

# Migrant Hygge:

## Feeling at home in a cold climate

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**Abstract:** When migrants move from the global South to the Nordic north, what resources facilitate integration into their new host country? This is a critical issue both theoretically, for understanding rapid processes of social and cultural change, and also for policymakers seeking to integrate international migrants into Western societies. *Part I* in this study discusses the theoretical arguments and previous findings in the research literature. For evidence, most work has analysed objective indices, like migrant integration into the labor market. By contrast, we focus on the subjective perceptions of migrants from many developing societies who come to live in Sweden. We seek to understand the conditions under which international migrants say that they feel at home, that they express Swedish identity, and that they feel pride in Sweden - treated in this study as our core measures of subjective integration. Drawing upon forms of capital theories, we expect rates of subjective integration to vary due to migrants' reservoirs of human, economic, and social capital. To explore patterns, Part II describes the evidence derived from a unique survey dataset of 6,516 migrants who moved to Sweden from 2008-2018 from countries such as Iraq, Syria, Eritrea, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The study is part of the 7<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey. Part III describes the results of the analysis. Part IV summarizes the key findings and considers their broader implications.

**Keywords:** Migrant attitudes, migrant integration, cultural values, Swedish culture

Every day, all over the world, people leave their homes in search of a safer, better life. Most people have had the experience of leaving the place where they grew up, perhaps moving to the next village, region, or city. But some leave their country entirely – sometimes temporarily, such as crossing national borders for work or study, sometimes forever. Worldwide, in 1990 there were around 152 million international migrants, defined by UN DESA as those living for more than a year in a country other than the one where they were born.<sup>1</sup> Today there are around 260 million.<sup>2</sup> Many migrants move to affluent European societies, which OECD estimates suggest now contain 74 million or around one third of the world's migrants.<sup>3</sup> The growing diversity and flow of migrants across national borders highlights the importance of understanding the broader implications of these dramatic population shifts for social cohesion and cultural change. Interest has been spurred by the refugee crisis in Europe, by high profile instances of terrorism associated with Islamic radicals and the White Nationalist backlash, as well as by the political consequences for the fortunes of authoritarian-populist parties and leaders in Western societies (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Kaufmann 2019).

An extensive literature has sought to understand the social integration of newcomers, understood here as the two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and host societies in which strangers are incorporated into social, economic, cultural, and political life in their new homes.<sup>4</sup> The key question addressed in this study is what accelerates this process? In particular, when people move from war-torn and poor nations in the global South, such as Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Iraq, to live in affluent post-industrial societies in the Nordic north, like Sweden, under what conditions are they most likely to feel at home in their new communities? When do they feel 'hygge'?

To contribute towards understanding these issues, *Part I* in this study discusses the theoretical arguments and reviews findings in the previous empirical research literature. Understanding processes of migrant integration is important theoretically, for identifying the key drivers of social inclusion and cohesion, and also vital for policymakers, seeking effective strategies to accommodate waves of newcomers into their society. *Part II* describes the evidence and research design. Most previous studies have examined 'objective' indices of migrant integration, like workforce participation and social mobility. An extensive literature has also analysed cultural attitudes towards immigration among the host society. By contrast, we focus upon 'subjective' indicators among migrants, drawing upon a unique social survey in 2018 interviewing almost 6,000 first-generation migrants from the global South who moved to live in Sweden during the last decade. The study is part of the 7<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey. This dataset allows us to compare the attitudes and backgrounds of a large and diverse stratified random sample of recent migrants from the

Global South. Sweden provides an excellent test case of an affluent European welfare state with a long tradition of social tolerance and with generous opportunities for refugees and asylum seekers, but also one where immigration policies have tightened in recent years. Migrant integration is measured by three subjective indicators of national identities, including migrants saying that: (i) they feel at home in Sweden; (ii) they identify with Sweden more than their country of origin; and (iii) they feel a sense of national pride in Sweden.

Traditional socialization theories have long suggested that deep-rooted national identities, rooted in feelings of blood and belonging, develop during early childhood and adolescence, transmitted by cultural agencies such as the family, school and media, changing only slowly, if at all, during adulthood. After all, studies have found that even after long-standing membership within the European Union, the abolition of internal borders to work, travel and welfare benefits, and active policies promoting 'Europeanness' since the 1950s, people living in member states still identify far more strongly with their nation-state than with Europe.<sup>5</sup>

Yet the process of migration from the county of birth to settling into a new country of destiny can be expected to have profound effects on national identities. Following theories developed by Alba and Lee (2003) to explain the experiences in the United States, rates of subjective integration for new migrants into Sweden, and thus shifts in national identities, are expected to be accelerated by reservoirs of human capital (such as education qualifications and linguistic skills), economic capital (such as household savings and financial security), and social capital (for example, by community and family networks, organizational memberships, and feelings of security and social trust). Models test these propositions, controlling for standard socio-demographic factors at individual level, such as gender, age, and Swedish citizenship, as well as the length of residency in Sweden. Part III describes the results of the analysis. Part IV summarizes the key findings and considers their broader implications, both theoretically and also for policy initiatives seeking to strengthen migrant integration in Sweden and other affluent Western societies.

### **I: Theories of Integration**

One of the most striking aspects of globalization in contemporary societies concerns the growing pace and diversity of the flow of peoples across national borders (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton 1999). Migrants move to a different country for varied reasons. Economic migrants aim to better their lives and opportunities, such as to get a job or an education, or to send remunerations to support families back home. Immigrants can bring valuable talent and stimulate the economy. They form a disproportionate share of entrepreneurs; for example, in 2016, 40% of Fortune's list of the 500 top U.S. firms were owned by immigrants or their children.<sup>6</sup> Advanced

industrialized societies like Sweden with an aging population, a shortage of skilled labor, and declining fertility rates, can expand the working-age population, consumption, and productivity through the successful integration of young migrants.<sup>7</sup> Some legal immigrants are highly-educated scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs; others are young workers with minimal education and manual-intensive occupations.<sup>8</sup> Low-skilled immigrants taking jobs involving hard physical labor can fill important needs in farm-work, building construction, home services, the hospitality industry, health care, and food preparation.<sup>9</sup>

Refugees also cross borders to avoid persecution or human rights violations such as torture and persecution. Millions flee from armed conflicts or other violence. Some no longer feel safe at home because of who they are or what they do or believe – such as their ethnicity, religion, sexuality or political opinions. The refugee crisis in the European Union has slowed from its height; the number of people applying for asylum in the EU peaked at 1.26 million in 2015, including many migrants from Muslim-majority societies, such as refugees from Syria and Afghanistan.<sup>10</sup> But the movement of peoples towards Europe continues to exert a devastating toll on human life and its consequences have raised difficult challenges for European policymakers in managing welfare benefits, education, employment and training facilities for refugees and for maintaining social cohesion. The transformation of European societies through the migrant population flows and growing multicultural diversity has been dramatic. Worldwide, the United Nations estimates that in 2015, 248 million migrants lived outside their country of birth.<sup>11</sup> This figure has doubled since 1960 and continues to rise. Europe now hosts more migrants than any other world region.<sup>12</sup>

Sweden exemplifies these trends as an affluent post-industrial knowledge economy and generous welfare state at the forefront of the European debates about immigration. During the 1970s, Sweden was inhabited almost entirely by ethnic Swedes, along with some small migrant communities from Germany, Finland and the Baltic states. In 2000, *Statistics Sweden* estimates that around one million out of nine million residents (or 15% of the population) had foreign backgrounds (defined as foreign born or second-generation).<sup>13</sup> By 2017, the total Swedish population had risen to just over 10 million, including an estimated 1.87 million with foreign backgrounds (around 25% of the total population).<sup>14</sup> Some people moved to Sweden from similar post-industrial European and Nordic societies, chiefly Finland, Germany and Poland, following the free movement of peoples within the European Union and the expansion of EU borders. But around one million (about half of the migrants) were drawn from diverse cultures, religious traditions, and ethnic backgrounds, including many from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia seeking to escape conflict and poverty in some of the least developed societies around the world.

