own business. Whether this is a main casual mechanism for business creation, as measured in MN_234A, can be explored by considering the unemployment rate in the countries survey. This data in the table below is provided from V229 "Employment status."

	Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia	Yemen
Unemployed	13.2%	8.6%	2.0%	6.9%	14.4%	12.0%
(N)	1,200	1,200	1,271	1,200	1,205	1,000

The evidence provided here is inconclusive as far as establishing a causal link between unemployment and business creation. The country with the highest portion of respondents reporting they have taken steps to create a business, Lebanon, has the second lowest unemployment rate, at 6.9%, of the six MENA countries considered. At the opposite end of the scale, Tunisia has the highest unemployment rate, at 14.4%, and the second lowest portion of respondents preparing to start a business, at 9.4%.

Part of the problem with the thesis that a lack of job opportunities may spur business creation is that both phenomena often share a common origin of economic malaise. More often than not, the factors that are driving up unemployment are the same thing inhibiting job creation.

Moving along, MN_228R "Opinion of those who start and run their own businesses" asks respondents to describe their opinion on entrepreneurs as either "very favourable," "fairly favourable," "fairly unfavourable," or "very unfavourable." The results of MN_228R are displayed below.

Table 19. Opinion of those who start and run their own businesses

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Very favorable	51.9%	52.9%	42.0%	43.0%	30.6%	71.6%
Fairly favorable	33.2%	36.4%	45.1%	37.8%	36.5%	21.9%
Fairly unfavorable	8.7%	6.8%	8.1%	12.4%	19.4%	1.8%
Very unfavorable	6.2%	4.0%	4.8%	6.8%	13.5%	4.7%
(N)	(6,222)	(1,103)	(900)	(1,096)	(1,076)	(1,146)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very favorable	72.0%
Fairly favorable	22.4%
Fairly unfavorable	3.1%
Very unfavorable	2.4%
(N)	(901)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

85.1% of respondents in the MENA region view people who have started and run their own business in a favourable way; only 6.2% took a "very unfavourable" view of entrepreneurs. With the exception of Lebanon, all countries have favourable views in the range between 80% and 95% of respondents. At 32.9%, Lebanon has double the average

percentage of respondents reporting an unfavourable opinion of business starters. The case of Lebanon is particularly strange given that it had one of the highest rates of respondents indicating they would prefer to run their own business, in MN_228L. The results found in MN_228R also run counter to the important role that start-ups and other young firms play in job creation in the Lebanese economy.[190]

5.5.2. Unemployment and finding work

The table below records the responses to V229 "Employment status," in which respondents are asked to describe their current status of employment. The responses displayed in the row, "Unemployed," were cited in the discussion above.

Table 20. Employment status

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon
Full time	25.2%	19.7%	18.6%	18.7%	48.5%	30.7%
Part time	10.1%	11.6%	7.4%	4.6%	21.3%	7.9%
Self employed	10.8%	9.0%	13.4%	7.9%	5.4%	15.7%
Retired	7.1%	6.5%	5.6%	12.4%	7.3%	5.9%
Housewife	26.2%	22.4%	36.2%	41.3%	7.5%	16.8%
Students	11.3%	17.2%	10.2%	8.1%	7.1%	15.4%
Unemployed	8.9%	13.2%	8.6%	6.2%	2.0%	6.9%
Other	0.5%	0.5%	-	0.8%	0.9%	0.7%
(N)	(8,276)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,271)	(1,200)

	Country Code	
	Tunisia	Yemen
Full time	21.5%	15.8%
Part time	6.6%	10.6%
Self employed	11.9%	12.6%
Retired	8.1%	3.2%
Housewife	21.0%	41.6%
Students	15.9%	4.2%
Unemployed	14.4%	12.0%
Other	0.7%	-
(N)	(1,205)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

[190] Schiffbauer, Marc, Abdoulaye Sy, Sahar Hussain, Hania Sahnoun, and Philip Keefer. Jobs or Privileges: Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank. 2015. http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/jobs-or-privileges-unleashing-the-employment-potential-of-the-middle-east-and-north-africa

According to the data from V229, the average rate of unemployment across the MENA countries surveyed is 8.9% – a modestly healthy (if slightly elevated) level of unemployment in an economy. At the high end of the scale are Yemen (12.0%), Algeria (13.2%), and Tunisia (14.4%). Lebanon (6.9%), Jordan (6.2%), and Kuwait (2.0%) have the lowest portions of respondents reporting they are unemployed. Iraq, at 8.6%, is just below the MENA average of 8.9%.

Is the unemployment data presented in V229 "Employment status" accurate? The table below considers the respondent-reported rate of unemployment gathered by the World Values Survey alongside corresponding unemployment rates provided by the CIA *World Factbook*. No data on the unemployment rate in Lebanon was available from the *World Factbook*.

Table 21. Unemployment: comparing WVS & World Factbook figures[191]

	From V229	From *World Factbook*
Algeria	13.2% 2014	12.4% (2016 est.)
Iraq	8.6% 2013	16.0% (2012 est.)
Jordan	6.2% 2014	14.8% (2016 est.)
Kuwait	2.0% 2013	3.0% (2016 est.)
Lebanon*	6.9% 2013	-
Tunisia	14.4% 2013	15.4% (2016 est.)
Yemen	12.0% 2013	27.0% (2014 est.)

**Unemployment rate for Lebanon was unavailable from CIA World Factbook*

With the exception of Algeria, the unemployment rate reported by the *World Factbook* is larger than that found by V229 in each of the countries covered for which data is available – in some cases dramatically so. World Values Survey and *World Factbook* figures cohere relatively closely for Algeria, Kuwait, and Tunisia. However, in Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen, the latter figures were almost double the rate found in V229. According to the *World Factbook*, Yemen – which posts an already troubling unemployment rate of 12.0% in V229 – has an unemployment rate of 27.0%.

There are a number of factors that could explain the discrepancy between the unemployment figures presented here. First, and perhaps the most obvious explanation, is that the World Values Survey and *World Factbook* numbers are measuring different things. The percentage "unemployed" in V229 corresponds to the portion of all respondents in a particular country that chose to describe their current status as

[191] "Field listing: Unemployment rate." CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2129.html#jo

"unemployed." "All respondents" includes people who are retired, housewives, and students, as well as people working part and full-time and those who are self-employed. By contrast, the unemployment rate is typically calculated as the portion of people who are unemployed over the labour force, which includes employed and unemployed individuals.[192] There are specific parameters for determining who is unemployed or in the labour force: the labour force only includes those who are either currently working (whether part or full-time) or are actively looking for work. The U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics defines the unemployed as "All those who did not have a job at all during the survey reference week, made at least one specific active effort to find a job during the prior 4 weeks, and were available for work (unless temporarily ill)," as well as people who have been temporarily laid off.[193] Hence, individuals who are retired, going to school, or homemakers, for example, are excluded from determinations of the labour force and the unemployment rate.

Adjusting the figures in V229 to include only "full time," "part time," "self-employed," and "unemployed" respondents results in an unemployment rate for Yemen of 23.5%, which is much closer to the rate cited by the *World Factbook*, at 27.0%. However, while this adjustment process may bring the numbers in line for countries where the gap was as pronounced as it is Yemen, it does create problems for countries where the initial unemployment "rate" found in V229 closely matches *World Factbook* figures. For example, adjusting the data for Tunisia yields an unemployment rate of 26.5% – significantly higher than the rate of 15.4% cited by the *World Factbook*.

Other issues that might impede a dovetailing comparison of the unemployment figures here include differences in survey dates – although this is most likely a very minor issue; an unrepresentative sample population in either survey; respondents' hesitance to state they are unemployed; and the prevalence of informal work in some of the countries. The last point, in particular, is almost certainly at play in Iraq and Yemen, which in V230 "Sector of employment," record 52.9% and 55.1% of respondents working in the informal economy. The calculus used to determine the unemployment rate presented in the *World Factbook* might be failing to account for many of these individuals.

Moving forward, the results of MN_229A "Have you actively looked for work in the past four weeks?" are displayed in the table below. The "four weeks" distinction is noteworthy, as it is the same time period used by U.S. labour statisticians to distinguish

[192] "How the Government Measures Unemployment." Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor). 8 October 2015. https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm
[193] "How the Government Measures Unemployment." Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor). 8 October 2015. https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm

unemployed individuals from those who have dropped out of the labour force – sometimes referred to as "discouraged workers."

Table 22. Have you actively looked for work in the past four weeks?

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Yes	18.1%	18.1%	17.2%	13.5%	19.2%	17.9%
No	69.3%	42.3%	82.8%	54.2%	80.8%	82.0%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	6.7%	39.6%	-	-	-	-
No answer	5.9%	-	-	32.3%	-	0.1%
(N)	(7,108)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)	(1,200)	(1,205)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	23.7%
No	76.3%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	-
No answer	-
(N)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

When asked if they have looked for work during the past four weeks, 18.1% of respondents in the MENA region stated "yes." "Yes" should be understood to include (but not necessarily limited to include) people who are currently unemployed and searching for work and people who are employed but exploring other opportunities. Similarly, the "no" response may include people who are not working and have left the market for labour as well as employed individuals. Because MN_229A covers is asked of the entire survey sample of the countries covered, it is not analogous to a measure of labour force participation. A final note before discussing briefly the results: the large portions of respondents in Algeria and Kuwait selecting "not applicable (not active persons)" and "no answer," respectively should be taken as largely comprising of respondents answering "no."

The results of MN_229A are bounded at either end by Kuwait, with the lowest percentage of respondents looking for work (13.5%), and Yemen, with the highest percentage, at 23.7%. Their relative placement corresponds to low and high unemployment rates respectively observed in either country. Filtering MN_229A results to only include data on respondents reporting themselves as unemployed in V229 yields the table below.

Table 23. Employment status (Unemployed) & job search

	TOTAL	Country Code [Employment status=Unemployed]				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Yes	75.9%	77.2%	86.4%	73.1%	78.3%	74.0%
No	23.5%	22.8%	13.6%	11.5%	21.7%	26.0%
No answer	0.6%	-	-	15.4%	-	-
(N)	(663)	(158)	(103)	(26)	(83)	(173)

	Country Code [Employment status=Unemployed]
	Yemen
Yes	66.7%
No	33.3%
No answer	-
(N)	(120)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Applying U.S. Labour Department standards, respondents answering "no" in the table above would not be counted as "unemployed" since they have not actively searched for a job within the four-week window. Most of these respondents could be referred to as discouraged workers. Interestingly, Yemen appears to have the highest portion of discouraged workers, with only 66.7% of those who reported being unemployed in V229 having searched for a job sometime during the past four weeks, at the time of the survey. This finding makes sense given the Yemen's poor economy and high levels of unemployment, which can pressure people to simply drop out of the labour force.

Finally, the table below shows the results of MN_229B "If you received an employment opportunity (last/next month): you would be interested and able to start working."

Table 24. If you received an employment opportunity (last/next month): you would be interested and able to start working

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Yes	28.7%	27.3%	26.2%	26.5%	25.8%	25.4%
No	59.9%	33.1%	73.8%	48.0%	74.2%	74.6%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	6.7%	39.6%	-	-	-	-
No answer	4.7%	-	-	25.5%	-	-
(N)	(7,108)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)	(1,200)	(1,205)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	43.8%
No	56.2%
Not applicable (Not active persons)	-
No answer	-
(N)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the MENA region, 28.7% of respondents stated that "yes," they would be interested and able to start working if offered an employment opportunity. In all countries surveyed except Yemen, the response rate for "yes" hews closely to this regional average. Among the employed respondents it covers, MN_229B functions as a proximate measure of job satisfaction: employers compete for workers on the basis of the salary, benefits, and opportunities for professional development a position offers.

Yemen's high positive response rate to MN_229B is indicative of both its high unemployment rate and its relative depressed job satisfaction levels, as measured by MN_233A and MN_233B.

***

5.6. Borrowing money

When it comes to patterns of lending in borrowing in the MENA region, there exist a number of differences between countries. Surveying on whether people have borrowed money, who they borrowed it from, and why, was completed in six MENA countries: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen.

The table below shows the results of MN_237A "You/member of your family living with you (over last year) – borrow money," which asks respondents to answer either "yes" or "no" to whether they or a member of their family with whom they live has borrowed money at some time over the past year.

Table 25. You/member of your family living with you (over last year) – borrow money

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Yes	35.2%	35.4%	28.7%	43.0%	26.7%	25.1%
No	64.8%	64.6%	71.3%	57.0%	73.3%	74.9%
(N)	(6,935)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,130)	(1,200)	(1,205)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	56.1%
No	43.9%
(N)	(1,000)

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

35.2% of respondents in the region indicate that they or their family borrowed money over the previous year. The country with the smallest portion of respondents reporting having taken out a loan is Tunisia, at 25.1%, followed closely by Lebanon's 26.7%. 56.1% of respondents in Yemen stated they/their family have borrowed money in the past year, giving it the highest positive reporting rate of the countries surveyed.

5.6.1. Reasons for borrowing

Breaking down the reasons as to why people borrow money is the subject of MN_237C1–C6, which cover, in order, "starting or growing a business," "buying or improving a home," "getting married," "household purchases," "emergencies," and "others." Because these questions employ a common question frame, they are presented in a single table. The percentages shown correspond to the portion of respondents who answered "yes" in MN_237A "You/member of your family living with you (over last year) – borrow money" and mentioned the topic at hand as a reason for borrowing.

Table 26. If "borrow money," the loan was used for: …

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
C1. Starting or growing a business	10.1%	8.5%	7.6%	13.4%	20.3%	9.6%
C2. Buying or improving a home	22.0%	16.0%	18.0%	30.7%	36.2%	30.0%
C3. Getting married	7.3%	9.2%	3.8%	9.4%	14.1%	5.9%
C4. Household purchases	35.5%	35.5%	41.0%	24.3%	18.1%	30.0%
C5. Emergencies	26.0%	25.9%	29.1%	26.6%	23.4%	19.8%

C6. Others	5.2%	4.9%	0.6%	13.1%	5.9%	4.6%
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	(2,439)	425	344	486	320	303

	Country Code
	Yemen
C1. Starting or growing a business	4.1%
C2. Buying or improving a home	7.5%
C3. Getting married	2.7%
C4. Household purchases	56.6%
C5. Emergencies	28.6%
C6. Others	0.5%
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	561

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the MENA region, the most prevalent reason for borrowing money is "household purchases" (C4), with 35.5% of respondents affirming this as a motivating factor in their borrowing decisions over the past year. In Yemen, 56.6% of respondents who had borrowed money in the last year cite household purchases as a reason, and in every country except Kuwait and Lebanon (where it ranked second, incidentally) these purchases were the leading cause of borrowing.

The second most common reason for borrowing is for "emergencies" (C5), at 26.0% for the MENA region. Again, Yemen displays the highest positive response rate for this factor, 28.6%. Overall, the rate of borrowing driven by emergencies is fairly consistent across all countries surveyed, at around a quarter of respondents. "Buying or improving a home" (C2) comes third in the region, at 22.0%, and demonstrates a wider range of figures between countries, from 7.5% in Yemen to 36.2% in Lebanon.

The least prevalent reason for borrowing in the MENA region is for "others" (C6), with a positive response rate of 5.2%. This is followed by "getting married" (C3), at 7.3%, and "starting or growing a business" (C1), at 10.1%.

Figure 10, below, presents the results the results displayed in the previous table in graphical form.

