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DEMOGRAPHIC PATTERNS FROM THE 1960s IN FRANCE, ITALY, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL A REVIEW

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Abstract

Demographic behaviour has changed dramatically in the industrialised world after World War II. This literature review describes the demographic development in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal from the 1960s. The general pattern is delayed transition to adulthood and first birth, fertility and marriage-rates have declined, while divorce-rates have increased. But demographic behaviour differs between the countries. In France, cohabitation and births outside marriage are common and the divorce rate is relatively high. Female employment is high, public childcare is developed and public policies are generous. The economic situation for young people and families is relatively stable. Fertility rates are high and stable. In the South of Europe, leaving home and first partnership are postponed. Cohabitation and births outside marriage as well as divorce are rare - the conjugal family is still intact. Female employment is low, unemployment high, childcare is provided within the family and public policy is tight. Portugal differs from Italy and Spain with higher rates of female employment, more public childcare and public aid. The economic situation for young people and families is unstable. Fertility rates are among the lowest in the world. Many argue that the strained economy in the South both inhibits family formation and reinforces the role of the traditional family, with a family centred welfare,- production,- and value system. This prevents economic change since service is not externalised from the family. Discussing demographic patterns in Europe, some see convergence, others disparity. Later studies do not find strong support for convergence.

Sammanfattning

Under efterkrigstiden har demografiska mönster genomgått stora förändringar. Den här litteraturöversikten behandlar den demografiska utvecklingen i Frankrike, Italien, Spanien och Portugal från 1960-talet och framåt. Generellt inträffar övergång till vuxenliv och första födsel senare, fertilitet och äktenskap har minskat medan skilsmässor ökat. Men skillnaderna mellan länder är stora. I Frankrike, som liknar Sverige, är samboende och barn utanför äktenskap vanliga, och antal skilsmässor relativt högt. Kvinnor förvärvsarbetar i hög utsträckning, offentlig barnomsorg och bidrag till barnfamiljer är väl utbyggda. Den ekonomiska situationen för ungdomar och barnfamiljer är stabil. Fertiliteten är hög. I Syd-Europa flyttar man hemifrån och inleder sitt första förhållande senare än i Frankrike. Samboende och barn utanför äktenskap är ovanligt, liksom skilsmässa – kärnfamiljen är intakt. Kvinnor arbetar utanför hemmet i relativt låg utsträckning, barnomsorg tillgodoses inom familjen och särskilda bidrag för barnfamiljer är få. Portugal skiljer sig dock från Italien och Spanien med högre andel kvinnor på arbetsmarknaden, mer offentlig barnomsorg och fler statliga bidrag. Den ekonomiska situationen för ungdomar och barnfamiljer är osäker. Fertiliteten är lägst i världen. Många hävdar att den svaga ekonomin i Syd-Europa hindrar familjebildning och förstärker den traditionella familjen, där omsorg såväl som produktion har familjen som kärna. Detta förhindrar ekonomisk förändring eftersom tjänster inte externaliseras från familjen. Vissa menar att demografiska mönster i Europa närmar sig varann, medan andra hävdar att betydande skillnader kvarstår och tom. ökar i vissa fall.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic change in demographic behaviour in the industrialised world after the Second World War has resulted in a large body of scientific studies as well as an intense political debate. In this review I will describe the development with regard to the transition to adulthood, partnership formation and fertility patterns in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal from the 1960s. Data sources are presented in the appendix.

In all four countries, the transition to adulthood is delayed, the first child is born later, marriage has declined while the divorce rate is on the rise and families with more than two children are few. These changes took place in the mid-1960s in France, but appeared some ten to fifteen years later in the southern countries. While the south of Europe has a rather homogenous demographic pattern, the situation in France differs to a large extent and resembles the situation in the Nordic countries. In France, young people move out early, enter partnership at a young age, a large majority cohabit before marriage, and divorce is common. Women work to a great extent, public childcare is developed and public policies help families with young children. In the southern countries the situation is quite the opposite. Young people live at home until they are 30 or older, the first partnership is late, cohabitation outside marriage is rare and so is divorce. Female labour force participation is still lower than in Europe in general, unemployment is high, childcare is provided within the family and public policy is tight. However, Portugal differs from Italy and Spain in some respects, e.g. with higher rates of female employment and more public childcare facilities along with more public aid to families with young children. The differences have been widely discussed, and while some argue the south is showing the same pattern as the rest of Europe, only delayed, others argue that the south is structurally different. Some see convergence, others disparity. However, recent studies do not find strong support for the convergence theory (see Hantrais 1997, Bettio and Villa 1998, Reher 1998 Billari and Wilson 2001, Billari et. al. 2001, Corijn 2001).

A clear remaining difference is the role of the family. Many argue that economic hardship in the south of Europe reinforces the control role of the family, thereby preventing economic change since the family rather than the state provides a "safety net" as well as service such as childcare. Thus, the conjugal family is still intact. In France where the economy is less strained, unemployment is lower and more women are economically independent, the family has transferred many of its obligations to society, and the family is now more de-institutionalised than in the south. How this difference should be understood is debated. Many point to the institutional setting for an explanation while others stress the importance of cultural patterns and path dependency.

Vogel has identified three national clusters of the EU-member states that are similar in their welfare mix as well as in the general living standards. Italy, Spain and Portugal belong to the southern cluster characterised by low welfare state provisions, lower employment rates, low female employment but strong traditional families. It has high levels of income inequality, poverty and class inequality, but low levels of generational inequality. The Nordic cluster exhibits large social expenses as well as high labour market participation and weak family ties. Income inequality is lower, as are poverty rates and class inequality, but there are high levels of inequality between generations. France belongs to the central European cluster with an intermediate position between the southern and Nordic cluster, though France is close to the Nordic cluster. These clusters seem to be useful tools in understanding and describing

demographic patterns, whether we understand the institutional context as resting on cultural differences, or as resting on different coping strategies in different economic settings.

Vogel (1998) argues that the primary causes of the variation in family formation and fertility behaviour in Europe should be sought in the underlying institutional context defining the individual resources, which will determine material living standards in the early phases of adulthood. In a cross-national comparison of the 15 nations of the European union, plus Norway, with data from several international sources Vogel found that there are similarities within clusters of EU-countries, concerning the welfare mix of labour markets and welfare state provisions (employment, earnings; respectively childcare facilities, paid leave, other family-related subsidies) as well as between behavioural patterns and finally material living standards. Likewise, there are dissimilarities between clusters of EU-countries concerning the institutional configuration as well as the behavioural and welfare outcome. These findings indicate different national strategies of welfare production and individual behavioural adaptation. This underlines the importance of the institutional configuration in supporting a change towards gender equality, and economic independence, and youth policies as well as family policies supporting early partnering and high and earlier fertility.

1. TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD

In brief:

What is generally described as the transition to adulthood usually includes the process of leaving the parental home, the first partnership formation, and economic independence. In Europe, this transition is found to occur later and later and the disparities between countries are large (Billari and Wilson 2001, Billari et. al. 2001, Corijn 2001, Fernandez Cordón 1997, Aassve et al 2001b, Vogel 1998 and 2001). Across Europe the cohorts born around 1960 have experienced leaving the parental home in a considerably heterogeneous way. In southern Europe young people stay longer in the parental home while they are particularly early home-leavers in the northern countries, although there are only minor differences in the length of youth education and the age when the first regular job is taken. There has been a significant increase of young people with a job who still live with their parents in the southern countries, especially in the 25-29 age group. In all EU countries, young women leave earlier than young men (Vogel 1998). National differences are still visible, suggesting surprisingly stable national patterns in the transition to adult life rather than international convergence towards individual diversity as proposed by the theory of the second demographic transition. In France economic independence is delayed, but the age of leaving home and first partnership is stable since young people often get help from their parents when first leaving home (Galland 2000, Villeneuve-Gokalp 2000). While leaving home is a homogeneous behaviour in France, it is less so in Portugal and Italy (Billari et. al. 2001).

The explanation of the differences between countries vary. Several scholars stress the importance of cultural differences (e.g. Reher 1998, Holdsworth 2000, Billari and Wilson 2001 and Corijn 2001). Another group points at the importance of economic aspects (e.g. Fernandez Cordón 1997, Vogel 1998 and 2001, Aassve et al 2001a and b). However, some (Aassve et. al. 2001a and b, Holdsworth 2000) acknowledge that cultural contingencies have shaped the institutional and economic setting, thus combining cultural and economic arguments.

Transition to adulthood

European countries share two important and closely related features concerning their youths: a reduction in employment and a rise in residential dependence. Cohorts born around 1950 and 1960 postponed the transition out of the parental home in most countries (Corijn 2001). Still, the transition to adulthood may be the life course transition that displays the greatest diversity in Europe. Although there are only minor differences in the length of youth education and the age when the first regular job is taken, young adults still move out much later in the south than in other countries. However, in all EU countries, young women leave earlier than young men (Vogel 1998).

In Italy, Portugal and Spain, leaving home is late and heterogeneous, while in France it is relatively early and homogeneous (Billari et. al. 2001). The proportion of economic and residential dependency is generally higher in the southern European countries for both sexes, at all ages and increased between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s.[1] This seems to create most difficulties in the transition to adulthood (Fernandez Cordón 1997). Until the age of 20, residential independence does not depend on work status. Young people under 20 are almost all living with their parents in all EU countries, and the proportion is also stable over time. In the Northern and Western European countries, the proportion living in the parental home declines sharply between the age-groups 20-24 and 25-29. The pattern in Southern Europe is quite different with little change in residential dependence for the 20-24 (even the 25-29) age group as compared to those under 20. The number of young working adults staying in the parental home in Southern Europe has also grown between 1986 and 1994, but not in other EU countries (Fernandez Cordón 1997).[2] In spite of higher levels of unemployment young adults in Southern Europe are less exposed to poverty and diminishing social status than in northern Europe, due to the "strong family" system which supports young adults longer than in weak family systems (Billari et. al. 2001, Vogel 2001).

