I am completing my PhD at the London School of Economics, and planning to defend my thesis in early 2020. I am a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Future Studies, in the Climate Ethics project.
My research concerns what decisions to make, and which beliefs to hold, when one has highly uncertain evidence. This work combines elements of decision theory, formal epistemology and philosophy of science. I work mostly on cases in climate science, looking at how policymakers should respond to the scientific uncertainty there.
In my thesis, I look at how policymakers should respond to disagreement on expert panels. I argue that none of the leading tools in formal epistemology (i.e., "supra-Bayesianism" and opinion pooling) are fit for purpose. Instead, I argue in favour of a decision theoretic approach using imprecise probabilities. I apply this framework to a real case study involving insurance against hurricane damage on the Atlantic coast of the USA. Finally, I conduct a methodological reflection on the relation between formal epistemology and scientific modelling, arguing that epistemologists are modellers.