Figure 10. If you or a family member borrowed money, what for?



5.6.2. Who is borrowing money?

By crossing respondents' employment status, as reported in V229, with whether they answered "yes" to MN_237A "You/member of your family living with you (over last year) – borrow money," some idea of the answer to this question emerges. The table below presents the employment data for the 35.2% of respondents in the MENA region that confirmed they or their family have borrowed money over the past year.

Table 27. Employment status of those borrowing money ("Yes" on MN_237A)

Employment status	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
Full time	24.8%	20.7%	12.5%	49.2%	27.5%	23.4%
Part time	12.8%	11.8%	9.0%	20.5%	9.7%	6.6%
Self employed	9.5%	6.8%	10.2%	3.9%	15.6%	12.2%
Retired	6.9%	5.6%	7.6%	8.9%	8.4%	9.2%
Housewife	25.1%	22.6%	40.1%	6.6%	16.9%	20.5%
Student	8.0%	14.1%	3.5%	7.2%	10.3%	10.6%
Unemployed	12.6%	17.9%	17.2%	3.3%	11.2%	17.2%
Other	0.2%	0.5%	-	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	(2,437)	425	344	484	320	303

Employment status	Country

	Code
	Yemen
Full time	13.5%
Part time	14.4%
Self employed	11.1%
Retired	3.6%
Housewife	41.0%
Student	4.1%
Unemployed	12.3%
Other	-
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	561

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Full time workers and housewives each account for about a quarter – 24.8% and 25.1% – of the respondents who borrowed money across the MENA region. 49.2% of borrowers in Kuwait are employed full-time, which makes intuitive sense given the exceedingly low levels of unemployment in the country as previously discussed. Yemen has the highest portion of borrowers who are also housewives, at 41.0%, followed closely by Iraq at 40.1%. The next largest categories of borrowers in the region are part time workers and unemployed people, at 12.8% and 12.6%. Again, Kuwait has the largest portion of part time employed borrowers, at 20.5%. Algeria has the highest percentage of borrowers who are unemployed, 17.9%; the North African nation is followed in this category by Iraq and Tunisia, both tied with 17.2% of borrowing respondents.

5.6.3. Who is lending the money?

From taking commercial banks to friends and family, where respondents in the MENA region choose to borrow from varies greatly from country to country. As with the table "MN_237C1–C6. If "borrow money," the loan was used for: …" which considers the reasons for borrowing, the next table includes the results of multiple questions – MN237B1–B7 – that ask respondents who answered "yes" to MN_237A from whom they borrowed money. The percentages displayed correspond to the portion of people that mentioned each source of credit.

Table 28. If "borrow money," from any of the following places: …

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Iraq	Kuwait	Lebanon	Tunisia
B1. Microfinance institution	6.2%	8.0%	6.7%	6.0%	12.2%	7.6%
B2. Commercial bank	18.6%	3.1%	2.6%	45.0%	33.8%	25.1%
B3. Public bank	11.7%	3.3%	4.7%	25.3%	26.2%	10.9%
B4. Friends or family	61.4%	80.7%	80.2%	18.9%	33.4%	50.8%
B5. Informal savings/lending association (e.g., Jamiyat)	3.2%	0.5%	3.5%	6.5%	6.2%	1.7%
B6. Credit supplier	6.1%	1.2%	0.9%	22.7%	4.1%	1.7%
B7. Other	2.8%	3.3%	1.5%	3.7%	6.6%	2.3%
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	(2,437)	425	344	484	320	303

	Country Code
	Yemen
B1. Microfinance institution	0.5%
B2. Commercial bank	1.2%
B3. Public bank	1.4%
B4. Friends or family	96.1%
B5. Informal savings/lending association (e.g., Jamiyat)	1.2%
B6. Credit supplier	0.5%
B7. Other	0.5%
(N) "Yes" to MN_237A	561

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Friends and family form the most popular source for borrowing in Algeria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Yemen. Borrowers in Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen are particularly dependent on this source of credit, which in Yemen, covers 96.1% of borrowers surveyed. At the low end, friends and family provide loans for only 18.6% of Kuwaiti borrowers. For the region as a whole, 61.4% of respondents go to friends and family when borrowing money.

Kuwait and Lebanon, and Tunisia to a lesser extent, demonstrate lending sources that are relatively diversified. In both Kuwait and Lebanon, commercial banks are the leading source of credit, with 45.0% and 33.8% of borrowers indicating they have sought funds from these institutions. Public banks account for about a quarter of respondents in each country as well. Greater borrowing from more formal, institutionalised establishments, like commercial and public banks, microfinance institutions, and other credit suppliers in Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia probably provides a proximate measure of the health of the financial services sectors in these countries, relative to the other three countries which are overwhelmingly dominated by interpersonal lending.

5.6.4. Are MENA borrowing habits healthy?

In Iraq and Yemen, and Algeria to a lesser extent, housewives account for the lion's share of borrowing, as determined in the cross of MN_237A and V229. These three countries also show overwhelming majorities of borrowers who seek loans from friends and family, versus all other potential creditors. These figures likely bear some relation to one another, and furthermore suggest that the main reason motivating the decision to use this particular source of credit is lack of income, and hence credit history.

Yemen, which has the highest rate of borrowing (56.1% respondents report they/their family borrowed money in the past year) and of borrowers obtaining credit from family and friends, has the highest rate of unemployment – 27%, according to the CIA World Factbook[194] – and a dependency ratio of 75%,[195] in an economy where most people work in agriculture. For the average Yemeni, obtaining a loan through an established lender appears to be a tough prospect. And, things are probably worse than the data here, which was collected in 2013, shows. Since March 2015, Yemen has been enveloped in a deadly civil war involving a direct Saudi military intervention, which has killed 10,000 civilians, according to a top UN official,[196] and has displaced three million people.

Not just in Yemen, but across the MENA region, the risk of non-repayment of borrowed funds is compounded by the fact that the majority of borrowing is for household purchases and emergencies (61.5%), versus towards opportunities for return on investment, like starting or expanding a business (10.1%).

Of the countries surveyed, Kuwait has the highest rate of employment according to V229 "Employment status," at 75.2%, and demonstrates more prudent uses for borrowed capital in comparison to a country like Yemen. While household purchases and emergencies account for the largest share of borrowing when combined – totalling 50.9%, the main single reason for taking out a loan among Kuwaiti respondents is for "buying or improving a home," at 30.7%. The choice of lenders in Kuwait is dramatically different from most other MENA countries as well. 76.3% of Kuwaiti borrowers sought credit from either a commercial or public bank or microfinance institution, compared to the MENA average of 36.5%. Only 18.9% of Kuwaiti

[194] "Field listing: Unemployment rate." CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2129.html#jo
[195] "Field Listing: Dependency Ratios." The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/fields/2261.html#ym
[196] Al-Haj, Ahmed. "Top UN official: 10,000 civilians killed in Yemen conflict." Associated Press. 16 January 2017. https://apnews.com/43471432a8e949a7af6fc56928284d78/top-un-official-10000-civilians-killed-yemen-conflict

borrowing was from family and friends, whereas across the MENA region this source accounted for 61.4% of lending.

These figures reflect the relative strength of the Kuwaiti economy in one sense. Still, Kuwait has the second highest rate of borrowing of the countries surveyed, with 43.0% of respondents reporting they or their family have sought a loan in the past year. Moreover, the country is heavily dependent on oil revenues, which support a massive public sector that employs 78.0% of respondents – versus the MENA average of 35.0%.

Lebanon has the second lowest percentage of respondents (26.7%) who report having taken out a loan in the past year, just behind Tunisia's 25.1%. The country demonstrates the healthiest borrowing habits in the MENA region, as the only country where a majority of borrowers cite either business creation or buying/improving a home as their reason for taking out a loan, at 56.6%. It also has the lowest rate of borrowers obtaining loans for household loans and emergencies. Lebanon's borrowing patterns are complemented by the fact that it has the second highest rate of employment (full and part time, and self-employed) of the countries surveyed, at 54.3%. Despite the dysfunction of its political system, Lebanon actually enjoys modest economic health, mostly in respect to consumer debt, according to the indicators covered in this chapter.

5.6.5. Borrowing money, MENA compared to World

Because the questions on borrowing were part of a supplemental addendum to the World Values Survey questionnaire for only the seven MENA countries covered here, a direct comparison of responses in these countries to countries in different regions of the world is not possible. However, a policy paper published by the World Bank during the same time period of this survey, "The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World," does provide an opportunity to just briefly discuss how the MENA region compares to the world in terms of its borrowing habits.[197]

The World Bank's report finds that 46.0% of its survey respondents in the Middle East borrowed money during the past year (survey date: 2014).[198] This figure is higher than the 35.2% positive response rate obtained by the World Values Survey for the region on

[197] Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, and Peter Van Oudheusden. The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World (Policy Research Working Paper 7255). World Bank Group. April 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS7255.pdf#page=3
[198] Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, and Peter Van Oudheusden. The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World (Policy Research Working Paper 7255). World Bank Group. April 2015. 48. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS7255.pdf#page=3

its most corresponding question, MN_237A "You/member of your family living with you (over last year) – borrow money." Differences in respondent samples as well as the countries covered in either survey almost certainly have a major effect in these alternate numbers.

Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are the only regions that exceed the borrowing rate found in the Middle East by the World Bank, respectively reporting 54.0% and 47.0%. East Asia and the Pacific (41.0%), Europe and Central Asia (40.0%), High-income OECD economies (40.0%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (33.0%) observe lower rates of borrowing. In regards to the sources of borrowing, the heavy reliance, found by the World Values Survey, of borrowers in the MENA region on family and friends as lenders is likewise confirmed in the World Bank report. With the exception of the OECD, this preference for obtaining loans from family and friends is mirrored in all surveyed regions, where it is the leading source for credit.

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5.7. Performance of education system

The final selection of questions to be covered in this chapter deals with the performance of the formal education system in respondents' countries, with specific respect to whether it builds the skills needed in finding employment, job performance, and business creation. Three questions, MN_249A1–A3, each deal with one of these areas of performance by the education system. Respondents are asked to separately answer "yes" or "no" on each question. For example, MN_249A1 asks whether the respondent agrees that the formal education system in his/her country is providing people with the skills and training they need "to find employment."

The results of MN_249A1–A3 are combined into a single table, shown below. Because of the high number of respondents choosing to answer "Not applicable (no formal education background), "no answer," and "don't know," these responses are included in the table, under "Other."

Table 29. Formal education system provides people with skills/training: …

	MN_249A1. To find employment			MN_249A2. To perform their jobs well			MN_249A3. To start a business		
	Yes	No	Other*	Yes	No	Other*	Yes	No	Other*
TOTAL	46.8%	31.1%	22.1%	45.4%	31.5%	23.1%	36.9%	35.8%	27.2%
Algeria	43.3%	23.5%	33.2%	37.5%	27.3%	35.3%	28.2%	29.5%	42.3%
Iraq	55.4%	27.7%	16.9%	52.9%	27.7%	19.4%	39.1%	35.4%	36.0%
Jordan	50.0%	38.3%	11.6%	52.7%	35.2%	12.2%	50.1%	37.5%	12.4%
Kuwait	63.6%	26.2%	10.2%	54.6%	32.5%	12.9%	35.4%	38.6%	26.0%
Lebanon	34.5%	44.0%	21.5%	42.7%	32.5%	19.7%	36.0%	43.6%	20.4%
Tunisia	41.2%	33.3%	25.5%	40.2%	34.2%	25.7%	36.5%	36.8%	26.6%
Yemen	36.5%	23.7%	39.8%	34.8%	25.4%	39.8%	32.6%	27.6%	39.8%

** "Other" includes the answers choices "Not applicable (DZ, IQ, JO, LB, TN, YE: No formal education)," "No answer," and "Don't know"*

Source, World Values Survey (WVS): Algeria 2014, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

For the MENA region as a whole, similar percentages of respondents answered "yes" on MN_237A1 "To find employment" and MN_237A2 "To perform their jobs well," at 46.8% and 45.4% respectively. On both questions, the highest positive response rate is observed in Kuwait. 63.6% of Kuwaiti respondents agreed that their country's education system was providing sufficient skills and training to find employment, and 54.6% of Kuwaitis agreed that the education system was performing its duties regarding building skills towards job performance. The lowest positive response rate for MN_237A1, at 34.5%, is in Lebanon, and is lower than the portion of Lebanese respondents answering "no," at 44.0%. Yemen has the lowest positive response rate for MN_237A2, at 34.8%.

The positive response rate to MN_237A3 "To start a business" is lower compared to the previous two questions, indicating that the education systems in the countries surveyed tend to do a worse job in preparing students with the skills to start a business relative to other areas of educational performance. The portion of respondents in the MENA region answering "yes" on MN_237A3 is 36.9%. The portion of MENA respondents answering "no" to this question is only just slightly lower, at 35.8%, and in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Tunisia, is higher than the portion answering "yes." In every country except Jordan and Lebanon, MN_237A3 possesses the lowest positive response rate out of the three questions on educational performance. Incidentally, Jordan displays the greatest percentage of respondents agreeing that the education system adequately prepares entrepreneurial skills, at 50.1%.

A notable feature of the results for MN_237A1–A3 is the large portion of responses falling into the "Other" category. A significant percentage of these "other" responses are

from respondents marked as "not applicable," which should be understood as respondents who do not have a formal education (including primary school). Across the region, 13.3% of respondents lack a formal education, with the highest percentage being in Yemen, at 39.8%. The startling number of uneducated Yemeni respondents has the effect of depressing "yes" and "no" responses across the board for Yemen in MN_237A1–A3.

The final graph of this chapter, Figure 11, shows the results of MN_237A1–A3 when the responses "Not applicable (DZ, IQ, JO, LB, TN, YE: No formal education)," "No answer," and "Don't know" are filtered out.

Figure 11. Performance of education system



**This graph excludes respondents selecting answer choices: "Not applicable (DZ, IQ, JO, LB, TN, YE: No formal education)," "No answer," and "Don't know."*

Removing the "Other" responses produces some notable changes in the results, as displayed above. Firstly, this change has an across-the-board inflationary effect on the numbers shown from those recorded in the previous table. Yemen, in particular, gets a major boost, given that it has the highest portion of respondents reporting "Other" in all three questions. Kuwait maintains the highest positive response rate in MN_249A1 "To find employment," at 70.9%, but slips to just below Iraq's 65.7% in MN_249A2 "To perform their jobs well." Jordan maintains its lead position on MN_237A3 "To start a business," with a positive response rate of 57.2%. Meanwhile, Lebanon ranks last on all

three questions, and MN_249A1 and MN_249A3 shows more people answering "no" than "yes."

Either way the results of MN_237A1–A3 are presented, the picture that emerges of educational performance in regards to preparing students for entering the economy is fairly bleak across the MENA region. As a region that is currently experiencing a youth bulge in its demographics, this is particularly bad news. It is widely believed in the appropriate policy circles that a lack of sufficient job opportunities is a major driver for radicalisation, especially among youths: an educational system that fails to adequately prepare its graduates with the skills and training to be success in the job market is not only doing a personal disservice to these graduates but is also subtly creating a risk to national security.

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6. Security

6.1 Introduction

At its most elemental level, the state is an instrument for protecting people from harm. While this definition of the state as well as security is clearly incomplete, it is nevertheless provides a useful point from which to proceed in this chapter. Moreover, despite the narrowness of this definition, governments around the world, including many in the MENA region, fail on this most basic charge of state responsibility. At worst, a nation's government may in fact become the main actor leading efforts to harm and even kill its citizens.