Partnerships are also formed much later in the south of Europe compared to Northern Europe, and the fact that the age has increased during the last years can be seen as sign of even greater problems to become independent there. Another important difference is that in southern Europe moving out coincides with moving in with a partner, rather than finishing education as in Northern Europe (Vogel 2001). There are also differences between the countries concerning the family status of young adults still living in the parental home. The majority is single and childless, but in e.g. Spain and Portugal, more than 5 percent of young women with their own families still live with their parents, in Portugal 13 percent. Most of these women are single or divorced mothers (Aassve et. al. 2001b).

In France, young people generally enter adult life later than before. However, the median ages for leaving home and forming a first partnership have not changed even though young people

[1] In Southern Europe, large proportions aged 25-29 still live at home[1] and among the 30-34 year olds the numbers are still considerable[1]. In France, the situation is quite different. Not even half as many 25-29 year olds, and few people between 30-34 year olds live at home[1] (Aassve et. al. 2001b).

[2] In e.g. Spain, there is no stigma attached to living at the parental home (Miret-Gamundi 2000).

attain economic and residential independence later. Age at first birth is also delayed (Galland 2000). Villeneuve-Gokalp (2000) argues that for cohorts born 1968-1972, the stage between living with the parents and independent living arrangements is blurred by transition solutions, e.g. moving to another location while still supported by the parents (see also Galland 2000). A dual residency applies to ten percent of the young population, and more to students than to employed or unemployed. Young people are moving into independent housing later and later, while the age at which they actually leave the parental home has been stable since the early 1990s. Around 20 per cent of first departures from the parental home is temporary, slightly more for men, and there are twice the number of returns home after an assisted departure than after an unassisted departure. In 90 per cent of cases, professional problems play a role when returning after having had residential independence, but personal problems seem to be the strongest reason to return. A delayed departure from the parental home depends largely on difficulties in the professional life (Villeneuve-Gokalp 2000).

Focusing on generations born in 1911-1935, and 1952-1975 in France, the timing of leaving home is found to have changed a great deal depending on the cause of departure (Courgeau 2000). Leaving home to get married became less important since the generations born in the 1950s and is now negligible. Departure to cohabitation, which has earlier compensated for the decline in departure for marriage, is now decreasing, starting with the generations born in the 1970s. The departures for career reasons depend on the age of leaving the educational system, but stay at a similar level throughout the century. The business cycle effects are much smaller for the generations born after 1952, than for those born between 1911 and 1935. Individual characteristics change the timing of departure differently for men and women. While young women with low education leave home early, but this is not the case for men. Having had a job before leaving the parental home delays the departure for young men only, not for women. The family type plays the same role throughout the century; a higher number of siblings or the death of a mother speed up departures whereas having parents of foreign origin delays them. Living with one parent and his or her partner also speeds up the process for both men and women.[3] If the mother stays single after separation, the children leave home at roughly the same age as in families with two biological parents (Villenuve-Gokalp 2001).

Looking at inter-country variation, the evidence points towards the persistence of national differences and towards greater diversity. In explaining these differences, two major lines appear in the literature: an economic and a cultural explanation. Reher (1998), Holdsworth (2000) and Corijn (2001) stress the importance of culture for national differences. Reher (1998) argues that the pattern of leaving home late, the closer timing of leaving the parental home and marriage, as well as support from the family during periods of economic difficulty in the south has historical roots. He stresses that the cultural and historical differences in Europe are profound, and that they will continue to be so. Comparing leaving home for British and Spanish cohorts in their early 30s in 1991, Holdsworth (2000) finds that young people of similar backgrounds have different experiences of leaving home which she argues demonstrate the importance of cultural norms on the transition out of the parental home. She does not find important differences in the impact of transferable material parental resources using the father's occupation as a proxy between the two countries. There are however important effects of parental cultural capital and of non-transferable resources. Being unemployed is not an obstacle to leaving home in Britain, but it delays household formation in Spain. The opportunity structure is only one factor behind the late transition out of the parental home in Spain. The expectation that young people in Spain will not leave home until

[3] Data only for those born 1967 or later

they can establish a family household is incorporated into the wider institutional framework. Along with Aassve et. al. (2001b), Holdsworth finds that cultural continuities, together with historical contingencies having long-term consequences, have contributed to shape institutional frameworks at the societal level, with advantages and disadvantages for various living arrangements. Corijn (2001) also underlines the importance of culture, especially religion, both at the individual level and at the societal level. This is particularly important in terms of leaving home and marriage in countries with a high prevalence of Catholics.

Aassve et. al. (2001a and b) provide results pointing towards the economic explanation. Analysing the impact of employment, earnings, household income, and welfare on young adults' decision to leave the parental home in ten European countries, including France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, they find that in Southern Europe, employment and earnings are particularly important for individuals' leaving home behaviour, given the weakness of the welfare state (Aassve et. al. 2001b[4] see also Vogel 1998 and Fernandez Cordón 1997). For France the results are mixed. Employment and income are important factors, but the effects are less clear and there are significant variations. Aassve et. al. argue that the differences reflect on the one hand long-standing path dependent and self-reinforcing factors, and on the other hand institutional, economic and business cycle factors. Cultural contingencies have contributed to shape institutional frameworks at the societal level which in turn determines young Europeans' living arrangements. This opens for a discussion of a combination of cultural and economic explanations for demographic differences.

Bettio and Villa (1998) presents a theory where late development, a weak welfare state along with strong economic networks within the family, have favoured an alternative model of emancipation of family members *within* the family, rather than *from* the family in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece). The emancipation within the family both requires and sustains a cohesive family. Bettio and Villa illustrates this model with three phenomena:
a) *inter-family transactions*: The family retains an important role in production and economic inter-dependence remains strong. This is exemplified by the large proportion of family firms, and the intensity of material and financial co-operation between households and family members in Italy.
b) *the long-lasting family*: Young adults stay longer with their parents, often until their thirties. However, the Mediterranean countries are not entirely homogeneous.
c) *The position of women*: For female children, the emancipation within the family combines strong traditional aspirations to motherhood and family life with an ambition of pursuing a career. During the phase of prolonged adolescence, female children may benefit from the family as much as the male children, though later in life it is mainly or exclusively adult women who restitute their own services to the family, caring for their children, the older parents and finally the grandchildren. Thus "emancipation within the family makes greater demands on women's time than emancipation from the family"(1998:160).

[4] In Italy and Spain employment and income are crucial factors in determining when people leave home. The effect of income on the decision to leave home is positive and significant for Spanish women, and more so for men. High parental income seems to delay the transition out of the parental home. The results for Portugal are fairly similar to Italy and Spain, despite a different institutional setting with almost non-existent social security, generally lower income levels but higher employment rates. A significant difference concerns women who are not working. In contrast to their Italian and Spanish counterparts, they do not have a higher probability of leaving home

Using the economic explanation, Baizán et al. (2002) argue that state policies have strongly shaped educational and work trajectories in Spain. Normative welfare arrangements partially contribute to preventing not only the diversification of household forms, but also of young adults' possibilities of shaping their own households. "The increasing risks of unemployment and flexibilisation are concentrated on young people and women, not only because they are the new entrants in the labour market, but mainly because of their weaker position in the household organisation/social policy link. As we have seen, this has the consequence of delaying the transition to adulthood." (2002:219)

2. PARTNERSHIP

In brief:

As in transition to adulthood, partnership formation displays great variety across countries. Since the mid 1960s, Northern and Western Europe have shown a rise in cohabitation, later marriage, declining marriage rates and increasing divorce rates; partnerships have become more varied and fragile. However, there were much less changes in the Southern European countries. The southern family model is characterised by widespread multigenerational living arrangements, high marriage rates, strong kinship networks, low female employment, low fertility and strong family-oriented values. The family patterns in France are quite the opposite. Early partnership formation is common, as is cohabitation outside marriage (since the 1960s and is spread in all social groups). In Southern Europe, it is still marginal. In France, the de-institutionalisation of the family is clear, while in the southern countries the conjugal family is still very much the norm. Explanations for the different family patterns evolve around culture and economy. Some argue that the culture fosters and forms family patterns, reproduced both by norms and the institutional setting favouring certain family forms. Others argue that economic circumstances determine the options for family formation.

The general trend in Europe is increasing divorce rates. However, in Southern Europe divorce rates are still very low. After separation, men enter new unions quicker and more often than women. Children usually stay with their mothers. Differences in divorce rates between Italy and other Western European countries are not explained by differences in individual characteristics. The source of differences should rather be sought at a macro-social level (De Rosa 1992, Solsona et. al. 2000). Solsona et. al. find a positive relationship between union dissolution and parental experience of divorce; a very young age at marriage; cohabitation; heterogamy and economic independence. They also find that divorce affects the population selectively and it is more selective in countries where the phenomenon is recent, e.g. Spain and Italy. In contexts where divorce rates are low, high levels of education correlate with a stronger tendency for divorce, but when divorce becomes something normalised the selective effects disappear (Solsona et. al. 2000). Divorce induces women to enter the labour market for economic reasons and job security seems to be associated positively with the decision to separate, which points at economic factors behind divorce rates. De Rosa finds it probable that family stability in Italy responds to a need for security due to economic difficulties and a shortage of housing, making it both better for young people to stay at home and harder for women to separate.