Compared with other European societies, Sweden has traditionally offered refugees and asylum-seekers some of the most generous citizenship rights, labor market opportunities, and welfare benefits (Papadopoulos 2011). In 1975, Sweden also adopted an official policy of multiculturalism, including respecting ethnic and religious pluralism, for example through state-funded minority cultural associations. In this regard, the predominant liberal tolerance culture in Sweden has traditionally been generous towards refugees and asylum seekers, rather than seeking to eliminate diversity through assimilation policies, such as those used in France.

Swedish hospitality has come under growing challenge in recent years, however, from the refugee crisis, and the mass exodus of displaced persons moving across the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans when fleeing from violent disorder in fragile states, notably Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, seeking shelter in Europe. Public concern about the issue of immigration rose in Sweden in recent years (see Figure 1). In the 2014 Swedish elections, vote and seat gains by the Swedish Democrats, and plummeting electoral fortune for the Social Democrats, led to the adoption of more restrictive asylum and reunification laws in 2016. Like elsewhere in Europe, Sweden has also experienced problems arising from the lack of social integration for immigrants, exemplified by high rates of youth unemployment, lower student achievement and worse crime rates, and social unrest in public housing areas where immigrants are located in the perimeter of large cities (Skodo 2018).

The refugee crisis accelerated European political debate about the issue of immigration. In the Eurobarometer surveys, for example, when asked to nominate the two most important problems in their own country, the proportion of the EU public mentioning about immigration rose sharply from around 15% in mid-2013 to around 36% by the end of 2015, before declining somewhat again to around 22% in 2017. As Figure 1 illustrates, public concern in Swedish mirrored the general European trends.

[Figure 1 about here]

Internal migration within the European Union accelerated following the establishment of the free flow of labor in 1993 and the expansion of the EU in the east after 2004. Large-scale migration from the Global South has been a more recent phenomena in the Nordic region, however, peaking during the 2015 EU refugee crisis. These twin trends have transformed ethnic diversity in urban areas in West European and Scandinavian nations which have received the greatest influx of migrants. Due to these developments, European countries which used to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural heritage, historical traditions, ethnic composition, language, lifestyles, and religious faith -- such as Denmark, France, Germany, and Sweden -- have become far more cosmopolitan today. This influx of people will

also have profound consequences for the future, because the aging white native European populations usually have much lower fertility rates than the younger immigrant families from the global South.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, an anti-immigrant backlash has also helped to trigger the rise of authoritarian populist parties and stoked the nativist diatribes of leaders such as Victor Orban, Donald Trump, and Jimmie Åkesson (Norris and Inglehart 2019).

In the light of these development, what has been the experience of migrants, in particular under what circumstances are they most likely to feel at home in their host society, regarding themselves as new Swedes, and under what conditions are they more likely to feel ‘strangers in a strange land’? During the early twentieth century, the Chicago school of sociology sought to understand how successive waves of European immigrants became assimilated into American society, understood as a process where individuals adopt the cultural norms of the dominant host culture (Kivisto 2002). The American historical experience from the colonial era until World War I suggested that migrant populations gradually came to adopt mainstream values, ways of life, and beliefs prevailing in their host society, usually through a gradual intergenerational process (Alba and Nee 2003). The socialization of second and third generation minority groups were thought to be influenced in general by the agencies of cultural transmission and socialization, including families, schools, the mass media, participation in the labor-force, and bridging social networks in the host community (Inglehart 2018; Pettersson 2007). During the early twentieth century, the dominant normative paradigm for understanding American waves of immigration was thought to be assimilation by ‘hyphenated’ groups who gradually came to abandon their roots in the old country as they came to see themselves as Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, Polish-Americans and other European émigrés.

As a normative ideal, however, the concept of assimilation gradually fell out of favor in America, driven in large part by the growing national diversity of new waves of migrants from around the world, as well as by a reaction discrediting ethnocentric assumptions about the superiority of Anglo-American culture in the United States, where assimilation was seen as a one-way process involving migrants fitting into American society (Glazer 2002). One alternative concept, invoking the antithesis of assimilation, concerns ‘multiculturalism’ involving respecting and protecting alternative diverse cultures with each host society. This term has increasingly fallen out of favor in most European societies, however, including Sweden, on the grounds that it impedes integration (Joppke 2004; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). There are both pros and cons focusing on identity, recognition and the protection of difference (Abraham 2008). Critics argue that by supporting ethnic differences and identity politics, the migrants may

invoke culture as an excuse for certain behaviors, leading to an excessive tolerance of difference (Wikan 2002: 81; Bretell 2008).

In recent years, ideas of assimilation and multiculturalism have both been largely superseded by modern concepts of integration, used in this study. These emphasize a two-way process, involving changes among both the host society (for example, adaptation to new cuisines, fashions and lifestyles) *and* the migrants (such as by foreign-born populations acquiring new languages and educational skills). Through integration, migrants are thought to adopt the social norms and cultural attitudes of the host society, but these are blended with their culture of origin, generating a multicultural fusion. Integration can occur in multiple areas. Ager and Strang (2008) developed a conceptual framework involving four domains: objective indicators, such as achievement and access to employment, housing, education, and health; political integration through citizenship and rights; barriers related to language and cultures; as well as social connections, using subjective indicators measuring the bonds linking migrants and host communities. In many ways, a subjective sense of belonging through national identities, shared social interactions, and informal support network are arguably the ultimate indicators of living in an integrated society, which are even more fundamental to the daily quality of life and social cohesion than material living conditions, instrumental economic benefits, and more abstract legal rights.

Focusing upon this last domain, what fosters subjective integration, particularly the development of a sense of shared national identity by migrants with the host community? Socialization theories suggest that ethno-national identities are acquired through early childhood so that they change slowly, if at all, during adult years. For example, an extensive body of work has examined whether national identities had weakened over time as a result of membership of the European Union, reporting that national rather than European identities remain strong despite the ever-closer economic, political and social ties across state borders within the EU (Duchesne and Frogner 1995; Scheuer 1999; Risse 2001).

Studies have theorized that one reason for the persistence of strong national identities is that these are based on imaginary communities of 'blood and belonging' built upon shared historical customs and traditions, common languages, religious legacies, and ancestral roots in the countries of birth (Ignatieff 1995). Under this understanding, ethnic national identities can be expected to prove an enduring orientation which persists as fixed throughout a lifetime, or rarely alter, even if people move countries or gain citizenship and naturalization rights in a different state from the one in which they were born.