The subject of security is of particular importance to residents of the MENA region. Terrorism, interstate and civil war are a few of the more obvious issues that come to mind when thinking about Middle Eastern security, but there are also the issues of property and violent crime, race, and policing which are perhaps more salient to a Western audience. More recent additions to the canon of what should be considered security issues include the environment, food, and income. Security is thus a potential expansive subject, and not just for the MENA region.

For its purposes, this chapter approaches this subject via two distinct levels: local and state security. Local security encapsulates the aforementioned issues of crime, race, antisocial behaviour, and policing. These are issues of security that virtually any person in every part of the world can expect to deal with in some way in their own personal lives. State security covers the higher-order topics of war and peace. A useful way of thinking about the difference between these two categories is that issues of state security can rise to pose an existential threat to an entire country, whereas crime, for example, can pose an existential threat to an individual's life but very rarely to the continuity of national governments.

The World Values Survey uses a variety of questions to survey thousands of people around the world on their thoughts, opinions, perceptions, and beliefs on local and state security in their countries, in general and in regards to specific issues, from which consolidated local and state security scores can be produced. The results of this survey find that, as a region, conditions of local security in MENA countries are consistent with the rest of the world. On questions over state security, however, the severe problems confronting the MENA region are evident.

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6.2. Local security

Several questions in the survey cover local security. Local security is understood here as issues the average individual may confront in his or her community and in daily life that affect them personally. Within this chapter of the report, local security is covered by questions mostly pertaining to crime as well as general perceptions about safety and security in the respondent's neighbourhood. For the sake of efficiency and also because these topics are either specifically examined or referenced elsewhere in the report, this chapter's discussion of local security does not make use of the much broader concept of "human security," which involves components of economic, food, health, environmental, community/ethnic, and political security in addition to traditional physical security.[199]

The mean responses for V170, V171, V172, V173, V174, V175, and V189 are consolidated to produce a single "local security" score. This score – expressed as a number between 1.0 and 4.0 – provides the scale on the x-axis of the first graph of the chapter "Local and state security: MENA compared to World," which plots the relationship between local and state security for the countries surveyed in Wave 6.

6.2.1. Local security score and its components

V170 "Secure in neighbourhood" asks respondents to describe how secure they feel in their neighbourhood by selecting one of four answer choices. In order to determine the mean response, each choice is assigned a whole number value between 1 and 4. The answer choices, with their assigned numerical values in parentheses, are as follows: "not at all secure" (1); "not very secure" (2); "quite secure" (3); "very secure" (4). The table below shows the data for MENA countries for V170, with the percentage of respondents selecting each choice as well as the mean response.

[199] "Human Development Report 1994." UN Development Programme. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994. Web PDF version. Pgs 24-25. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf

Table 1. Secure in neighbourhood

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very secure (4)	45.5%	28.6%	38.5%	32.1%	66.2%	69.6%
Quite secure (3)	34.4%	56.1%	49.0%	46.5%	27.1%	25.9%
Not very secure (2)	13.0%	13.4%	9.6%	16.3%	5.6%	4.1%
Not at all secure (1)	7.1%	2.0%	2.9%	5.1%	1.2%	0.5%
Mean	3.18	3.12	3.23	3.06	3.59	3.22
(N)	(15,063)	(1,179)	(992)	(1,186)	(1,200)	(1,255)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Very secure (4)	22.2%	55.9%	27.7%	85.2%	59.8%	5.9%
Quite secure (3)	45.2%	29.1%	48.0%	10.4%	32.6%	20.2%
Not very secure (2)	27.0%	12.2%	19.6%	1.7%	4.8%	29.3%
Not at all secure (1)	5.6%	2.8%	4.7%	2.7%	2.7%	44.5%
Mean	2.84	3.38	2.97	3.78	3.49	1.87
(N)	(1,189)	(2,092)	(1,197)	(1,060)	(1,198)	(1,517)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very Secure (4)	61.6%
Quite secure (3)	31.2%
Not very secure (2)	5.8%
Not at all secure (1)	1.4%
Mean	3.53
(N)	(998)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The next five components of the local security score are V171, 172, V173, V174, and V175. These questions all employ the same question frame, asking respondents, "How frequently do the following things occur in your neighbourhood?" V171 asks about "robberies," V172 "alcohol consumed in the streets," V173 " police or military interfere with people's private life," V174 "racist behaviour," and V175 asks about the frequency of "drug sales in the streets." Respondents are asked to characterise the frequency of each of these illegal or antisocial activities by selecting one of four answer choices; as with V170, these choices are assigned a numerical value between 1 and 4.

Answer choices, with their assigned numerical values in parentheses, are as follows: "very frequently" (1); "quite frequently" (2); "not frequently" (3); "not at all frequently"

(4). The table below shows responses to V171 "How frequently do the following things occur in your neighbourhood: Robberies"; inclusion of this table is primarily to show the common format used by V171 through V175.

Table 2. How frequently do the following things occur in your neighbourhood: Robberies

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very frequently (1)	7.8%	6.5%	6.5%	1.8%	7.7%	4.4%
Quite frequently (2)	20.7%	36.8%	24.2%	21.7%	24.2%	18.4%
Not frequently (3)	30.0%	38.6%	31.0%	48.9%	22.8%	28.5%
Not at all frequently (4)	41.5%	18.1%	38.3%	27.6%	45.4%	48.7%
Mean	3.05	2.68	3.01	3.02	3.06	3.22
(N)	(14,917)	(1,158)	(987)	(1,190)	(1,195)	(1,245)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Very frequently (1)	10.3%	4.4%	11.9%	1.7%	8.4%	24.9%
Quite frequently (2)	32.7%	6.3%	18.8%	5.5%	18.1%	28.9%
Not frequently (3)	36.9%	26.1%	31.2%	14.6%	36.3%	22.0%
Not at all frequently (4)	20.1%	63.3%	38.1%	78.3%	37.2%	24.3%
Mean	2.67	3.49	2.96	3.70	3.02	2.46
(N)	(1,174)	(2,084)	(1,196)	(1,059)	(1,192)	(1,445)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very frequently (1)	2.3%
Quite frequently (2)	21.6%
Not frequently (3)	26.3%
Not at all frequently (4)	49.8%
Mean	3.24
(N)	(992)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Figure 1, below, displays the portion of respondents in the 12 MENA countries reporting the frequency of the five illegal or antisocial behaviours considered by V171-175 as "very" or "quite" frequent – the numbers in parentheses respectively correspond to these two answer choices. The colour grading of this chart provides an effective shorthand way for judging each country's relative performance on these particular components of local security, with lighter shading indicating better local security conditions and darker shading indicating worse local security – at least in regards to these five components.

Figure 1. Illegal and antisocial behaviour components of local security



The seventh and final component of the local security score is V189 "In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family: Felt unsafe from crime in your own home." V189 prompts respondents to answer this very question by selecting either "often," "sometimes," "rarely," or "never." V189 narrows respondents' impressions on local security directly to their individual personal life and that of their family. Answer choices, with their assigned numerical values in parentheses, are as follows: "often" (1); "sometimes" (2); "rarely" (3); "never" (4). The table below shows the data for V189.

Table 3. In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family: Felt unsafe from crime in your own home

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Often (1)	6.8%	3.2%	1.9%	6.7%	2.4%	1.9%
Sometimes (2)	13.5%	10.0%	13.2%	22.3%	10.5%	5.6%
Rarely (3)	16.1%	25.0%	19.8%	24.9%	9.8%	12.6%
Never (4)	63.7%	61.7%	65.0%	46.1%	77.2%	79.9%
Mean	3.37	3.45	3.48	3.10	3.62	3.71
(N)	(15,009)	(1,145)	(998)	(1,193)	(1,200)	(1,259)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt

Often (1)	9.1%	9.6%	4.1%	0.4%	3.3%	26.7%
Sometimes (2)	12.9%	15.6%	14.3%	1.6%	7.7%	29.3%
Rarely (3)	16.7%	15.0%	20.1%	2.3%	15.0%	15.6%
Never (4)	61.3%	59.7%	61.6%	95.6%	74.0%	28.4%
Mean	3.30	3.25	3.39	3.93	3.60	2.46
(N)	(1,175)	(2,092)	(1,184)	(1,060)	(1,198)	(1,515)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Often (1)	1.9%
Sometimes (2)	11.4%
Rarely (3)	16.8%
Never (4)	69.9%
Mean	3.55
(N)	(991)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

V170, V171-175, and V189 all employ the same scale for coding responses, with the lowest possible response being 1.0 and the highest possible response being 4.0; responses below 1.0 or above 4.0 are not possible. Hence, the mean response to each question must be a number between 1.0 and 4.0. When considering mean responses, this denotes 2.5 as the mid-point of the scale, signifying a completely neutral mean response. For all seven questions used to produce the local security score, lower numerical values indicate less "security" – in a general sense – and higher values indicate greater security.

To use table "V170. Secure in neighbourhood" as an example, the MENA region mean is 3.18, suggesting that across the region respondents, on average, feel slightly above "quite secure" in their neighbourhoods. Among MENA countries, respondents in Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar demonstrate the highest levels of security in their neighbourhoods, with respective means of 3.59, 3.65, and 3.78. The high reported level of neighbourhood security in each of these countries is fairly unsurprising given their relative political stability and low crime levels.[200] At the low end of the scale, Morocco, Lebanon, and Egypt have the lowest means for reported neighbourhood security, at 2.97, 2.84, and 1.87, respectively. Egypt's deficit of neighbourhood security is particularly striking – well below the MENA region average and below the mid-point of 2.5. Egypt is the only MENA country in which a majority of respondents indicated they felt "not very secure" and "not at all secure." Since the overthrow of Hosni Mukarak in February 2011, Egypt

[200] "2016 Crime and Safety Report(s)" for Jordan, Kuwait, and Qatar. US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Web.
Report for Jordan (March 2016): https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19208
Report for Kuwait (February 2016): https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19057
Report for Qatar (March 2016): https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19398

has been afflicted by sustained civil unrest as well as sporadic sectarian violence. The year this survey was conducted in Egypt, 2012, was a particularly turbulent one – coinciding with the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi.

The next table shows the mean responses for all MENA countries surveyed for V170, V171-175, and V189 as well as the resultant local security score in the very bottom row. Mean responses for the seven questions are averaged to produce a country's local security score. As with each of these questions, a higher local security score corresponds to greater local security and a lower score, less local security. Furthermore, 1.0 would be the lowest local security possible and 4.0 the maximum; 2.5 is the mid-point, indicating local security is equally defined by security and insecurity.

Table 4. Local security

	MENA	Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
V170. Secure in neighbourhood (not at all /very secure)	3.18	3.12	3.23	3.06	3.59	3.65
V171. How frequent: Robberies (very/not at all frequently)	3.05	2.68	3.01	3.02	3.06	3.22
V172. How frequent: Public alcohol consumption (very/not at all frequently)	3.13	2.67	3.54	3.38	3.23	3.50
V173. How frequent: Police or military interference (very/not at all frequently)	3.46	3.26	3.29	3.18	3.74	3.62
V174. How frequent: Racist behaviour (very/not at all frequently)	3.43	3.41	3.55	3.45	3.59	3.42
V175. How frequent: Drug sales in streets (very/not at all frequently)	3.31	2.72	3.76	3.85	3.55	3.72
V189. Felt unsafe from crime in your home (often/never)	3.37	3.45	3.48	3.10	3.62	3.71
Local security	**3.28**	**3.04**	**3.41**	**3.29**	**3.48**	**3.55**

	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar*	Tunisia	Egypt
V170. Secure in neighbourhood (not at all /very secure)	2.84	3.38	2.97	3.78	3.49	1.87
V171. How frequent: Robberies (very/not at all frequently)	2.67	3.49	2.96	3.70	3.02	2.46
V172. How frequent: Public alcohol consumption (very/not at all frequently)	2.68	3.11	2.93	-	2.93	2.86
V173. How frequent: Police or military interference (very/not at all frequently)	3.00	3.66	3.53	3.63	3.38	3.38

V174. How frequent: Racist behaviour (very/not at all frequently)	2.93	3.41	3.39	3.72	3.69	3.20
V175. How frequent: Drug sales in streets (very/not at all frequently)	3.07	3.15	3.05	-	3.48	2.54
V189. Felt unsafe from crime in your home (often/never)	3.30	3.25	3.39	3.93	3.60	2.46
Local security	**2.93**	**3.35**	**3.17**	**3.75***	**3.37**	**2.68**

	Yemen
V170. Secure in neighbourhood (not at all/very secure)	3.53
V171. How frequent: Robberies (very/not at all frequently)	3.24
V172. How frequent: Public alcohol consumption (very/not at all frequently)	3.78
V173. How frequent: Police or military interference (very/not at all frequently)	3.67
V174. How frequent: Racist behaviour	3.47
V175. How frequent: Drug sales in streets (very/not at all frequently)	3.90
V189. Felt unsafe from crime in your home (often/never)	3.55
Local security	**3.59**

**Data for V172 and V175 is not available for Qatar: only 5 local security components used to calculate local security score*

The local security score for the MENA region as a whole is 3.28, suggesting a fair level of local security that is consistent with the global mean of 3.29. MENA countries when ranked in order from lowest to highest local security scores are: Egypt (2.68); Lebanon (2.93); Algeria (3.04); Morocco (3.17); Iraq (3.29); Libya (3.35), Tunisia (3.37); Palestine (3.41); Jordan (3.48); Kuwait (3.55); Yemen (3.59); Qatar (3.78).

On Qatar's local security score, a necessary disclaimer is that this value does not include V172 "How frequent: Public alcohol consumption" and V175 "How frequent: Drug sales in the streets," for which data was not available for Qatari respondents. Despite the lack of data on V172 and V175 for Qatar, the country's first place ranking in the MENA for local security is otherwise consistent with its rankings, relative to all other MENA countries, in the other five components of local security – with the exception of V173 "How frequent: Police or military interference," where Libya (3.66), Yemen (3.67), and Jordan (3.74) all place higher than Qatar (3.63).

Among other countries with particularly high local security scores, Jordan and Kuwait are not particularly surprising, owing to the earlier discussed factors of low crime rates and relative political stability. Jordan's highest absolute mean for all seven components is its mean response to V173, on police or military interference in citizens' private lives, at 3.74; Jordan also places ahead of all other MENA countries on this question. Jordanian respondents' low reported incidence of police and military harassment correlates with their high confidence in these institutions, as seen in V109 "Confidence: The armed forces" and V113 "Confidence: The police," in which 90.9% and 82.5% of respondents, respectively, expressed either "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of confidence. Kuwait's highest absolute mean is for V175 "How frequent: Drug sales in streets," at 3.72. Kuwait enjoys its highest rankings in V170 "Secure in neighbourhood," at 3.65, and V189 "Felt unsafe from crime in your home," at 3.71; placing second to Qatar in both questions.

Yemen's high local security score of 3.59 is particularly unexpected given its reputation as a country devastated by armed conflict and terrorism. If Qatar's local security score, which is based on an incomplete dataset, is excluded from the rankings, Yemen places first among MENA countries with its local security score. Yemen's highest absolute mean is for V175 "How frequent: Drug sales in streets," at 3.9, followed by V172 "How frequent: Public alcohol consumption," at 3.78. These questions are intuitively related, and point to the illegal status of both substances in Yemen as well as Yemeni temperance. The lowest mean for Yemen is for V171 "How frequent: Robberies," at 3.24 – still well above the MENA average of 3.05.