2.1 Cohabitation and marriage

The partnership patterns in Europe reveal clear differences. While early partnership formation is common in the Nordic countries, the levels in Italy and Spain are much lower, and declined in last decade. France is closer to the Nordic patterns and shows only a small decrease in early partnering. Cohabitation is common also in first relationships. In the southern countries on the other hand, this is still rare. Southern Europe also displays a clear delay in marriages, matching the delay of leaving the parental home. It is common to stay single up until and beyond age 25, usually while still living in the parental home. However, after the age of 30, the proportion of persons living in partnerships is higher in the south than in the north. Living in a formal marriage is still the dominant pattern in all countries, and country differences are limited. However, there is a slight tendency of decreasing marriage- and cohabitation rates (Vogel 1998).

Divorce rates have increased, along with the rise in cohabitation, later marriage and declining marriage rates since the late 1960s. Thus partnerships have become more varied and more fragile. The rise in divorce in Europe is not seen in Southern Europe where rates are very low (see below) and Southern Europe also displays low rates of single parent families (Kiernan 1996, Jurado Guerrero and Naldini 1997). In Southern Europe the conjugal nuclear family is still prominent. However, relationships within the household and between family members and society in general contrast quite sharply between cohorts in Spain: for couples married during the 1960s (a time of growing economy) the family model was patriarchal. At present the strength of the patriarchal model is weakened and the economy is in crisis. Though the proportion of births to non-married parents has increased slightly, cohabitation is seen as a trial marriage and most children are born to married parents. Spain and Portugal show the lowest proportion of non-family households in Europe. There is still a significant proportion of single earner young households, while 90 per cent of men aged 28-35 living with their partner are employed, 60 per cent of their female partners are housewives. Therefore, there is no sign of real transformation of family formation in Spain (Miret-Gamundi 2000). While in Spain most cohabitants are young and urban, in Italy, most unmarried couples are separated or divorced (Jurado Guerrero and Naldini 1997).

In France, in the 1950s and 1960s the rates of births outside marriage and divorce were low and people married early. By the 1990s, the situation was quite the opposite. There has been a 40% drop in the number of marriages since 1972, when the number of marriages peaked. The drop exclusively concerns first marriage, and age at first marriage has increased with around four years.[5] The proportion of re-marriages has increased. Direct marriage rates started to fall in 1980, and first unions were delayed. Marriages without prior cohabitation had become an exception and the breakdown of unmarried unions became more frequent (Daguet 1996b, Toulemon 1997). In 1996, a steep increase in marriages was recorded, mainly among couples with children. This was a consequence of a change in fiscal legislation, making it economically favourable for cohabiting parents to marry. White-collar workers and Parisians were most sensitive to this change (Beaumel et. al. 1999).

By the 1990s, marriage was still the dominant form for French couples living together though cohabitation is now widespread. In 1965 10% of new couples cohabited before marriage, while thirty years later as many as 90% do. Cohabitation began to emerge on a large scale in

[5] 28.7 years for men and 26.7 for women.

the 1970s, first in the working class[6], primarily as a childfree, transitional phase preceding marriage. It seemed to delay marriage, but not to replace it and a pregnancy was an incentive to marriage. Since the 1980s, cohabitation does not necessarily lead to marriage (Daguet 1996, Toulemon 1997). Until 1982-83, the decline in marriages was completely compensated by the increase in cohabitation, except for the age-group 20-24, where the propensity dropped after 1980, due to the delay in leaving the parental home. Young cohabitants are mostly never married, and older cohabitants are mostly divorced or separated. Cohabitation continues to spread as an alternative to marriage and cohabitants are now more numerous than married couples among young people. More than half of the first births take place outside marriage and the birth of a child is no longer an imperative reason to marry (Toulemon 1997, Beaumel et. al. 1999).

Again, the explanations evolve around either cultural traits or economic context or both. According to Reher (1998) it is unquestionable that certain external indicators of the family and of family forms are converging in Europe, but most of these indicators still show no decline in relative variability. These transformations will be a convergence in the external indicators of family life, but will not undermine the deep disparities that have always characterised the family in the different regions in Europe. He argues that the family is a highly complex institution; people's attitudes toward the family, the way they live family life, and the type of influence the family has on the lives of its members are essential to the meaning of the family; and there is no indication of convergence on this count (Reher 1998:220). This is not just a measure of modernisation or of catching up, but a pattern consistent with historical features, i.e. path dependency.

Jurado Guerrero and Naldini (1997) use both a cultural and economic perspective and argue that three factors seem to explain the continued reproduction of the southern family model;
1) The socio-economic situation is characterised by high unemployment, precarious and informal jobs, high rates of self-employed persons and employees in small enterprises and great territorial heterogeneity.
2) Social policies are often related to the family unit in contrast to individual rights.
3) The family culture is still strong and there are only low levels of secularisation.
This leads to widespread multigenerational living arrangements, high institutionalisation of marriage, strong kinship networks, low female employment, low fertility and strong family values. Jurado Guerrero and Naldini underline the role of the Catholic ethics, stressing communitarian values.

Kiernan (1996) sees the marked increase in female participation in the labour market as having a fundamental effect on partnership behaviour, which points to an economic perspective on demographic changes. According to her, there has been a clear change in the sex-roles in most European countries during the 1980s, though there were substantial national dissimilarities in the extent of change. She concludes that "the automatic nature of marriage and parenthood has been increasingly questioned; they are no longer inevitabilities but are considered as choices" (1996:89). Bettio and Villa (1998) argue that the transformation of the family into a 'post-nuclear family', seen as a de-institutionalisation of the family, does not apply to the evolution in the Mediterranean countries. The basic unit of society is still the conjugal family. Declining fertility has reduced the size of the family, not its cohesiveness.

[6] By the late 1960s students started to cohabit on a large scale. Cohabitation then spread to other groups during the 1970s. Before 1977 however, cohabitation was still marginal, but it is now common in all social groups.

Examining the influence of educational attainment and labour market position on entry into a first partnership in Spain. Luxán et. al. (2000) found that between the development period 1965-74 and the crisis period in 1981-90, the main explanation for male partnership-formation patterns has shifted from education to labour-force involvement. While education only played a role in timing, labour-force participation explained differences in intensity in family formation. For women, the negative relationship between labour market participation and first partnership formation has disappeared. These results indicate that one explanation for the low levels of first partnership formation in the 1980s in Spain was the difficulties faced by young men in finding stable jobs. Luxán et. al. find no support for the hypothesis that the present higher level of female involvement in the labour market explains their low levels of marriage. The male provider model seems not to have disappeared, since the rules of family formation in Spain still favour men who are better situated in the labour market, i.e. those who better fit the male breadwinner model**.**

2.2 Separation and divorce

The general trend in Europe is increasing rates of divorce, except for Southern Europe. The pattern of marital dissolution in Italy is similar to other western countries, but the incidence of divorce is much lower. However, separation is more common. Women who are most likely to face marital dissolution are those born in recent decades, with high levels of education or qualified occupation, who married early, have cohabited before marriage, and who have no more than two children under 15 (de Rosa 1992). In both Italy and Spain, there is regional diversity. In Italy the risk is higher in the northwest and especially in the urban areas (Solsona et. al. 2000, de Rosa 1992). Spain displays a positive relationship between union dissolution and parental experience of divorce, a very young age at marriage, premarital cohabitation, marital heterogamy and economic independence.

The risk of break-up in France has tripled from marriages in the early 1960s to those in the early 1980s. The risk of marriage breakdown has increased almost as much for couples with children as for those without, but the presence of a young child greatly reduces the risk. It is the presence of a young child, i.e. under school-age, more than the actual number of children, that reduces the risk of marital breakdown. Couples with at least two children have a significantly reduced risk compared with childless couples at least while the children are very young. It is far more common for unmarried couples to break up, also when they have children (Toulemon 1995). After separation or divorce, men enter a new union earlier, and to a larger extent than women do (Beaumel et. al. 1999, Toulemon 2001b, Solsona et. al. 2000). In France, single mothers tend to form a new union if they have little education while the most educated women marry to a lesser extent and more often choose to live alone (Desplanques 1994).

Fatherhood is more divided between biological children and residential stepchildren than motherhood, which is almost always both biological and residential. After a union disruption, fathers more often have a second union than mothers; in such cases they seldom live with their children from their first union, but are quite likely to live with stepchildren. Men may live more years of their life in the presence of children than their female counterparts, but they live on average a shorter period of time with any one child than do women. The increase in the number of links between men and children, his own and his partner's, may be seen as something positive; however, these links are more vulnerable to disruption than those of women's in case of union disruption (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2000).

Explanations of divorce rates are mainly economic, if there is little economic space for separation, you do not separate. De Rosa finds it probable that family stability in Italy today responds to a need for security due to economic difficulties and a shortage of housing, making it both better for young people to stay at home and harder for women to separate. The differences between Italy and other Western European countries cannot be explained with different individual behaviour since the same categories of women tend to divorce. The source of the differences should rather be sought at a macro-social level. The selective effect has a stronger influence on women than on men, why Solsona et. al. (2000) point to the necessity of analysing divorce in terms of gender relations, with regard to both determinant factors and to consequences. Looking at the role of religion for an explanation of the low rates of divorce in Italy shows no clear results.