Yet this view is challenged by civic notions of nationalism which regard all people living within the boundaries of a state as

sharing the same legal status, political rights, and national identity. This perspective implies that feelings of national identity and pride can be expected to evolve over time, even in adulthood, especially if migrants become naturalized citizens in their new home communities.

What factors are likely to facilitate migrant integration, measured by the adoption of Swedish national identities and pride? Building upon arguments originally developed by the forms of capital approach (Bourdieu 1986; Nee and Sanders 2001; Cederberg and Villares-Varela 2019), this study theorizes that rates of acculturation by foreign-born migrants resident in Swedish society can be expected to vary through access to different forms of 'capital'. The notion of '*capital*' refers to valuable resources which can be invested to generate further benefits to the individual and their family, as well as to their community and the broader society (Putnam 1993; Portes 1998). What particular types of human, economic, or social capital prove most important for migrants settling in Europe, however, remains unclear.

*Human capital* has long been commonly regarded as an invaluable asset for international migrants, including their stock of skills, knowledge, talents, and experience which can help to improve an individual's economic position, earnings potential, productive capacity, and occupational status, with external benefits for society and the economy (Borjas 1989). Human capital can be conceptualized as the stock of knowledge, skills and attributes which can produce further value. This is exemplified by the acquisition of formal educational qualifications, vocational, professional, and technical credentials, and work experience, potentially providing access to high skilled and well-paid careers.

A recent meta-analysis of the research literature reported that education was usually found to strengthen psychological integration of refugees, or identification with the host culture (Sheikh and Anderson 2018). Education also typically provides the formal qualifications, professional skills and competencies that facilitate subsequent employment. Linguistic proficiencies, especially acquisition and familiarity with the language of the host country, has also consistently been regarded as important for access to the labor market, as well as for broader social interactions, knowledge of the host society, and processes of acculturation into the host society. Language skills are a high priority for integration policies, for example they are used in naturalization and citizenship tests in many European countries (Oers, Ersboll and Kostakopoulou 2010).

*Economic capital*, including income, cash and financial assets, can also be expected to be important for settling migrants into their host country, especially individual or household financial savings, wealth, and work skills which migrants bring with them or acquire. Employment is thought to have many benefits for integration, including through improving living standards and expanding work-



related social networks, generating status and respect, and providing financial security. Where foreign credentials are undervalued or not recognized in the host society, however, this can be a major barrier leading to under-employment of skilled professionals. Formal or informal access to financial loans and bank accounts can be particularly important for entrepreneurs seeking to start their own small manufacturing or retail business. Economic capital also includes wages from participation in the paid labor force and any transferable assets which well-off migrants hold from investments, pensions and stocks. Economic resources critical for low-skilled workers include access to welfare benefits, especially social protection programs provided by their host society, such as public housing, vocational training, health care, childcare, and schooling.

The idea of ‘segmented assimilation’ developed by Portes and Zhou (1993) found that migrant groups to America, such as Jewish, Hispanic and Asian communities, integrated at different rates in part due to their socioeconomic status and access to financial resources, with professionals and managers adopting to mainstream American values much faster than unskilled manual workers at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy or those who were unemployed. Similarly in Europe, migrants can be expected to differ sharply in their resources and skills; for example, Finns, Lithuanians, and Germans who move to Stockholm for work often enjoy similar living standards and lifestyles to the resident Swedish population, which could facilitate integration far more easily than would be the case with refugees fleeing conflict in some of the poorest societies in the world, such as Somalians, Syrians, Eritreans, or Afghans.

Finally, *social* capital, by contrast, involves factors likely to engage newcomers in their local and diaspora communities, providing informal support networks within ethnic communities and kinship ties, as well as connections with neighbors, friends and residents in host communities. Social capital can be strengthened through formal organizational networks, like active membership of sports clubs, trade unions, religious organizations, and local voluntary associations, informal bonds among social groups and local networks of friends and family, and also feelings of security and social trust (Putnam 1993). Immigration to Western societies often involves the loss of traditional support from kinship networks and local community ties in the country of origin, and the development of new support networks in host societies may take time to be built. Putnam’s influential theory (1993) emphasized that cultural integration and social trust across diverse ethnic groups can be strengthened by ‘bridging’ forms of social capital, such as membership and activism within social clubs and voluntary associations which include a diverse cross-section of the local community, such as political parties and trade unions. At the same time, however, ‘bonding’ forms of social capital, exemplified by kinship, religious, and ethnic ties, may also serve as important

resources for international migrants settling into their local communities, reducing the risks of social isolation and providing an informal safety net. Putnam (2007) also cautioned that social trust was also often lower in more ethnically-diverse local American communities, as identity groups turned inwards. Wessendorf and Phillimore (2019) argue that newcomers to the UK feel more settled where they have strong social relations within the host community, such as informal acquaintances and enduring friendships. A sense of security has also been regarded as important for social integration, such as living in safe communities and avoiding harassment and intimidation (Ager and Strang 2008).

Theories therefore suggest that human, economic and social forms of capital can all be expected to facilitate migrant integration. Further analysis is required to see which aspects are most important. We need to explore these issues both to understand processes of migrant integration, but also to identify the more effective policy-relevant programs to achieve this objective. Certain forms of capital, like the acquisition of formal educational credentials and skills training, are more open to government policy interventions than others, such as informal social and kinship networks.

The most extensive body of empirical research has monitored the integration of long-standing ethnic communities by using objective structural indicators from official statistics, such as comparing inequalities in educational attainment and rates of employment for the migrant and host communities. Yet structural conditions may not be consistently related to *subjective* perceptions of integration among migrants, especially among more recently-arrived migrant populations, such as highly-skilled refugees and low-skilled economic migrants from poorer developing societies in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, or South Asia moving to northern Europe during the last decade. The theoretical framework therefore predicts several propositions open to testing with empirical survey evidence in this study.

## **Part II: Data and evidence**

The most common approach to understand migrant integration has been through analyzing ‘objective’ social indices using data often derived from official statistics and household surveys, such as structural patterns of inequality in educational attainment and language skills, occupational status, and labour force participation among the host and migrant communities (Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008). Comparisons have been drawn between migrant and native populations, as well as across successive generation of migrants, and among sub-groups with different ethno-national ancestry or ethno-religious identities living today within specific countries, such as the Indian, Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Afro-Caribbean communities in the UK (Bisin et al 2008; Heath et al 2014); guest workers with Turkish ancestry in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, as well as North

Africans resident in France (Heath, Rethon and Kilpi 2008). Yet objective indices cannot say anything, in themselves, concerning how far migrants feel part of the host society. Minority communities can still feel 'strangers in a strange land', and alienated from predominant social norms and cultural beliefs, even if they and their children achieve considerable material success and improved living standards. After all, professional and executive expats who move abroad in pursuit of career opportunities for advancement may feel relatively well-off and materially successful, improving their lifestyles and that of their families by objective standards, without necessarily feeling at home or socially accepted living in their new country of residency. In many countries there is no such thing as a politics of incorporation, the migrants are seen as guests who have little influence on the host society. This is common in the Middle East where migrant workers are recruited from developing countries because they can be more easily controlled than native populations. Guest workers, like Turks living in Germany, may enjoy certain substantial economic benefits, compared with living standards in their poorer country of origins, but yet still be excluded from naturalization and citizenship rights, sometimes after residing in the host society for decades (Fargues 2011).