At the other end of the local security spectrum, notably low scores are observed in Algeria (3.04), Lebanon (2.93), and Egypt (2.68). Algeria obtains its lowest absolute means in V171 "How frequent: Robberies," at 2.68, and V172 "How frequent: Public alcohol consumption," at 2.67; Algeria's mean response of 2.67 for V172 is lowest among MENA countries in this question. Algeria's local security score is predominately weighted down by these two questions and V175 "How frequent: Drug sales in streets," which taken altogether address types of criminal activity that constitute routine antisocial behaviour, misdemeanour, and minor felony offences. In the other four components of the local security score – V170, V173, V174, and V189, Algeria does not deviate significantly from MENA averages. Lebanon, on the other hand, does deviate significantly below MENA averages in six of seven local security components, the exception being V189 "Felt unsafe from crime in your home." Lebanon's lowest absolute means are for V171 "How frequent: Robberies," at 2.67, and V172 "How

frequent: Public alcohol consumption," at 2.68 – a result it shares in common with Algeria. Of all MENA countries,

Lebanese respondents report the highest incidence of interference in people's private lives, indicated by the country's mean response to V173 of 3.00, versus the MENA average of 3.46. Lebanon also has the highest portion of respondents who report "racist behaviour" occurring in their communities, with a mean response of 2.93 for V174, versus the MENA average of 3.43. Lebanon's depressed overall responses to V170 and V171-175 and its local security score of 2.93 reflected the fractious quality of Lebanese society, which deeply divided along religious sectarian lines.

The lowest local security score is held by Egypt, at 2.68. Egyptian mean responses for all seven local security components are below the means for the MENA region. In V170 "Secure in neighbourhood" (1.87), V171 "How frequent: Robberies" (2.46), V175 "How frequent: Drug sales in streets" (2.54), and V189 "Felt unsafe from crime in your home" (2.46) Egypt has the lowest mean responses in the MENA region. Moreover, Egyptian means for these four questions are below are almost equal to the mid-point value of 2.50, meaning that on these topics, feelings of insecurity are either greater or equal to feelings of security for Egyptian respondents. Egypt is the only MENA country surveyed to have mean responses that cross below the mid-point of the scales.

As noted earlier, Egyptian society has experienced significant civil, social, and political turbulence since the Arab Spring, which is bound to have exacerbated conditions that promote (or at least do not sufficiently punish) anti-social and criminal behaviour components of local security. Perhaps the most notable result among the seven components of the local security score is the mean Egyptian response for V189, which specifically asks respondents, "In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family felt unsafe from crime in your home?" 56% of Egyptian respondents reported either "often" or "sometimes," generating a mean response of 2.46. The next highest country, in terms of the percentage of respondents selecting these two choices, is Iraq, at 29% and a mean response of 3.1. To frame this a different way: the lack of local security in Egypt is greater than in war-torn Iraq and sufficiently large that more Egyptians report having been afraid of crime within their own homes than those who have not.

6.2.2. Additional factors in local security

In addition to the seven questions that are used to produce the local security score, V176, V177, V178, V179, and V180 are used to survey local security conditions in respondents' countries. These five questions employ a similar simple "yes" or "no" question frame.

Figure 2. Personal experiences with crime in past 12 months



Figure 2 displays the results of the two related questions, V179 "Respondent was victim of crime during last year" and V180 "Respondent's family was victim of a crime during last year. The numbers correspond to the percentage of respondents answering "yes" to these questions. The graph clearly shows how in Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia (9 of the 12 countries covered), the portion of respondents who's family members have been the victim of a crime is greater than the portion of respondents who have personally been a victim of a crime. In Jordan and Egypt, this relationship is reversed, with more respondents being victimised than the number of respondents who report that their families have been crime victims. In Qatar, "yes" responses are equal on both questions, at a very minimal 2%.

The table below shows results for V179 "Respondent was victim of crime during last year," in which respondents in the 12 MENA countries were asked whether they have "been the victim of a crime during the past year."

Table 5. Respondent was victim of crime during last year

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	5.7%	11.2%	3.4%	4.1%	5.6%	5.9%
No	94.3%	88.8%	96.6%	95.9%	94.4%	94.1%
(N)	(14,909)	(1,141)	(986)	(1,190)	(1,200)	(1,207)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	8.5%	5.9%	11.2%	2.1%	1.7%	3.9%
No	91.5%	94.1%	88.8%	97.9%	98.3%	96.1%
(N)	(1,126)	(2,095)	(1,199)	(1,060)	(1,193)	(1,517)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	4.8%
No	95.2%
(N)	(995)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Across the MENA region, 5.7% of respondents report having been a victim of a crime during the past year – slightly below the global average of 7.7%. Countries observing the lowest number of respondents reporting being the victim of a crime are Palestine (3.45), Qatar (2.1%), and Tunisia (1.7%). These countries also have local security scores – Palestine at 3.41, Qatar at 3.75, and Tunisia at 3.37 – above the MENA average of 3.18. Interestingly, the country with the lowest local security score, Egypt, at 2.68, has the fourth lowest percentage of respondents that report having been the victim of a crime, at 3.9%. Moreover, on V189, asking respondents "in the last 12 months, how often have you or your family felt unsafe from crime in your own home?" the mean response for Egyptians is 2.46, indicating a slight majority of respondents answering "often" or "sometimes." Clearly, there is a wide discrepancy between Egyptians' fear of crime and its actual occurrence.

Countries with the highest percentage of respondents reporting being the victim of a crime are Lebanon (8.5%), Algeria (11.2%), and Morocco (11.2%), which also respectively obtained the second, third, and fourth lowest local security scores. At this end of the scale for V179, Kuwait's fourth-place ranking (tied with Libya), at 5.9%, is somewhat surprising and does not correlate with its high local security score of 3.55. To be fair, Kuwait's 5.9% is not far off the MENA average of 5.7% reporting being the victim of a crime.

The next question, V180 "Respondent's family was victim of a crime during last year" is similar to V179, but instead asks the respondent whether any member of his or her immediate family "has been the victim of a crime during the last year?"

Table 6. Respondent's family was victim of a crime during last year

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	8.2%	22.7%	7.3%	10.5%	4.5%	6.9%
No	91.8%	77.3%	92.7%	89.5%	95.5%	93.1%
(N)	(14,822)	(1,104)	(978)	(1,185)	(1,200)	(1,193)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	13.6%	6.6%	12.4%	1.8%	5.2%	3.5%
No	86.4%	93.4%	87.6%	98.2%	94.8%	96.5%
(N)	(1,168)	(2,074)	(1,173)	(1,060)	(1,183)	(1,520)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	5.6%
No	94.4%
(N)	(985)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The number of positive "yes" responses to V180 is greater than in V179, which makes intuitive sense because of the expanded number of potential "victims" V180 necessarily entails. 8.2% of MENA respondents report that during the last year at least one immediate family member was the victim of a crime. This figure is still below the global average of 10.1%.

Egypt again has a low positive reporting rate of 3.5% in response to V180 and is second only to Qatar's 1.8%. Qatar and Egypt respectively have the first and second lowest percentages of respondents confirming family members having been crime victims in the past year. Jordan, at 4.5%, comes third. These three countries are exclusive among the MENA countries surveyed to have lower numbers of respondents answering "yes" to V180 than to V179. This particular quality between the responses to V179 and V180 obviously confounds the logical hypothesis that positive response figures should be higher for V180 versus V179 – a hypothesis supported by all other MENA countries and the region's totals for these questions. The discrepancy observed between this hypothesis and results for Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan could be attributable to a number of factors.

Among them: a survey sample including respondents who are personally more susceptible to crime; unclear instructions to these respondents on who or what constitutes "immediate family"; a disproportionate number of respondents lacking sufficient and/or recent ties to immediate family; a desire among respondents to shield the honour or identity of family members.

At the opposite end of the scale, Morocco (12.4%), Lebanon (13.6%), and Algeria (22.7%) round out the MENA countries with the highest portion of respondents that report having family members being the victim of a crime – a finding that is mostly consistent with these countries' results in V179. Algeria shows a large increase in positive responses from V179 to V180, more than doubling from 11.2% to 22.7%. Other notably large increases are observed in Tunisia, from 1.7% to 5.2%; Palestine, from 3.4% to 7.3%; and Iraq, from 4.1% to 10.5%.

V176, V177, and V178 – displayed in the following three tables – ask respondents about whether they have taken certain measures or actions "for reasons of security," with V176 asking specifically about "didn't carry much money"; V177 "preferred not to go out at night"; V178 "carried a knife, gun, or other weapons."

Table 7. Things done for reasons of security: Didn't carry much money

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	37.2%	45.6%	23.7%	34.7%	18.5%	27.3%
No	62.8%	54.4%	76.3%	65.3%	81.5%	72.7%
(N)	(14,659)	(1,128)	(971)	(1,157)	(1,191)	(1,191)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	40.1%	52.7%	58.5%	11.3%	23.7%	68.0%
No	59.9%	47.3%	41.5%	88.7%	76.3%	32.0%
(N)	(1,059)	(2,074)	(1,149)	(1,059)	(1,189)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	13.3%
No	86.7%
(N)	(968)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Table 8. Things done for reasons of security: Preferred not to go out at night

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	38.5%	42.9%	25.3%	42.5%	14.6%	22.3%
No	59.3%	53.0%	73.0%	55.5%	85.2%	69.5%
No answer	1.4%	4.1%	1.7%	-	0.2%	8.2%
Don´t know	0.8%	-	-	2.0%	-	-
(N)	(15,222)	(1,200)	(1,000)	(1,200)	(1,200)	(1,303)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	41.1%	68.0%	42.1%	12.3%	24.9%	65.0%
No	55.1%	30.6%	55.2%	87.7%	73.8%	35.0%
No answer	-	0.2%	1.4%	-	1.3%	-
Don´t know	3.8%	1.2%	1.2%	-	-	-
(N)	(1,200)	(2,131)	(1,200)	(1,060)	(1,205)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	24.9%
No	74.1%
No answer	-
Don´t know	1.0%
(N)	(1,000)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Table 9. Things done for reasons of security: Carried a knife, gun, or other weapon

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	9.1%	8.7%	3.5%	8.5%	4.4%	7.5%
No	90.9%	91.3%	96.5%	91.5%	95.6%	92.5%
(N)	(14,856)	(1,148)	(983)	(1,171)	(1,197)	(1,203)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	16.7%	21.1%	6.4%	1.4%	4.4%	4.5%
No	83.3%	78.9%	93.6%	98.6%	95.6%	95.5%
(N)	(1,141)	(2,091)	(1,155)	(1,060)	(1,192)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	13.9%
No	86.1%
(N)	(992)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

For V176 "Didn't carry much money" and V177 "Preferred not to go out at night," the percentage of total respondents in the MENA region answering "yes" to both questions is roughly parallel, at 37.2% and 38.5%, respectively. On both questions, Qatar has the lowest percentage of positive responses, with 11.3% for V176 and 12.3% for V177, which matches its low positive response rates in V179 and V180 and its high local security score.

Following Qatar on V176 "Didn't carry much money" are Yemen (13.3%) and Jordan (18.5%). The low portion of respondents stating they have carried less money on their person in these two countries is fairly consistent with the higher-end local security scores observed in both: Yemen at 3.59 and Jordan at 3.62. However, an additional factor that may be influencing V176 results for these countries are the average low earnings of their residents. Yemeni GDP per capita, at $2,700, is the lowest among the MENA countries surveyed, for which data is available; Jordan is third lowest at $10,900.[201] Further support for this hypothesis is provided by Tunisia, which has the fourth lowest GDP per capita among countries surveyed ($11,500) and has the fourth lowest percentage of respondents answering "yes" to V176, at 23.7%.

The interplay of causal factors, such as crime rates, incomes, and overall security conditions, that are responsible for responses to V176 is most likely complex and varied across countries. While Yemen, Jordan, and Tunisia all commonly demonstrate low relative positive response rates for V176 and high local security as well as low GDP per capita, Qatar's leading low positive response rate for V176 is attended by a GDP per capita that is not only the highest in the MENA region but the world, at $132,900.[202] Moreover, in Morocco, which places second to Yemen in terms of having the lowest GDP per capita of countries surveyed, at $8,200, 58.5% of respondents reported carrying less money for reasons of security. The only MENA country with a greater portion of respondents reporting the same is Egypt, with 68%.

On V177 "Preferred not to go out at night," Qatar (12.3%) is followed by Jordan (14.6%), Kuwait (22.3%), and Yemen and Tunisia (24.9% for both) in terms of having the lowest percentages of respondents stating they have preferred not to go out at night for reasons of security. These results are fairly consistent with those observed in V177. Countries with the highest percentages of respondents reporting they have preferred not to go out at night are Algeria (42.9%), Egypt (65%), and Libya (68%). It is worth noting

[201] "Country Comparison: GDP – per capita (PPP)." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
[202] "Country Comparison: GDP – per capita (PPP)." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html

that Iraq has the fourth highest positive response rate at 42.5% - only 0.4% behind Algeria. The high positive response rates in Iraq and especially Libya for V177 should be properly considered in light of deteriorating overall security environments in these countries during the time surveying was conducted, not strictly local security factors. Consider Libya, which achieves a local security score above the MENA average: it is probably not advisable to venture outside one's home during a civil war, regardless of whether your neighbourhood experiences many robberies.

It was noted earlier in this section that there is a wide divergence between Egypt's low local security score (2.68) and respondents' actual personal experience of crime, as reported in V179 "Respondent was victim of crime during last year" and V180 "Respondent's family was victim of a crime during last year," which was found to be well below the MENA average. A possible explanation for this observation may exist in the high portions of Egyptian respondents that reported "carrying less money" and "preferring not to go out at night" in V176 and V177, respectively. Assuming these answers accurately reflect reality, these preventative measures taken by Egyptian residents – driven by their perception of local insecurity – could be effective in reducing their vulnerability to criminal acts. Obviously, this is a speculative hypothesis and is limited to explaining Egypt's particularly discordant local security data.

The third question on measures or actions taken "for reasons of security" is V178 "Carried a knife, gun, or other weapon." Overall, positive response rates tended to be much lower for V178 versus V176 and V177. For the MENA region, 9.1% of respondents indicated "yes" on whether they have "carried a knife, gun, or other weapon" for protection. Countries with the lowest rate of positive responses are Jordan (4.4%), Palestine (3.5%), and Qatar (2.1%): these countries' responses correlate with their high local security scores. However, among countries with the highest portions of respondents that report carrying a weapon for protection, this relationship is less clear.

The highest positive response rates for V178 are observed in Yemen (13.9%), Lebanon (16.7%), and Libya (21.2%). An important factor to consider is the rate of gun ownership for countries at the high end of V178. Using the most extensive dataset available, compiled by the Small Arms Survey, Yemen, Lebanon, and Libya respectively exhibit the first, fourth, and sixth highest rates of gun ownership among MENA countries surveyed (excluding Palestine).[203] At 54.8 firearms/100 people, Yemen, which obtains

[203] "Annex 4: The largest civilian firearms arsenals for 178 countries." *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City*. Small Arms Survey. August 2007. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2007-Chapter-02-annexe-4-EN.pdf
Full report: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-type/yearbook/small-arms-survey-2007.html

the second highest local security score in the MENA region, not only leads the region in gun ownership but comes second globally to the United States' 88.8 firearms/100 people. Also, given the flood of firearms that have poured into Libya and into civilian hands since the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, the 2007 estimated gun ownership figures reported by the Small Arms Survey for Libya probably are not accurate for 2013 levels – when the World Values Survey was conducted there.[204] Hence, responses to V178 are most likely influenced by some interplay of weapons ownership rates and general local and state security factors.

