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Abstract

Traditional welfare states have gradually become more involved in competition politics. In order to sustain economic growth in a globalising economy these states get increasingly supply oriented and act to promote technological change, innovations and entrepreneurship. In Sweden, efforts to develop knowledge based niches have become key elements in an increasingly growth oriented regional/industrial policy. This paper will address the spatial implications of these changes. Two territorial approaches can be fruitfully identified. First, the growth policy is based on an economic geography in which the promotion of regional specialisation and industrial clusters are vital parts. Thus, focus is turning from the periphery towards the centre as aims and means are directed towards international competitiveness. Second, the decentralisation of regional policy and the orientation towards partnerships, networks and cross sector co-operations is driving towards a spatial fragmentation where time and space specific regions are created on a project basis. The contours of a development system of regions partly over-lapping each others can be identified.

1. The competition politics: a new role for welfare states?

The Swedish welfare state was established in a nationally defined and highly corporative environment. It was based on the existence of mass-producing export sectors and high skill/high wage production. Economic growth was promoted by state intervention mainly on the demand side of the economy; re-distribution of incomes and the establishment of welfare institutions provided a national consumption base. Also, the welfare state was a national state aiming at levelling regional disparities within its territory. Regional policies were highly re-distributive and the role of regional and local authorities was primarily to implement and supervise state policies.

During the last few decades, challenges like stagnating growth, the internationalisation of financial markets and the recognition of an ageing population have forced the state to engage increasingly in promoting economic growth. This is following an international trend in which traditional welfare states respond to problems like outward flow of capital, penetration of foreign capital and an increasingly international division of labour, all making the control mechanisms of the welfare state less effective.

Jessop (2002, pp 94) describes the emergence of a “competition state” which is the state that aims to secure economic growth within its borders and to secure competitive advantages for nationally based capital. The state is actively seeking to promote the development of export

oriented niches where there are options to be internationally competitive. Not the least in small economies like the Nordic countries, this means an orientation towards the supply-side of the economy, searching the knowledge based niches in expanding sectors of the economy in which the small economy may be able to compete on the global market. Empirical studies indicate that a competition state phenomenon takes place in many European countries (i.e. Héretier et al. 1996; Wishblade 2003, Sørensen 2002).

One of the characteristics of the “competition state” is a process of re-scaling. The welfare state is a *national* state insofar that the national territory is the basis for generalising prosperity to all households and to all localities and regions. The emergence of a “competition state” is driven by the fact that states could no longer act as if national economies were more or less closed. Moreover, regions and localities are increasingly found to have their own specific problems and relative advantages. The competitiveness of cities and regions is now said to depend not only on narrow economic determinants but also on localised interdependencies, knowledge assets, regional competencies, institutional thickness, social capital, trust and capacities for collective learning as well as distinctive and attractive local amenities and culture (Jessop 2002, p 109). The promotion by the state of technological change, innovations and entrepreneurship must be executed on a sub national level. Therefore, a decentralisation of regional/industrial policy is a key element of the emerging competition policy.

The ‘advent’ of the ‘competition state’ signals a new role for the state. Whilst the purpose of the welfare state is to redistribute incomes and to equalise living conditions between regions and localities, the ‘competition state’ in contrast develop different strategies for various parts of its territory. Each region is encouraged to develop its own unique conditions. Thus, competition policies open up for uneven regional development.

The active promotion of economic growth in itself is not a new task for the state (Lundquist 2003). Policies for economic growth and the development of welfare institutions are traditionally closely linked and mutually dependent. What has become vital and what may conflict the traditional regional policy is the active selection of areas, regions and milieux that are considered suitable for international competition and which become subject for state efforts to increase their ability to compete. Neither does the competition policy replace the welfare policy; it is rather a perspective emerging alongside the traditional re-distributive policies as one of the multiple and often contradictory roles of the state.