Other studies have compared the formal legal and policy framework for integration used in different countries, such as those governing requirements for naturalization and citizenship, as well as the role of anti-discrimination legislation protecting minority rights (Geddes et al. 2004; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2007). Countries differ substantially in their immigration policies, including those which have traditionally been relatively open and liberal, such as Sweden, and others which have been far more restrictive (Brochmann and Hammar 1999; Spencer 2003; Papadopoulos 2011). Under political pressure from authoritarian-populist parties, and growing public concern, recent years have seen many countries tighten their policies, including Sweden. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what impact, if any, formal immigration policies have had on how far migrant communities feel that they have settled fully into their host society or whether they encounter hostility, threats and prejudice. After all, the Jewish diaspora from Eastern Europe which settled in Western European societies centuries ago, and which prospered and became well established pillars of the local community, still experience incidents of anti-Semitism today.

Another extensive body of literature using cross-national and time-series survey research has analysed the host community's attitudes towards immigration, especially in Europe and North America, for example, a review by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) found around 100 studies of attitudes towards immigration in around a dozen Western societies. Cross-national data on attitudes towards immigration is carried in the European Social Survey, the Gallup World Poll, the Eurobarometers, the Pew Global Attitudes Survey,

IPSOS Global Trends, and the World Values Survey, amongst other sources.<sup>16</sup> This work is important to understand the host community's adaptation to diversity and their acceptance or rejection of migrants and ethnic minorities living in each society, where integration is understood as a two-way process. Several studies have also incorporated survey experiments, for example, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Sniderman et al. 2004). Most survey research on attitudes towards international migration has focused on the attitudes of the host population (Hollofield and Wong 2015).

To understand the process and drivers of migrant integration more fully, studies ideally need to learn more directly about the perspectives and experiences of the migrants themselves in diverse contexts. Many ethnographic studies of migrants have been conducted in countries of destiny using qualitative in-depth interviews or focus groups, for example, exploring the experiences of asylum seekers and displaced migrants within particular communities. This method provides a rich source of insights, although given the diversity of the migrant experiences, it can remain difficult to draw broader lessons from specific groups and localities.

For more systematic empirical generalizations, a growing number of specially-designed surveys of a sample of migrant populations have been conducted, for example a recent review identified 157 quantitative studies conducted since 2000 (EASO 2018). These have often sought to understand migrant's subjective cultural attitudes, values, and perceptions. The EU's PROMINSTAT project collates quantitative research studies to improve statistical data on migrant integration and discrimination.<sup>17</sup>

Household and social surveys of migrant attitudes raise several important methodological challenges (Font 2013; Reichel and Morales 2017; EASO 2018). One is that contemporary processes of population mobility across national borders are often complex in terms of their duration and purposes, whether for temporary or permanent residents. There are often serious limits in trying to analyse international migrant attitudes and values through the stratified random sampling methods and the standard sample size used in most social surveys or public opinion polls. Migrant populations form a relatively small proportion of the total population and thus, unless pooled cross-nationally, standard surveys usually contain only a limited number of migrant respondents within each country. It may also be difficult to gain access to ethnic minorities for interview, and there may be higher non-response rates, whether due to linguistic or cultural barriers, high rates of geographic mobility, or concerns by foreign-born undocumented aliens and asylum seekers about the potential consequences of participation for their official legal status. Another issue is that migrant populations are also often concentrated disproportionately within certain geographic areas, like Bradford, Birmingham and Inner

London in the UK. Given patterns of geographic clustering, many surveys use a multi-stage stratified random sample first selecting geographic areas containing high proportions of migrant residents, and then screening potential respondents to over-sample specific types of ethnic minorities living within these areas (Reichel and Morales 2017). Surveys then use variety of sampling techniques to identify individual respondents, including probability samples drawn at random from official lists, like local address records. Examples include U.S. surveys of second-generation migrants from Latin America living in Los Angeles (Ayers 2007), and the political attitudes and electoral behaviour of Bangladeshi, Indian, Pakistani, Black-African and Black-Caribbean communities in the 2010 British Election Study Ethnic Minority Survey (Fisher, Health, Sanders and Sobolewska et al. 2010). Other studies adopt mixed sampling strategies, selecting immigrant meeting places distributed across municipalities and areas in the first stage, such as migrant assistance, education, language, or jobs training centers, before then randomly selecting individual respondents in the second stage.

*The survey of Swedish migrants*

This article draws upon a survey of migrants living in Sweden based on a study conducted in 2018 by the Institute for Future Studies in Stockholm as part of the 7<sup>th</sup> wave of the World Values Survey.<sup>18</sup> Like several previous surveys of migrants (EASO 2018), a stratified non-probability sampling method was used to select those chosen for interview. The migrant population of interest was defined as those who had moved to Sweden from 2007 to 2018. The sampling frame specified several additional criteria, namely: (i) migrants had to be registered as resident in Sweden; (ii) they had to come from countries outside of Europe; and (iii) they had to reside in one of 54 selected municipalities chosen as a representative sample of urban and rural localities distributed across Sweden (Back 2007). Respondents who met these criteria were selected for interview through three different methods: via written invitations sent to migrants who had stayed in Sweden for more than five years; by contacting migrants attending courses on Swedish for Immigrants (SFI); and by interviewing all those attending selected language classes in the upper secondary school system. Through these methods, in total 7,161 respondents were invited to participate in the study. Of these, 11% declined the invitation, yielding a total sample size of 6,516. Respondents could choose to answer the survey in any of seven different languages (English, Arabic, Somali, Tigrinya, Dari, Turkish or Swedish). Interviews were conducted via computer-assisted questionnaires available both in Swedish and in the chosen mother-tongue. For illiterate respondents, translation assistants fluent in the respondents' native languages were present.

Table A1 describes the background and demographic characteristics of respondents. The majority of migrants (53%) were drawn from countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), notably Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Around one fifth were from Sub-Saharan Africa, notably Somalia and Eritrea. Others came to Sweden from South Asia, South East Asia and East Asia, and from Central and Eastern Europe, with small groups of migrants from countries elsewhere around the developing world. Three quarters of the migrants moved to Sweden from authoritarian states (classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House), with around one fifth drawn from low-income economies (GDP per capita in PPP below \$10,000). When asked why they had left their home country, the majority (57%) said this was to avoid war and conflict, with just over one quarter (27%) saying that they were seeking to improve their life opportunities abroad.

[Table 1 about here]

The survey drew upon the core questionnaire used for the World Values Survey Wave 7 (2018-2019) with the addition of many specially-designed additional items. Understanding the process of integration ideally requires insights into the characteristics and background of diverse migrant groups, their perceptions and feelings about the host society, their living conditions, attitudes and experiences, the reasons why people chose to move abroad, the size and distribution of minority populations, their employment, incomes, housing and education, and so on. Most work on integration has focused on objective data and official statistics, but this is insufficient to understand integration without also acknowledging the subjective perceptions of migrants. The latter can be measured by several indicators, such as feelings of national identity towards the country of origin or destiny, perceptions of prejudice or discrimination, civic engagement and participation, or satisfaction with living in the host country. The Technical Appendix describes the core variables which were selected for analysis and their coding in more detail. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables including their means and standard deviations.