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6.3. State security

Having covered issues of local security, this section now considers state security in the MENA region. As this chapter of the report deals with it, state security is understood to be security that exists across a society as a whole. Like local security, state security has a direct impact on the life of the average citizen. However, unlike local security, issues of state security extend well beyond an individual person's own community or neighbourhood, and have implications for all communities within a particular society.

This is not to say that issues of local security cannot have implications beyond the confines of a particular neighbourhood or across an entire country. For example, race relations are an important national issue in many countries. Furthermore, local security issues, such as crime, drugs, or even race relations, can transcend to become matters of state security if severe enough. Still, for the purposes of this report, issues of state security are limited to interstate war, civil war, and terrorism. In addition to being issues of society-wide consequence, these topics possess an additional set of qualities that define state security as distinct from local. First, interstate and civil war and terrorism are all undeniably and fundamentally political. While they can intersect with politics, components of local security, like petty crime or public intoxication, are not chiefly about politics. Second, state security issues extend not only across a particular society or country, but can – and often do – transcend state boundaries, becoming issues of international security.

A final noteworthy distinction between state and local security is that while both directly impact people's lives, the impact of state security is more often only perceived by the

[204] Reeve, Christopher. "After Decades With Almost No Guns, Almost Every Libyan Household Has One." Mic. 25 February 2014. https://mic.com/articles/83019/after-decades-with-almost-no-guns-almost-every-libyan-household-has-one#.pCBDstoDh

average individual when it is lacking. In other words, a person can determine, with a fair degree of confidence, whether he or she lives in a safe or dangerous neighbourhood. This same person would have a more difficult time making the same determination about whether the country where this neighbourhood is located; that is unless, this country was currently under siege by an armed foreign power or engaged in a vicious civil war. In this case, it is very easy to conclude that one's country is not a safe place.

As defined above, this section of the report examines state security as it is perceived by the people living in the MENA region. This survey's data is necessarily subjective but nonetheless valuable. In considering war and terrorism, the perceptions of average citizens are often neglected as an area of research, despite the fact it is these people that research on the subjects is ultimately serves.

6.3.1. State security score and its components

V183 "Worries: A war involving my country," V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack," and V185 "Worries: A civil war" are used to produce a country's "state security score." The state security score is determined by the same method as the local security score, and uses the same 1.0 to 4.0 scale, with higher scores indicating greater state security and vice versa; 2.5 is the mid-point score.

V183, V184, and V185 employ a common question frame that asks respondents to choose one of four answer choices to characterise "to what degree are you worried about the following situations: 'a war involving my country'/'a terrorist attack'/'a civil war'." The answer choices, with their assigned numerical values in parentheses, are as follows: "very much" (1); "a great deal" (2); "not much" (3); "not at all" (4). Results for V183 are displayed in the following table.

Table 10. Worries: A war involving my country

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very much (1)	55.4%	58.4%	32.8%	38.8%	28.8%	55.7%
A great deal (2)	20.9%	18.9%	33.4%	28.6%	28.4%	17.4%
Not much (3)	13.3%	13.1%	18.6%	24.4%	22.3%	16.1%
Not at all (4)	10.4%	9.6%	15.2%	8.3%	20.5%	10.9%
Mean	1.79	1.74	2.16	2.02	2.35	1.82
(N)	(14,648)	(1,122)	(985)	(1,174)	(1,194)	(1,233)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt

Very much (1)	40.2%	65.4%	42.0%	74.8%	90.6%	59.2%
A great deal (2)	33.4%	15.2%	15.7%	10.7%	6.7%	22.5%
Not much (3)	18.4%	10.0%	13.8%	7.7%	1.9%	11.0%
Not at all (4)	8.0%	9.4%	28.4%	6.8%	0.8%	7.3%
Mean	1.94	1.63	2.28	1.47	1.13	1.66
(N)	(1,166)	(2,051)	(1,023)	(1,060)	(1,187)	(1,475)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very much (1)	68.2%
A great deal (2)	25.8%
Not much (3)	4.2%
Not at all (4)	1.8%
Mean	1.40
(N)	(978)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

55.4% of all MENA respondents indicated they are "very much" worried about "a war involving my country, with a further 20.9% worried "a great deal." Only a combined total of 23.7% of MENA respondents selected "not much" and "not at all" to describe the degree to which they are worried about a war involving their country. This breakdown of results produces a mean response of 1.79 for the region. None of the countries in the MENA region exhibit a mean response for V183 "Worries: A war involving my country" that is above the mid-point of 2.5, indicating that for all countries, feelings of insecurity on the topic of interstate war prevail over feelings of security. In fact, this dominant condition of insecurity is observed in all MENA countries in the following questions, V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack" and V185 "Worries: A civil war," which are used to produce the state security score. V184 is shown in the below table.

Table 11. Worries: A terrorist attack

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Very much (1)	56.3%	60.6%	27.6%	49.0%	27.8%	53.2%
A great deal (2)	19.3%	18.0%	25.2%	31.9%	26.4%	12.7%
Not much (3)	12.6%	11.5%	25.1%	13.4%	22.7%	18.4%
Not at all (4)	11.9%	9.9%	22.1%	5.7%	23.1%	15.8%
Mean	1.80	1.71	2.42	1.76	2.41	1.97
(N)	(14,695)	(1,131)	(977)	(1,195)	(1,195)	(1,237)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Very much (1)	41.7%	71.3%	43.8%	71.9%	92.3%	54.3%
A great deal (2)	32.2%	12.7%	14.4%	10.7%	5.4%	23.9%
Not much (3)	16.3%	7.5%	12.3%	8.4%	1.9%	10.7%

Not at all (4)	9.8%	8.5%	29.5%	9.0%	0.3%	11.1%
Mean	1.94	1.63	2.28	1.47	1.10	1.79
(N)	(1,176)	(2,059)	(1,032)	(1,059)	(1,193)	(1,466)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Very much (1)	68.6%
A great deal (2)	21.8%
Not much (3)	7.4%
Not at all (4)	2.2%
Mean	1.43
(N)	(975)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The mean response to V184 for the MENA region is 1.80 – highly consistent with the mean of 1.79 for V183. Again, similar to worries about interstate war, all countries demonstrate feelings of insecurity prevailing over feelings of security on the topic of terrorism. The third and final table shows results for V185 "Worries: A civil war." Respondents from Kuwait and Qatar were not available for this question.

Table 12. Worries: A civil war

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon
Very much (1)	55.6%	57.0%	30.7%	42.2%	25.9%	43.0%
A great deal (2)	19.7%	18.6%	27.2%	24.2%	25.9%	28.2%
Not much (3)	12.6%	14.6%	22.5%	23.7%	20.9%	20.4%
Not at all (4)	12.0%	9.9%	19.6%	9.9%	27.3%	8.3%
Mean	1.81	1.78	2.31	2.01	2.50	1.94
(N)	(12,381)	(1,120)	(978)	(1,169)	(1,195)	(1,179)

	Country Code				
	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen
Very much (1)	75.5%	41.3%	92.2%	59.6%	69.2%
A great deal (2)	9.3%	13.9%	5.5%	27.7%	23.6%
Not much (3)	6.6%	10.6%	1.8%	6.9%	4.8%
Not at all (4)	8.6%	34.3%	0.6%	5.8%	2.4%
Mean	1.48	2.38	1.11	1.59	1.40
(N)	(2,062)	(1,018)	(1,192)	(1,488)	(980)

Selected samples: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The MENA region mean for V185 is 1.81. Among high and low country mean responses for V183 "Worries: A war involving my country," V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack," and V185 "Worries: A civil war," there is notable consistency. Countries that have high mean responses for all three questions – indicating relatively greater feelings of state security – are Jordan, Morocco, and Palestine. Of the countries surveyed, Jordan obtains the highest average responses in the MENA for V183 and V185, at 2.35 and 2.50, respectively. Jordan is virtually tied with Palestine on V184, with Jordan scoring a mean response of 2.41, compared to Palestine's 2.42.

As it was earlier noted in this chapter, Jordanian respondents report high confidence in their state security services, as measured in V109 "Confidence: The armed forces" and V113 "Confidence: The police," at 90.9% and 82.5%, respectively. These figures are well above confidence levels for the MENA region as a whole, with 64.3% of MENA respondents expressing confidence in the armed forces and 60.9% for the police. Furthermore, Jordan's intelligence service, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) – commonly known by its Arabic name, "mukhabarat," is regarded as "one of most important and professional intelligence agencies in the region."[205]

Confidence in state security institutions is most likely not an important causal factor for Palestinians' higher relative feelings of state security, as Palestine largely lacks these institutions to begin with. Interstate and civil war as well as terrorism are most likely not the central issues in regards to "state security" for Palestinian respondents; these issues are instead refracted through the lens of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It would be fair to argue that Palestinian Arabs have not fared particularly well across the almost seven decades that have passed since the formal establishment of the State of Israel, especially in terms of political rights. Palestinians remain a people disposed of sovereign nation state. However, this history of a common struggle – as well as the resultant lack of a Palestinian state and political rights – has fostered a strong sense of solidarity among the Palestinian people. National solidarity among Palestinians probably plays an important role in their responses to V185 "Worries: A civil war." On V183 "Worries: A war involving my country" and V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack," Palestine's higher-than-regional means are probably heavily influenced by the fact that Palestinian have become relatively de-sensitised to acts of Palestinian terrorism against Israeli targets and the inevitable Israeli retaliation that follows.

Libya, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen consistently demonstrate the lowest means for V183, V184, and V185, with Tunisia possessing the lowest means in all three questions. Over

[205] "Jordan 2016 Crime and Safety Report." US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Bureau of Diplomatic Security. March 2016. Web. https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=19208

90% of Tunisian respondents selected "very much" to describe the degree to which they are varyingly worried about interstate war, terrorism, and civil war. Although Tunisia is the only Arab country to have made a full and successful democratic transition as a result of the Arab Spring, the country faces high levels of insecurity and jihadi terrorism and is furthermore subject to the security vacuum in neighbouring Libya. The year in which this survey was conducted in Tunisia, 2013, was a particularly turbulent year for the country: several high-level assassinations, protests, and political assassinations eventually gave way to the passage a new constitution in January 2014.

While the high levels of insecurity reported by Libyan and Yemeni respondents to V183, V184, and V185 are not unexpected, Qatari results for V183 "Worries: A war involving my country" and V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack" are somewhat surprising. Qatar has a mean of 1.47 for V183 – placing third lowest to Yemen (1.40) and Tunisia (1.13) – and a mean of 1.55 for V184 – fourth lowest after Libya (1.53), Yemen (1.43), and Tunisia (1.10). Data on V185 "Worries: A civil war" is not available for Qatar. Qatari responses on these components of state security stand in stark contrast to the country's local security score of 3.75 – the highest in the MENA – as well as the high levels of confidence Qatari respondents report having in their armed forces (V109) and police (V113), which are also the highest in the region. Just as a significant gap was observed in Egyptian local security data, between respondents' self-reported perceptions of crime and its actual occurrence, a similar dynamic may shape Qatari perceptions of state security – which deviate from the country's high level of local security and reputation for political stability.

The table below shows the mean responses for MENA countries for V183, V184, and V185 and each country's state security score, which is determined from these three figures.

Table 13: State security

	MENA	Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait*
V183. Worries: A war involving my country (very much/not at all)	1.79	1.74	2.16	2.02	2.35	1.82
V184. Worries: A terrorist attack (very much/not at all)	1.80	1.71	2.42	1.76	2.41	1.97
V185. Worries: A civil war (very much/not at all)	1.81	1.78	2.31	2.01	2.50	-
State Security	**1.80**	**1.74**	**2.30**	**1.93**	**2.42**	**1.90***

	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar*	Tunisia	Egypt
V183. Worries: A war involving my country (very much/not at all)	1.94	1.63	2.28	1.47	1.13	1.66
V184. Worries: A terrorist attack (very much/not at all)	1.94	1.53	2.28	1.55	1.10	1.79
V185. Worries: A civil war (very much/not at all)	1.94	1.48	2.38	-	1.11	1.59
State Security	**1.94**	**1.55**	**2.31**	**1.51***	**1.11**	**1.68**

	Yemen
V183. Worries: A war involving my country (very much/not at all)	1.40
V184. Worries: A terrorist attack (very much/not at all)	1.43
V185. Worries: A civil war (very much/not at all)	1.40
State Security	**1.41**

**Data for V185 is not available for Kuwait and Qatar; only 2 state security components used to calculate State Security score*

The state security score for the MENA region as a whole is 1.80, indicative of the region's decisive lack of security with relation to the risks of terrorism and interstate and civil war. For these components of state security, a total state security score of 1.80 can be understood to denote an average response that is between being worried "very much" and "a great deal."

Countries that score highest for state security in the MENA region are Palestine (2.30), Morocco (2.31), and Jordan (2.42). No country in the MENA region obtains a state security score greater than the mid-point value of 2.5; this means that in every MENA country, a majority of respondents report feeling insecure, in terms of state security

issues, versus feelings of security. Countries that score lowest in state security are Qatar (1.51), Yemen (1.41), and Tunisia (1.11). It must be noted, however, that the state security score for Qatar, as well as Kuwait, does not include data for V185 "Worries: A civil war." If these two countries are excluded, Libya takes Qatar's place of having the third lowest state security score in the MENA region. At the high and low ends of state security scores, countries' relative positions in this score are fairly consistent with rankings of mean responses for V183, V184, V185. To illustrate, Tunisia possesses the lowest state security score among the countries surveyed and has the lowest relative means in all three components of the state security score.

Overall, each country's mean responses for the three components of state security – anxieties about "a war involving my country," "a terrorist attack," and "a civil war" – demonstrate little significant deviation. In fact, Lebanon shows mean responses of 1.94 for all questions. The greatest deviation between mean responses to V183, V184, and V185 is observed in Iraq and Palestine, which both have a difference of 0.26 between their highest and lowest mean responses.

Iraq's state security score of 1.93 is above the MENA average of 1.80 and is deserving of some specific mention, given prevailing perceptions on the country's distinct lack of security in this area. On V183 "Worries: A war involving my country" and V185 "Worries: A civil war," Iraq displays virtually equivalent mean responses of 2.02 and 2.01, respectively; these values are greater than MENA averages. Among the three state security components, Iraq's lowest mean is 1.76 for V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack," in which Iraq scores just slightly below the MENA average of 1.80. Similar to the high relative mean responses observed in Palestine, a casual explanation for Iraq's state security score and V183, V184, and V185 mean responses being higher than the MENA average may be that Iraqis have become modestly de-sensitised to political violence and the risks of war and terrorism. It is also worth noting that this survey's data for Iraq is from 2013, before the lightning advance of ISIS across the country in 2014.

The last figure in this section is displayed below, Figure 3 "What do people in the region?" This chart displays the portion of respondents stating they are worried "very much" and "a great deal" (the numbers in parentheses correspond respectively to these answer choices) on V183 "Worries: A war involving my country," V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack," and V185 "Worries: A civil war," as well as the remaining three questions in this battery: V181 "Worries: Losing my job or not finding a job," V182 "Worries: Not being able to give one's children a good education," and V186 "Worries: Government wire-tapping or reading my mail or email."