Besides the changing *aims* of the regional/industrial policy there is also a shift in the *forms* of state government. The view of the state as a single sovereign body ruling on a top-down basis with regulations and subsidies has been questioned both in state theory and in everyday practice. These changes has been thoroughly examined in the debate on a change from *government* to *governance* (i.e. Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997; Klickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997; Brinton & Provan 2000; Peters & Pierre 2000). Within the field of regional policy in the Nordic countries these changes are obvious. The state is decentralising the policy formulation to regional and local levels, thereby opening up for a regional self-organisation based on sector crossing partnerships, networks etc. The role of the state is to provide the arena; deregulate, decentralise and build institutions that may support but not in detail govern regional activities (Westholm 2000). Within modern state theory it is a common theme that the top-down rationale is replaced by a complex fabric of actors involved in giving the cause of events its direction and content (Sörenssen 2002 p 45-62). In Sweden, several studies have analysed the increasing number of public/public and public/private co-operations (i.e. Gossas

2003). These theories and studies correspond to changes that are explicit also in policy formation (for instance in Sweden: prop 2001/02: 2004.) The concept of Innovations Systems which has become a key perspective in regional and national development in the EU and its member states, express the expectations on some kind of more or less self-organised merging of actors as a key issue for the development of growth niches.

Whether these changes means a withdrawal of the state or should be interpreted as a changing way of national state governing is not yet clear. Pierre (2000:1) calls the development from government to governance the most important change in the advanced democracies in modern times: *the erosion of traditional bases of political power*". Jessop describes it as a process of relativisation of scale in which the national space is not as dominant as it was during the first post-war decades (Jessop 2002, p 172-179).

Thus, the problems of the welfare state have resulted in a "relativisation" of the national territory as the basis for state activity. This is a double process of both increased involvement in international relations and a decentralisation to regions and localities of functions that has traditionally been executed on national level.

Alongside the decentralisation following on competition politics there is also a decentralisation of the traditional welfare functions. In the light of New Public Management, welfare states have adopted values such as user's choice, quality, effectiveness and efficiency (Giddens 2003). Decentralisation of decision-making, planning and service delivery has been considered a central instrument to enhance the quality of social services.

In the following, some spatial implications of the decentralisation of state functions in Sweden during the last two decades will be analysed. The decentralisation of welfare functions and the emergence of a decentralised regional competition policy have resulted in an increasingly asymmetric system where the regional level is differently organised in various parts of the country. Also the local authorities are under pressure for change; in their everyday activities they transcend borders and get increasingly involved in networks and politics beyond the territory on which their mandate is resting. The aim is to explain the current crisis of the political/administrative system materialised in a vast state activity to re-organise the political organisation at regional and local levels. The crisis appears to be a crisis of re-scaling as the decentralisation of the state towards a self-organising system of actors has built into the system a process of spatial fragmentation.

2. Decentralisation of welfare functions in Sweden

Decentralisation of the welfare functions has been a general trend in OECD countries since at least the 1980's. The motives and the practical arrangements vary depending on ideological differences as well as the country specific traditions of centralisation, funding etc. In Sweden, with a long tradition of publicly funded welfare and also with welfare services mainly produced by public authorities, privatisation has not been the primary mode of decentralisation. In some regions, there was an expansion of non-profit organisations carrying out social services as part of the emerging social economy (Westlund and Westerdahl 1998). The main form was co-operatives taking charge of traditionally public services as child care, health care and dental care (Lorendahl 1996).

On a national basis the share of publicly funded services provided by private or civil organisations is still low although it increased from 6% to 12% from 1990-2000 (se källa i Valfärdsbokslutet). The main form of decentralisation took place within the public sector as

delegation of education, elderly care, etc from the state and from county councils to the local authorities.

In Sweden, the local authorities has played a major role in the expansion of the welfare services during the post - war era. The local authorities are, in an international comparison relatively few and powerful and their activity correspond to a substantial share of the GDP. They raise their own taxes, they are in many ways politically independent and can define their own responsibilities. The relatively strong position of local authorities as political and administrative units can be described as a result of their importance in the welfare system (Bergmark 2001). Especially the expansion of social policy demanded a strong local level and the system of local authorities was reformed 1952 and 1970 in order to fulfil the ambitions of the welfare state. In many ways the local sphere has been integrated in the welfare state concept to such a degree that they have been labelled “welfare localities” (välfärdskommuner; Premfors 1996).