3. FERTILITY

In brief:

After the Second World War, Europe has seen dramatic and variant change in fertility. The post-war years, large parts of the industrialised world experienced a baby boom up to the mid-1960s in western countries. In the south of Europe, the baby boom took place between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. There was a sharp break in fertility trends around 1965 in almost all of Western Europe, followed by 10 years of rapid decline in fertility until historically unprecedented low levels were reached. The break in fertility trends occurred roughly ten years later in Southern Europe.

Until the mid-1960s, the drop in mean age at childbirth accelerated, then slowed down, until it was gradually reversed. Postponement of births began during the first half of the 1970s in Western Europe, and during the late 1970s and early 1980s in Southern Europe. Around 1975 the fall in fertility slowed down. In the 1970s, the southern countries had a much higher fertility rate than the Nordic and the central European countries, but a rapid decline brought Italy, Portugal and Spain to extremely low rates of fertility in the late 1980s. In the Nordic countries and France, fertility is now higher.

The number of births outside marriage is another demographic behaviour that show great disparity and great change in Europe since the 1960s. In Northern Europe and in France, the numbers have increased and it is now common for cohabiting parents to have children, while in Southern Europe, most children are still born to married parents, or to parents who marry after the birth.

Explanations of different fertility levels mainly rely on an economic perspective. The main explanation is that small economic space (high unemployment and low welfare compensation) leads to small families. I.e., a higher opportunity cost for children may explain the very low fertility in the south of Europe (Vogel1998). Some stress the ‘catching-up’ argument, arguing that the Mediterranean will catch up with other industrialised countries where fertility has stabilised at higher levels. Bettio and Villa (1998) oppose this, arguing that the difference in fertility rates between Southern Europe and the western and northern parts is too large. In Northern Europe and France, fertility is no longer as closely linked to marriage as before while in Southern Europe, it is. Muñoz-Pérez argues that this is part of the explanation of low birth rates, since the decline in marriage rates is followed by a decline in births which is not compensated by births outside marriage to the same extent as in France.

In France, like in the Nordic countries, female labour force participation and fertility is high. Southern Europe shows the opposite pattern with low female labour force participation and low fertility. Throughout the 1980s, women's share of the total employment rose in all EC countries, largely due to the growth in part-time jobs in the service sector. Bettio and Villa (1998) argue that the southern family model inhibits female labour force participation since most care services are performed within the family by women, instead of being externalised thereby both relieving women of excess work in the family and creating job opportunities. This seems to create a feedback circle, where a strong family limits labour market opportunities, which in turn reinforces the need for a strong family. Low employment is matched by low fertility. Miret-Gamundi (2000) argue that the higher levels of fertility during the southern baby boom were achieved from a model based on clearly specialised gender-roles. Contrary to Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci (1992) Jurado Guerrero and Naldini (1997) reject modernisation and other explanations given for other West European countries, (such as high female employment rates, high female participation in education and secularisation) when explaining the low fertility rates in Italy and Spain. In both countries, fertility declined greatly even though women's employment rates were lower than in other European countries; a gender divergence in education remained stable until the 1970s which is later than in the rest of Europe; abortion laws are restrictive and the influence of the Catholic church remains strong. Vogel (2001) argues that the low rates of employment among young women and a scarcity of childcare institutions in the south of Europe reduce childbearing as the opportunity cost for children will be high. Empirical results show a significant negative correlation between female labour force participation and fertility in the 1960s and the 1970s for all countries, but the correlation became weaker over time. As societal level responses (e.g. childcare availability and attitudes towards working mothers) reduced the incompatibility between childrearing and female employment. In the Mediterranean countries this incompatibility persists.

3.1 Fertility

After the Second World War, Europe has seen dramatic changes in fertility. The post-war baby boom ended in the mid-1960s in western countries. There was a sharp break in fertility trends around 1965 in almost all of Western Europe, followed by 10 years of rapid decline in fertility when historically unprecedented low levels were reached. In the south of Europe, the baby boom was some ten years later and occurred from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s. The break in fertility trends was also roughly ten years later. Until the mid-1960s, the drop in mean age at childbirth accelerated. This movement then slowed down, until it was gradually reversed.

Postponement of births began during the first half of the 1970s in Western Europe, and during the late 1970s and early 1980s in Southern Europe. Around 1975 the fall in fertility slowed down. In the 1970s, the southern countries had a much higher fertility rate than the Nordic and Central European countries. However, a rapid decline brought Italy, Portugal and Spain to extremely low rates of fertility. In the Nordic countries on the other hand, fertility is now higher. The demographic evolution was relatively homogeneous in Western Europe between 1950-1980, but a clear divergence between countries occurred during the 1980s (Muñoz-Pérez 1991). At this time marriage lost in importance for forming a family with the number of births in consensual unions increasing in some countries, while in other countries marriage

remained the dominant form of partnership and births outside marriage remained few (Calot and Blayo 1982, Prioux 1990, Vogel 1998).

In Spain fertility outside marriage was low but became slightly higher than in Italy. The situation was much the same in Portugal, though the extra-marital births were more numerous. Thus, in Southern Europe the decline in fertility corresponds to declining marital fertility (Muñoz-Pérez 1989, Jurado Guerrero and Naldini 1997). Baizán et. al. (2001). Despite few childless marriages, birth rates have fallen drastically in Southern Europe, and the aversion to extra-conjugal fertility has accentuated the fall. Declining rates of marriage have strongly affected total fertility rates in many areas (Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992). However, Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci (1992) put the low levels of fertility in Southern Europe in a new perspective, when arguing that in spite of what is commonly assumed, Italy and Spain have never had very high levels of fertility.

Despite the sweeping economic changes in the 1960s, the Spanish dictatorship still governed the country according to catholic doctrine; contraception was banned up until 1977, and divorce was not allowed until 1981. The higher levels of fertility during the southern baby boom were based on a model with clearly differentiated gender roles. The trends of industrialisation, urbanisation and migration from the late 1950s brought important changes in cultural values, although the transition to democracy begun only after the death of Franco in 1975. From the mid 1960s until 1980, the male mean age at marriage in Spain decreased rapidly leading to important changes in the family life-cycle; people left the parental home earlier and lived for longer in a family of their own, now the trend is reversed. Today Spain has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world, and there is a steadily rising mean age at first marriage.

Between 1946 and 1995, the fertility in France was one of the highest in Western Europe. During the baby boom the total fertility rate was around 2.6 between 1946 and 1967 (3 children per woman in the 1940s.) After 1965 TFR fell drastically to stabilise around 1.8 in 1975. The average age of mothers declined until 1977 when the mean age at first birth was 26.5 years, since then it has steadily increased to between 28 and 29 years (Daguet 1996). Since 1975, several major changes have occurred: the marriage decline and the increasing number of unmarried couples along with the higher proportion of births outside wedlock; the dramatic increase in the mean age at childbirth; the increasing participation of women (even mothers) in the labour force, and the availability of reliable contraceptive methods that are widely used. Nevertheless, these changes did not have any major impact on the overall level of cohort fertility[7] (Toulemon and Mazuy 2001, Toulemon 2001a).

There are substantial differences between the parenthood experience for men and women in France. Men declare fewer "biological" children on average than women.[8] The main reason for this is the proportionately higher number of men among immigrants and the number of children not recognised by their father. More men than women remain childless, but men have large families more often than women (Toulemon and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2000, Toulemon 2001b).

Explaining different fertility levels from an economic point of view shows that economic constraints (high unemployment and low welfare compensation) lead to small families.

[7] When also taking increased mean age at birth into account, women born between 1945 and 1955 will have more than 2.1 children and women born in 1970 can have more than 2.0 children.
[8] Men's fertility is six per cent lower than women's.

Focusing on the situation of women, Fernandez Cordón (1997) underlines that the share of women in full economic autonomy decreased in the southern countries recently, which has to be put in relation to the very low levels of fertility.

Vogel (1998) argues the primary causes of the variation in family formation and fertility in Europe should be sought in the underlying institutional context defining the individual resources, which will determine material living standards in the early phases of adulthood. In the northern and western parts of Europe, more of the traditional family responsibilities have been absorbed by the labour market and the welfare state than in the south. He further argues that two major trends are to be expected in family and reproductive behaviour, one long-term in the direction of fragmentation, instability, diversity, and independence and the other towards a postponement of family formation and reproduction. Since most of the crucial decisions about family formation, partnering, de-partnering, and childbearing are made in the ages between 20 and 30, coinciding with a rapid growth in educational demands, persistent youth unemployment and welfare state contraction, we can expect rapid changes in the family and reproductive behaviour of the youth (1998:21). The model of family pathways assumes individual decisions between a variety of available family formation options. Transitions between stages are influenced by the institutional context and can be seen as coping strategies to control future living standards. The timing and spacing of these transitions are linked to change and variation in labour market and welfare state performance (Vogel 1998:33).

According to Toulemon (2001a), period fertility is becoming more and more reactive to economic situation and employment opportunities. Also Bettio and Villa (1998) underline the importance of the economic structure for family behaviour. They argue that differences in fertility reflect differences in the 'economics of the family' across countries. The 'economics of the family' refers to economic relations among the members of the family, as well as the economic role of the family within society, which varies across countries. In Mediterranean countries, the combination of low fertility and low female labour force participation is favoured by a family centred welfare system, a family-based production system and a family-oriented value system. This has encouraged a specific pattern of economic emancipation of children within the family, rather than from the family (see above). Emancipation within the family entails additional costs of children to parents, and creates additional demands on women's time and other resources, which represents the differential cost of fertility to women compared to other family contexts. Thus, the Mediterranean family discourages fertility (Bettio and Villa 1998:166). Unemployment strengthens the discouraging effect.