#### *Indicators of the feeling Swedish*

This study selected three subjective indicators as the dependent variables, providing robustness checks on the results and alternative dimensions of feelings towards Swedish national identities. The first concerns how far migrants say that they felt at home in Sweden, a simple indicator but one well suited for our purpose. The question “*Do you feel at home in Sweden?*” was recoded into binary categories: ‘Yes very much at home’ (1), and ‘Yes, just a little bit’ or ‘No, not at all.’ (0). The second focused on feelings of national identity, asking respondents: “*As a migrant you have a lot of new things to decide about in your new country.*”

*Do you feel most akin /connected to the country you come from or to Sweden?"* The item was measured using a continuous 10-point scale. The final item monitored national pride, by combining two items *'How proud are you to be Swedish?' and 'How proud are you of your country of origin?'* into a single consistent 8-point scale.

To explain these feelings, human and economic capital were measured selected indices described in Technical Appendix A, including by highest educational qualifications, familiarity with the Swedish language, household savings, employment status, perceived economic benefits, reported financial security, relative economic mobility, and standard of living.<sup>19</sup> Social capital was measured by adaption to Swedish society, particularized and generalized social trust, contact with Swedish society, activism and membership of formal voluntary organizations, and feelings of security, and use of the legacy news media and social media as information sources, again with all items described in the Appendix. Controls included sex, age, marital status, length of residency, Swedish citizenship and type of religion (Muslim), all of which were expected to influence feelings of integration. Other indices were evaluated but dropped from the analysis and presentation of the results, proving insignificant, including the specific country of origin, and political measures of integration, such as civic activism and voting participation.

### **Part III: Results and Analysis**

Turning to the analysis of the results, Table 2 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis when migrants from different countries were asked about feeling at home in Sweden. The first model includes the standard controls, showing a consistent gender gap; in general, male migrants were significantly more likely to say they feel at home in Sweden than women. Age was also important, with older migrants feeling more at home than the younger cohorts, a counter-intuitive finding, since younger migrants might well be expected to adapt more fluidly to their new home, discussed further in the conclusion. Both sex and age persisted as important and significant predictors throughout the successive models in Table 2 -- as well as across subsequent analysis (Tables 3 and Table 4) suggesting that this is far from a product of measurement error or an accidental fluke. In addition, the migrant's length of residency, Swedish citizenship, and Muslim religion were also significant in the first model in Table 2, although these factors dropped out of the equation once the human and economic capital variables were entered.

[Table 2 about here]

In the second model, Swedish language competencies was both significantly related to feeling at home in Swedish society; not surprisingly being able to communicate fluidly in the host country's mother tongue facilitates social interactions and opportunities.

Contrary to theoretical expectations, however, the effects of education were significant but negative; low-skilled migrants with no or little formal education reported feeling more at home in Sweden than college graduates, a matter discussed in the next section. Moreover, contrary to human capital theories, household savings and paid work were not significant predictors of feeling at home and thereby belonging to Swedish society. By contrast, however, improved standards of living, and being financially satisfied, were related to feeling at home in Sweden.

The final model in Table 2 entered indicators of social capital. This showed that feeling able to adapt to Swedish norms and laws, informal contact with Swedish society, and the strength of Swedish networks, as well as feelings of security and use of the news media, were all positively related to feeling at home in Sweden. All these factors can be expected to facilitate day-to-day informal social interactions with the host society, making migrants feel more included and connected to Swedish society. By contrast to Putnam's (1993) theory of social capital, however, both particularized social trust (such as trust in neighbours and family) and generalized social trust (such as trust towards strangers), along with active membership in a range of voluntary associations, were not significant predictors of feeling at home in Sweden.

As a further replication test of the robustness of the observed findings, Table 3 shows the results of alternative models where the dependent variable was national identities, using a 10-point scale where respondents were asked whether they felt closer to their country of origin, or to Sweden, their country of destiny.

The control variables in the first model in Table 3 again confirmed the gender and age gaps observed earlier; men and older migrants were more likely to identify with Sweden. In this model, moreover, Muslim migrants were significantly more likely than average to say that they felt closer to Sweden than the country they had left. The second model in Table 3 adds the human and economic capital variables, with the results suggesting that again language was an important factor, with competencies in Swedish associated, not surprisingly, with a stronger sense of Swedish identification. Again, contrary to theories of human capital, being employed was negatively related to feelings of Swedish identification, for reasons discussed further below. The indicators of material economic benefits by migrants who had improved their standard of living are all related to feeling Swedish.

The last model added indicators of social capital. Again, social trust was insignificant in both its particularized and generalized forms, as was membership of a range of formal community organizations, providing no support for the Putnam thesis. But adaption to Swedish laws and social norms, the ease of participation in Swedish social



networks, and feelings of security were all linked with feeling more Swedish. Indeed, the strongest single predictor in the whole model was whether migrants found it easy to adapt to Swedish social norms and laws.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

Finally, as an additional replication test, comparable models were run where the dependent variable was feelings of pride in being Swedish more than pride in the country of origin. Similar results were observed in Table 4 to those already described earlier for sex and age, although in this case being Muslim was negatively associated with Swedish national pride. Swedish citizenship and length of residence were also not significantly associated with Swedish national pride. Feelings of pride were also strengthened among those who felt economically well off and better off than their parents, and among those who found it easy to adapt to Swedish laws and norms, as well as, in this case, those who were more trusting. Therefore, overall the replication tests confirm certain similarities in the factors predicting the three dependent variables although, not surprisingly given the related but different concepts being analyzed, some differences can be observed across each of the models.

#### **Part IV: Conclusions and discussion**

The challenge of the successful integration of migrants, understood as a two-way process of adjustment by both the host and the migrant populations, has risen on the policy agenda in many countries. This follows the accelerating pace of global population flows across national borders, as well as the growing diversity of peoples in Europe. Extensive research on the integration of international migrants has focused upon structural conditions associated with employment and education, seen as critical resources which play a major role in improving standards of living for new Swedes, which are expected to facilitate psychological acculturation and feelings of belonging to their new home.

The key findings from this study suggest that if we look more directly at subjective indicators of integration, *migrants who feel that they enjoy economic and financial benefits in their new society are indeed more likely to integrate*. Improvements in material security and well-being is hardly surprising, given the immense contrasts experienced in moving to Sweden from some of the poorest and most conflict-ridden societies around the world.

In addition, *adaptation to Swedish norms and laws, and the more informal forms of contact with Swedish society, also play a significant role in generating the feeling of hygge among migrants*. Nevertheless, feelings of being at home in Sweden and feelings of Swedish national identity were not significantly related to several of the ‘classic’ forms of social capital proposed by Putnam’s theory, including particularized and generalized

trust, and active membership in a range of voluntary associations and community organizations.

Some of the more counter-intuitive results observed in the models deserve further discussion and exploration in future studies. While many previous researchers report a positive correlation between education and objective criteria of integration, this study found the opposite with subjective indices; *the least educated migrants felt the most at home in Swedish society*, although education was not a significant predictor of national identity or pride. A possible explanation for this finding could be that this group tends to receive the most generous state support for integration; they are invited to educational programs where they learn to read and write in Swedish, and they receive financial support and housing during their first two years in Sweden. More educated migrants arriving in Sweden, such as university graduates and skilled professionals, are assumed to manage most of their integration by themselves. This pattern is also illustrated by responses to questions on whether the respondents' lives have improved since arriving in Sweden; while most are positive, the less-educated migrants report the greatest improvement.