The decentralisation of political powers to the local authorities may be seen as a withdrawal of responsibilities from the state in favour of increased local government. Three forms of decentralisation of welfare functions have been identified: a) delegation of authorities, b) financing (balance between general and specified state grants) and c) the degree of binding regulations. All these forms have been a concern of decentralisation in Sweden during the second half of the 2000th century in Sweden. The main sectors that have been the target of decentralisation during the 1990’s were:

- * The *education system* was fully transferred from the state to the local authorities in 1991.
- * The local authorities got *increased authority concerning their internal organisation* 1992.
- * The replacement of directed state payments with *general grants which the local authorities could allocate according to their own priorities*. 1993.
- * A major decentralisation within the *elderly care* took place in 1992 when the local authorities gained the overall responsibility for the elderly care from the county councils. (ÄDEL – reformen). Similar decentralisations took place within *the care of disabled persons* (1994) and *the psychiatric care* (1995). The motive was to increase the opportunity for user’s preferences to come through.
- * In 1995, the local authorities gained an increased responsibility within the *labour market policy*, including the formation of measures against youth unemployment etc.

Parallel to the decentralisation process there has also been steps taken that have balanced the effects of the decentralisation. The state introduced a ban on tax increases 1991-1993 and in the end of the 1990’s there was also new regulations for instance in order to safe guard a basic standard within the child care etc. An overall assessment is that the decentralisations of welfare functions have had limited effects on the political/administrative system in general. For some of the welfare functions the differences in standard between local authorities has increased. This goes for some of the costs for education, social subsistence and elderly care. Other functions seem to have a decreased variation; the care for children and young adults.

These changes may well be effects of economic pressures rather than decentralisation. To conclude, the decentralisations of the welfare system does not appear as a withdrawal of the

welfare state in favour of more local political powers. Bergmark (SOU 2001:52) concludes that the transfer of political and administrative powers over welfare functions in Sweden should be seen as a further integration of local authorities in the national welfare state. Within this process, there is an increasing economic pressure on the local authorities which brings on the agenda the issue of a possible third enlargement reform of the local authorities. Demographic changes has made already small localities even smaller with a declining income base for local tax. Technological change and high labour costs are adding to the relevance of economies of scale also for the public sector.

3. Competition state politics in Sweden

Within the emerging field of regional/industrial politics, decentralisation has taken more diffuse and discursive routes. A few important steps can be identified in this transition:

* *The Swedish EU-membership 1995.* The arrival of the structural funds introduced a number of various “regions” for the programme schemes of Objective 1, 2, Leader, URBAN, Interreg etc. It was also a decentralisation as regional authorities, county councils and local authorities played a vital role in the implementation of the programmes. The programmes demanded from the regions to be able to formulate needs and opportunities and to produce co-financing of the measures. Also, the co-financing system forced the Swedish regional and local administrations to cross their borders and become actors in the re-territorialisation process. For instance the Leader programme and Interreg introduced new regions, which explicitly were constructed to transgress traditional boundaries. In this process, new divisions of space were introduced involving, but also conflicting, the traditional political-administrative organisation (Larsson 2002).

In the expenditure of the Structural Funds, as well as in specific Community Initiatives, the principle of partnerships is used both vertically, to link the different levels of administration to each other, and horizontally to involve a broad variety of locally active private, public and voluntary organisations in the analysis (SWAT-analysis) and in projects and actions. In the EU programmes and initiatives a number of advantages with partnerships have been raised. Co-ordination of policies/programmes/activities, pooling of skills, sharing of risks, leverage of additional resources and cross-fertilisation of creative ideas were some of the benefits pointed out and reflecting the hopes in partnerships as a general element in regional politics. (Geddes 1998). Thus, besides being a measure in the effort to generate dynamic development strategies the partnership approach also added to the “relativisation of space”.

** Swedish regional policy; from distribution of welfare to global competitiveness*

The national regional policy has changed in a similar direction to correspond with the structural Funds. Over a 20-year period the Swedish regional policy gradually changed from focussing weak and peripheral rural regions to a policy for growth and development in all regions. The traditional policy aiming at redistributing wealth and equalise living conditions has gradually been replaced by a policy striving to take advantage of the varying opportunities in different localities. Local and regional economies have increasingly been recognised to have their own specific problems that could not be resolved either through national economic policies or uniformly imposed regional policies. This prompted demands for regionally tailored and targeted policies to be developed and implemented within the regions.