In addition, Miret-Gamundi points to the "denaturalisation" of having children; i.e. when children are seen as a "problem for leisure time" or a "difficulty for the parents' career" (2000:285). Young adults believe that a child needs a tremendous amount of affection and time, which should be provided by both members of the couple. However, men do not take their share in the care for children.

Yet the explanation of fertility patterns might be more complex than the effect of contemporary phenomena. Studying seven low-fertility countries, among them Italy, Murphy and Wang (2001) find that fertility patterns of parents and children are positively correlated, and the relationship becomes stronger over time. There is also some evidence for this regarding grandparents and grandchildren. According to Murphy and Wang "this contradicts the assumption that the factors which determine contemporary fertility patterns are increasingly to be found in people's own life experiences, such as their educational and employment careers."(2001:94)

Kohler et. al. (2001) suggest a theory of the lowest-low fertility, defined as a period total fertility rate below 1.3. Spain and Italy were the first countries to experience such low fertility levels in the early 1990s, followed by countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Kohler et al. argue that lowest low-fertility is caused by a combination of four distinct demographic and behavioural factors:
a) *demographic distortions of period fertility measures*, caused by postponement of childbearing and changes in the parity-composition of the population, reduce the level of period-fertility indicators below the associated level of cohort fertility.
b) *socio-economic incentives to delay childbearing*. This postponement is a rational response to economic uncertainty in early adulthood, increased returns to education, shortages in the labour market etc. Most relevant in the Southern European context is the incompatibility of female labour force participation and childbearing due to inflexible labour markets and insufficient day-care provisions.
c) *perpetuating mechanisms* and in particular social interaction processes affecting the timing of fertility, render the population response to these new socio-economic conditions substantially larger than the direct individual responses.
d) *postponement-quantum interactions* imply that the delay in timing of fertility also have causal effects on parity-progression probabilities and completed fertility.

These four factors are not unique to the lowest-low fertility countries, but these countries are characterised by a combination of all four factors in a pronounced fashion. Kohler et. al. also speculate on the future of the lowest-low fertility countries. In none of these countries has the mean age at first birth stabilised for several consecutive years at a level that could be perceived as the endpoint of fertility postponement. However, in the Southern European countries, the periods with the most rapid pace of postponement may have passed. Despite a potential reversal of period fertility, many cohorts in Southern Europe will remain at below replacement fertility in the next decades due to the already late childbearing in these countries that leaves little scope for a future recuperation of fertility. However, economic improvements can induce fertility increase, especially for young adults, and more generous social policies can create socio-economic incentives.

Calot and Blayo (1982) argue that the fall in fertility has been simultaneous and only temporarily delayed in Southern Europe. According to them fertility is increasingly homogeneous and they argue that the evolution of the European fertility is mostly governed by identical factors in all countries, and not specifically national ones. Substantial differences persist but similarity largely prevails. Muñoz-Pérez (1989) and Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci (1992) come to the conclusion that the southern countries follow the European pattern, only delayed by a few years and underline the women's labour force participation as an important variable in explaining the low fertility.

Dalla Zuanna (2001) draws on the notion of the strong family system (Reher 1998, Micheli 2000). He argues that though the forces reducing fertility are not particularly different in Italy compared with other European countries, the strong family is persistent, as most people consider their own utility and family utility to be the same. He argues that these patterns hold all over Southern Europe. Familism encourages late departure from the parental family because economic conditions are more favourable in the parental household. Late departure has a direct effect on fertility since it 'often results' in a higher age at marriage, which gives a shorter time interval for childbearing. An indirect effect of late departure from the parental home is that men go straight from living with their parents to living with their partner, giving

them no experience of housework. As Italian husbands do not help in the home, "the excessive burden for women can be considered as an important cause of Italy's lowest low fertility." (2001:148).

3.2 Births outside marriage

The number of births outside marriage varies greatly across Europe, especially since the 1960s. In Northern Europe, it is common for cohabiting parents to have children, while in Southern Europe most children are born to married parents. Per 100 women married in Spain in 1986, roughly six children were born before marriage, which is close to the prenuptial births recorded in France in the 1970s.[9] Out-of-wedlock childbearing was rare in France in the 1960s and the 1970s and was limited to specific social groups (such as cohabiting manual workers) or situations (unplanned pregnancy, difficulty to obtain a divorce etc.) Since then the attitudes and behaviour relating to marriage have changed dramatically. Along with the increasing propensity of non-marital cohabitation, a considerable amount of births take place outside marriage. Fertility of extra-marital unions does not seem to depend on age, duration or intention to marry later. Fertility hardly changed between 1980 and 1990, and the increase in extra-marital unions has not resulted in lower fertility (Leridon 1990). Unplanned births are now less common and as cohabitation is widespread, birth outside marriage occurs in all social strata, though it is slightly more common in the lower classes. Today, children born outside marriage are usually born to cohabiting parents, and the large majority are recognised by the father.[10] However, legitimisation of these children by marriage of their parents has become more rare and occurs later. Differences between social strata have diminished. Unmarried parents are now much more similar in age and occupation to married parents than earlier (Muñoz-Pérez and Prioux 1999a, b, c).

3.3 Birth order and family size

Changes in fertility reflect changes in birth parity. During the post-war years, first birth rates tended to increase everywhere, the first child was born earlier in the marriage and women had their first child at younger ages. From the second half of the 1960s, couples began delaying the birth of their first child. In France, the interval between the first and the second births also lengthened in the 1970s. In Southern Europe, the proportion of women who had a second child increased first, but has been declining in Italy and Spain since the 1970s. Thus, a growing proportion of married couples is postponing or deciding against the birth of a second child. The later decline in second births in Greece and Portugal seems to be more closely

[9] Per 100 French marriages in 1988, 20 children were born outside marriage. In the late 1990s, 65% of the parents of children born outside marriage in Spain married later, while in France, this level of legitimisation was little more than 50% in the 1970s and only 40% in the early 1990s. This indicates that in Spain, it is harder to continue cohabitation outside marriage after the birth of a child (Thierry 1999).

[10] In 1996, 39 per cent of births took place outside marriage in France, compared to 6 per cent in 1965 and the numbers have not ceased to increase. There were large changes in the recognition of children outside marriage. While the recognition of the child close to birth concerned less than one third of children born in 1965 and 1970, the numbers rose fast in the early 1970s. This increase was due to a change in legislation in 1972, which gave recognised children born outside marriage basically the same rights as legitimate children. In the 1990s the numbers fell again and landed around 46%, the same level as in 1970. The proportion of children eventually recognised by their father was around three quarters for children born in 1965 and 1970 but is around 90% for children born in the 1990s.

related to the decline in first-birth rates, which in turn is related to the drop in nuptiality (Muñoz-Perez 1989, Blayo 1986, Prioux 1990).

Completed fertility at the higher birth orders has plummeted in all countries. The proportion of women who had a third child declined in France, beginning with the birth cohorts around the mid 1930s. This trend also reached Southern Europe. In the period 1950-1975, the proportion of families with more than two children declined rapidly in Spain, Portugal and Italy, though at the same time there was an increase in births of lower orders. There was an increase in the proportion of couples with at least one child and more parents had a second child in Portugal and Spain. In Italy, the progression ratio from first to second child also increased during this period, while the proportion of couples with at least one child hardly changed and remained at a lower level than in the other two countries. Some national characteristics continued to prevail. In Portugal the relatively low parity progression from first to second child coexisted with a high progression ratio from third to fourth births and in Italy there were more childless couples than anywhere else. Spain had a very high progression ratio from first to second birth (Muñoz-Perez 1989). In Italy, between 1965 and 1974, the decline in marital fertility was basically due to the drop in births of third and higher orders. After 1974, numbers of births of higher orders as well as the first order, continued to decline at the same rate, while those of orders two and three fell more rapidly. The average number of first births per woman in Italy decreased continuously. In Spain all births were affected, but after 1978, numbers of births of second and particularly third orders virtually collapsed. There has also been a recovery in first births, showing an increase in the interval between marriage and first birth, consistent with the trend in Western Europe a few years earlier. In Portugal a steep fall in the number of first births, along with a decline in second births, account for a large part of the current drop in overall fertility (Muñoz-Perez 1989). The pattern in France is similar. Early marriages and the increase in first births during the 1950s and 1960s along with births of third and higher orders becoming less common and more closely spaced led to a reduction in family size and a misleading rise in annual total fertility rates. When the rates of first and second births stopped rising, the gradual disappearance of larger families was no longer compensated and there was a sharp fall in the rates, accentuated after 1970 by a decrease in the rate of first births (Blayo 1986). The higher fertility observed between 1977 and 1981 applied in some years to births of first and second orders, and the slight rise observed between 1984 and 1986 was caused solely by births of third and higher orders.

There is no general trend for one-child families, but all Western European countries display a clear growth of the proportion of women with two children, which results from a reduction in childlessness and a decrease in the proportion of women with large families. For women born around 1945 in France, or married in 1966-70 in Portugal, the situation differs from the rest of Europe, showing a relatively high proportion of one-child families. Birth rates of third and higher orders seem to have become more stable, or even have increased: the fertility decline is therefore less and less influenced by reductions in the number of births of higher orders (Muñoz-Perez 1989, Blayo 1986, Prioux 1990). Most couples have children, albeit fewer, and later in life. Second-order births are becoming exceptions in some regions. In Italy, Spain and Portugal, childlessness remains low, while third-order births have shrunk rapidly. France is slightly different, notwithstanding an increase in childlessness. The two-child pattern dominates (Toulemon and Mazuy 2001). More men than women remain childless, but men have large families more often than women (Toulemon 2001b).[11]

[11] The ideal number of children is very close to the completed family size. The large families, with four children or more are rare, only 9% of women, and infertility is on the increase (Toulemon 2001a).