Being employed in the host society is also usually seen as an objective indicator of successful integration. Yet the pattern was more complicated for the subjective indicators; *employment status was not such a significant predictor for feeling at home in Sweden and feelings of national pride, while it was negatively associated with feeling Swedish*. One potential explanation may be the nature of the sample. Many of the newly-arrived younger migrants in the study are still in the school system, and most of those who have finished school are not yet employed. Only one fifth of the survey respondents were in paid employment, and one-third of these jobs are only part-time (see Table A1). Thus, the low employment rate in this group remains a major policy challenge facing Swedish society.

Another observation from the results of the study concerns the gender gap; *across all the three indices, men consistently feel more integrated*. This may be because men are often the main breadwinners in their countries of origin, with responsibility for both the economic well-being and the material security of their families. In Sweden, by contrast, many new migrants receive state financial support and housing, thus reducing the responsibilities normally assigned to men. The women still have the same workload as before, for example taking care of children and elderly dependents, as well as household duties. The lives of women migrants may change less than men, even though they now live in Sweden, that generally has far more gender equality than their home countries. The issues of sex roles and gender equality in migrant population raises complex issues which deserve further unpacking in future research.

What are the broader implications of the results? The findings from this study matter not only for Swedish integration policies, but also for other comparable European states. Integration policies have tended to follow two alternative approaches. Multicultural policies underline the importance of states protecting and supporting migrant culture and languages as a mean to facilitate social diversity, for example, by offering classes in many languages in state-funded schools and providing state subsidizes for minority religious schools. By contrast, assimilationist policies stress the importance of state policies encouraging migrants to blend in, learn the language, values and social norms of the new country, along with banning certain religious practices. As mentioned, Sweden adopted an official policy of multiculturalism more than 40 years ago, but it has undergone major changes over time. Today, there is a broader consensus that multiculturalism should be limited by Swedish law. In this view, international agreements, like those standards governing human rights, children's rights, and women's rights, should never be diluted to accommodate cultural differences (Skodo 2018). Policy-wise, this has led to Swedish laws rejecting practices such as corporal punishment of children, under-age marriage, and female genital mutilation. Parallel to this, Swedish policy has come to stress acculturation, the adaption of migrants to Swedish values and ways of life. Government policies have sought to include migrants in Swedish society, both *objectively*, through expanding opportunities for language skills, education and participation in working life, and also *subjectively*, the focus of this article.


An in-depth understanding of the process of integration is a prerequisite for a more constructive and evidence-based public dialogue on migrant issues. All people have multiple identities: professionally in the workforce, as family members at home, and as citizens in the public sphere. How these identities are balanced affects our behaviour and the success of our social relationships. Theories of ethnic forms of nationalism often assume that feelings of national identity are acquired in early life, from growing up in, say, Syria, Eritrea or Somalia, shaped by cues of blood and belonging, shared customs and enduring traditions. Ethnic national identities are thought to be learnt during one's formative years, so that they are largely fixed by the time a person reaches adulthood (Ignatieff 1995). We believe this assumption needs to be revised somewhat. This article has shown that subjective integration can be relatively short-term process whereby new migrants react positively and come to feel at home in Sweden within a decade of arrival.

A substantial body of survey evidence demonstrates that cultural attitudes among migrants remain far less socially liberal than host populations in Europe. Previous studies have found that many attitudes and values of migrants, such as those towards religion and gender equality, are often located approximately half way between their country of origins and their country of destiny (Norris and Inglehart

2012). In this survey, as well, many migrants to Sweden expressed traditional values which strongly disapproved of an individual's right to decide about their sexual orientation, choice of partner, or whether they should marry, have children, have abortions or divorce, all attitudes where Sweden are very socially liberal. In this regard, traditional cultural values among migrant populations seem likely to evolve relatively slowly, without adopting the socially-liberal culture in Sweden overnight.

At the same time, the evidence examined here also suggests that *cultural differences can persist but migrants can still feel at home in Sweden and express pride in their new country of destiny*. The results suggest that, under certain circumstances, rather than being fixed from early childhood, feelings of national identity can also prove relatively fluid and adaptable. Many migrants from the Global South report that they feel at home in Sweden, they identify more closely with Sweden than with their country of origin, and they feel proud of becoming Swedish. These positive reactions are generally strengthened by the feeling that it is easy to adapt to Swedish laws and norms, by a sense of security and safety, and by experience of improved life conditions and economic situations in their new home. Of course, in some ways this is hardly surprising, after all Sweden is an affluent post-industrial society with a generous welfare state and high standard of living. By contrast, many migrants come from war zones and poor countries with dysfunctional infrastructures. Nevertheless, the many positive benefits which migrants experience when living in Sweden shapes not just material improvements in lifestyles, for themselves and their families, but also their feelings of integration into their new home.

**Figure 1: Public concern about immigration in Sweden**



**Note:** Proportion mentioning immigration in Sweden.

**Source:** Eurobarometer <http://ec.europa.eu>

**Table 1: Descriptive statistics**

	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation
<b>INDICATORS OF SUBJECTIVE INTEGRATION</b>					
Feel at home in Sweden	6516	0	1	0.59	0.49
Feel closer to Sweden than country of origins	6516	1	10	7.26	1.94
Feel more pride in Sweden than country of origins	6516	2	8	5.20	0.61
<b>CONTROLS</b>					
Sex (Male)	6516	0	1	0.45	0.50
Age (Years)	6361	13	84	33.38	12.48
Marital status	6516	0	1	0.53	0.50
Length of residency	6455	0	11	3.19	2.66
Citizenship (Swedish)	6516	0	1	0.18	0.38
Type of religion (Muslim)	6516	0	1	0.56	0.50
<b>HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL</b>					
Education (Low>High)	6516	0	6	3.61	1.72
Swedish language	6516	2	5	4.32	0.80
Household savings (Low>High)	6516	1	4	2.87	0.73
Employment status (In work)	6516	0	1	0.19	0.34
Economic benefit	6516	1	5	3.77	1.18
Financial satisfaction	6516	1	5	3.77	1.18
Relative economic mobility	6516	1	10	4.99	2.22
Standard of living	6516	1	3	2.37	0.55
<b>SOCIAL CAPITAL</b>					
Adapt to Swedish society	6516	1	10	7.59	2.04
Particularized trust	6516	25	100	77.78	9.41
Generalized trust	6516	25	100	62.18	11.05
Contact with Swedish society	6516	1	4	2.98	0.81
Swedish networks	6516	0	1	0.57	0.42
Voluntary organizations	6516	0	99	8.95	9.35
Feelings of security	6516	1	4	3.38	0.43
Use of legacy media (TV, papers, radio)	6516	3	15	9.39	2.00
Use of social media	6516	4	20	17.07	2.03
Valid N (listwise)	6310				