Figure 3. What do people in the MENA region worry about?



The data presented in Figure 3 makes clear just how visceral and widespread fears of war and terrorism are in the MENA region. In all 12 countries, people are at least as worried about their country experiencing a civil or interstate war, or terrorist attack as they are about either losing their job or their children not receiving a good education – if not more. Concerns about government surveillance of citizens' private communications are high in the MENA, but trail fairly well behind worries on the other six factors in this battery.

To see just how unusual the MENA region is in regards to what keeps its residents up at night, consider Sweden. Swedish results on V181-186 break down as follows:

- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "losing job": 29.2%
- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "children education": 25.4%
- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "war": 11.3%
- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "terrorism": 22.5%
- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "civil war": 6.9%
- Worried "very much"/"a great deal" about "wire-tapping": 17.5%

Ignoring the fact that Swedish numbers are much lower across the board than the corresponding figures for the MENA region, concerns about the country being involved in an interstate or civil war rank significantly lower in the minds of Swedes than concerns about their job security and their children's education. Fear of terrorism is roughly comparable but still lower than fear of losing one's job or not being able to provide one's children with good schooling. Finally, worries about government surveillance are higher in Sweden in relative terms than they are in MENA countries. For most people living in Sweden – and prosperous, politically countries in general – the loss of one's job or the failure of one's children to receive a proper education present a more immediate and tangible threat to their personal life. War is a more abstract concern: something that is fought by other people and far away from home. In the MENA region, these threats are all equally elevated in terms of the real damage they can do in a person's life.

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6.4. Plotting local and state security

To recap thus far, this chapter has explained the process by which a measure can be taken on the perceived levels of local and state security within a given surveyed country. Each country's local security score is determined based on responses to V170, V171-175, and V189; the state security score is similarly determined from the responses to V183, V184, and V185. Both local and state security scores are presented as numbers between 1.0 and 4.0, with mid-point values of 2.5. For both, 1.0 represents the minimum possible value, and 4.0 the maximum.

Scores below the mid-point of 2.5 indicated conditions of local/state security in which perceptions of insecurity prevail over perceptions of security. Likewise, scores above 2.5 indicate local/state security conditions where perceptions of security prevail over those of insecurity. Taken together, higher values for local and state security indicate greater local and state security.

By plotting MENA countries' local and state security scores together, some idea of the complete security terrain of the region emerges. Figure 4 shows the local (x-axis) and state (y-axis) security scores for the 12 MENA countries surveyed and the region as a whole.

Figure 4. Local and state security (MENA only)



**Incomplete data for local and state security scores for Kuwait and Qatar. No data on V172 and V175 (local security components) for Qatar; no data on V185 (state security component) for Kuwait and Qatar.*

A zero-to-slightly-negative correlation exists between local and state security for the MENA region, indicating that increased perceptions of local security are not accompanied by improved perceptions of state security, and for some countries are in fact, inversely related. This near-zero/slightly-negative correlation suggests that, for at least the MENA region, security conditions in these countries should be considered on a case-by case basis.

Local and state security scores (MENA only)

	Local security score	State security score
MENA	3.28	1.80
Algeria	3.04	1.74
Palestine	3.41	2.30
Iraq	3.29	1.93
Jordan	3.48	2.42
Kuwait*	3.55	1.90
Lebanon	2.93	1.94
Libya	3.35	1.55
Morocco	3.17	2.31
Qatar*	3.75	1.51
Tunisia	3.37	1.11
Egypt	2.68	1.68
Yemen	3.59	1.41

**Incomplete data for local and state security scores for Kuwait and Qatar. No data on V172 and V175 (local security components) for Qatar; no data on V185 (state security component) for Kuwait and Qatar.*

For a country like Egypt, which has the lowest local security score (2.68) in the region as well as the world, it does make some intuitive sense that perceptions of state security are also low. A state that cannot provide adequate security in one's own neighbourhood is unlikely to inspire much confidence in its handling of issues of war and peace. According to this line of thinking, improved local security conditions ought to suggest greater confidence in the state's ability to protect its citizens from war and terrorism. With its MENA-leading state security score of 2.42 and fourth-highest local security score of 3.48, Jordan fits into this explanation.

Obviously, this hypothesised positive relationship between local and state security does not exist at least within the MENA region. Qatar's region-leading local security score of 3.75 earns it a state security score of 1.51, which is below the MENA average of 1.80 and third lowest in the entire region.

Qatar is a very wealthy country, with the highest GDP per capita in the world, and is able to spend amply on its national and civil defence.[206] It moreover enjoys the relative luxury of political stability and as the results of this survey would indicate, high levels of local security. That Qatari respondents would report a high incidence of worries about their country being involved in a war (V183) and terrorism (V184) suggests they view issues of local and state security as separable. The near-zero correlation between these factors observed in Figure 4 supports a similar conclusion for the MENA region as a whole.

6.4.1. Local and state security, MENA compared to World

Figure 5 plots the local and state security scores for all countries in the world surveyed, in the same fashion as Figure 4, with local security on the x-axis and state security on the y-axis. 10 of the 12 MENA countries surveyed are included in the graph, marked with red – as are the non-MENA Muslim-majority countries. Kuwait and Qatar are not plotted on the below graph because they lack data for some of the components used to calculate the local and state security scores.

[206] "Country Comparison: GDP – per capita (PPP)." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html

Figure 5. MENA to World: Local and state security



When plotted for all countries, a modest positive correlation between local and state security can be observed. No country possesses a local security score below the mid-point value of 2.5, indicating that respondents' feelings of local security outweigh feelings of insecurity in all countries. MENA countries are well-distributed, from the low end with Egypt at 2.68 – the lowest score of any country surveyed – to Yemen at 3.59. Yemen's local security score of 3.59 is comparable to that of the Netherlands (3.58), Poland (3.59), as well as Germany (3.60) – a result that is all the more remarkable given its reputation as a jihadist safe haven and deeply impoverished nation.

Although it is not included in Figure 5, Qatar's local security score of 3.75 would place just behind Georgia (3.82) at the high end of scoring. Perhaps surprisingly, several MENA countries outperform their more developed and Western peers on local security. Qatar (3.75), Yemen (3.59), Kuwait (3.55), Jordan (3.48), and Palestine (3.41) possess local security scores (in parentheses) greater than the United States' score of 3.37; Tunisia is tied with the United States. The table below further illustrates the MENA region's almost perfect correspondence with the world average for local security, with respective mean scores of 3.28 and 3.29.

Table 14. Local and state security MENA, Non-MENA, West, & World

	Local security score	State security score
MENA*	3.28	1.80
Non-MENA	3.29	2.23
West†	3.46	2.92
World	3.29	2.16

**"MENA" includes all 12 MENA countries covered in the report, including Qatar and Kuwait, for which provisional local and state security scores are used in conjunction with the complete scores of the 10 other MENA countries*
†"West" includes the following countries: Australia, Cyprus, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and United States

However, while this table demonstrates that MENA countries are relatively unremarkable in regards to local security, it also shows that the region deviates significantly below the rest of the world on state security. The state security score for the MENA region is 1.80, compared to 2.16 for the world and 2.23 for all non-MENA countries. It is worth highlighting the contrast between the zero-to-slightly-negative correlation when plotting local and state security for only MENA countries (Figure 4) and the positive correlation when plotting these variables for all countries (Figure 5).

As mentioned in the previous section, concerns about war and terrorism – the components of the state security score – are uniform across various Middle Eastern states, with low to high local security scores, producing the near-zero correlation in Figure 4. The MENA country achieving the highest state security score of 2.42, Jordan, is roughly comparable in this metric to Cyprus (2.37), China (2.47), and Spain (2.43). At 1.11, Tunisia score lowest, on state security, not only in the MENA region but also the entire world; Rwanda, at 1.16, is a close second.

Overall, state security scores across the world tend to be depressed when compared to countries' corresponding local security scores – some dramatically so. The global state security score of 2.16 is well below the mid-point value of 2.5, indicating that for the world, on average, feelings of state insecurity prevail over feelings of security. It is worth noting the state security scale formulated by the World Values Survey is not a measure of real security capability or threat level, but is based on the respondent sentiment. Nevertheless, the individual scores generally track with might be expected in the realm of state security: for example, the distinct lack of state security in the MENA region, whereas Western countries achieve the highest scores.

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7. Violence

7.1. Introduction

The topic of violence plays a large role in life and politics in the MENA region. This chapter of the report examines the perceptions of this region's inhabitants in relation to violence: whether it is justifiable to achieve one's ends, in domestic settings, or for the state to use. Of particular relevance to the MENA region, is the relationship of violence and religion. MENA countries are some of the most religious in the world, and the proposition that there is some inherently violent or violence-justifying element to the Islamic faith of their populations has become an increasingly frequent refrain in contemporary times.

On the straightforward question put to the survey's respondents of whether they believe the use of violence against other people is justifiable, the MENA region was found to correlate perfectly with the global average. 67.3% of MENA respondents answered that violence towards others is "never justifiable"; 67.7% of all respondents from across the world agreed. Moreover, the Muslim world– including the MENA region and countries such as Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Turkey – is slightly less amenable to justifying violence against other people as the rest of the world taken together.

While MENA countries are consistent with other parts of the world on the abstract question of the justifiability of violence against others, responses diverge on specific applications of the principle embedded in this question: namely, whether it is justifiable for a man to hit his wife; for parents to beat their children; if war (the state use of violence) is sometimes necessary to obtain justice. On these questions, MENA respondents typically answered above the global averages, and also expressed more favorable opinions than their responses to whether violence against others is justified. This result suggests that some respondents in each question do not view these acts as falling under the purview of "violence against other people."

Finally, when crossing indicators of religious faith with attitudes on the justifiability of violence, negative correlation was observed for MENA countries, between increased faith and increased agreement that violence against other people is justifiable. MENA respondents who indicated that religion is an important part of their lives were less likely to believe that violence against others is justifiable, whereas the opposite was true of respondents that indicated they were not particularly religious. This finding may have

important implications for counter-radicalization and counterterrorism policy as it pertains to the MENA region.[207]

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7.2. Justifiability of violence, MENA compared to the World

The table below shows how the MENA region's responses to V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" compare to averages for the world, non-MENA Muslim countries, all Muslim countries (MENA plus non-MENA), and all non-Muslim countries, as well as the United States and Sweden. The question asks the respondent to select a single number between 1 and 10, with 1 meaning "never justifiable" and 10 meaning "always justifiable," in response to whether he or she believes violence against other people is justifiable.

Table 1. Justifiable: Violence against other people Global comparisons

	Number of respondents (N)	Mean	1 (Never justifiable)	2-4	5-6	7-9	10 (Always justifiable)
MENA	14,904	1.98	67.3%	21.4%	7.4%	3.0%	1.0%
World	83,653	1.98	67.7%	21.0%	6.5%	3.5%	1.3%
Other Muslim	11,368	1.77	71.7%	20.3%	4.9%	2.4%	0.8%
All Muslim	26,266	1.89	69.2%	20.9%	6.3%	2.8%	0.9%
All Non-Muslim	57,387	2.02	67.0%	21.0%	6.7%	3.7%	1.5%
US	2,171	2.12	66.3%	17.7%	10.9%	3.6%	1.5%
Sweden	1,183	2.18	63.2%	22.6%	8.6%	3.6%	2.1%

**"Other Muslim" includes Nigeria, which is 50% Muslim, 40% Christian, and 10% indigenous beliefs, according to the most recent CIA World Factbook figures.*[208]

The data shows that the MENA region's attitude toward the justifiability of violence against other people, with a mean of 1.98 (/10) is consistent with the world mean of 1.98. Moreover, Muslim-majority countries as whole, at 1.89, are slightly below averages of both the world and non-Muslim countries, at 1.98 and 2.02 respectively. 67.3% of MENA respondents believe that violence against other people is "never justified."

[207] Puranen, Bi. & Welander, Frej., "Profiling Violent Actions Through Values – an analysis of the mindset of people justifying violence, MENA region in comparison" Proceedings, ATA Science for Peace and security Programme, Jordan, Dead Sea, November 21-23 2016.
[208] "Nigeria." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 10 November 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html

Compare this number to pacifist Sweden, which is 4.1. percentage points lower in its belief that violence against others is "never justified," at 63.2%.

These results might seem counterintuitive, given reputation the MENA region has for political turbulence, terrorism, civil conflict, and war. However, these factors are probably responsible for tempering MENA respondents' views on the justifiability of using violence against others. Unlike respondents in Sweden or the United States, for example, this issue is not an abstract question for many residents of the MENA region. Finally, the lower than world average for all Muslim countries taken as a whole, at 1.77, provides evidences against arguments that Islamic countries are fundamentally more violent than their non-Muslim counterparts, which are in fact slightly above the global mean, at 2.02.

The next tables show MENA versus non-MENA and world average results for V208 "Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife" and V209 "Justifiable: Parents beating children." These questions survey respondents' attitudes on the justifiability of more narrowly defined uses of violence, specifically in the home. They employ the same 1-to-10 point scale as V210.

Table 2. Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife – Global comparisons

	Number of respondents (N)	Mean	1 (Never justifiable)	2-4	5-6	7-9	10 (Always justifiable)
MENA	14,940	2.45	57.9%	23.7%	19.9%	5.5%	1.8%
Non-MENA	68,744	1.99	70.1%	18.0%	6.7%	3.8%	1.4%
World	83,684	2.07	67.9%	19.0%	7.4%	3.2%	1.5%

Table 3. Justifiable: Parents beating children – Global comparisons

	Number of respondents (N)	Mean	1 (Never justifiable)	2-4	5-6	7-9	10 (Always justifiable)
MENA	14,959	3.45	38.8%	35.6%	19.9%	11.3%	3.4%
Non-MENA	68,730	2.79	54.3%	27.7%	20.6%	9.1%	2.7%
World	83,689	2.91	51.5%	22.4%	13.8%	9.5%	2.9%

The divergence of MENA respondents from the world average in V208 and V209 is notable, especially given the consistency of these respondents in V210. Overall, the means for the MENA, non-MENA countries, and the world increase in response to

whether respondents believe it is justifiable for a man to beat his wife and for parents to beat their children in comparison to respondents' beliefs on whether using violence against others is justified. The means for the MENA region for V208 and V209, in particular, experience a significant increase from the mean in V210: this phenomenon is discussed in detail later in the report.

Whereas the world average response to V208 "Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife" is 2.07, the MENA region mean is 2.45; the non-MENA mean is 1.99. The MENA region's divergence from world and non-MENA averages most likely indicates that MENA countries are more patriarchal societies. The divergence between MENA and global figures is even more pronounced in V209 "Justifiable: Parents beating children." For V209, the world mean is 2.91, the non-MENA mean is 2.79, and the MENA mean is 3.45. This most likely indicates that MENA respondents hold more traditional views on child-rearing, which includes corporal punishment.

The final table below compares the MENA region to non-MENA countries and the world in response to V187, which asks whether the respondent "agrees" or "disagrees" that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice.