3.4 Work and fertility

In France, like in the Nordic countries, female labour force participation and fertility is high. Southern Europe shows the opposite pattern with low female labour force participation and low fertility. Throughout the 1980s, women's share of total employment rose in all EC countries, largely due to the growth in part-time jobs in the service sector (Kiernan 1996). There is a large variation between EU-member states, more or less reproducing the three distinct clusters Vogel outlines above. The Nordic countries have the best performing labour market and the most generous welfare state provisions, while the southern cluster is the opposite. Portugal is an outlier from the southern cluster with higher female employment as well as lower unemployment risk. The lowest employment level is in Italy with early retirement and low female employment. In Italy and Spain, female employment is generally low, and this also applies to part time work. For women with children in Southern Europe, the first option is not part-time work but leaving the labour market. France has intermediate female employment as well as part-time rates for mothers. Focusing on parents, Vogel finds that the employment rates of mothers and fathers of pre-school children display considerable gender differences in Italy and Spain. Portugal on the other hand, has much smaller differences, even smaller than France, due to its high female employment levels. Looking at income differences of mothers vs. fathers displays the same gender gap, small in the Nordic countries, large in the southern countries. France, which has a relatively generous family policy, and Portugal, with its rather modern positioning of young women, are closer to the Nordic countries (Vogel 1998).

In Italy and Spain, the rapid economic development of the post-war period led to a sharp decline in the proportion of employed women, as the agricultural sector where most women worked diminished and their low level of education made it hard to work in other sectors. During the 1960s and 1970s, female education increased and in the 1970s and 1980s, female labour force participation increased (Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci 1992). With the revolution in 1974, the general improvement in labour conditions in Portugal was much more favourable for men than for women: a major increase in female unemployment in the second half of the 1970s was accompanied by a stabilisation of male unemployment at very low levels. In the 1980s, instability grew for both sexes. Despite increasing equality in qualifications, labour market opportunities of women and men have remained rather different in Portugal (André and Feio 2000). There is also a growing cleavage between the more qualified workers, among whom equality has been strengthened, and the less qualified group, where on the contrary, there is a growing divergence between men and women. In the more qualified group, women's access to higher education in higher social groups has promoted their commitment to socially valued professional careers. In the less qualified group on the other hand, high female activity rates are explained by the need to increase family income.

Caring is another important family task that influence women's opportunities. "Free care services inhibit the growth of a market and continue to make heavy demands on women's time, in a vicious circle of reciprocal inhibition by demand and supply" (Bettio and Villa 1998:149). A traditionally cohesive family may inhibit the development of a service sector and hence female labour force participation. Self-employment, which is particularly common in the Mediterranean countries because of the resilience of family enterprises, also plays an inhibiting role, as women traditionally have been under-represented.

The effects of labour force status, especially female labour force participation and unemployment, on fertility has been thoroughly studied. Delgado Perez and Livi-Bacci (1992) point to the great speed at which female labour force participation increased and at "society's slow response" (1992:171) to that as the main reason for low feritlity. Bettio and Villa disagree with this, arguing that female participation did not increase to an 'exceptional' degree (table 1, 1998:139). Miret-Gamundi (2000) argue that the higher levels of fertility during the southern baby boom were linked to a model based on strictly separated gender roles.

Jurado Guerrero and Naldini (1997) emphasise that fertility declined in Italy and Spain at a much lower rate of female labour force participation than in other European countries. The educational gender gap remained until the 1970s, which is later than in the rest of Europe; abortion laws were restrictive and the Catholic church had a strong influence. Women's entrance on the labour market has some distinctive features in Italy and Spain compared to other countries:
1) the growth of female activity rates has been accompanied by an increase of women's unemployment rates. The gender division of unemployment is much more clear-cut in Italy and Spain than in other European countries.
2) women's part-time employment is very low compared to other European countries
3) the service sector, traditionally occupied by women in Central/Northern European countries, is hardly developed and a higher proportion of people are employed in the agriculture sector.
Structural employment shortages, low part-time employment and a less developed service sector can partially explain low female employment rates. The low rate of employment and the high presence of women in the informal sector favour asymmetric relationships between genders in the family (Jurado Guerrero and Naldini 1997), which increases the opportunity cost of children in Italy and Spain more than in other countries in Northern/Central Europe. Low employment rates among young women and scarcity of childcare institutions in the south of Europe discourage childbearing (Vogel 2001).

Working mothers face the following problems in a family-centred society such as in Italy (Dalla Zuanna 2001):
1) child rearing facilities are scarce as society is organised to suit the male-breadwinner model
2) there is no state support for a new child
3) women have a double workload as they also do most household work
4) working while having children violates the social norm

These factors result in fewer children being born, and more women leaving the labour market when becoming mothers.

As for France, the interdependencies between female labour force participation and fertility rates are explained by an increase in preference for employment and an intrinsic disinclination for large families (Blanchet and Pennec 1997). Part of the female population changes its labour force participation by restricting family size. Female employment rates have risen sharply for a given family size.

3.5 Public policy and fertility

France has a long history of public policies helping parents, which is not the case in Southern Europe. In Mediterranean Europe the family was essential for the well-being of its more vulnerable members, while elsewhere it was much less so. These differences still exist today. Everywhere, the institutional support has grown with modernisation, yet divergent patterns of support remain visible (Reher 1998:209). The total volume of the welfare state arrangements, as well as the directed provisions (public support of care of children and elderly), tends to support female employment, fertility and parenthood best in the Nordic cluster and in France, but hardly in the southern cluster (Vogel 1998).

Socio-demographic changes are experienced and perceived differently in different national contexts, with differing policy responses from governments. The pace and degree of socio-demographic change varies between European countries although the trends observed (population ageing, the development of alternative family forms and changes in intergenerational dependency) move in the same direction, and the social problems it engenders are perceived differently in different countries. France, which has almost consistently maintained an above average fertility rate, is one of the EU member states that has gone the furthest in using demographic data in the political debate, and in recognising the state as a policy actor in demographic matters. Declining fertility has long been considered as a threat to the nation's economic future, thus demanding and justifying government intervention. By contrast, in Italy and Spain where fertility is extremely low, governments have been reluctant to intervene directly in demographic affairs, and consider them to belong to the private domain. The role of the family is mirrored in the legal systems: in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal adults have legal duty to maintain both their parents and their children. In Italy, even in-laws and half siblings must provide support in proportion to income (Hantrais 1999).

There are important variations in the extent to which family policy has been legitimised and institutionalised. Hantrais (1997) argues that France and Portugal have gone furthest in recognising the state as a family policy actor.[12] In Portugal economic activity for women with young children has been substantial, despite the lack of state-provided services for working mothers. Italy and Spain show low female economic activity rates, low fertility and little public provision for working mothers. In Southern Europe, support is provided through family networks (1997:375). As women have entered the labour force, their workload has increased since they still have the main responsibility for care services (Carrasco and Rodríguez 2000).

Looking at policies in EU-countries Gauthier (2000) finds that total cash expenditures for families with children have been relatively constant since the early 1980s, despite the slow economic growth during the 1980s. France was one of the countries with the highest cash expenditures, while Spain and Portugal had low cash support for families. The nature of state support has changed significantly since the early 1960s towards means tested benefits, while earlier universal benefits were more common. Across all countries, the duration of maternity and/or parental leave has increased. By 1999, all countries had introduced childcare leave after the period covered by maternity/parental leave, an option only offered in Austria and Italy in the early 1970s. The differences in design of the leave are large. France and Spain

[12] France has pursued social policies providing a high level of support for all families, to promote child rearing, and since the 1970s to enable economically active women to continue to raise children. France has had explicitly pro-natalist objectives.

have two of the longest maternity, parental, and childcare leaves in Europe, followed by Portugal while Italy has among the shortest in the EU. The percentage of children in publicly funded childcare and education institutions also differ to a large extent: for children under the age of three, France has high rates compared to the other EU countries, Portugal is in an intermediate position while Italy and Spain have low rates.[13] Since the 1990s, public provisions for childcare have increased substantially in all countries although the level of governmental involvement is widely different. It is also worth noting that all countries that exhibit an average TFR above 1.7 during the 1990s (the Nordic countries and France) have a well-developed network of public childcare facilities. The significance of parental leave for fertility appears less important (Vogel 2001).

The law and family policy in Italy show that the care of children is considered a woman's responsibility, and that the male breadwinner regime is still strong. From the late 1960s, Italy set up a series of progressive policies regarding women in paid work and the care of children. These policies neither reflected nor led to changes in women's responsibility for the care of children and for the gender division of labour in the family (Bimbi 2000).