**Note:** See the Technical Appendix for all variables and codings.

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrant

**Table 2: Predictors of integration: Feeling at home in Sweden**

	Controls			Human and economic capital			Social capital		
	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.
Sex (Male)	0.21	0.06	***	0.27	0.06	***	0.19	0.06	***
Age	0.02	0.00	***	0.03	0.00	***	0.03	0.00	***
Marital status	-0.10	0.06	N/s	-0.11	0.07	N/s	-0.13	0.07	N/s
Length of residency	0.04	0.01	***	0.01	0.01	N/s	0.02	0.01	N/s
Citizenship (Swedish)	0.22	0.09	**	0.12	0.09	N/s	0.10	0.09	N/s
Type of religion (Muslim)	-0.15	0.06	**	-0.02	0.06	N/s	-0.03	0.06	N/s
<b>HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL</b>									
Education (Low>High)				-0.10	0.02	***	-0.10	0.02	***
Swedish language				0.34	0.04	***	0.27	0.04	***
Household savings (Low>High)				0.03	0.04	N/s	-0.01	0.04	N/s
Employment status (In work)				-0.06	0.09	N/s	-0.06	0.09	N/s
Economic benefit				0.23	0.03	***	0.20	0.03	***
Financial satisfaction				0.07	0.01	***	0.04	0.01	**
Relative economic mobility				0.13	0.05	**	0.10	0.05	N/s
<b>SOCIAL CAPITAL</b>									
Adapt to Swedish society							0.09	0.01	***
Particularized trust							0.00	0.00	N/s
Generalized trust							0.00	0.00	N/s
Contact with Swedish society							0.12	0.04	***
Swedish networks							0.46	0.07	***
Voluntary organizations							0.00	0.00	N/s
Feelings of security							0.50	0.07	***
Use of legacy media							0.05	0.02	**
Use of social media use							-0.01	0.02	N/s
Constant	-0.38	0.10	***	-3.42	0.28	***	-6.29	0.48	***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	0.03			0.11			0.16		
% correctly predicted	59.9			65.0			66.60		

**Note:** Binary logistic regression models where the dependent variable is 'feeling at home in Sweden' Yes (1)/ No (0).

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrants.

**Table 3: Predictors of integration: Swedish national identity**

	Controls				Human and economic capital				Social capital			
	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig.
Sex (Male)	0.18	0.05	0.05	***	0.21	0.05	0.05	***	0.13	0.05	0.03	***
Age	0.01	0.00	0.08	***	0.02	0.00	0.11	***	0.01	0.00	0.08	***
Marital status	-0.07	0.06	-0.02	N/s	-0.08	0.06	-0.02	N/s	-0.07	0.05	-0.02	N/s
Length of residency	0.01	0.01	0.02	N/s	0.01	0.01	0.01	N/s	0.01	0.01	0.01	N/s
Citizenship (Swedish)	-0.03	0.08	-0.01	N/s	-0.08	0.08	-0.02	N/s	-0.08	0.07	-0.02	N/s
Type of religion (Muslim)	0.17	0.05	0.04	***	0.21	0.05	0.05	***	0.18	0.05	0.05	***
<b>HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL</b>												
Education (Low>High)					-0.02	0.01	-0.02	N/s	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	N/s
Swedish language					0.10	0.03	0.04	***	0.04	0.03	0.02	N/s
Household savings (Low>High)					-0.05	0.03	-0.02	N/s	-0.08	0.03	-0.03	*
Employment status (In work)					-0.20	0.08	-0.04	**	-0.19	0.07	-0.03	**
Economic benefit					0.10	0.02	0.06	***	0.08	0.02	0.05	***
Financial satisfaction					0.08	0.01	0.09	***	0.04	0.01	0.05	***
Relative economic mobility					0.13	0.05	0.04	**	0.10	0.04	0.03	*
<b>SOCIAL CAPITAL</b>												
Adapt to Swedish society									0.23	0.01	0.24	***
Particularized trust									0.01	0.00	0.02	N/s
Generalized trust									0.00	0.00	-0.01	N/s
Contact with Swedish society									0.02	0.03	0.01	N/s
Swedish social networks									0.22	0.06	0.05	***
Voluntary organizations									0.00	0.00	-0.01	N/s
Feelings of security									0.20	0.06	0.04	***
Use of legacy media (TV, papers, radio)									0.01	0.01	0.01	N/s
Use of social media									0.00	0.01	0.00	N/s
(Constant)	6.67	0.08		***	5.28	0.23		***	3.25	0.37		***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.01			0.03					0.09			

**Notes:** OLS Linear regression where the dependent variable is national identity measured by feeling closer to the country of destiny (Sweden) than the country of origin (10-point scale)

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrants.



**Table 4: Predictors of integration: Swedish national pride**

	Controls				Human and Economic Capital				Social capital			
	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig.	B	SE	Beta	Sig.
Sex (Male)	0.12	0.02	0.10	***	0.12	0.02	0.10	***	0.11	0.02	0.09	***
Age	0.00	0.00	0.03	*	0.00	0.00	0.05	***	0.00	0.00	0.03	*
Marital status	0.02	0.02	0.02	N/s	0.02	0.02	0.02	N/s	0.02	0.02	0.02	N/s
Length of residency	0.00	0.00	0.02	N/s	0.00	0.00	0.01	N/s	0.00	0.00	0.01	N/s
Citizenship (Swedish)	0.00	0.02	0.00	N/s	-0.01	0.02	0.00	N/s	-0.01	0.02	0.00	N/s
Type of religion (Muslim)	-0.06	0.02	-0.05	***	-0.05	0.02	-0.04	***	-0.05	0.02	-0.04	***
<b>HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL</b>												
Education (Low>High)					0.00	0.01	-0.01	N/s	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	N/s
Swedish language					0.03	0.01	0.04	***	0.02	0.01	0.02	N/s
Household savings (Low>High)					0.00	0.01	0.00	N/s	0.00	0.01	0.00	N/s
Employment status (In work)					0.01	0.02	0.01	N/s	0.01	0.02	0.00	N/s
Economic benefit					0.03	0.01	0.06	***	0.03	0.01	0.06	***
Financial satisfaction					-0.01	0.00	-0.02	N/s	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	*
Relative economic mobility					0.04	0.01	0.04	***	0.04	0.01	0.04	**
<b>SOCIAL CAPITAL</b>												
Adapt to Swedish society									0.03	0.00	0.10	***
Particularized trust									0.00	0.00	-0.04	**
Generalized trust									0.00	0.00	0.06	***
Contact with Swedish society									0.01	0.01	0.01	N/s
Swedish networks									0.01	0.02	0.00	N/s
Voluntary organizations									0.00	0.00	-0.01	N/s
Feelings of security									0.01	0.02	0.01	N/s
Use of legacy media (TV, papers, radio)									0.01	0.00	0.02	N/s
Use of social media									0.00	0.00	0.00	N/s
(Constant)	5.11	0.03		***	4.80	0.07		***	4.56	0.12		***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.01				0.02				0.03			

**Notes:** OLS Linear regression where the dependent variable is feelings of pride in being Swedish more than pride in the country of origin (10-point scale)

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrants.