Decentralisation has been an important element as the endogenous idiom replaced the idea of a top-down rationale. The management of capital accessible for regional development in various state bodies was decentralised to the regions in 1998 (prop 1997/98:68). The regional

authorities “created” broad partnerships from all sectors to produce “growth programmes”, regional development plans. The programmes are formulated by the regional authorities in cooperation with a number of thematic and sub regional partnerships in the region. In these programmes are built in SWAT-analyses and to expose regional resources/abilities, and assess the physical infrastructure, natural resources, culture, identity, institutions, etc. As with the Structural Funds, the national regional policy has developed a multitude of new more or less project based regions based on projects and partnerships.

* *A regional development policy*

In the latest governmental proposition on regional policy (prop 2001/2004:4) the issue of national competitiveness is explicitly made the key issue while the stabilising role of regional policy is played down. The policy states that all regions in all parts of the country should strive for economic growth in order to maximise the national growth rate. Thus, in a 15 – year period the role of the regions in regional policy has changed from being the subject for redistributional measures to becoming the basis for national growth.

In the implementation of the current regional policy, *the regional development policy*, the state is aiming at mobilise and force the regions to increased initiatives. The policy change is described as a political reform of state policy in order to make the regions responsible for regional development “thereby contributing to the national interest of competitiveness”. (NUTEK 2003)

A key element of the *regional development policy* is a changing view on the geographical scale. It is clearly stated that concentration of economic activities is favouring the national growth rate. Therefore, the regional policy is aiming at increasing the size of the labour markets. As the policies for increased mobility of labour between regions and labour markets, the current measures are directed to increase the commuting. *The enlargement of regions* as a state policy is signalling a change of focus from the sparsely populated parts of the country towards towns and cities as the nodes for regional growth processes. The change is built on economic theories on the importance of strong regional clusters (i.e. Porter 1999, Maskell/Malmberg 2002). In the traditional contradiction between stability and mobility as a national policy for the welfare state, increased international competition has made mobility the key to success.

* *The Innovation Systems Policy*

At the Lisbon summit meeting 2001 the EU decided to become “*the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.*” (Lengrand, 2002). At the same time, VINNOVA (Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems) developed a regional policy for development and growth. The purpose was to

“*promote sustainable growth in the regions based on international ability, by successively developing or further developing the functioning dynamics and effectiveness of innovations systems in functional regions at an international level.*” (Vinnova 2001)

The programme takes the previous development of regional policy further steps towards a “competition state”. Firstly, the traditional regional policy aiming at equalisation within a national context is here re-placed by an emphasis on international competitiveness. The innovations policy is addressing regions with capability to become internationally competitive. The state is aiming at supporting so called Triple Helix-formations; coalitions

between business, universities and the state with ability to develop competitive niches. Secondly, a functional approach to the concept of “region” is fully adapted. Vinnova defined a region as “*the groups, coalitions, partnerships applying to the programme and the location of their core competencies and supporting activities*”. *The traditional administrative regions which become involved and which become important players are dependent on these locations.*

Obviously, the regional innovations policy is adapting a functional approach to regions as time and space specific projects to which the political/administrative system will have to adapt. The system of regions is becoming increasingly asymmetric and fragmented as it is built on numerous of “projects” with varying actors, sectors and levels.

To conclude, the formation of a *regional development policy* over a 15-20 year period and of an *innovations systems policy* over the last few years, has brought about a fundamental shift in the approach to the regions in Sweden. In the outline above of these changes, two spatial approaches has been identified. First, the growth policy is based on an economic geography in which the promotion of regional specialisation and industrial clusters are vital parts. Regional enlargement is a key-word; the increasing of labour markets is a strategy to utilize economies of scale. Sparsely populated regions and small labour markets must be functionally linked to towns and cities. Thus, focus is turning from the periphery towards the centre. Second, the decentralisation of regional policy and the orientation towards networks and sector – crossing co-operations is driving towards a spatial fragmentation where time and space specific regions are created on a project basis.

In the following section, these two changes are further elaborated as a basis for some conclusions on the difficulties for the state to organise the political administration on various levels to meet the demands of both welfare and competition policies.