Using a historical perspective Martin (1998) shows a development of an opposition against married women's labour market work in France. An examination of the economic policy in favour of families introduced after 1945 shows that the Single Salary Allowance (L'Allocation de salaire unique, the ASU) has been 'the centre piece' of the pro-natalist project, designed to discourage women from engaging in paid work once married. The allowance was made progressive, strongly in favour of families with two or more children why the disincentive to labour force participation varied with the number of dependent children. Between 1946 and 1965, female labour force participation was limited, due to a policy giving incentives to stay at home after the second child was born. In the late 1960s, when women to a larger extent than ever before were working mothers, the family policy did not change. The ASU was not abolished until 1978 (Martin 1998). Since the early 1970s, successive French governments have developed social policies designed to enable women to engage in full-time employment while raising a family, e.g. by setting up publicly funded childcare facilities. The parental leave scheme was set up in 1977, and was progressively extended alongside the expansion of public childcare. In 1984 fathers became eligible for parental leave. In 1986 the parental leave was extended until the child reached the age of three instead of two. Working part time while taking parental leave became more flexible in 1991. Women make up 98-99% of parents taking leave, since men earn more on average and parental leave is not paid, and unequal gender distribution of domestic and child raising tasks within the family along with traditional values are deeply rooted. Fagnani (1999) argues that the child rearing benefit, a flat rate benefit provided to parents with at least two children until the youngest child reaches three years, encourages mothers to stay at home as does high unemployment.

The effects of family policy have been widely discussed. There is empirical evidence from international studies that indicate that by reducing the cost of having children, fertility may be increased, but the effect is limited and varies across countries (Hantrais 1999). The Mediterranean countries show inconsistent patterns. In Spain and Portugal fertility has been declining and family support has been low. In Italy the northern parts have the most supportive family policy, but fertility is particularly low. Baizán et. al. suggest that since the effects of union formation on first births show a strong effect, "any policy that encourages

[13] (23, 12, 6 and 5% respectively).

union formation (…) will have a positive effect on fertility." (2001:24). The lowest-low fertility countries share a generally weak state support for children and Kohler et. al. (2001) argue that this reduces the progression probabilities to higher parities. Most relevant in the Southern European context is the incompatibility of female labour force participation and childbearing due to inflexible labour markets and insufficient day-care provisions.

APPENDIX
DATA SOURCES

Addis E. (2000) **"Gender in the Reform of the Italian Welfare State"**
Analyses the reform of the Italian welfare state

Ahn N., Mira P. (2000) **"Job bust, baby bust?: Evidence from Spain"**
Examines the relationship between fertility, marriage and male employment status using micro data from Spain. The data are drawn from the Spanish Socio-demographic Survey carried out by the Spanish Statistical Institute (INE) in 1991. The survey had 159.154 interviewees of ages ten and over. Ahn and Mira limit their analysis to prime-aged males. Their sample covered the period of relatively low-unemployment of the 1970s and the deep recession of the early and mid-1980s.

André I.M., Feio P. A. (2000) **"Development and Equality between Women and Men in the Portuguese Labour Market"**
Examines the relationship between men and women on the labour market. Data from the Employment Survey, INE Estatísticas do Emprego 1992; 1997 and Ministério da Educacao, 1994/95.

Aassve A., Billari F.C., Ongaro F. (2001a) **"The Impact of income and employment status on leaving home: Evidence from the Italian ECHP Sample"**
Investigates the role economic resources play in the decision of young Italian adults to leave the parental home Using the first two waves of the Italian sample of the European Community Household Panel. (ECHP)

Aassve A.; Billari F. C.; Mazzuco S.; Ongaro, F. (2001b) **"Leaving Home Ain't Easy: Acomparative longitudinal analysis of ECHP data"**
Analyses the impact of employment, earnings, household income, and welfare on young adults' decision to leave the parental home in ten European countries. (Among them France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.) Longitudinal data from three waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)

Baizán P., Aassve A., Billari F.C. (2001) **"Cohabitation, marriage, first birth: The interrelationship of family formation events in Spain"**
Studies the interrelationship of family formation events in Spain. The data come from the Spanish Fertility and Family Survey conducted in 1995, a retrospective survey of which they only use the female sample of 4021 women born between 1945 and 1976.

Baizán P., Michelin F., Billari F.C. (2002) **"Political Economy and Life Course Patterns: the Heterogeneity of Occupational, Family and Household Trajectories of Young Spaniards"**
Explores the linkages between macro changes and the dynamics of educational, occupational, family and household careers, i.e. the transitions to adulthood, of young Spaniards. The cohorts studied are those born between 1945 and 1974, since the institutional setting has transformed during their life courses. They study five-year birth-cohorts to detect inter-cohort trends in the degree of diversity and stability in the work, educational, household and family careers. Retrospective data from the Spanish Fertility and Family Survey, FFS, conducted in 1994 and 1995.

Beaumel C., Kejrosse R., Toulemon L. (1999) **"Des mariages, des coulpes et des enfants"**
Describes family formation in France using statistics from the Insee employment survey from 1990 to 1998 and Insee statistics on the civil status

Bettio F., Villa P (1998) **"A Mediterranean perspective on the breakdown on the breakdown of the relationship between participation and fertility"**
Explores sthe characteristics of participation and fertility. Data from several sources.

Billari, F. C.; Philipov, D.; Baizán, P. (2001) **"Leaving home in Europe: the experience of cohorts born around 1960"**
Explores the leaving home patterns in Europe. A cross-country study of micro data of representative samples from 16 European countries with a life course perspective. Data from the series of Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) that was carried out mainly in the nineties.

Billari F. C.; Wilson C. (2001) **"Convergence towards diversity? Cohort dynamics in the transition to adulthood in contemporary Western Europe"**
Examines the median age at which women in nine European countries (among them France Italy, Portugal, Spain) experienced these events and the inter-quartile range in each cohort. Review relevant theories and carry out an analysis of data from the FFS from around 1990 of nine European countries.

Bimbi, F. (2000) **"The Family Paradigm in the Italian Welfare State (1947-1996)"**
An analysis of laws and policies in Italy.

Blanchet D., Pennec S. (1997) **"Is the rise in female participation linked to fertility rate trends?"**
Investigates what conclusions can be drawn about the simultaneous increase in female participation and decrease in fertility in France. Women are grouped as either in or out of the labour force and either mothers of more than two children or to two or less children i.e. 0-18 years old. The are of 35-39 years old and data come from population censuses from 1962 to 1990 from the French Institute of Statistics, INSEE

Blayo C. (1986) **"La constitution de la famille en France depuis 1946"**
Describes the family size in France since 1946. Data from Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques, (the National Institute of Demographic Studies), INED

Calot G., Blayo C. (1982) **"Recent Course of Fertility in Western Europé"**
Investigates the completed fertility of birth cohorts and the total period fertility ratio using annual national data in 16 countries in Western Europe.

Carrasco C., Rodríguez A. (2000) **"Women, families and work in Spain: Structural changes and new demands"**
Studies the labour market situation for families in Spain using data from the 1991 CIRES Survey, a Spanish state survey, carried out among women and men over 18, and the EPA survey covering labour market experience.

Corijn M. (2001) **"Transitions to adulthood in Europe for the 1950s and 1960s cohorts"**

Analyses the results of a broad cross-country comparative project on transition to adulthood in nine European countries (among them France, Italy and Spain) using a longitudinal approach Data from the FFS.

Courgeau D. (2000) **"Le depart de chez les parents: une analyse démographique sur le long terme"**
Investigates the transitions from the parental home in France from a long term perspective.

Data from two national surveys on family and career where the first, from INED, covers generations born in 1911 to 1935, and the other, from INSEE, observes the generations born from 1952 to 1975.

Dalla Zuanna G. (2001) **"The banquet of Aeolus: a familistic interpretation of Italy's lowest low fertility"**
Examines the connection between familism and reproductive behaviour. Data from several sources.

Daguet F. (1996a) **"La parenthese du baby-boom"**
Describes fertility from 1946 to 1995. Data from the INSEE civil status records.

Daguet F. (1996b) **"Mariage, divorce et union libre"**
Daguet presents an overview of partnership behaviour in France.

Desplanques G. (1994) **"Les familles recomposées en 1990"**
Describes the recomposed families in France. Data from a survey on the family carried out by the Insee in 1990 and the 1990 census.

Engelhardt H., Kögel T., Prskawetz A. (2001) **"Fertilty and female employment reconsidered: A macro-level time series analysis"**
A cross-national comparison of macro-level time series data from six developed countries, among them Italy and France.

Fagnani J. (1999) **"Parental leave in France"**
Analyses of the parental leave in France

Fernandez Cordón J. A., (1997) **"Youth Residential Independence and Autonomy. A Comparative study"**
Data from the Labour Force Surveys (from 1983 to 1994), conducted in all European Union countries, some descriptive comparisons concerning residential trends and work status among three Southern European countries (Spain, Greece, and Italy) and three central European countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) are presented. 'Young people' refers to the age group 15-30. Fernandez Cordón notes that the data have important limitations in so far as it is impossible to document returns of people from an advanced stage. The series are also too short to permit a full longitudinal reconstruction of the process, therefore mainly cross-sectional indicators have been used in the study.

Flaquer L. (2000) **"Family policy and welfare state in Southern Europe"**
Analyses the family policy and welfare states in Italy, Spain, Portugal

Fraboni R., Billari F.C. (2001) **"Measure and dynamics of marriage squeezes: from baby boom to baby bust in Italy"**
Studies the dynamics of the Italian marriage market. Data from 1969 to 1995 from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) Period, sex- and age-specific nuptiality rates. The analysis is conducted both at the national and at the regional level.

Galland O. (2000) **"Entrer dans la vie adulte: des étapes toujours plus tardives mais resserrées"**
Investigates the timing of the stages in the transition to adulthood in France.
Data from two surveys covering employment carried out by Insee in 1992 and 1997. Galland chooses a sample of those 18-29 and 19-29 in 1992 and 1997 respectively.

Gauthier A.H. (2000) **"Public policies affecting fertility and families in Europe: A survey of the 15 member states"**
Surveys the recent trends in public policies affecting the European Union. She investigates conventional family policy indicators, (cash benefits, maternity and parental leave and benefits, childcare facilities) but she also includes an analysis of the context in which changes and policies have been taking place.