**Appendix A: Variables, measurement, and coding**

Variable	Question	Coding
<b>INDICATORS OF SUBJECTIVE INTEGRATION</b>		
Feeling at home in Sweden	Do you feel at home in Sweden?	Yes, very much at home (1)/ Yes just a little bit, or No not at all (0)
National identity	As a migrant you have a lot of new things to decide about in your new country. Do you feel most akin /connected to the country you come from or to Sweden?	Closer to country of origin (0)/ To Sweden (10)
National pride	How proud are you to be Swedish? How proud are you of your country of origin?	8-point combined scale (Proud of being Swedish 1-4, plus Not proud of country of origin)
<b>CONTROLS</b>		
Sex (Male)	R's sex	Male (1), female (0)
Age	When were you born?	Years
Marital status	Are you currently...	Married/living together as married (1), else (0)
Length of residency	When did you arrive in Sweden?	Years 2007-2018
Citizenship (Swedish)	Are you a Swedish citizen?	
Type of religion (Muslim)	Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?	Muslim (1), else (0)
<b>HUMAN AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL</b>		
Education (Low>High)	What is the highest educational level that you have attained?	No education (0) to Doctoral or equivalent (8).
Swedish language	During your time in Sweden, have your expectations been met with regards to the following: Learning the Swedish language	From 'Not at all' (1) to Very well (5)
Household savings (Low>High)	During the past year, did your family do any of the following?	Spent savings and borrowed money (1), Spent some savings (2), Just got by (3), Saved money (4).
Employment status (In work)	Are you employed?	Yes FT, PT or self-employed (1), else (0)
Economic benefit	How do you think it has been in Sweden compared to the country you came from? Your economic conditions	Not much improvement (1) to Significant improvement (4)

Financial satisfaction	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?	Completely dissatisfied (0)/ Completely satisfied (1)
Relative economic mobility	Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are ...	Worse off (1), about the same (2), or better off (3)
<b>SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CAPITAL</b>		
Adapt to Swedish society	Do you think it is difficult to adapt to the laws and norms that exist in Sweden?	Very difficult (1)/Very easy (10)
Particularized trust	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group? Your family? Your neighborhood? People you know personally?	Completely (4), somewhat (3), not very much (2) or not at all (1). 12-point additive scale.
Generalized trust	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group? People you meet for the first time? People of another nationality? People of another religion?	Completely (4), somewhat (3), not very much (2) or not at all (1). 12-point additive scale.
Contact with Swedish society	During your time in Sweden, have your expectations been met with regards to the following: Contacts with Swedish society	From 'Not at all' (1) to Very well (5)
Swedish social networks	Do you think it's easy to meet Swedes?	No (0), Yes (1)
Voluntary organizations	Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are...	Not a member (0), an inactive member (1) or an active member (2)
Feelings of security	Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?	Not very secure (1) to very secure (4)

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrants.

**Appendix Table A1. Characteristics of the migrant respondents**

<b>CHARACTERISTICS</b>	<b>CODING</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>AGE GROUP</b>	Under 25	29
	25-34	27
	25-44	23
	45 and above	20
<b>EDUCATION</b>	No school	5
	Elementary	40
	Upper secondary	36
	University graduate	19
<b>CITIZENSHIP</b>	Swedish citizen	18
	Not	82
<b>DURATION OF SWEDISH RESIDENCY</b>	Less than one year	12
	One year	16
	Two years	12
	Three years	31
	Four years	11
	Five years	5
	Six Years	4
	More than 6 years	10
<b>RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION</b>	Muslim	67
	Catholic	5
	Protestant	3
	Orthodox	8
	Other	9
	None	8
<b>GENDER</b>	Man	45
	Woman	55
<b>COUNTRY OF BIRTH</b>	Afghanistan	9
	Eritrea	7
	Iran	3
	Iraq	7
	Somalia	6
	Syria	36
	Other	33
<b>EMPLOYMENT STATUS</b>	FT Work	11
	PT work	7
	Self-employed	1
	Houseperson	7
	Retired	2
	Student	49
	Unemployed	12
	Other	12
<b>REASON FOR MIGRATION (MULTIPLE CHOICE)</b>	War and conflict	43
	Better opportunities	27

**Source:** The World Values Survey (WVS-7) survey of Swedish migrants.

## Acknowledgments

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<sup>1</sup> An international migrant is defined by UN DESA as someone who has been living for one year or longer in a country other than the one in which he or she was born. This means that many foreign workers and international students are counted as migrants, but not those visiting for a shorter period.

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<sup>2</sup> See also [https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock\\_abs\\_&t=2017](https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_&t=2017) for the distribution and estimates.

<sup>3</sup> OECD. 2017. *Key statistics on migration in OECD countries*.

<http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm>

<sup>4</sup> The UN Migration Agency: International Organization for Migration. ‘*Integration and Social Cohesion*.’ Global Pact thematic paper.

[https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our\\_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Integration-and-Social-Cohesion.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Integration-and-Social-Cohesion.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> For example, in the series of Eurobarometer surveys from March 1999 to November 2018, when asked about their feelings of attachment, around half of all Germans and French said that they felt ‘very attached’ to their own country, whereas around one fifth said that they felt the same about Europe. See <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/>

<sup>6</sup> <http://research.newamericaneconomy.org/report/nearly-6-million-workers-employed-at-immigrant-owned-businesses-new-report-finds/>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/52/mcs050916>

<sup>8</sup> <https://clas.berkeley.edu/research/immigration-economic-benefits-immigration>. See also Maja Povzhanovic Frykman. 2018. *Högutbildade migranter i Sverige*, Arkiv Förlag.

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/16/immigrants-dont-make-up-a-majority-of-workers-in-any-u-s-industry/>

<sup>10</sup> UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/europe-emergency.html>

<sup>11</sup> OECD. 2017. *International Migration Outlook, 2017 -Statistical Annex*. Version 2 - Last updated: 08-Jun-2017.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2017. *International Migrant Stock, 2015*. New York: UN.

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<sup>13</sup> OECD 2017. *International Migration Outlook, 2017 -Statistical Annex*. Version 2 - Last updated: 08-Jun-2017. [http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2017\\_migr\\_outlook-2017-en](http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2017_migr_outlook-2017-en)

<sup>14</sup>

[http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START\\_\\_BE\\_\\_BE0101\\_\\_BE0101Q/UtlSvBakgGroV/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b393edc4-b193-431b-9c4c-ffbde09b6751](http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START__BE__BE0101__BE0101Q/UtlSvBakgGroV/table/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=b393edc4-b193-431b-9c4c-ffbde09b6751)

<sup>15</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Being\\_young\\_in\\_Europe\\_today\\_-\\_demographic\\_trends](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Being_young_in_Europe_today_-_demographic_trends)

<sup>16</sup> For overviews, see <https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/public-opinion-migration>. See also Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, Anita Pugliese, Dato Tsabutashvili. 2015. *How the World Views Migration*. Berlin: International Organization for Migration.

[http://publications.iom.int/system/files/how\\_the\\_world\\_gallup.pdf](http://publications.iom.int/system/files/how_the_world_gallup.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/node/64>

<sup>18</sup> Data for the 7<sup>th</sup> wave WVS/EVS survey will be released in 2020. Full methodological details about the World Values Surveys, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures,

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fieldwork procedures, principle investigators, and organization can be found at:  
[www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

<sup>19</sup> Household income, subjective social class, and occupation were not included in the survey.