4. Two ways of re-territorialisation

The enlargement of functional regions

The Swedish regional policy has made *regional enlargement* as a central theme. The idea is to compensate a sparse population with increased mobility so that the labour markets increase. It is a policy mainly based on an economic geography, developed during the 1990’s in the US and Europe. This research stresses that the process of globalisation is increasing rather than reducing the impact of location on industrial performance (*Lundeqvist 2002*). The competitive advantages in a global economy are often heavily local, arising from concentrations of highly specialised skills and knowledge, institutions, rivals and customers (*Porter 1998*). A main feature of this research is that nearness and density is a fundamental prerequisite for economic growth. People and economic activity tend to concentrate in cities and industrial regions. The concentration of economic activity is basically a reflection of the economies of scale, working through the existence of fixed costs, independent of the volumes produced. In order to obtain the volumes, production is drawn towards bigger markets with the results that these markets continue to grow. Without economies of scale the enterprises and plants could have been evenly distributed over space (*Dahl et al 2003*). The most pronounced message from the new economic geography is that regions with larger population have a more diversified economy and a higher potential for economic growth than small/sparse regions. The number of branches, vital for the dynamics of the economy is correlated to population size.

The new economic geography is also developing beyond neo-classic economics. The knowledge-based economy is built on learning, which takes place in interactions. The learning processes are the results, not only of relations between firms but also between firms and customers, component suppliers and public and private institutions (*Lorenzen 2002*). Therefore, the content of regional policies must evolve within the region and be based upon a profound knowledge of what its ability or capacity is in relation to those of other regions (*Maskell 1997*). The potential of geographical density in terms of communication is also founded on the opportunities to build “cultural density”. Close relations between economic entities form the basis for social capital, trust and understanding which all are seen to be crucial components of economic growth (*Lorenzen 2002*). The “innovations systems” and “regional clusters” are key concepts indicating that the crossing of frontiers between actors is a key to economic growth.

A few policy implications for non-urban areas are following on these economic geography developments. First, specialisation may be necessary in order to obtain the increased number of interactions and thus the learning and growth stimulating processes. Clusters of firms related to each other can build learning networks also in environments where the total number of economic activities is limited (*Lorenzen 2002*). The spatial clustering as a means to increase competitiveness is well supported in research (*Malmberg and Maskell 2002*). Second, within the limits of the population size in a region, an increase of the dynamics of the labour market is a way of promoting density. A more fluid labour market gives better job opportunities for the individual and more employees to choose from for the employer. To some extent the breaking of ethnic, gender and class barriers on the labour market can add to the dynamics. The same effect will come from increased mobility of labour between, for instance, public and private sector.

A more powerful effect on the labour market dynamics can be achieved by increasing commuting; regional enlargement is a main recipe for increasing the labour market dynamics. Hence infrastructure investments are often the means in the new economic geography.

A system of thin regions

The other spatial approach could be described as a flexible space. On a European level a trend of re-territorialisation has been recognised (e.g. *Ray 2001*). It represents, simultaneously, a process of atomisation and of increasingly complex connectivity between places. Local action groups, Local Authorities, development agencies etc are progressively involved in projects and activities that create their own spatial formations. The process is supported by decentralisation of national political-administrative systems as well as the Structural Funds. EU policies are dividing the territory in new ways and sometimes explicitly aiming at creating new regions based on for instance a single funding framework (i.e. the Leader programme, *Larsson 2002*). The initiating factors for the emergence of a new region can be primarily endogenous or they can be to any extent external. Moreover, the new regions can be mainly stemming from increased pressure for changes or from emerging opportunities. The emerging policy for regional innovations policy has this spatial approach as a centripetal point.

When the spatial formation is based on everyday practice or negotiations, it may have the ability to create a functional region, able to carry out that specific activity. The local action group, the single enterprise and possibly the development agency can use the spatial flexibility to exclude or include actors and activities. For the public sector administrations, which are based on a fixed territory, the same processes are at work. Local Authorities are

increasingly involved in co-operations and networking beyond their borders and with varying spatial formations. In one single Swedish local authority (Borlänge, 50 000 inhabitants) 85 projects/co-operations over the municipality border were identified. (*Gossas 2003*) Moreover, these co-operations were carried out in a number of spatial formations. Actually, this local authority was active in 25 different “regions”.

For the Local Authority the border crossing co-operations may be a way of increasing efficiency by co-operating with neighbours over scarce resources. It can also be a development strategy in order to become more powerful in competition with other regions. In the case of the Local Authority, resting on a spatially defined political mandate and some times also a common tax base, this may raise questions of legitimacy. The complex patterns of networks are arenas for decisions that are ex-territorial and with limited transparency for the citizens.