Table 4. Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice

	Number of respondents (N)	Agree	Disagree
MENA	14,219	46.3%	53.7 %
Non-MENA	65,807	31.6%	68.4%
World	80,027	34.2%	65.8%

MENA respondents are notably more agreeable to the proposition that war, or the use of the military force, is sometimes necessary to the pursuit of justice than respondents in the rest of the world. A useful way to characterize the relationship between V187 "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice" and V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" is that V210 asks respondents about their attitudes about violence in the abstract, while V187 offers respondents a more concrete and narrowly-defined area to decipher their views on violence – similar to V208 and V209.

Answers to V187 are likely heavily influenced by the role of the military and martial culture in a respondent's society, as well as the country's historical relationship with the use of state violence. In many MENA countries, the military exerts a large presence in political, economic, and social affairs and is frequently the most trusted of state

institutions. In Egypt, which has the highest percentage of respondents agreeing with the proposition of V187, the dominant political actor is and has been the military throughout the country's modern history. Additionally, in non-democratic societies – which the majority of MENA countries are – violent means may be perceived as one of the few options available to citizens for pursuing change.

Considering some specific countries and regions' attitudes on V187 appears to support the hypothesized relationship between responses and the role of the military and military history. Former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries have the lowest percentage of respondents agreeing with V187, at 18.9%. Citizens of these countries endured state-sponsored violence by communist regimes, and moreover, countries in Eastern Europe deposed these regimes through largely non-violent means – demonstrating that in some cases, war *is not* necessary to obtain justice. The former Warsaw Pact is followed by Latin America, where only 20.3% of respondent agreed with V187. Citizens of these countries likewise experienced harsh military regimes during the Cold War as well as guerrilla warfare. The two countries with the largest percentage of respondents agreeing that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice" are Pakistan (83.7%) and the United States (73.0%). The United States, in particular, is a country where the military commands a high level of public respect and whose foreign policy assertively reflects this principle.

7.2.1. Violence against other people, in MENA

The table below shows answers to V210 of the questionnaire, which asks respondents' attitudes on whether violence against other people is never justified, always justified, or something in between. Respondents indicate their opinion by selecting a value from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning "never justifiable" and 10 meaning "always justifiable." Across the MENA region as a whole, 67.3% of respondents indicated they believed that violence against others is "never justified," while on the opposite side of the scale, 1.0% indicated "always justifiable." Mid-range answers, numbers 5 and 6, consisted of 7.4% of respondents and can be properly understood to indicate an ambivalent attitude towards the justifiability of using violence against others. The mean answer choice for the region is 1.98.

Table 5. Justifiable: Violence against other people

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Never justifiable	67.3%	51.7%	60.2%	49.1%	79.2%	63.6%
2	10.2%	10.6%	12.9%	23.6%	9.5%	10.8%
3	6.6%	8.2%	8.7%	11.0%	4.8%	7.2%
4	4.6%	6.2%	7.4%	7.7%	3.0%	4.2%
5	5.2%	10.6%	5.4%	4.7%	1.8%	6.6%
6	2.2%	5.1%	2.3%	2.2%	0.9%	2.5%
7	1.6%	2.5%	1.5%	1.2%	0.3%	1.8%
8	0.9%	1.8%	0.7%	0.3%	0.3%	0.8%
9	0.5%	0.9%	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%
Always justifiable	1.0%	2.4%	0.7%	0.1%	-	1.9%
(N)	(14,904)	(1,139)	(990)	(1,195)	(1,200)	(1,258)
Mean	1.98	2.70	2.07	2.10	1.45	2.15
Standard Deviation	1.83	2.32	1.74	1.49	1.12	2.02
Base mean	(14,904)	(1,139)	(990)	(1,195)	(1,200)	(1,258)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Never justifiable	54.7%	74.1%	87.3%	80.7%	81.5%	53.4%
2	9.4%	6.1%	6.1%	4.2%	5.0%	15.8%
3	6.8%	5.2%	2.4%	3.7%	3.9%	10.4%
4	6.7%	4.7%	1.0%	1.6%	2.4%	6.1%
5	7.7%	4.3%	1.8%	4.4%	3.5%	7.4%
6	5.2%	1.2%	0.6%	1.8%	1.4%	2.1%
7	4.5%	1.8%	0.3%	1.9%	0.7%	1.7%
8	2.5%	0.9%	0.1%	0.8%	0.6%	1.0%
9	1.8%	0.5%	0.1%	0.4%	0.1%	0.7%
Always justifiable	0.8%	1.3%	0.3%	0.6%	1.0%	1.3%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,069)	(1,144)	(1,059)	(1,186)	(1,523)
Mean	2.65	1.86	1.30	1.68	1.59	2.30
Standard Deviation	2.31	1.84	1.01	1.67	1.55	1.94
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,069)	(1,144)	(1,059)	(1,186)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Never justifiable	73.0%
2	8.6%
3	6.3%
4	3.4%
5	3.9%
6	1.3%
7	1.1%
8	0.7%
9	1.0%
Always justifiable	0.7%
(N)	(940)
Mean	1.79
Standard Deviation	1.71
Base mean	(940)

Source, WVS 6th wave: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

The mean response for the MENA region on whether violence against other people is justifiable is 1.98. MENA countries surveyed were fairly consistent in the very low percentages of respondents believing that violence against others is "always justified," ranging from virtually non-existent in Iraq (0.1%) and Jordan (-), to 2.4% in Algeria at the high end. More significant variation is seen at the opposite end of the scale, where respondents indicate they believe violence against is "never justified."

Countries that deviate significantly below the region's mean of 1.98 are Jordan (1.45), Morocco (1.30), Qatar (1.68), Tunisia (1.59), and Yemen (1.79). With the exception of Yemen, these countries are relatively stable and have reputations for governments that enjoy popular legitimacy. Violence-averse attitudes in these countries may be influenced by citizens' trust in their public institutions. Trust in institutions can preclude dispositions that justify the use of violence via two pathways: first, citizens will resort to institutions like the courts and police to settle interpersonal disputes; second, citizens believe they would be punished for criminal violent acts.

Countries that deviate significantly above the mean for V210 – indicating greater numbers of respondents may believe there are scenarios in which violence may in fact be justified – include Algeria (2.70), Iraq (2.10), Kuwait (2.15), Lebanon (2.65), and Egypt (2.30). Explanations for these deviations are probably country-specific. Modern Algeria is the product of its brutal war of independence from France and a more recent and equally bloody civil war from 1991 to 2002. The occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi forces during the First Gulf War was only reversed by a large military intervention. Iraq is defined by sectarianism, engendering distrust of state institutions to settle interpersonal disputes, and has been subject to armed conflict and civil violence for almost two decades now. Likewise, Lebanon's demographics and politics are decisively sectarian. And, in Egypt, public confidence in public institutions is low. This particular analysis does create questions worth considering. For example, assuming the Algerian experience of civil war at least partially explains its more accommodative view on the justifiability of violence against others, why then does Libya, which is presently engaged in its own civil war, show an average response to V210, at 1.86, that is below the mean for the MENA region?

7.2.2. Violence in the home, in MENA

V208 "Is it justifiable for a man to beat his wife?" and V209 "Is it justifiable for parents to beat their children" narrow the respondents' beliefs on the permissibility of using violence to the domicile. The questions employ the same 10-point scale as V210 (violence against others). Tables displaying the results are provided below.

Table 6. Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Never justifiable	57.9%	40.6%	55.6%	34.9%	74.6%	55.4%
2	9.4%	10.6%	10.8%	16.2%	10.2%	11.9%
3	8.3%	9.7%	9.6%	16.0%	6.2%	8.2%
4	6.0%	7.8%	8.4%	15.5%	3.7%	5.8%
5	7.5%	13.8%	6.4%	8.3%	3.4%	8.9%
6	3.4%	6.1%	3.2%	4.2%	0.8%	4.0%
7	2.2%	3.5%	2.2%	3.1%	0.6%	1.7%
8	2.3%	2.8%	1.6%	1.3%	0.2%	1.0%
9	1.0%	1.4%	1.0%	0.3%	-	1.0%
Always justifiable	1.8%	3.6%	1.2%	0.3%	0.4%	2.2%
(N)	(14,940)	(1,139)	(994)	(1,197)	(1,200)	(1,261)
Mean	2.45	3.24	2.40	2.81	1.60	2.46
Standard Deviation	2.22	2.53	2.08	1.86	1.31	2.18
Base mean	(14,940)	(1,139)	(994)	(1,197)	(1,200)	(1,261)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Never justifiable	53.6%	69.8%	63.1%	76.6%	68.7%	38.9%
2	9.2%	5.7%	5.6%	5.1%	4.9%	15.2%
3	7.5%	7.3%	4.3%	3.8%	6.9%	11.6%
4	6.3%	3.5%	3.4%	2.6%	5.2%	5.7%
5	7.2%	5.6%	11.3%	4.7%	8.1%	7.0%
6	6.0%	2.5%	2.8%	2.5%	1.8%	4.8%
7	3.5%	1.3%	2.1%	1.6%	1.6%	3.5%
8	3.5%	1.5%	2.0%	1.5%	0.9%	8.6%
9	2.6%	0.8%	1.1%	0.8%	0.1%	2.3%
Always justifiable	0.6%	1.9%	4.4%	0.7%	1.9%	2.5%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,068)	(1,126)	(1,058)	(1,189)	(1,523)
Mean	2.73	2.08	2.58	1.85	2.09	3.29
Standard Deviation	2.39	2.08	2.56	1.87	1.98	2.67
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,068)	(1,126)	(1,058)	(1,189)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Never justifiable	62.0%
2	8.1%
3	8.1%

4	6.1%
5	7.4%
6	2.6%
7	2.3%
8	1.3%
9	0.8%
Always justifiable	1.1%
(N)	(985)
Mean	2.25
Standard Deviation	2.04
Base mean	(985)

Source, WVS 6th wave: Algeria 2014, Egypt 2012, Iraq 2013, Jordan 2014, Kuwait 2013, Lebanon 2013, Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013, Qatar 2010, Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013

Table 7. Justifiable: Parents beating children

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Never justifiable	38.8%	30.1%	36.3%	25.2%	50.2%	47.4%
2	8.9%	8.7%	10.3%	15.6%	10.3%	13.1%
3	9.5%	8.9%	12.3%	15.5%	9.7%	12.6%
4	8.3%	8.9%	13.5%	13.8%	8.7%	6.1%
5	13.3%	16.5%	13.2%	11.9%	10.8%	8.9%
6	6.6%	8.7%	5.8%	8.4%	4.3%	3.6%
7	5.0%	7.2%	3.4%	4.7%	3.1%	2.6%
8	4.3%	5.4%	2.4%	3.5%	1.3%	1.3%
9	2.0%	4.2%	0.7%	1.1%	0.2%	1.3%
Always justifiable	3.4%	1.5%	2.2%	0.4%	1.4%	3.0%
(N)	(14,959)	(1,140)	(995)	(1,196)	(1,200)	(1,265)
Mean	3.45	3.90	3.20	3.42	2.63	2.73
Standard Deviation	2.63	2.60	2.28	2.14	2.12	2.33
Base mean	(14,959)	(1,140)	(995)	(1,196)	(1,200)	(1,265)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Never justifiable	44.8%	44.1%	39.9%	45.3%	46.7%	29.3%
2	9.8%	6.1%	4.4%	5.3%	4.3%	13.5%
3	10.3%	6.4%	6.9%	6.2%	8.7%	8.6%
4	7.5%	6.4%	4.9%	7.3%	7.3%	6.4%
5	9.2%	13.6%	23.1%	13.0%	15.5%	7.7%
6	6.3%	7.8%	4.0%	8.1%	6.8%	7.6%
7	5.2%	5.5%	4.3%	6.6%	3.7%	6.4%
8	2.9%	4.1%	2.5%	4.0%	2.4%	12.6%
9	2.2%	1.5%	1.9%	1.4%	1.6%	3.9%
Always justifiable	1.8%	4.5%	8.2%	2.7%	2.9%	4.0%
(N)	(1,200)	(2,071)	(1,131)	(1,059)	(1,190)	(1,523)
Mean	3.07	3.46	3.77	3.36	3.18	4.13
Standard Deviation	2.48	2.76	2.90	2.64	2.53	2.94
Base mean	(1,200)	(2,071)	(1,131)	(1,059)	(1,190)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen

Never justifiable	21.6%
2	4.8%
3	10.6%
4	11.6%
5	20.1%
6	6.2%
7	6.5%
8	7.1%
9	3.4%
Always justifiable	8.1%
(N)	(989)
Mean	4.61
Standard Deviation	2.80
Base mean	(989)

Source, WVS 6th wave: Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco

Across the board, respondents' answers on their attitudes toward using violence against their spouse or children show a greater inclination to justify these acts compared to answers on the broader question of whether the use of violence against other people is ever justified. On whether it is justified for a man to beat his wife, 57.9% of MENA respondents indicated it was "never justifiable," 23.7% indicated numbers 2 to 4, 10.9% indicated numbers 5 to 6, 5.5% indicated numbers 7 to 9, and 1.8% indicated "always justifiable." On whether it is justified for parents to beat their children, 38.8% of respondents indicated it was "never justifiable," 26.7% indicated numbers 2 to 4, 19.9% indicated numbers 5 to 6, 11.3% indicated numbers 7 to 9, and 3.4% indicated "always justifiable." The mean answer for V208 "Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife" is 2.45 and for V209 "Justifiable: Parents beating children" is 3.07. When the data for V208 "Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife" is crossed by respondents' sex, the mean for female respondents in the MENA region, at 2.21, is only slightly below the mean for male respondents, at 2.67.

Compare these numbers to the answers on whether violence against other people is justified, where 67.3% of MENA respondents chose "never justifiable" and the mean was 1.98, and the difference between the figures is striking. The largest spread, in terms of mean answers, between V208 "Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife" and V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" is 1.28 from Morocco, with a mean of 2.58 for V208 and 1.30 for V210. The largest spread between V209 "Justifiable: Parents beating children" and V210 is 2.82 from Yemen, with a mean of 4.61 for V209 and 1.79 for V210. Lebanon demonstrates the smallest spread between V210 and both V208 and V209, of 0.08 and 0.42 respectively.

Table 8. Differences between the variables V208, V209, and V210 responses

	Difference between V208 and V210 means	Difference between V209 and V210 means
MENA region	0.75	1.47
Algeria	0.54	1.47
Palestine	0.33	1.13
Iraq	0.71	1.32
Jordan	0.15	1.18
Kuwait	0.31	0.58
Lebanon	0.08	0.42
Libya	0.22	1.60
Morocco	1.28	2.47
Qatar	0.55	1.68
Tunisia	0.50	1.59
Egypt	0.99	1.83
Yemen	0.46	2.82

In every single country, there is an increase in the number of respondents who believe that using violence against one's spouse or children is justifiable versus the number of respondents believing that violence against other people is justifiable. This result strongly suggests that the domestic violence described in V208 and V209 is not included in the mental schema of violence invoked in V210 for many of the questionnaire respondents. For these respondents, the violence described in V210 may have been exclusively political violence, for example, not striking one's child or wife. For respondents that indicated violence against others is not justifiable while beating one's children is justifiable, the latter form of violence may simply be viewed as discipline and in an entirely different category of action from the former form of violence.

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7.3. Justifiability of war and the willingness to fight

V187 asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Like V208 "Is it justifiable for a man to beat his wife?" and V209 "Is it justifiable for parents to beat their children," V187 targets a defined topic, the justifiability of war, that provides insight into the respondents' attitudes towards the use of violence.