Guerrero, T., Naldini M. (1997) **"Is the South so Different? Italian and Spanish families in Comparative Perspective"**
Analyses family changes in Italy and Spain from 1960 to 1990 and contrasts them with four central/northern European countries. Data from Eurobarometer, Eurostat and World Values Survey 1990-1993.

Hantrais L. (1997) **"Exploring Relationships between Social Policy and Changing Family Forms within the European"**
Examines the linkages between social policy and changing family forms in European member states since the 1960s using harmonised statistical data from Eurostat.

Hantrais L. (1999) **"Socio-demographic change, policy impacts and outcomes in social Europe."**
Examines how socio-demographic change are experienced and perceived in different national contexts, and analyses the policy responses of governments.

Holdsworth C., (2000) **"Leaving home in Britain and Spain"**
Compares leaving home for a cohort of British and Spanish young people, in their early 30s in 1991.

Kiernan K.E. (1996) **"Partnership Behaviour in Europe: Recent Trends and Issues"**
An overview of partnership in Europe. Data from several studies.

Kohler H-P., Billari F.C., Ortega J.A. **"Towards a theory of Lowest-Low Fertility"**
Proposes a theory of lowest-low fertility. Data on Europe from the Council of Europe 2001.

Leridon H., Villeneuve-Gokalp C. (1989) **"The new couples: Numbers, characteristics and attitudes"**
Describes the partnership pattern in France. Data from the Family History Survey from 1985 with a sample of around 4000 people conducted by INED.

Leridon H. (1990) **"Extra-Marital Cohabitation and Fertility"**
Leridon uses data from a sample of over 4000 men and women between the ages of 21 and 44 years from 1985 from INED.

Luxán M., Miret P., Trevino R. (2000) **"Is the Male-Provider Model Still in Place? Partnership Formation in contemporary Spain"**
Examines the influence of educational attainment and labour market position for males and females on entry into a first partnership in two periods in contemporary Spain to highlight the causes of present low level of first unions in Spain. Data from the 1991 Socio-demographic Survey (INE) conducted by the Spanish Central Statistical Institute. The sample is of 160,000 individuals.

Martin J. (1998) **"Politique familiale et travail des femmes mariées en France. Perspective historique: 1942-1982"**
Uses a historical perspective and a consideration of the socio-institutional context to show a development of an opposition against working married women, the aim being to keep them as full-time mothers and housewives. An examination of the economic policy in favour of families introduced after 1945 and the analysis of data on the Single Salary Allowance (L'Allocation de salaire unique, the ASU)

Micheli G.A. (2000) **"Kinship, Family and Social Network: The anthropological embedment of fertility change in Southern Europe"**
Data from Eurostat.

Miret-Gamundi P. (2000) **"Fathers and Families in contemporary Spain"**
Focuses on the shrinking time for men between the role of a son to the role of a father. Data from Spanish census and registers and the 1991 Spanish socio-demographic Survey, Eurostat.

Muñoz-Pérez F. (1991) **"Les naissances hors mariageet les conceptions prénuptiales en Espagne depuis 1975: I – Une période de profonds changements"**
Using data from 1985 Fertility Survey and civil status records, Muñoz-Pérez describes the changes in births outside marriage.

Muñoz-Pérez F. (1989) **"The decline of fertility in Southern Europe"**
Analysing national censuses, Muñoz-Pérez describes the fertility pattern in Southern Europe.

Muñoz-Pérez F., Prioux F. (1999a) **"Les enfants nes hors mariage et leurs parents. Reconnaissances et legitimations depuis 1965"**
An INED survey from 1996-1997 reveals the changing pattern of paternal filiations of children born outside marriage.

Muñoz-Pérez F., Prioux F. (1999b) **"Reconnaissances et légitmations des enfants nés hors mariage depuis 1965. Des comportements différents selon l'age et leur milieu social"**
Using data from a survey from INED in 1996-1997, Muñoz-Pérez and Prioux analyse the recognition and legitimisation of children born outside marriage.

Muñoz-Pérez F., Prioux F. (1999) **"Naître hors mariage"**
Using a survey carried out by INED in 1997 covering around 5000 children born in 1965 and every five years until 1994, all in all 35 000, Muñoz-Pérez and Prioux examine births outside marriage in France.

Murphy M., Wang D. (2001) **"Family level Continuities in Childbearing in Low-Fertility Societies"**
A study of seven low-fertility countries, among them Italy. Data for the European countries are taken from the 1986 ISSP co-ordinated series of surveys on scoial networks and country files from FFS programme.

Perez M.D., Livi-Bacci M. (1992) **"Fertility in Italy and Spain: The Lowest in the World"**
Describes and discusses the low fertility in Italy and Spain.

Prioux F. (1990) **"Fertility and family size in western Europe"**
An overview of fertility and family size in Western Europe using several sources.

Reher D.S. (1998) **"Family ties in Western Europe Persistent Contrast"**
A historical perspective on cross-country differences. Several data sources.

de Rose A. (1992) **"Socio-Economic Factors and Family Size as Determinants of Marital Dissolution in Italy"**
In studying socio-economic factors and family size as determinants of marital dissolution in Italy, De Rose (1992) uses data from the Italian Family Structure and Behaviour Survey of 1983.

Solsona M., Houle R., Simó, C. (2000) **"Separation and Divorce in Spain"**
Explores recent trends in divorce in Spain using data from the 1991 Socio-demographic Survey (INE) conducted by the Spanish Central Statistical Institute and the national censuses of 1975, 1981, 1986 and 1991 and Spanish Labour force Surveys (EPA)

Thierry X. (1999) **"La fécondité prénuptiale en Espagne"**
Using the Spanish census from 1991, Thierry investigates the prenuptial fertility in Spain.

Toulemon L. (1995) **"The place of Children in the History of Couples"**
Data from the INED Fertility Survey 1988.

Toulemon L. (1997) **"Cohabitation is here to stay"**
Uses retrospective surveys from INSEE and draws on several studies, to explore if and how cohabitation has replaced marriage in France since the end of the 1960s.

Toulemon T., Lapierre-Adamcyk E. (2000) "**Demographic patterns of motherhood and fatherhood in France"**
Data from the Fertility and Family Survey conducted by the INED in 1994 with a sample of 3007 women and 1966 men, and the 1985 Education and Social Mobility Survey conducted by the INSEE with a sample of 22500 men and 16800 women is used to describe different demographic patterns of mothers and fathers in France.

Toulemon L. (2001a) **"Why fertility is not so low in France"**
Descibes the fertility pattern in France. Data from several studies.

Toulemon L. (2001b) **"Men's fertility and Family Size as Compared to Women's"**
In conjunction with the 1999 population census in France, the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) conducted a one-per-cent survey on family histories and for the first time

men as well as women were included, aged 18 and over which Toulemon use to explore differences in fertility between men and women.

Toulemon L. (2001c) **"Combien d'enfants, combien de frères et soeurs depuis cent ans?"**
Calculates numbers of children and siblings in France. Data from INSEE and INED.

Toulemon L., Mazuy M., (2001) **"Les naissances sont retardees mais la fecondite est stable"**

Villeneuve-Gokalp C. (1991) **"From marriage to informal union: recent changes in the behaviour of French couples"**
Using data from the Family History Survey conducted by INED in 1985 with a sample of roughly 4000 people, Villeneuve-Gokalp investigates the forms of cohabitation and its diffusion.

Villeneuve-Gokalp C. (1999) **"La double famille des enfants de parents séparés"**
Explores the family situation of children with separated parents using data from two surveys organised by Ined in 1986 and 1994.

Villeneuve-Gokalp C. (2000) **"Les jeunes partent toujours au même âge de chez leurs parents"**
Using data from a survey from Insee in 1997 covering employment, analyses the transition out of the parental home in France for the generations born between 1968-1972, i.e. those between 25 and 29 years in 1997.

Villeneuve-Gokalp C. (2001) **"Conséquences des ruptures familiales sur le départ et la mise en couple des enfants"**
Using four large national population surveys from 1992-1999 carried out by Insee and Ined, Villeneuve-Gokalp examines if children of divorced parents in France leave the parental home and form their first union earlier than children of parents that are still together

Vogel J. (1998) **"Coping with the European welfare mix"**
A cross-national comparison of the 15 nations of the European union, plus Norway, using data from several international sources (the SNA, ESSPROS, EUROSTAT, ECHP).

Vogel J. (2001) **"Uppskjutet föräldraskap bland Europas unga"**
Describes the timing of parenthood in Europe.

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Baizán, Pau; Michelin, Francesca; Billari, Francesco C. (2002) **"Political Economy and Life Course Patterns: the Heterogeneity of Occupational, Family and Household Trajectories of Young Spaniards"** *Demographic Research* Vol.6 pp.192-240

Beaumel, Catherine; Kejrosse, Roselyne; Toulemon, Laurent (1999) **"Des mariages, des coulpes et des enfants"** *Insee Première* No.624

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Billari Francesco C.; Wilson, Chris (2001) **"Convergence towards diversity? Cohort dynamics in the transition to adulthood in contemporary Western Europe"** *Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, MPIDR working paper* WP 2001-039

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Fagnani, Jeanne (1999) **"Parental leave in France"** in Moss P., Deven F. (eds.) *"Parental leave: progress or pitfall?"* The Hague/Brussels, NIDI/CBGS Publications, vol.35

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Flaquer, Luís (2000) **"Family policy and welfare state in Southern Europé"** *Working Paper,* Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

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