The single region, whether being formed by local activities or decided in negotiations on national or EU levels, must be viewed as part of a dynamic system. It may become increasingly institutionalised or, if vital conditions disappear, re-organised or cease to exist. Although the single “thin region” (*Westholm 2001*) is fragile as it is based on weak institutional structures, the dynamic character of the system of “thin regions” may hold an adaptive capacity needed in the networking economy. Historically, the formation of regions is a response to certain needs; local and regional borders are normally more intensely crossed at times when new economic activities are emerging (*Florén 1998*). The ICT and the developing knowledge based economy, exploiting human capabilities, may be seen as the driving force for the change towards a more flexible space.

The flexible character of the “thin regions” indicates a development towards a territorial flux, where regions with various spatial extension are operating in time and space specific “projects”. These regions should not be viewed as forming a mosaic pattern as they are disposed in layers overlapping each other. The single region can be activated in order to solve a specific problem, for instance a road lobby project, based on actors along the road, or a long-term development programme with actors from private, public and voluntary sectors. The existence of thin regions, is thus connected to governance as a way of governing in which the interdependence of organisations is recognized (*Stoker 1998*).

The concept of “thin regions”, disposed in layers, opens up for a development to take place in any scale and in a variable geometry of regions. There is no lower limit to the scale of a region and it is also recognised that there may be functional regions overlapping or partly overlapping each other. The system is thus built on openness in relation to the nature of development.

This development system is resulting from both political strategy and from economic processes. As a political process it is stemming from the complex fabric of policies being implemented at various levels: in the EU, on national level as well as in the regions and local communities. Common features are the recognition of the endogenous potential of regions, of the importance of organisational relations.

5. Re-scaling and the political/administrative crisis

How does these changes affect the political/administrative system and the role of the state? The decentralisation of welfare functions and of competition politics does not necessarily

mean a withdrawal of the state. What has happened is rather that the state continue to operate through regional and local levels but in different forms. In Sweden, an important change is the move towards regional and local self-organisation. The decentralisation has come to range the political organisation. On the local level, the state has opened up for the Local Authorities to transcend their borders and operate more freely beyond the territory on which their mandate is resting. This is a political reform which may increase the differences between localities.

On the regional level a similar development is taking place. The uniform double system of regional authorities representing the state and the elected county councils raising their own taxes has been replaced by a multitude of solutions in various parts of the country. In some regions, regional parliaments elected for four years periods has been established (Västra Götalandsregionen and Region Skåne). These parliaments are responsible for both welfare functions such as health care and for competition politics; regional growth and development. In other regions traditional institutions are still intact. There are also a number of other “governance experiments” going on initiated by regional institutions.

The increasing complexity of the “development system” and the number of experiments and investigations and commissions concerning the local and regional policy formation indicate that the political administrative system is in a state of turbulence. Four main challenges have to be addressed in the continuing re-organisation and re-scaling of the public sector:

a) **Efficiency in the public service provision.** The demographic structure and increasing international competitiveness is putting the welfare functions under economic pressure. Generally, the local authorities and county councils are facing declining incomes to meet increasing demands during the coming decades.

b) **Competitiveness.** The two spatial approaches governing the emerging competition politics; “regional enlargement” and “thin regions” are both expressions of increasingly complex spatial relations. They also reflect a belief in the importance of “functional regions”. The challenge will be to organise the political administrative system in a way that can support the territorial flux and still meet the demands of control and transparency that is a primary interest for the state.

c) **Minimise uneven regional development.** The trust in specific local conditions as the basis for development and economic growth opens up for increasing regional disparities. Regions which are rich on relative advantages will be favoured in the system in relation to regions with difficulties to find a profitable profile. Therefore, if the competition policy, aiming at increasing economic growth, is successful it will either increase disparities or must be supplemented with redistributive measures. Also the asymmetric organisation of public administrations in localities and regions may open up for uneven development. The Innovations Systems policy is explicitly a policy for winners, although the measures have been implemented also in declining economies.

d) **Democratic legitimacy and transparency.**

From a democratic perspective the complex fabric of policies on various scales and the “project based” political landscape may be a problem. There are emerging new political spaces that transcend territorially defined borders without leading to new territorial demarcations. In a local political landscape where not even the politicians may be able to

over-look the changing relations, the single citizen may have substantial difficulties to exercise her democratic rights.

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