Table 9. Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Agree	46.3%	37.8%	49.4%	46.9%	38.1%	49.7%
Disagree	53.7%	62.2%	50.6%	53.1%	61.9%	50.3%
(N)	(14,219)	(1,071)	(928)	(1,087)	(1,130)	(1,121)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Agree	54.3%	54.1%	26.0%	56.5%	34.1%	56.7%
Disagree	45.7%	45.9%	74.0%	43.5%	65.9%	43.3%
(N)	(1,105)	(2,010)	(1,111)	(1,046)	(1,147)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Agree	42.8%
Disagree	57.2%
(N)	(940)

Source, WVS 6th wave: Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013,Morocco 2011,Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

An average of 46.3% of respondents in the MENA region agreed that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Egypt has the highest percentage of respondents agreeing with the proposition, at 56.7%, while Qatar, at 56.5%, is virtually tied. Egypt is presently led former Defence Minister Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who deposed the country's first democratically-elected president Mohamed Morsi in a 2013 coup. The outsized role the military plays in Egyptian society could be an important factor driving Egyptian respondents' support for the proposition in V187. Countries that deviate significantly below the MENA average are led by Morocco, at 26.0% agreeing with the proposition, followed by Tunisia, at 34.1%, and Jordan, at 38.1%. Coincidentally, these three countries also had the lowest mean answers for V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people," indicating that versus their peers respondents in the countries had lower opinions on the justifiability of violence.

A respondent's opinion on the whether violence against other people can be justified (V210) is likely one factor among many influencing whether he or she agrees or disagrees with the statement that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Other probable factors are the prestige and perceived capability of a country's military/security forces; whether the country has experienced success or failure in its military engagements, as well as the scale of this success or failure; whether respondents

have personally experience war or conflict, and whether this experience improved or diminished their personal circumstances.

Survey respondents' willingness to fight for their country is measured by V66, which asks: "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?" Respondents could answer this question by responding with "yes" or "no." The results for the MENA region are displayed in the table below.

Table 10. Willingness to fight for your country

	TOTAL	Country Code				
		Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait
Yes	75.5%	83.3%	65.9%	71.6%	85.9%	81.4%
No	24.5%	16.7%	34.1%	28.4%	14.1%	18.6%
(N)	(14,151)	(1,025)	(886)	(1,074)	(1,115)	(1,195)

	Country Code					
	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Qatar	Tunisia	Egypt
Yes	53.4%	73.7%	76.5%	98.1%	77.4%	65.4%
No	46.6%	26.3%	23.5%	1.9%	22.6%	34.6%
(N)	(1,079)	(2,005)	(1,111)	(1,057)	(1,097)	(1,523)

	Country Code
	Yemen
Yes	77.2%
No	22.8%
(N)	(985)

Source WVS, 6th wave: Algeria 2014,Egypt 2012,Iraq 2013,Jordan 2014,Kuwait 2013,Lebanon 2013,Libya 2013, Morocco 2011, Palestine 2013,Qatar 2010,Tunisia 2013,Yemen 2013

In the MENA region, 75.5% of the people stated that they would be willing to fight for their country with Qatar having the most "willing" population, both in the region and among all countries surveyed by the World Values Survey, with 98.1% answering "yes." Kuwait, Algeria, and Jordan also demonstrate elevated percentages of respondents expressing a willingness to fight, at 81.4%, 83.3%, and 85.9%, respectively. Lebanese respondents, on the other hand, were the least willing to fight for their country, with only 53.4% answering "yes."

Compared to the rest of the world, the MENA region is slightly above the global mean of 68.4%, by roughly 7 percentage points, while South America and Europe respondents were on average the least willing to fight for their country. As a region, the MENA region was topped only by Asia in its willingness to fight.

Figure 1. Willingness to fight for your country, MENA & World



	Muslim n-a countries	All muslim countries	Asia	MENA	World	North America	Africa	Europe	South America
Yes	77,9%	76,5%	76,0%	75,5%	68,4%	65,3%	65,0%	64,1%	59,3%

What contributes to the willingness of people to fight for their country? A scatterplot was created to see if respondents' concerns about war and terrorism correlated with attitudes on fighting for one's country.

Figure 2 plots a combined scale for V183 "Worries: A war involving my country" and V184 "Worries: A terrorist attack" on the x-axis, and V66 "Willingness to fight for your country" on the y-axis; MENA countries are marked in red. Globally, there is a fair positive correlation between increased worries about war and terrorism and respondents' willingness to fight for their country.

Figure 2. Worries about war, terrorism and willingness to fight, MENA & World



However, when results for Muslim countries only are segregated, as shown in Figure 3, the positive correlation between worries about war and terrorism and the willingness to fight disappears. In the below scatterplot respondents are separated by gender, with MENA countries marked in red and non-MENA Muslim countries marked in green. A zero-to-slightly negative correlation is observed.

Figure 3. Worries about war, terrorism and willingness to fight, MENA only, gender differences



In respect to the gender divide in responses to V66, on the willingness to fight for one's country, Iraq displayed the widest divergence between male and female respondents, with female respondents reporting "yes" 31.2 percentage points less than men.

The smallest discrepancy is observed in Qatar – incidentally the country with the highest positive reporting rate in both the MENA and the world. Here, 99.2% of male respondents and 97.2% of respondents indicated they would be willing to fight for their country. Gender breakdowns for all MENA countries surveyed are shown in the table below.

Table 11. Gender breakdown of "yes" responses on willingness to fight for ones country

	Men (% "yes")	Women (% "yes")
TOTAL	82.9%	67.4%
Algeria	85.1%	81.2%
Palestine	74.0%	58.2%
Iraq	86.4%	55.2%
Jordan	93.5%	78.0%
Kuwait	90.6%	63.4%
Lebanon	60.3%	46.6%
Libya	80.1%	66.6%
Morocco	82.0%	70.7%
Qatar	99.2%	97.2%
Tunisia	86.3%	67.0%
Egypt	71.8%	58.9%
Yemen	88.5%	66.0%

The combination of the MENA region's generally high willingness to fight and the negative correlation between this willingness and concerns about state security (whereas a modest positive correlation is observed here for the world as a whole) points to the unique political circumstances present in this part of the world. When compared to global means, MENA respondents' elevated willingness to fight for their country is in line with their likewise agreement that war is sometimes necessary for achieving justice (V187). In light of the region's history of military and strongman rule, as well as its deficits in democracy, political rights, and security, that the data should suggest a greater degree of preference for martial solutions in MENA countries, as a whole, is not terribly surprising. At the same time, concerns about war and terrorism are frequently accompanied by state insecurity and a lack of perceived state authority in the MENA region. Places where citizens are particularly anxious about security issues are typically marked by dysfunctional political regimes: hence the negative correlation among MENA countries between these worries and a willingness to risk one's life on behalf of the state.

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7.4. Relationship of religiosity and violence

For the majority of MENA countries, the data shows a negative correlation between the importance of religious faith in one's life and whether the respondent believes violence against other people is justifiable. The bar graph in Figure 4 crosses V9 "Important in life: Religion" (coloured bars) and V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" (y-

axis) for respondents in the 12 MENA countries as well as 8 non-MENA Muslim countries surveyed. Movement up the y-axis indicates increasing belief that there are grounds for justifying the use of violence against other people; the point scale on this axis is the 10-point scale of V210.

Figure 4. Violence and importance of religion



With the exclusion of Azerbaijan, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Uzbekistan, there is a clear trend of attitudes more favourable to the use of violence against others increasing as the importance of religious faith for respondents declines. Individuals for whom religion is a very important part of their lives are likely more familiar with their religion's teachings and able to better comprehend the nuances and humanistic components of faith. This may well explain the negative correlation between observed in the graph. Moreover, this data is consistent with evidence that most jihadists have only a basic understanding of their religion. [209]

An important disclaimer, however, is that across the MENA region, respondents overwhelmingly indicate that religious faith is a "very important" part of their lives. 89.8% of MENA respondents indicate that religious faith is "very important," compared

[209] Batrawy, Aya; Dodds, Paisley and Lori Hinnart. "'Islam for Dummies': IS recruits have poor grasp of faith." Associated Press. 15 August 2016. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9f94ff7f1e294118956b049a51548b33/islamic-state-gets-know-nothing-recruits-and-rejoices

to a combined total of 2.8% for "not very important" and "not at all important." Hence while there might be a larger absolute number of respondents who reported that they are both very religious and believe violence is justifiable than the number of respondents reporting that they are both not very religious and believe that violence is justifiable.

Figure 5 below also presents the relationship between respondents' opinions on the justifiability of violence against others and the importance of religion, for MENA countries as well as global regional averages. The table additionally crosses V210 with V147 "Religious person," which asks respondents "Independently of whether you attend religious services or not, would you say you are (An atheist/Not a religious person/A religious person."

Figure 5. Violence, religious identification, and importance of religion



Crossing V210 with V147 produces a negative correlation between increased religious identification – moving from "atheist" to "not religious" to "religious" – that is compatible with the negative correlation observed when crossing V210 with V9. Again, as with the relationship between V210 and V9, an important disclaimer is that the

negative correlation when crossing V210 with V147 could be slanted by the fact that an overwhelming majority of MENA respondents (79.4%) identified as "a religious person."

The final graph, Figure 6 below, crosses V210 with V154, which asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with the proposition, "The only acceptable religion is my religion." The graph includes results from 11 MENA countries and 8 non-MENA Muslim-majority countries. The sample size disclaimer for the previous two figures applies here as well: 87.9% of MENA respondents "agreed" or "strongly agreed" versus 12.1% who "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed."

Figure 6. Violence and exclusive religious belief



V154 "The only acceptable religion is my religion" essentially measures whether the respondent subscribes to a belief that religious truth is exclusive to their own faith – that is, "my religion is 'right' and other religions are 'wrong.'" The data here is somewhat difficult to generalize. However, in 7 out of 11 MENA countries, negative correlation is observed between increased agreement with V154 and increased belief that violence against others is justifiable (V210).

In Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen respondents that disagree with the statement, "The only acceptable religion is my religion," are more amenable to

justifying violence than respondents that agree. Only in Lebanon and Qatar is there a positive correlation between increased exclusive religious belief and the justifiability of violence. Finally, almost zero correlation between the variables is observed in Palestine and Jordan.

The negative correlation between whether respondents are exclusive in their religious belief and whether (and to what degree) they believe violence against other people is justifiable is counterintuitive. It would be valid to predict that the belief that other faiths are "not acceptable" would grant the person holding this view moral license to conduct violent acts against members of these inferior religions. This construct undergirds Islam's concept of the "infidel," which directly translates to "unbeliever."

One possible explanation of the negative correlation is that these are countries in which the vast majority of the population is Muslim. Thus, for the typical Muslim respondent in one of these countries, most of his or her countrymen would not be excluded by his or her belief that "the only acceptable religion is my religion," as agreement with this statement would not justify using violence against fellow Muslims. Support for this hypothesis may be found in the positive relationship between the variables found in sectarian Lebanon, which is 27% Sunni Muslim, 27% Shia Muslim, 40% Christian, and 5.6% Druze, with other small religious minorities as well.[210]

A second, and likely parallel, explanation lies in the "shahada," or "the testimony," which is one of the "five pillars" of Islam – principles serving as the foundation of Muslim life. The shahada is a statement of belief for followers of Islam. It reads, "There is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God."

The shahada reflects the monotheism and universalist claim inherent to Islamic faith, and consequently the religion's fundamentally exclusive nature. Recognizing this, agreement with the statement, "the only acceptable religion is my religion," may signify the respondent is simply following basic Islamic doctrine, more than indicating he or she is some form of religious bigot. Moving forward with this assumption, the negative correlation between V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" and V154 "The only acceptable religion is my religion" echoes the negative correlation found when crossing V210 and V9 "Important in life: Religion."

[210] "Lebanon." *The World Factbook*. Central Intelligence Agency. 21 November 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html

7.4.1. Relationship of religiosity to violence, MENA compared to World

The following three regression plots show the relationship of religiosity and the justifiability of violence in the MENA region, non-MENA Muslim countries, and all other countries surveyed.

The first regression plot crosses V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" (y-axis) with V147 "Religious person" (x-axis). The y-axis is measured by the 1-to-10 scale used in V210, with higher numbers indicating increased belief that violence against other people can be justified; the y-axis is the same for all three regression plots in this section. The x-axis in Figure 7 below is measured by the percentage of respondents that identified as "a religious person" in response to V147, which asks respondents to identify as either "a religious person," "not a religious person," or "an atheist."

Figure 7. Violence and religious identification MENA & World



The scatterplot above shows a near-zero but slightly positive correlation between increased identification as "a religious person" and whether respondents believe violence against others is justifiable. The slightly positive slope of the graph is influenced by the significant outliers of the Philippines and South Africa. MENA countries are clustered toward the right-hand side of the graph, indicating a higher percentage of respondents that are religious. Of the MENA countries, Lebanon has the lowest percentage of respondents identifying as religious people, at 66.2%. Incidentally, Lebanon also has the second highest mean for V210 among MENA countries, at 2.65. Overall, as discussed earlier in the report, the MENA region's attitude toward the justifiability of violence against others is fairly consistent with the global average.

The second regression plot, Figure 8, crosses V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" (y-axis) with V152 "How important is God in your life" (x-axis). Both V210 and V152 utilize 10-point scales, reflected in the scales on the x and y-axes. V152 asks respondents to select a single number between 1 and 10 to characterize the "importance of God in your life," with 1 indicating "not at all important" and 10 indicating "very important."

Figure 8. Violence and importance of God MENA & World



Figure 8 demonstrates a near-zero but slightly positive correlation between the increased importance of God in one's life and attitudes increasingly amenable to justifying violence against others, which is similar to the result seen in the first regression. Again, the Philippines and South Africa are notable outliers on the y-axis.

MENA countries' higher religiosity is more apparent in this second regression. Overall, the mean response for the MENA region on V152 "How important is God in your life" is 9.60. The mean for non-MENA Muslim countries is 8.84 and for all other countries is 7.04. Individual MENA countries deviate little from the region's mean of 9.60 on the x-axis. Meanwhile, the spread on the y-axis, indicating a country's mean attitude toward the justifiability of using violence against other people, is larger. By considering the relationship between the variables on the x (V152) and y-axes (V210), it is fairly safe to conclude that the higher average religiosity of MENA countries is not the decisive factor determining their attitudes towards violence.

The third and final regression plot, Figure 9, crosses V210 "Justifiable: Violence against other people" (y-axis) with V154 "The only acceptable religion is my religion" (x-axis). V154 asks respondents to select whether they "strongly disagree," "disagree," "agree," or "strongly agree" with the statement, "The only acceptable religion is my religion." These answer choices are coded with 1 for "strongly disagree" through 4 for "strongly agree"; this 4-point scale is used in the x-axis.

Figure 9. Violence and exclusive religious belief MENA & World



The scatterplot shows zero correlation between increased agreement with the statement, "The only acceptable religion is my religion," and increased justifiability of violence against other people. What is particularly significant about the data, however, is the segregation on the x-axis between countries that are majority Muslim – particularly MENA countries – and the rest of the world. The mean for all Muslim countries to V154, on exclusive religious belief, is 3.29; for the MENA region it is 3.52. Compare this to the mean for non-Muslim countries, 2.20. The spread between the x-axis averages for Muslim and non-Muslim countries strongly suggests the notion that religious truth is exclusive to a single religion is a uniquely robust component of Islamic faith. According to the regression, however, this specific quality of Islam does not exert a major influence on attitudes toward justifying violence against others among adherents of the religion.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

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